This impoverishment of aims and depravation of principles by the triumph of the political spirit outside of its proper sphere，cannot unfortunately be restricted to any one set of people in the state. It is something in the very atmosphere，which no sanitary cordon can limit. Liberalism，too，would be something more generous，more attractive —yes，and more practically effective，if its professors and champions could allow their sense of what is feasible to be refreshed and widened by a more free recognition，however private and undemonstrative，of the theoretic ideas which give their social creed whatever life and consistency it may have. Such ideas are these: That the conditions of the social union are not a mystery，only to be touched by miracle，but the results of explicable causes，and susceptible of constant modification: that the thoughts of wise and patriotic men should be perpetually turned towards the improvement of these conditions in every direction: that contented acquiescence in the ordering that has come down to us from the past is selfish and anti-social，because amid the ceaseless change that is inevitable in a growing organism，the institutions of the past demand progressive readaptations: that such improvements are most likely to be secured in the greatest abundance by limiting the sphere of authority，extending that of free individuality，and steadily striving after the bestowal，so far as the nature of things will ever permit it，of equality of opportunity: that while there is dignity in ancestry，a modern society is only safe in proportion as it summons capacity to its public counsels and enterprises; that such a society to endure must progress: that progress on its political side means more than anything else the substitution of Justice as a governing idea，instead of Privilege，and that the best guarantee for justice in public dealings is the participation in their own government of the people most likely to suffer from injustice. This is not an exhaustive account of the progressive doctrine，and we have here nothing to say as to its soundness. We only submit that if those who use the watchwords of Liberalism were to return upon its principles，instead of dwelling exclusively on practical compromises，the tone of public life would be immeasurably raised. The cause of social improvement would be less systematically balked of the victories that are best worth gaining. Progress would mean something more than mere entrances and exits on the theatre of office. We should not see in the mass of parliamentary candidates—and they are important people，because nearly every Englishman with any ambition is a parliamentary candidate，actual or potential—that grave anxiety，that sober rigour，that immense caution，which are all so really laughable，because so many of those men are only anxious lest they should make a mistake in finding out what the majority of their constituents would like them to think; only rigorous against those who are indiscreet enough to press a principle against the beck of a whip or a wire-puller; and only very cautious not so much lest their opinion should be wrong，as lest it should not pay.
Indolence and timidity have united to popularise among us a flaccid latitudinarianism，which thinks itself a benign tolerance for the opinions of others. It is in truth only a pretentious form of being without settled opinions of our own，and without any desire to settle them. No one can complain of the want of speculative activity at the present time in a certain way. The air，at a certain social elevation，is as full as it has ever been of ideas，theories，problems，possible solutions，suggested questions，and proffered answers. But then they are at large，without cohesion，and very apt to be the objects even in the more instructed minds of not much more than dilettante interest. We see in solution an immense number of notions，which people think it quite unnecessary to precipitate in the form of convictions. We constantly hear the age lauded for its tolerance，for its candour，for its openness of mind，for the readiness with which a hearing is given to ideas that forty years ago，or even less than that，would have excluded persons suspected of holding them from decent society，and in fact did so exclude them. Before，however，we congratulate ourselves too warmly on this，let us be quite sure that we are not mistaking for tolerance what is really nothing more creditable than indifference. These two attitudes of mind，which are so vitally unlike in their real quality，are so hard to distinguish in their outer seeming.
