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[1] It may be said that Hume meant no more than this: that of two equally oppressed nations，the one which had been taught to assent to the doctrine of resistance would be more likely to practise 'the sacred duty of insurrection' than the other，from whom the doctrine had been concealed. Or，in other words，that the first would rise against oppression，when the oppression had reached a pitch which to the second would still seem bearable. The answer to answer to Hume's proposition，interpreted in this way，would be that if the doctrine of resistance be presented to the populace in its true shape,—if it be 'truth,' as he admits,—then the application of it in practice should be as little likely to prove mischievous as that of any other truth. If the gist of the remark be that this is a truth which the populace is especially likely to apply wrongly，in consequence of its ignorance，passion，and heedlessness，we may answer by appealing to history，which is rather a record of excessive patience in the various nations of the earth than of excessive petulance.
[2] There is another ground for the distinction between the conditions of holding and those of expressing opinion. This depends upon the psychological proposition that belief is independent of the will. Though this or any other state of the understanding may be involuntary，the manifestation of such a state is not so，but is a voluntary act，and，'being neutral in itself，may be commendable or reprehensible according to the circumstances in which it takes place.' (Bailey's Essay on Formation of Opinion,§ 7).
[3] The following words，illustrating the continuity between the Christian and Jewish churches，are not without instruction to those who meditate on the possible continuity between the Christian church and that which is one day to grow into the place of it:—'Not only do forms and ordinances remain under the Gospel equally as before; but，what was in use before is not so much superseded by the Gospel ordinances as changed into them. What took place under the Law is a pattern，what was commanded is a rule，under the Gospel. The substance remains，the use，the meaning，the circumstances，the benefit is changed; grace is added，life is infused: "the body is of Christ;" but it is in great measure that same body which was in being before He came. The Gospel has not put aside，it has incorporated into itself the revelation which went before it. It avails itself of the Old Testament，as a great gift to Christian as well as to Jew. It does not dispense with it，but it dispenses it. Persons sometimes urge that there is no code of duty in the New Testament，no ceremonial，no rules for Church polity. Certainly not; they are unnecessary; they are already given in the Old. Why should the Old Testament remain in the Christian church but to be used? There we are to look for our forms，our rites，our polity; only illustrated，tempered，spiritualised by the Gospel. The preempts remain，the observance of them is changed,' Dr. J.H. Newman; Sermon on Subjects of the Day，p. 205.
[4] There is a set of most acute and searching criticisms on this matter in Mr. Leslie Stephen's Essays on Free-Thinking and Plain-Speaking (Longmans，1873). The last essay in the volume，An Apology for Plain-Speaking, is a decisive and remarkable exposition of the treacherous playing with words，which underlies even the most vigorous efforts to make the phrases and formula of the old creed hold the reality of new faith.
[5] Upon this sentence the following criticism has been made:—'Surely both of these so–called contradictions are deliberately affirmed by the vast majority of all thinkers upon the subject. What orthodox asserter of the omnipresence of a "Creator with intelligible attributes" ever maintained that these attributes could be "grasped by men"?'—The orthodox asserter，no doubt，says that he does not maintain that the divine attributes can be grasped by men; but his habitual treatment of them as intelligible，and as the subjects of propositions made in languages that is designed to be intelligible，shows that his first reservation is merely nominal，as it is certainly inconsistent with his general position. Religious people who warn you most solemnly that man who is a worm and the son of a worm cannot possibly compass in his puny understanding the attributes of the Divine Being，will yet—as an eminent divine not in holy orders has truly said—tell you all about him，as if he were the man who lives in the next street.
[6] That able man，the late J.E. Cairnes，suggested the following objection to this paragraph. When two persons marry，there is a reasonable expectation，almost amounting to an understanding，that they will both of them adhere to their religion，just as both of them tacitly agree to follow the ways of the world in the host of minor social matters. If，therefore，either of them turns to some other creed，the person so turning has，so to speak，broken the contract. The utmost he or she can contend for is forbearance. If a woman embraces catholicism，she may seek tolerance，but she has no right to exact conformity. If the man becomes an unbeliever，he in like manner breaks the bargain，and may be justly asked not to flaunt his misdemeanour.
