1. Alan S. Blinder, After the Music Stopped: The Financial Crisis, the Response, and the Work Ahead (New York: Penguin Press, 2013),关于宏观经济； Roddy Boyd, Fatal Risk: A Cautionary Tale of AIG’s Corporate Suicide (Hoboken, NJ: Wiley, 2011); William D. Cohan, Money and Power: How Goldman Sachs Came to Rule the World (New York: Doubleday, 2011); Greg Farrell, Crash of the Titans: Greed, Hubris, the Fall of Merrill Lynch, and the Near-Collapse of Bank of America (New York: Crown Business, 2010); Kate Kelly, Street Fighters: The Last 72 Hours of Bear Stearns, the Toughest Firm on Wall Street (New York: Penguin, 2009); Michael Lewis, Boomerang: Travels in the New Third World (New York: W. W. Norton, 2011) and The Big Short: Inside the Doomsday Machine (New York: W. W. Norton, 2010), 关于金融投机；Lawrence G. McDonald, with Patrick Robinson, A Colossal Failure of Common Sense: The Inside Story of the Collapse of Lehman Brothers (New York: Crown Business, 2009); Gretchen Morgenson and Joshua A. Rosner, Reckless Endangerment: How Outsized Ambition, Greed, and Corruption Led to Economic Armageddon (New York: Times Books / Henry Holt, 2011), 关于房地美和房利美；Henry M. Paulson, On the Brink: Inside the Race to Stop the Collapse of the Global Financial System (New York: Business Plus, 2010), 关于美国财政部；Raghuram Rajan, Fault Lines: How Hidden Fractures Still Threaten the World Economy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010), 关于财政体系；Robert J. Shiller, Subprime Solution: How Today’s Global Financial Crisis Happened and What to Do about It (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008); Andrew Ross Sorkin, Too Big to Fail: The Inside Story of How Wall Street and Washington Fought to Save the Financial System (New York: Viking, 2009), 关于美国财政部；Gillian Tett, Fool’s Gold: How the Bold Dream of a Small Tribe at J. P. Morgan Was Corrupted by Wall Street Greed (New York: Free Press, 2009); and David Wessel, In Fed We Trust: Ben Bernanke’s War on the Great Panic (New York: Crown Business, 2009)。特别有用的是十分清晰、记录全面的Financial Crisis Inquiry Report: Final Report of the National Commission on the Causes of the Financial and Economic Crisis in the United States (Washington, DC: Government Printing Of.ce, 2011), http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/ pkg/GPO-FCIC/pdf/GPO-FCIC.pdf。以上所有书籍是关于本章内容的重要背景材料。
2. Carl Shapiro, “Consumer Information, Product Quality, and Seller Reputation,” Bell Journal of Economics 13, no. 1 (1982): 20–35.
3. Tobias Adrian and Hyun Song Shin, “Liquidity and Leverage,” Journal of Financial Intermediation 19, no. 3 (July 2010): 418–37. 艾德里安和申铉松计算了从20世纪90年代到2008年第一季度5家领先的投资银行：贝尔斯登、雷曼兄弟、美林、高盛和摩根士丹利。它们平均总资产为3 450亿美元，平均负债3 310亿美元，平均拥有133亿美元股本。见表2投资银行统计汇总。
4. 参见Paulson, On the Brink，以及Blinder, After the Music Stopped，以及其他人的作品。
5. 参见Charles Ellis, The Partnership: The Making of Goldman Sachs (New York: Penguin Press, 2008)中的第97页。埃利斯的书显著而准确地描述了一家金融公司内部发生的事情。由于要求匿名，这些账户非常少见。
6. Goldman Sachs, Annual Report 2005，第65页，合并财务状况声明中的表格，2014年12月6日得到，http://www.goldmansachs.com/investor-relations/.nancials/ archived/annual-reports/2005-annual-report.html。高盛的股东权益为280.02亿美元，总资产7 068.04亿美元。
7. Council of Economic Advisors, Economic Report of the President 2007，见表格B-26, http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/ERP-2007/pdf/ERP-2007.pdf。后来这一数据在2013年的报告中被向上调整到12.2。
8. 参见Ellis的The Partnership. 第4章，“Ford: The Largest IPO，”pp. 53–72。
9. 税收情况很棘手，因为家族放弃自己所垄断的投票权，股息归基金会所得。Ibid., p. 55.
