This much，concerning moderation in political practice. No such considerations present themselves in the matters which concern the shaping of our own lives，or the publications of our social opinions. In this region we are not imposing charges upon others，either by law or otherwise. We therefore owe nothing to the prejudices or habits of others. If any one sets serious value upon the point of difference between his own ideal and that which is current，if he thinks that his 'experiment in living' has promise of real worth，and that if more persons could be induced to imitate it，some portion of mankind would be thus put in possession of a better kind of happiness，then it is selling a birthright for a mess of pottage to abandon hopes so rich and generous，merely in order to avoid the passing and casual penalties of social disapproval. And there is a double evil in this kind of flinching from obedience to the voice of our better selves，whether it takes the form of absolute suppression of what we think and hope，or only of timorous and mutilated presentation. We lose not only the possible advantage of the given change. Besides that，we lose also the certain advantage of maintaining or increasing the amount of conscientiousness in the world. And everybody can perceive the loss incurred in a society where diminution of the latter sort takes place. The advance of the community depends not merely on the improvement and elevation of its moral maxima，but also on the quickening of moral sensibility. The latter work has mostly been effected，when it has been effected on a large scale，by teachers of a certain singular personal quality. They do nothing to improve the theory of conduct，but they have the art of stimulating men to a more enthusiastic willingness to rise in daily practice to the requirements of whatever theory they may accept. The love of virtue，of duty，of holiness，or by whatever name we call this powerful sentiment，exists in the majority of men，where it exists at all，independently of argument. It is a matter of affection，sympathy，association，aspiration. Hence，even while，in quality，sense of duty is a stationary factor，it is constantly changing in quantity. The amount of conscience in different communities，or in the same community at different times，varies infinitely. The immediate cause of the decline of a society in the order of morals is a decline in the quantity of its conscience，a deadening of its moral sensitiveness，and not a depravation of its theoretical ethics. The Greeks became corrupt and enfeebled，not for lack of ethical science，but through the decay in the numbers of those who were actually alive to the reality and force of ethical obligations. Mahometans triumphed over Christians in the East and in Spain—if we may for a moment isolate moral conditions from the rest of the total circumstances—not because their scheme of duty was more elevated or comprehensive，but because their respect for duty was more strenuous and fervid.
The great importance of leaving this priceless element in a community as free，as keen，and as active as possible，is overlooked by the thinkers who uphold coercion against liberty，as a saving social principle. Every act of coercion directed against an opinion or a way of living is in so far calculated to lessen the quantity of conscience in the society where such acts are practised. Of course，where ways of living interfere with the lawful rights of others，where they are not strictly self-regarding in all their details，it is necessary to force the dissidents，however strong may be their conscientious sentiment. The evil of attenuating that sentiment is smaller than the evil of allowing one set of persons to realise their own notions of happiness，at the expense of all the rest of the world. But where these notions can be realised without unlawful interference of that kind，then the forcible hindrance of such realisation is a direct weakening of the force and amount of conscience on which the community may count. There is one memorable historic case to illustrate this. Lewis XIV.，in revoking the Edict of Nantes，and the author of the still more cruel law of 1724，not only violently drove out multitudes of the most scrupulous part of the French nation; they virtually offered the most tremendous bribes to those of less stern resolution，to feign conversion to the orthodox faith. This was to treat conscience as a thing of mean value. It was to scatter to the wind with both hands the moral resources of the community. And who can fail to see the strength which would have been given to France in her hour of storm，a hundred years after the revocation of the Edict of Nantes，if her protestant sons，fortified by the training in the habits of individual responsibility which protestantism involves，had only been there to aid?
This consideration brings us to a new side of the discussion. We may seem to have been unconsciously arguing as strongly in favour of a vigorous social conservatism as of a self-asserting spirit of social improvement. All that we have been saying may appear to cut both ways. If the innovator should decline to practise silence or reserve，why should the possessor of power be less uncompromising，and why should he not impose silence by force? If the heretic ought to be uncompromising in expressing his opinions，and in acting upon them，in the fulness of his conviction that they are right，why should not the orthodox be equally uncompromising in his resolution to stamp out the heretical notions and unusual ways of living，in the fulness of his conviction that they are thoroughly wrong? To this question the answer is that the hollow kinds of compromise are as bad in the orthodox as in the heretical. Truth has as much to gain from sincerity and thoroughness in one as in the other. But the issue between the partisans of the two opposed schools turns upon the sense which we design to give to the process of stamping out. Those who cling to the tenets of liberty limit the action of the majority，as of the minority，strictly to persuasion. Those who dislike liberty，insist that earnestness of conviction justifies either a majority or a minority in using not persuasion only，but force. I do not propose here to enter into the great question which Mr. Mill pressed anew upon the minds of this generation. His arguments are familiar to every reader，and the conclusion at which he arrived is almost taken for a postulate in the present essay.[5] The object of these chapters is to reiterate the importance of self-assertion，tenacity，and positiveness of principlesan of coercion will argue that this thesis is on one side of it a justification of persecution，and other modes of interfering with new opinions and new ways of living by force，and the strong arm of the law，and whatever other energetic means of repression may be at command. If the minority are to be uncompromising alike in seeking and realising what they take for truth，why not the majority? Now this implies two propositions. It is the same as to say，first，that earnestness of conviction is not to be distinguished from a belief in our own infallibility; second，that faith in our infallibility is necessarily bound up with intolerance.
