There is in literature no more seductive illustration of this seductive type than Rousseau's renowned character of the Savoyard Vicar—penetrated with scepticism as to the attributes of the deity，the meaning of the holy rites，the authenticity of the sacred documents; yet full of reverence，and ever respecting in silence what he could neither reject nor understand. 'The essential worship,' he says，'is the worship of the heart. God never rejects this homage，under whatever form it be offered to him. In old days I used to say mass with the levity which in time infects even the gravest things when we do them too often. Since acquiring my new principles [of reverential scepticism] I celebrate it with more veneration: I am overcome by the majesty of the Supreme Being，by his presence，by the insufficiency of the human mind，which conceives so ill what pertains to its author. When I approach the moment of consecration，I collect myself for performing the act with all the feelings required by the church and the majesty of the sacrament. I strive to annihilate my reason before the Supreme Intelligence，saying，Who art thou that thou shouldst measure infinite power?'[5]
The Savoyard Vicar is not imaginary. The acquiescence in indefinite ideas for the sake of comforted emotions，and the abnegation of strong convictions in order to make room for free and plenteous effusion，have for us all the marks of a too familiar reality. Such a doctrine is an everyday plea for self-deception，and a current justification for illusion even among some of the finer spirits. They have persuaded themselves not only that the life of the religious emotions is the highest life，but that it is independent of the intellectual forms with which history happens to have associated it. And so they refine and sophisticate and make havoc with plain and honest interpretation，in order to preserve a soft serenity of soul unperturbed.
Now，we are not at all concerned to dispute such positions as that Feeling is the right starting-point of moral education; that in forming character appeal should be to the heart rather than to the understanding; that the only basis on which our faculties can be harmoniously ordered is the preponderance of affection over reason. These propositions open much grave and complex discussion，and they are not to our present purpose. We only desire to state the evil of the notion that a man is warranted in comforting himself with dogmas and formularies，which he has first to empty of all definite，precise，and clearly determinable significance，before he can get them out of the way of his religious sensibilities. Whether Reason or Affection is to have the empire in the society of the future，when Reason may possibly have no more to discover for us in the region of morals and religion，and so will have become emeritus and taken a lower place，as of a tutor whose services the human family，being now grown up，no longer requires，however this may be，it is at least certain that in the meantime the spiritual life of man needs direction quite as much as it needs impulse，and light quite as much as force. This direction and light can only be safely procured by the free and vigorous use of the intelligence. But the intelligence is not free in the presence of a mortal fear lest its conclusions should trouble soft tranquillity of spirit. There is always hope of a man so long as he dwells in the region of the direct categorical proposition and the unambiguous term; so long as he does not deny the rightly drawn conclusion after accepting the major and minor premisses. This may seem a scanty virtue and very easy grace. Yet experience shows it to be too hard of attainment for those who tamper with disinterestedness of conviction，for the sake of luxuriating in the softness of spiritual transport without interruption from a syllogism. It is true that there are now and then in life as in history noble and fair natures，that by the silent teaching and unconscious example of their inborn purity，star-like constancy，and great devotion，do carry the world about them to further heights of living than can be attained by ratiocination. But these，the blameless and loved saints of the earth，rise too rarely on our dull horizons to make a rule for the world. The law of things is that they who tamper with veracity，from whatever motive，are tampering with the vital force of human progress. Our comfort and the delight of the religious imagination are no better than forms of self-indulgence，when they are secured at the cost of that love of truth on which，more than on anything else，the increase of light and happiness among men must depend. We have to fight and do lifelong battle against the forces of darkness，and anything that turns the edge of reason blunts the surest and most potent of our weapons.
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[1] Burton's Lift of Hume，ii. 186-188
[2] Isaac Taylor's Natural History of Enthusiasm，p. 226.
[3] Pensées，II. Art ii.
[4] Dr. Newman's Grammar of Assent，p. 201.
[5] Emile，bk. iv.
