For there is a very evident distinction between an insurrection in a simple，and one in a complicated，or mixed constitution．In a simple government，every resistance against the supreme power，is absolutely illegal，and requires no further examination to be condemned．In a mixed government，cases may be imagined，in which the matter is very intricate，and therefore problematic and dubious.
In a mixed government，the supreme power，or the proper sovereign，consists always of several component parts connected together and regulated by the constitution．Each of these parts has its constitutional rights and prerogatives；and those of any one part，though in themselves more important，cannot be more sacred than those of any other．When either of them exceeds its legal bounds，and oppresses，or endeavours to destroy another，this latter，unless the constitution be an empty name，must have the right of resisting；and，unless the war，arising from this resistance，be not averted by some fortunate expedient；if the old balance cannot again be restored，the contest must necessarily，and legally end with the dissolution of the constitution．For between two independent component parts of the supreme power in a state，there can no more be a judge，than between two independent states．That this is a most unfortunate situation for the whole nation，interested in it，is self evident．The most dreadful circumstance it brings with it，is unquestionably this，that the people in such a controversy never know whom to obey，and whom to resist；for whom to declare，and against whom to act；that all rights and duties are thrown into confusion，and involved in obscurity，and that it becomes a problem，who is within，and who is without the line of insurrection．This evil is inseparable from mixed forms of government；(6) and however great it may be，its possibility can never be excluded from such constitutions．If，for example，the two houses of the British parliament should make the attempt to enact laws，without the sanction of the king，or the king，without the concurrence of parliament，the injured party would beyond all doubt resist，and resist with energy；nor could any one deny that this resistance，even though it should end in civil war and the ruin of the constitution，was perfectly lawful.
The American colonies were precisely in this，or at least in an extremely similar situation．Their constitution before the revolution was evidently a monarchy，more or less limited by the influence of their provincial assemblies．The legislative and executive powers were divided between the king and the provincial assemblies，as in England，between the king and the two houses of parliament．The king and his governor had only a negative upon acts of legislation，and the provincial assemblies in most of the colonies had a considerable share in the government．In all the provinces（Pennsylvania since 1700 excepted） these assemblies were divided into two houses，closely corresponding in their functions，with the two branches of the British parliament．The lower house，or the representative assembly possessed every where the exclusive right of prescribing taxes．In some colonies，for instance，in Maryland，the king，by the charter，had expressly renounced all right of taxation．In several others he had，in the literal sense of the word，only reserved the empty title of sovereignty．Connecticut and Rhode-Island were perfect democracies．The colonial assemblies of these provinces chose their governors without the confirmation of the king，and dismissed them at pleasure；they allowed no appeals from their courts of justice；their laws required no royal assent；nay，what is more remarkable，and a proof of their absolute independence，their charters granted them even the right of peace and war.
The king's power was，therefore，in all the colonies，more or less limited；in some，to such a degree that it could not be compared with his legitimate power in Great-Britain；and the colonial assemblies had a constitutional right to resist him，when he violated their constitutional powers．Now，the measures of the ministry，from 1764，were evident attacks，upon those powers．Whether the parliament had advised，or confirmed those attacks，was，as we have before shewn，nothing to the colonies；they had to do only with the king，and the king，according to their constitutions，could levy no taxes，but such as the provincial assemblies proposed．The stamp-act of 1764，was，therefore，a violation of their rights；the impost act of 1767，was a violation of their rights；the act of 1770，which maintained the tea-tax to support the supremacy of parliament，was a gross，and what was worst of all，an insulting violation of their rights．To punish them for their constitutional resistance against these unconstitutional resolves，was a revolting injustice；the mode of punishment（the Boston port-bill，the bill to abolish the Massachusetts charter，&c.） was not merely a violation，it was an entire dissolution of their rights．It was nothing more，than the proclamation of a fact，when the congress，in 1775，declared，“that by the abolition of the Massachusetts charter，the connection between that province and the crown was dissolved.”No resource was left but that of repelling force by force．The convocation of their first congress，was in itself not an illegal measure．This congress exercised originally only the same rights，which were unquestionably within the powers of every provincial assembly．It represented a legal resistance，and sought the means of preserving to America the constitution she had hitherto possessed．It was not until after the ministry had spurned at peace，rejected every proposal of conciliation，and finally required unconditional submission，that is，had dissolved the constitution，that the congress proceeded to the declaration，which substituted a new government，in the stead of that which was destroyed.