My answer to this would turn upon the absolute inexpediency of such silent bargains being assumed by public opinion. In the present state of opinion，where the whole air is alive with the spirit of change，nobody who takes his life or her life seriously，could allow an assumption which means reduction of one of the most important parts of character，the love of truth，to a nullity.
[7] The reader remembers how Wolmar，the atheistic husband of Julie in Rousseau's New Heloïsa，is distressed by the chagrin which his unbelief inflicts on the piety of his wife. 'He told me that he had been frequently tempted to make a feint of yielding to her arguments，and to pretend，for the sake of calming her sentiments that he did not really hold. But such baseness of soul is too far from him. Without for a moment imposing on Julie，such dissimulation would only have been a new torment to her. The good faith，the frankness，the union of heart，that console for so many troubles，would have been eclipsed between them. Was it by lessening his wife's esteem for him that he could reassure her? Instead of using any disguise，he tells her sincerely what he thinks，but he says it in so simple a tone，etc.—V. v. 126.
[8] The common reason alleged by freethinkers for having their children brought up in the orthodox ways is that，if they were not so brought up，they would be looked on as contaminating agents whom other parents would take care to keep away from the companionship of their children. This excuse may have had some force at another time. At the present day，when belief is so weak，we doubt whether the young would be excluded from the companionship of their equals in age，merely because they had not been trained in some of the conventional shibboleths. Even if it were so，there are certainly some ways of compensating for the disadvantages of exclusion from orthodox circles.
I have heard of a more interesting reason; namely，that the historic position of the young，relatively to the time in which they are placed，is in some sort falsified，unless they have gone through a training in the current beliefs of their age: unless they have undergone that，they miss，as it were，some of the normal antecedents. I do not think this plea will hold good. However desirable it may be that the young should know all sorts of erroneous beliefs and opinions as products of the past，it can hardly be in any degree desirable that they should take them for truths. If there were no other objection，there would be this，that the disturbance and waste of force involved in shaking off in their riper years the erroneous opinions which had been instilled into them in childhood，would more than counter-balance any advantages，whatever their precise nature may be，to be derived from having shared in their own proper persons the ungrounded notions of others.
[9] Miss Martineau has an excellent protest against 'the dereliction of principle shown in supposing that any "Cause" can be of so much importance as fidelity to truth，or can be important at all otherwise than in its relation to truth which wants vindicating. It reminds me of an incident which happened when I was in America，at the time of the severest trials of the Abolitionists. A pastor from the southern States lamented to a brother clergyman in the North the introduction of the Anti-slavery question，because the views of their sect were "getting on so well before!" "Getting on!" cried the northern minister. "What is the use of getting your vessel on when you have thrown both captain and cargo overboard?" Thus，what signifies the pursuit of any one reform，like those specified,—Anti-slavery and the Woman question,—when the freedom which is the very soul of the controversy，the very principle of the movement，—is mourned over in any other of its many manifestations? The only effectual advocates of such reforms as those are people who follow truth wherever it leads.'—Autobiography，ii. 442.
CHAPTER V THE REALISATION OF OPINION
A person who takes the trouble to form his own opinions and beliefs will feel that he owes no responsibility to the majority for his conclusions. If he is a genuine lover of truth，if he is inspired by the divine passion for seeing things as they are，and a divine abhorrence of holding ideas which do not conform to the facts，he will be wholly independent of the approval or assent of the persons around him. When he proceeds to apply his beliefs in the practical conduct of life，the position is different. There are now good reasons why his attitude should be in some ways less inflexible. The society in which he is placed is a very ancient and composite growth. The people from whom he dissents have not come by their opinions，customs，and institutions by a process of mere haphazard. These opinions and customs all had their origin in a certain real or supposed fitness. They have a certain depth of root in the lives of a proportion of the existing generation. Their fitness for satisfying human needs may have vanished，and their congruity with one another may have come to an end. That is only one side of the truth. The most zealous propagandism cannot penetrate to them. The quality of bearing to be transplanted from one kind of soil and climate to another is not very common，and it is far from being inexhaustible even where it exists.