10. Ibid., pp. 60–61.
11. Ibid., p. 185.
12. See ibid., p. 347，这也告诉我们，“制约参与辛迪加的规则更像出自兄弟会的而不是出自固执的按业绩支付的企业”。
13. 因此在金融危机中，迈克尔·托马斯先生感叹过去穆迪的首席债券评级分析师Albert Esokait和Dominic de Palma“严谨、清廉”。托马斯，“由白痴评级”。Forbes，9月16日，2008.
14. Ellis, The Partnership, p. 103.
15. Ibid., p. 114，从支付和观察来看，公司的资本可能已经枯竭了；p. 103，企业所有的资本属于合伙人。
16. Ellis, The Partnership, 第569~570页告诉我们，高盛上市的时候，“很多高盛的人把个人总资产的85%以上投资于该公司。因此，即使到那个时候，它还是一种有限责任公司，合伙人在企业失败破产时仍面临很多麻烦。
17. “Today is Moving Day for Goldman Sachs,” New York Times, April 1, 1957.
18. Goldman Sachs, “Who We Are,”“What We Do,” and “Our Thinking,” all accessed December 1, 2014, http://www.goldmansachs.com/index.html.
19. Source for opening date: “200 West Street,” Wikipedia, accessed October 22, 2014, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/200_West_Street.
20. Paul Goldberger, “The Shadow Building: The House That Goldman Built,” New Yorker, May 17, 2010, accessed October 22, 2014, http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2010/05/17/shadow-building.
21. 我们感谢ZoltanPozsar与我们分享他的见解，银行的决策取决于企业的担忧，企业担心如果银行违约，自己的传统存款将遭受到巨额损失。来源：与乔治·阿克洛夫的私人谈话。国际货币基金组织，2010~2011年。
22. Catherine Clifford and Chris Isidore, “The Fall of IndyMac,” Cable News Network, July 13, 2008, accessed December 1, 2014, http://money.cnn.com/2008/07/12/news/companies/indymac_fdic/.
23. See Ellis, The Partnership, p. 78.
24. Ibid., p. 5.
25. Cohan, Money and Power, p. 602.
26. 参见穆迪官网“Moody’s History: A Century of Market Leadership,”访问于11月9日，2014年, https://www.moodys.com/Pages/atc001.aspx.根据该资料，“过去和现在发生这一变化的理由是发行人要为市场准入提供的目标对象评级价值付费”。“美国外交关系委员会中的三巨头显然也是这样。”新闻背景是“信用评级的争议”，其更新于2013年10月22日。http://www.cfr.org/.nancial-crises/credit-rating-controversy/p22328.