CHAPTER IV RELIGIOUS CONFORMITY
The main field of discussion touching Compromise in expression and avowal lies in the region of religious belief. In politics no one seriously contends that respect for the feelings and prejudices of other people requires us to be silent about our opinions. A republican，for instance，is at perfect liberty to declare himself so. Nobody will say that he is not within his rights if he should think it worth while to practise this liberty，though of course he will have to face the obloquy which attends all opinion that is not shared by the more demonstrative and vocal portions of the public. It is true that in every stable society a general conviction prevails of the extreme undesirableness of constantly laying bare the foundations of government. Incessant discussion of the theoretical bases of the social union is naturally considered worse than idle. It is felt by many wise men that the chief business of the political thinker is to interest himself in generalisations of such a sort as leads with tolerable straightness to practical improvements of a far-reaching and durable kind. Even among those，however，who thus feel it not to be worth while to be for ever handling the abstract principles which are，after all，only clumsy expressions of the real conditions that bring and keep men together in society，yet nobody of any consideration pretends to silence or limit the free discussion of these principles. Although a man is not likely to be thanked who calls attention to the vast discrepancies between the theory and practice of the constitution，yet nobody now would countenance the notion of an inner doctrine in politics. We smile at the line that Hume took in speaking of the doctrine of non-resistance. He did not deny that the right of resistance to a tyrannical sovereign does actually belong to a nation. But，he said，'if ever on any occasion it were laudable to conceal truth from the populace，it must be confessed that the doctrine of resistance affords such an example; and that all speculative reasoners ought to observe with regard to this principle the same cautious silence which the laws，in every species of government，have ever prescribed to themselves.' As if the cautious silence of the political writer could prevent a populace from feeling the heaviness of an oppressor's hand，and striving to find relief from unjust burdens. As if any nation endowed with enough of the spirit of independence to assent to the right of resistance when offered to them as a speculative theorem，would not infallibly be led by the same spirit to assert the right without the speculative theorem. That so acute a head as Hume's should have failed to perceive these very plain considerations，and that he should moreover have perpetrated the absurdity of declaring the right of resistance，in the same breath in which he declares the laudableness of keeping it a secret，only allows how carefully a man need steer after he has once involved himself in the labyrinths of Economy.[1]
In religion the unreasonableness of imposing a similar cautious silence is not yet fully established，nor the vicious effects of practising it clearly recognised. In these high matters an amount of economy and management is held praiseworthy，which in any other subject would be universally condemned as cowardly and ignoble. Indeed the preliminary stage has scarcely been reached the stage in which public opinion grants to every one the unrestricted right of shaping his own beliefs，independently of those of the people who surround him. Any woman，for instance，suspected of having cast behind her the Bible and all practices of devotion and the elementary articles of the common creed，would be distrustfully regarded even by those who wink at the same kind of mental boldness in men. Nay，she would be so regarded even by some of the very men who have themselves discarded as superstition what they still wish women to retain for law and gospel. So long as any class of adults are effectually discouraged in the free use of their minds upon the most important subjects，we are warranted in saying that the era of free thought，which naturally precedes the era of free speech，is still imperfectly developed.
The duties and rights of free speech are by no means identical with those of independent thought. One general reason for this is tolerably plain. The expression of opinion directly affects other people，while its mere formation directly affects no one but ourselves. Therefore the limits of compromise in expression are less widely and freely placed，because the rights and interests of all who may be made listeners to our spoken or written words are immediately concerned. In forming opinions，a man or woman owes no consideration to any person or persons whatever. Truth is the single object. It is truth that in the forum of conscience claims an undivided allegiance. The publication of opinion stands on another footing. That is an external act，with possible consequences，like all other external acts，both to the doer and to every one within the sphere of his influence. And，besides these，it has possible consequences to the prosperity of the opinion itself.[2]
A hundred questions of fitness，of seasonableness，of conflicting expediencies，present themselves in this connection，and nothing gives more anxiety to a sensible man who holds notions opposed to the current prejudices，than to hit the right mark where intellectual integrity and prudence，firmness and wise reserve，are in exact accord. When we come to declaring opinions that are，however foolishly and unreasonably，associated with pain and even a kind of turpitude in the minds of those who strongly object to them，then some of our most powerful sympathies are naturally engaged. We wonder whether duty to truth can possibly require us to inflict keen distress on those to whom we are bound by the tenderest and most consecrated ties. This is so wholly honourable a sentiment，that no one who has not made himself drunk with the thin sour wine of a crude and absolute logic will refuse to consider it. Before，however，attempting to illustrate cases of conscience in this order，we venture to make a short digression into the region of the matter，as distinct from the manner of free speech. One or two changes of great importance in the way in which men think about religion，bear directly upon the conditions on which they may permit themselves and others to speak about it.