In common language we speak of a generation as something possessed of a kind of exact unity，with all its parts and members one and homogeneous. Yet very plainly it is not this. It is a whole，but a whole in a state of constant flux. Its factors and elements are eternally shifting. It is not one，but many generations. Each of the seven ages of man is neighbour to all the rest. The column of the veterans is already staggering over into the last abyss，while the column of the newest recruits is forming with all its nameless and uncounted hopes. To each its tradition，its tendency，its possibilities. Only a proportion of each in one society can have nerve enough to grasp the banner of a new truth，and endurance enough to bear it along rugged and untrodden ways.
And then，as we have said，one must remember the stuff of which life is made. One must consider what an overwhelming preponderance of the most tenacious energies and most concentrated interests of a society must be absorbed between material cares and the solicitude of the affections. It is obviously unreasonable to lose patience and quarrel with one's time，because it is tardy in throwing off its institutions and beliefs，and slow to achieve the transformation which is the problem in front of it. Men and women have to live. The task for most of them is arduous enough to make them well pleased with even such imperfect shelter as they find in the use and wont of daily existence. To insist on a whole community being made at once to submit to the reign of new practices and new ideas，which have just begun to commend themselves to the most advanced speculative intelligence of the time,—this，even if it were a possible process，would do much to make life impracticable and to hurry on social dissolution.
'It cannot be too emphatically asserted,' as has been said by one of the most influential of modern thinkers，'that this policy of compromise，alike in institutions，in actions，and in beliefs，which especially characterises English life，is a policy essential to a society going through the transitions caused by continued growth and development. Ideas and institutions proper to a past social state，but incongruous with the new social state that has grown out of it，surviving into this new social state they have made possible，and disappearing only as this new social state establishes its own ideas and institutions，are necessarily，during their survival，in conflict with these new ideas and institutions—necessarily furnish elements of contradiction in men's thoughts and deeds. And yet，as for the carrying on of social life，the old must continue so long as the new is not ready，this perpetual compromise is an indispensable accompaniment of a normal development.'[1]
Yet we must not press this argument，and the state of feeling that belongs to it，further than they may be fairly made to go. The danger in most natures lies on this side，for on this side our love of ease works，and our prejudices. The writer in the passage we have just quoted is describing compromise as a natural state of things，the resultant of divergent forces. He is not professing to define its conditions or limits as a practical duty. Nor is there anything in his words，or in the doctrine of social evolution of which he is the most elaborate and systematic expounder，to favour that deliberate sacrifice of truth，either in search or in expression，against which our two previous chapters were meant to protest.[2] When Mr. Spencer talks of a new social state establishing its own ideas，of course he means，and can only mean，that men and women establish their own ideas，and to do that，it is obvious that they must at one time or another have conceived them without any special friendliness of reference to the old ideas，which they were in the fulness of time to supersede. Still less，of course，can a new social state ever establish its ideas，unless the persons who hold them confess them openly，and give to them an honest and effective adherence.
Every discussion of the more fundamental principles of conduct must contain，expressly or by implication，some general theory of the nature and constitution of the social union. Let us state in a few words that which seems to command the greatest amount both of direct and analogical evidence in our time. It is perhaps all the more important to discuss our subject with immediate and express reference to this theory，because it has become in some minds a plea for a kind of philosophic indifference towards any policy of Thorough，as well as an excuse for systematic abstention from vigorous and downright courses of action.