Had the colonies had the design（and it cannot be denied that they manifested it clearly enough） in this whole contest to separate the king completely from the parliament，all the means were taken away from them of regulating their conduct，according to a system founded upon such a separation．The most intimate union subsisted between the ministry and the parliament；nor was it possible to resist the one，without quarrelling with the other．The king confirmed the hostile acts of parliament；he ceased to be the constitutional monarch of the colonies，and entered into an alliance with those，whom they considered as usurpers in a legal point of view．Had the king of England allied himself with a foreign power（and in a constitutional sense the parliament was no other to the colonies） against the parliament of Great-Britain，how would it be possible for the parliament to arm against this foreign power，and yet spare the king of England? Or rather，would not the mere undertaking of such an alliance include within itself an immediate justification of every defensive measure taken by the injured party，and an absolute renunciation of the constitution.
I think I have here sufficiently developed the first point in the comparison I proposed，that which relates to the conduct of North-America；there now remains only the easy task of exhibiting the second，which relates to the conduct of France.
The single period of the disturbances in France，when mention was made of militating rights，was that in which the parliaments took part，in 1787 and 1788．If the prerogatives of these parliaments were not so great and so unquestionable，as they would have represented them，yet their appeal to them gave at least a colour of lawfulness to their undertakings．That period，however，is to be considered only as preparatory to the real revolution.
From the breaking out of this revolution，the question as to the lawfulness of what the popular leaders did，was never（an extraordinary，yet an indubitable fact!） started．The word right would have vanished from the French language，had not an imaginary right of the nation，to do whatever they，or their representatives should please，appeared as a sort of substitute for all other rights.
This is not the place to analyse this right of the nation，sometimes likewise called right of man，a sort of magic spell，with which all the ties of nations and of humanity were insensibly dissolved．Those，who were serious in advancing，grounded it upon the chimerical principle of the sovereignty of the people，which I have endeavoured upon another occasion to elucidate．Thus much is certain，that the leaders of the revolution，under the shelter of this talisman，spared themselves and others the trouble of enquiring into the lawfulness of their proceedings；for in their system，all was right，which they resolved upon in the name of the people，or in the name of mankind.
In order to judge of their actions，according to their deserts，they must be snatched away from the tribunal they have erected for themselves，and placed at another bar，whose laws accord better with the dictates of uncorrupted reason，and the eternal prescriptions of real right.
When the deputies of the states，assembled together in the year 1789，they had beyond all doubt the right，to undertake great reforms in the government，and even in the constitution of the French monarchy．This right，however，they could exercise only under the three following conditions．First，that they should observe the general forms of an assembly of the states in France，until these forms should in a lawful manner be abolished，or changed．Secondly，that their laws should not have the force of laws，until assented to by the monarch．And，thirdly，that they should follow the instructions，given them by their constituents.
In less than six weeks，they had broken through these three fundamental conditions．The deputies of the third state，without the least authority，and with a shameful violation of the rights of the other states，declared that themselves alone constituted the national assembly.
When the king endeavoured to bring them back from this monstrous usurpation to their proper limits，they declared to him that they persisted in it，formally renounced obedience to him，and reduced him finally to the necessity of commanding the two other estates to acknowledge the usurpation.
That in the immeasurable career，which these two first successful acts of violence，had opened，they might no longer meet resistance from any quarter，they declared that the instructions of their constituents were not binding upon them.