One is led to suspect that carelessness is the right name for what looks like reasoned toleration，by such a line of consideration as the following. It is justly said that at the bottom of all the great discussions of modern society lie the two momentous questions，first whether there is a God，and second whether the soul is immortal. In other words，whether our fellow-creatures are the highest beings who take an interest in us，or in whom we need take an interest; and，then，whether life in this world is the only life of which we shall ever be conscious. It is true of most people that when they are talking of evolution，and the origin of species，and the experiential or intuitional source of ideas，and the utilitarian or transcendental basis of moral obligation，these are the questions which they really have in their minds. Now，in spite of the scientific activity of the day，nobody is likely to contend that men are pressed keenly in their souls by any poignant stress of spiritual tribulation in the face of the two supreme enigmas. Nobody will say that there is much of that striving and wrestling and bitter agonising，which whole societies of men have felt before now on questions of far less tremendous import. Ours，as has been truly said，is 'a time of loud disputes and weak convictions,' In a generation deeply impressed by a sense of intellectual responsibility this could not be. As it is，even superior men are better pleased to play about the height of these great arguments，to fly in busy intellectual sport from side to side，from aspect to aspect，than they are intent on resolving what it is，after all，that the discussion comes to and to which solution，when everything has been said and heard，the balance of truth really to incline. There are too many giggling epigrams; people are too willing to look on collections of mutually hostile opinions with the same kind of curiosity which they bestow on a collection of mutually hostile beasts in a menagerie. They have very faint predilections for one rather than another. If they were truly alive to the duty of conclusiveness，or to the inexpressible magnitude of the subjects which nominally occupy their minds，but really only exercise their tongues，this elegant Pyrrhonism would be impossible，and this light-hearted neutrality most unendurable.
Well has the illustrious Pascal said with reference to one of the two great issues of the modern controversy:—'The immortality of the soul is a thing that concerns us so closely and touches us so profoundly，that one must have lost all feeling to be indifferent as to knowing how the matter is. All our actions and all our thoughts must follow such different paths，according as there are eternal goods to hope for or are not，that it is impossible to take a step with sense and judgment，without regulating it in view of this point，which ought to be our first object.... I can have nothing but compassion for those who groan and travail in this doubt with all sincerity，who look on it as the worst of misfortunes，and who，sparing no pains to escape from it，make of this search their chief and most serious employment.... But he who doubts and searches not is at the same time a grievous wrongdoer，and a grievously unfortunate man. If along with this he is tranquil and self-satisfied，if he publishes his contentment to the world and plumes himself upon it，and if it is this very state of doubt which he makes the subject of his joy and vanity—I have no terms in which to describe so extravagant a creature.'[3] Who，except a member of the school of extravagant creatures themselves，would deny that Pascal's irritation is most wholesome and righteous?
Perhaps in reply to this，we may be confronted by our own doctrine of intellectual responsibility interpreted in a directly opposite sense. We may be reminded of the long array of difficulties that interfere between us and knowledge in that tremendous matter，and of objections that rise in such perplexing force to an answer either one way or the other. And finally we may be despatched with a eulogy of caution and a censure of too great heat after certainty. The answer is that there is a kind of Doubt not without search，but after and at the end of search，which is not open to Pascal's just reproaches against the more ignoble and frivolous kind. And this too has been described for us by a subtle doctor of Pascal's communion. 'Are there pleasures of Doubt，as well as of Inference and Assent? In one sense there are. Not indeed if doubt means ignorance，uncertainty，or hopeless suspense; but there is a certain grave acquiescence in ignorance，a recognition of our impotence to solve momentous and urgent questions，which has a satisfaction of its own. After high aspirations，after renewed endeavours，after bootless toil，after long wanderings，after hope，effort，weariness，failure，painfully alternating and recurring，it is an immense relief to the exhausted mind to be able to say，"At length I know that I can know nothing about anything." ... Ignorance remains the evil which it ever was，but something of the peace of certitude is gained in knowing the worst，and in having reconciled the mind to the endurance of it.'[4] Precisely，and what one would say of our own age is that it will not deliberately face this knowledge of the worst. So it misses the peace of certitude，and not only its peace，but the strength and coherency that follow strict acceptance of the worst，when the worst is after all the best within reach.