Neither of these propositions is true. Let us take them in turn. Earnestness of conviction is perfectly compatible with a sense of liability to error. This has been so excellently put by a former writer that we need not attempt to better his exposition. 'Every one must，of course，think his own opinions right; for if he thought them wrong，they would no longer be his opinions: but there is a wide difference between regarding ourselves as infallible，and being firmly convinced of the truth of our creed. When a man reflects on any particular doctrine，he may be impressed with a thorough conviction of the improbability or even impossibility of its being false: and so he may feel with regard to all his other opinions，when he makes them objects of separate contemplation. And yet when he views them in the aggregate，when he reflects that not a single being on the earth holds collectively the same，when he looks at the past history and present state of mankind，and observes the various creeds of different ages and nations，the peculiar modes of thinking of sects and bodies and individuals，the notions once firmly held，which have been exploded，the prejudices once universally prevalent，which have been removed，and the endless controversies which have distracted those who have made it the business of their lives to arrive at the truth; and when he further dwells on the consideration that many of these，his fellow-creatures，have had a conviction of the justness of their respective sentiments equal to his own，he cannot help the obvious inference，that in his own opinion it is next to impossible that there is not an admixture of error; that there is an infinitely greater probability of his being wrong in some than right in all.'[6]
Of course this is not an account of the actual frame of mind of ordinary men. They never do think of their opinions in the aggregate in comparison with the collective opinions of others，nor ever draw the conclusions which such reflections would suggest. But such a frame of mind is perfectly attainable，and has often been attained，by persons of far lower than first-rate capacity. And if this is so，there is no reason why it should not be held up for the admiration and imitation of all those classes of society which profess to have opinions. It would thus become an established element in the temper of the age. Nor need we fear that the result of this would be any flaccidity of conviction，or lethargy in act. A man would still be penetrated with the rightness of his own opinion on a given issue，and would still do all that he could to make it prevail in practice. But among the things which he would no longer permit himself to do，would be the forcible repression in others of any opinions，however hostile to his own，or of any kind of conduct，however widely it diverged from his own，and provided that it concerned themselves only. This widening of his tolerance would be the natural result of a rational and realised consciousness of his own general fallibility.
Next，even belief in one's own infallibility does not necessarily lead to intolerance. For it may be said that though no man in his senses would claim to be incapable of error，yet in every given case he is quite sure that he is not in error，and therefore this assurance in particular is tantamount by process of cumulation to a sense of infallibility in general. Now even if this were so，it would not of necessity either produce or justify intolerance. The certainty of the truth of your own opinions is independent of any special idea as to the means by which others may best be brought to share them. The question between persuasion and force remains apart—unless，indeed，we may say that in societies where habits of free discussion have once begun to take root，those who are least really sure about their opinions，are often most unwilling to trust to persuasion to bring them converts，and most disposed to grasp the rude implements of coercion，whether legal or merely social. The cry，'Be my brother，or I slay thee,' was the sign of a very weak，though very fiery，faith in the worth of fraternity. He whose faith is most assured，has the best reason for relying on persuasion，and the strongest motive to thrust from him all temptations to use angry force. The substitution of force for persuasion，among its other disadvantages，has this further drawback，from our present point of view，that it lessens the conscience of a society and breeds hypocrisy. You have not converted a man，because you have silenced him. Opinion and force belong to different elements. To think that you are able by social disapproval or other coercive means to crush a man's opinion，is as one who should fire a blunderbuss to put out a star. The acquiescence in current notions which is secured by law or by petulant social disapproval，is as worthless and as essentially hypocritical，as the conversion of an Irish pauper to protestantism by means of soup-tickets，or that of a savage to Christianity by the gift of a string of beads. Here is the radical fallacy of those who urge that people must use promises and threats in order to encourage opinions，thoughts，and feelings which they think good，and to prevent others which they think bad. Promises and threats can influence acts. Opinions and thoughts on morals，politics，and the rest，after they have once grown in a man's mind，can no more be influenced by promises and threats than can my knowledge that snow is white or that ice is cold. You may impose penalties on me by statute for saying that snow is white，or acting as if I thought ice cold，and the penalties may affect my conduct. They will not，because they cannot，modify my beliefs in the matter by a single iota. One result therefore of intolerance is to make hypocrites. On this，as on the rest of the grounds which vindicate the doctrine of liberty，a man who thought himself infallible either in particular or in general，from the Pope of Rome down to the editor of the daily newspaper，might still be inclined to abstain from any form of compulsion. The only reason to the contrary is that a man who is so silly as to think himself incapable of going wrong，is very likely to be too silly to perceive that coercion may be one way of going wrong.
The currency of the notion that earnest sincerity about one's opinions and ideals of conduct is inseparably connected with intolerance，is indirectly due to the predominance of legal or juristic analogies in social discussion. For one thing，the lawyer has to deal mainly with acts，and to deal with them by way of repression. His attention is primarily fixed on the deed，and only secondarily on the mind of the doer. And so a habit of thought is created，which treats opinion as something equally in the sphere of coercion with actions. At the same time it favours coercive ways of affecting opinion. Then，what is still more important，the jurist's conception of society has its root in the relation between sovereign and subject，between lawmaker and those whom law restrains. Exertion of power on one hand，and compliance on the other—this is his type of the conditions of the social union. The fertility and advance of discussion on social issues depends on the substitution of the evolutional for the legal conception. The lawyer's type of proposition is absolute. It is also，for various reasons which need not be given here，inspired by involuntary reference to the lower，rather than to the more highly developed，social states. In the lower states law，penalties，coercion，compulsion，the strong hand，a sternly repressive public opinion，were the conditions on which the community was united and held together. But the line of thought which these analogies suggest，becomes less and less generally appropriate in social discussion，in proportion as the community becomes more complex，more various in resource，more special in its organisation，in a word，more elaborately civilised. The evolutionist's idea of society concedes to law its historic place and its actual part. But then this idea leads directly to a way of looking at society，which makes the replacement of law by liberty a condition of reaching the higher stages of social development.