They had proceeded thus far，when，partly by their influence and example，partly by faults of the court，which need not be considered here，where the question only relates to right，the general rebellion broke out in Paris，and in all the provinces．Far from disapproving this rebellion，which，in perfect contrast with the rising of the people in America，had not the most distant connection with the lawful objects of the national assembly，they cherished and fostered it，gave it legislative force and consistence，conferred civic crowns upon its authors，called it an holy and virtuous insurrection，and took care to have it maintained in a continual flame，during the whole period of their government.
Under the shadow of this insurrection，they，who had placed themselves at its head，and taken upon themselves all responsibility，in a period of two years ran through the most remarkable circle of violation of all rights，public and private，that the world ever beheld．They drew up，without ever so much as asking the free assent of the king，a constitution so called，the incompetency，the impracticability，the ridiculous absurdity of which was so great，that，even among its authors—（another unexampled yet indubitable fact） not a single man would ever have seriously defended it．This constitution they compelled the king，upon pain of being immediately dethroned，to subscribe and swear to.
Scarcely had this happened，when their successors，who by virtue of this constitution alone，had a sort of legal existence，and held something resembling an authority to shew，instead of governing and quieting the state according to this constitution，directed all their secret，and what was still more revolting，all their public measures to its destruction．In less than a year they succeeded in effecting this new usurpation．Without so much as having a legal pretext，they suspended the constitution，dethroned the king，assumed to themselves，still forsooth in the name of the people，the power of calling a national convention，and proclaimed the republic，with fewer formalities，than a man would use to change his dress．By long habit dead to every sentiment of right，tormented by all the furies，plunged by their frantic measures，by crimes，and calamities of every kind into the lowest depth of criminal fool-hardiness，they now proclaimed against humanity and all its rights，a formal，irreconcileable war；and to shut behind them every door for return，and to snap the last thread by which they still held together with a lawful existence，they finally murdered justice herself，in the person of the most conscientious and upright monarch，who had ever adorned a throne.
The French revolution，therefore，began by a violation of rights，every step of its progress was a violation of rights，and it was never easy，until it had succeeded to establish absolute wrong，as the supreme and acknowledged maxim of a state completely dissolved，and yet existing only in bloody ruins.
2．The American revolution was from beginning to end，on the part of the Americans，merely a defensive revolution；the French was from beginning to end，in the highest sense of the word，an offensive revolution.
This difference of itself is essential and decisive；upon it rests，perhaps more than upon any other，the peculiar character，which has distinguished these two revolutions.
The British government began the revolution in America by resolves，for which they could shew no right；the colonies endeavoured by all means in their power to repel them．The colonies wished to maintain their old constitution；the government destroyed it．The resistance，which the colonies opposed against the mother country，was，in every period of this unhappy contest，exactly commensurate with the attack；the total separation was not resolved，until the utter impossibility of preserving the ancient condition was proved.
The stamp-act threw America into the most violent commotion；tumultuous scenes，though attended with no acts of bloody violence，broke out in all the provinces.(7) But they were no where formally sanctioned by the approbation of the legislative authorities．The little congress of 28 deputies of several colonies，who in the year 1765 assembled at New-York，and served as the model for the subsequent larger assembly，passed no other resolution than that“the colonies could only be taxed by their representatives，”and expressed this perfectly lawful resolve，in petitions to the king．The single general measure，which was then offered，the non-importation agreement，was a voluntary engagement，sanctioned by no public authority.
The declaratory act，which appeared in the year 1766，together with the repeal of the stamp-tax，could not possibly be agreeable to the colonies since it expressly and solemnly maintained the right of the British parliament to bind them by law in all cases whatsoever．Yet was this act received with great and remarkable tranquillity；and had the British government，from that time forward，given up forever their unhappy innovations；had they continued to govern the colonies，according to the old constitutional principles，there never would have been uttered a complaint against the declaratory act．It was long afterwards，and when the colonies had been provoked by repeated attacks of every kind，to the utmost extremity，that the provincial assembly of Massachusetts-Bay，declared that statute，an oppression.