Those who are in earnest when they blame too great haste after certainty，do in reality mean us to embrace certainty，but in favour of the vulgar opinions. They only see the prodigious difficulties of the controversy when you do not incline to their own side in it. They only panegyrise caution and the strictly provisional when they suspect that intrepidity and love of the conclusive would lead them to unwelcome shores. These persons，however，whether fortunately or unfortunately，have no longer much influence over the most active part of the national intelligence. Whether permanently or not，resolute orthodoxy，however prosperous it may seem among many of the uncultivated rich，has lost its hold upon thought. For thought has become dispersive，and the centrifugal forces of the human mind，among those who think seriously，have for the time become dominant and supreme. No one，I suppose，imagines that the singular ecclesiastical revival which is now going on，is accompanied by any revival of real and reasoned belief; or that the opulent manufacturers who subscribe so generously for restored cathedral fabrics and the like，have been moved by the apologetics of Aids to Faith and the Christian Evidence Society.
Obviously only three ways of dealing with the great problems of which we have spoken are compatible with a strong and well-bottomed character. We may affirm that there is a deity with definable attributes; and that there is a conscious state and continued personality after the dissolution of the body. Or we may deny. Or we may assure ourselves that we have no faculties enabling us on good evidence either to deny or affirm. Intellectual self-respect and all the qualities that are derived from that，may well go with any one of these three courses，decisively followed and consistently applied in framing a rule of life and a settled scheme of its aims and motives. Why do we say that intellectual self-respect is not vigorous，nor the sense of intellectual responsibility and truthfulness and coherency quick and wakeful among us? Because so many people，even among those who might be expected to know better，insist on the futile attempt to reconcile all those courses，instead of fixing on one and steadily abiding in it. They speak as if they affirmed，and they act as if they denied，and in their hearts they cherish a slovenly sort of suspicion that we can neither deny nor affirm. It may be said that this comes to much the same thing as if they had formally decided in the last or neutral sense. It is not so. This illegitimate union of three contradictories fritters character away，breaks it up into discordant parts，and dissolves into mercurial fluidity that leavening sincerity and free and cheerful boldness，which come of harmonious principles of faith and action，and without which men can never walk as confident lovers of justice and truth.
Ambrose's famous saying，that 'it hath not pleased the Lord to give his people salvation in dialectic,' has a profound meaning far beyond its application to theology. It is deeply true that our ruling convictions are less the product of ratiocination than of sympathy，imagination，usage，tradition. But from this it does not follow that the reasoning faculties are to be further discouraged. On the contrary，just because the other elements are so strong that they can be trusted to take care of themselves，it is expedient to give special countenance to the intellectual habits，which alone can check and rectify the constantly aberrating tendencies of sentiment on the one side，and custom on the other. This remark brings us to another type，of whom it is not irrelevant to speak shortly in this place. The consequences of the strength of the political spirit are not all direct，nor does its strength by any means spring solely from its indulgence to the less respectable elements of character，such as languor，extreme pliableness，superficiality. On the contrary，it has an indirect influence in removing the only effective restraint on the excesses of some qualities which，when duly directed and limited，are among the most precious parts of our mental constitution. The political spirit is the great force in throwing love of truth and accurate reasoning into a secondary place. The evil does not stop here. This achievement has indirectly countenanced the postponement of intellectual methods，and the diminution of the sense of intellectual responsibility，by a school that is anything rather than political.
Theology has borrowed，and coloured for her own use，the principles which were first brought into vogue in politics. If in the one field it is the fashion to consider convenience first and truth second，in the other there is a corresponding fashion of placing truth second and emotional comfort first. If there are some who compromise their real opinions，or the chance of reaching truth，for the sake of gain，there are far more who shrink from giving their intelligence free play，for the sake of keeping undisturbed certain luxurious spiritual sensibilities. This choice of emotional gratification before truth and upright dealing with one's own understanding，creates a character that is certainly far less unlovely than those who sacrifice their intellectual integrity to more material convenience. The moral flaw is less palpable and less gross. Yet here too there is the stain of intellectual improbity，and it is perhaps all the more mischievous for being partly hidden under the mien of spiritual exaltation.