27. 美国参议院关于“华尔街与金融危机”的听证会表明，“投资银行频频把压力施加给信用评级过程，使银行获得了很多它们原本不应享受到的优厚待遇”。美国参议院、国土安全和政府事务委员会常务调查小组Wall Street and the Financial Crisis: Anatomy of a Financial Collapse, Majority and Minority Staff Report，2011年4月13日，第278页，http://www.hsgac.senate.gov//imo/media/doc/Financial_Crisis/FinancialCrisisReport.pdf? attempt=2。
28. 因此，正如《财政危机调查报告》所述（第126页）“证券监管交易委员会或任何其他监管机构没有对评级机构进行充分监管，以确保评级质量和准确性。委员会以穆迪为该地区的研究案例，而穆迪依靠有缺陷且过时的模型为抵押贷款相关证券做出错误的评级，其未能执行对标的资产证券尽职调查，并且即使能明显看出模型是错误的，穆迪仍然沿用了该模型”。
29. Kristopher Gerardi, Andreas Lehnert, Shane M. Sherlund, and Paul Willen, “Making Sense of the Subprime Crisis,” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity （2008秋季）：第69页至第139页，“强调未能预见未来价格下跌是评级过高的主要因素。人们认为房价下降是不可能的，但后来房价“崩溃性”大幅度下降（第142页）。
30. Financial Crisis Inquiry Report, p. xxv. 此外，根据Charles W. Calomiris (“The Subprime Crisis: What’s Old, What’s New, and What’s Next,”为圣路易斯联储经济研讨会准备的文章“Maintaining Stability in a Changing Financial System,”Jackson Hole, WY, August 2008, 第21页)，80%的次级抵押贷款被评为AAA级，95%的评为A级以上或者更高。The Financial Crisis Inquiry Report (p. xxv) 进一步指出：“你还会读到穆迪崩溃背后的力量，包括有缺陷计算机模型，来自为评级付费的金融公司的压力，市场份额无情的驱动，以及缺乏资源来完成这项工作。尽管其利润创了纪录，并且缺乏有意义的监督。”
31. 美国参议院国土安全和政府事务委员会常设调查小组委员会，Wall Street and the Financial Crisis，第245页。
32. Lewis, The Big Short.
33. 他为约翰·保尔森做空抵押贷款市场的巨大交易所警醒，但后来他通过自己的模型做了调查。Cohan, Money and Power, pp. 493–95.
34. Ibid., p. 567.
35. Ibid., p. 595.
36. Associated Press, “Timeline of United Airlines’ Bankruptcy,” USA Today, February 1, 2006, accessed November 9, 2014, http://usatoday30 .usatoday.com/travel/.ights/2006-02-01-united-timeline_x.htm; Bloomberg News, “United Airlines Financial Plan Gains Approval from Creditors,” New York Times, Dec 31, 2005; and Micheline Maynard, “United Air Wins Right to Default on Its Employee Pension Plans,” New York Times, May 11, 2005.
37. 参见Ellis, The Partnership，第2页，脚注。
38. Bloomberg News, “Cuomo Announces Reform Agreements with 3 Credit Rating Agencies,” http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/ news?pid=newsarchive&sid=a1N1TUVbL2bQ.“42个月协议”参见Michael Virtanen, “NY Attorney General Looks at Ratings Agencies,” Associated Press, February 8, 2013.accessed March 21, 2014. http://bigstory.ap.org/article/ny-attorney-general-looks-ratings-agencies-0。
39. Danielle Carbone, “The Impact of the Dodd-Frank Act’s Credit-Rating Agency Reform on Public Companies,” Corporate and Securities Law Advisor 24, no. 9 (September 2010): 1–7, http://www.shearman.com/ ~/media/Files/NewsInsights/Publications/2010/09/The-Impact-of-the-DoddFrank-Acts-Credit-Rating-A__/Files/View-full-article-The-Impact-of -the-DoddFrank-Ac__/FileAttachment/CM022211InsightsCarbone.pdf.
40. Boyd, Fatal Risk.
41. Financial Crisis Inquiry Report, pp. 141 and 267.
42. Ibid., p. 267.
43. Ibid., p. 141.
44. Ibid.
45. Ibid.
46. Boyd, Fatal Risk, p. 196.
47. Ibid., p. 182.
48. Financial Crisis Inquiry Report, pp. 347–50.
49. US Department of the Treasury, “Investment in AIG,”访问于2015年3月21日，http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/financial-stability/TARP -Programs/aig/Pages/status.aspx.
50. 图出自René M. Stulz, “Credit Default Swaps and the Credit Crisis,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 24, no. 1 (Winter 2010): 80, 2008年6月30日。
51. Ibid., p. 82.