The peculiar character of all the best kinds of dissent from the nominal creed of the time，makes it rather less difficult for us to try to reconcile unflinching honesty with a just and becoming regard for the feelings of those who have claims upon our forbearance，than would have been the case a hundred years ago. 'It is not now with a polite sneer,' as a high ecclesiastical authority lately admitted，'still less with a rude buffet or coarse words，that Christianity is assailed.' Before churchmen congratulate themselves too warmly on this improvement in the nature of the attack，perhaps they ought to ask themselves how far it is due to the change in the position of the defending party. The truth is that the coarse and realistic criticism of which Voltaire was the consummate master，has done its work. It has driven the defenders of the old faith into the milder and more genial climate of non-natural interpretations，and the historic sense，and a certain elastic relativity of dogma. The old criticism was victorious，but after victory it vanished. One reason of this was that the coarse and realistic forms of belief had either vanished before it，or else they forsook their ancient pretensions and clothed themselves in more modest robes. The consequence of this，and of other causes which might be named，is that the modern attack，while fully as serious and much more radical，has a certain gravity，decorum，and worthiness of form. No one of any sense or knowledge now thinks the Christian religion had its origin in deliberate imposture. The modern freethinker does not attack it; he explains it. And what is more，he explains it by referring its growth to the better，and not to the worse part of human nature. He traces it to men's cravings for a higher morality. He finds its source in their aspirations after nobler expression of that feeling for the incommensurable things，which is in truth under so many varieties of inwoven pattern the common universal web of religious faith.
The result of this way of looking at a creed which a man no longer accepts，is that he is able to speak of it with patience and historic respect. He can openly mark his dissent from it，without exacerbating the orthodox sentiment by galling pleasantries or bitter animadversion upon details. We are now awake to the all-important truth that belief in this or that detail of superstition is the result of an irrational state of mind，and flows logically from superstitious premisses. We see that it is to begin at the wrong end，to assail the deductions as impossible，instead of sedulously building up a state of mind in which their impossibility would become spontaneously visible.
Besides the great change which such a point of view makes in men's way of speaking of a religion，whose dogmas and documents they reject，there is this further consideration leaning in the same direction. The tendency of modern free thought is more and more visibly towards the extraction of the first and more permanent elements of the old faith，to make the purified material of the new. When Dr. Congreve met the famous epigram about Comte's system being Catholicism minus Christianity，by the reply that it is Catholicism plus Science，he gave an ingenious expression to the direction which is almost necessarily taken by all who attempt，in however informal a manner，to construct for themselves some working system of faith，in place of the faith which science and criticism have sapped. In what ultimate form，acceptable to great multitudes of men，these attempts will at last issue，no one can now tell. For we，like the Hebrews of old，shall all have to live and die in faith，'not having received the promises，but having seen them afar off，and being persuaded of them，and embracing them，and confessing that we are strangers and pilgrims on the earth.' Meanwhile，after the first great glow and passion of the just and necessary revolt of reason against superstition have slowly lost the exciting splendour of the dawn，and become diffused in the colourless space of a rather bleak noonday，the mind gradually collects again some of the ideas of the old religion of the West，and willingly，or even joyfully，suffers itself to be once more breathed upon by something of its spirit. Christianity was the last great religious synthesis. It is the one nearest to us. Nothing is more natural than that those who cannot rest content with intellectual analysis，while awaiting the advent of the Saint Paul of the humanitarian faith of the future，should gather up provisionally such fragmentary illustrations of this new faith as are to be found in the records of the old. Whatever form may be ultimately imposed on our vague religious aspirations by some prophet to come，who shall unite sublime depth of feeling and lofty purity of life with strong intellectual grasp and the gift of a noble eloquence，we may at least be sure of this，that it will stand as closely related to Christianity as Christianity stood closely related to the old Judaic dispensation. It is commonly assumed that the rejecters of the popular religion stand in face of it，as the Christians stood in face of the pagan belief and pagan rites in the Empire. The analogy is inexact. The modern denier，if he is anything better than that，or entertains hopes of a creed to come，is nearer to the position of the Christianising Jew.[3] Science，when she has accomplished all her triumphs in her own order，will still have to go back，when the time comes，to assist in the building up of a new creed by which men can live. The builders will have to seek material in the purified and sublimated ideas，of which the confessions and rites of the Christian churches have been the grosser expression. Just as what was once the new dispensation was preached a Judaeos ad Judaeos apud Judaeos，so must the new，that is to be，find a Christian teacher and Christian hearers. It can hardly be other than an expansion，a development，a readaptation，of all the moral and spiritual truth that lay hidden under the worn-out forms. It must be such a harmonising of the truth with our intellectual conceptions as shall fit it to be an active guide to conduct. In a world 'where men sit and hear each other groan，where but to think is to be full of sorrow,' it is hard to imagine a time when we shall be indifferent to that sovereign legend of Pity. We have to incorporate it in some wider gospel of Justice and Progress.
