这场经典的赛事，甚至还用慢动作播放精彩的第四节，我们以今年封面的颜色表 .29
The Omaha Golden Spikes (nee the Omaha Royals) will meet the
Iowa Cubs on Saturday evening, May 1st, at Rosenblatt Stadium. Your
Chairman, whose breaking ball had the crowd buzzing last year, will
again take the mound. This year I plan to introduce my "flutterball." It's a
real source of irritation to me that many view our annual meeting as a
financial event rather than the sports classic I consider it to be. Once the
world sees my flutterball, that misperception will be erased.
奥玛哈金钉鞋队(原奥玛哈皇家队)将于五月一日星期六晚上在Rosenblatt体育
馆对上爱荷华州的小熊队，去年本人技惊四座的变化球，将会再度出现在投手丘
上，不过今年我还预计祭出新练的上飘球，对于许多人将Berkshire股东会视为
投资金融界而非体育界的盛事，我感到相当的气愤，相信等到世人看过我的上飘
球后，应该就能导正大家这种错误的观念。
Our proxy statement includes instructions about obtainin
tickets to the game and also a large quantity of other information that
should help you to enjoy your visit. I particularly urge the 60,000
shareholders that we gained through the Gen Re merger to join us.
Come and meet your fellow capitalists.
股东会资料将告诉大家如何取得球赛入场的门票，以及有关本次会议期间大量的
旅游信息，在此我也特别呼吁经由购并通用再保而新加入的60,000名股东，一
定要来见见其它资本主义的伙伴。
* * * * * * * * * * * *
It wouldn't be right to close without a word about the 11.8 peopl
who work with me in Berkshire's corporate office. In addition to
handling the myriad of tax, regulatory and administrative matters that
come with owning dozens of businesses, this group efficiently and
cheerfully manages various special projects, some of which generate
hundreds of inquiries. Here's a sample of what went on in 1998:
在年报结束前，我一定要再感谢一下在Berkshire企业总部与我一起共事的11.8
位工作伙伴，除了平时要处理因为拥有数十家营利事业所衍生复杂难解的租税、
法令与行政事务之外，这个团队同时还非常有效率且热心地管理许多特别的专
案，包含了上千次的不厌其烦的回答，以下就是他们在1998年所做的一些工
作。
● 6,106 shareholders designated 3,880 charities to receive
contributions.
● 6,106位股东指定捐赠给3,880个慈善机关团体
● Kelly Muchemore processed about 17,500 admission tickets for
the annual meeting, along with orders and checks for 3,200
baseball tickets.
● Kelly Muchemore处理超过17,500件股东会出席证，外加3,200件棒
球赛的订单与支票
● Kelly and Marc Hamburg produced and directed the Aksarben
extravaganza, a job that required them to arrange the
presentations made by our subsidiaries, prepare our movie, and
sometimes lend people a hand with travel and lodging.
● Kelly与Marc Hamburg负责制作、导演整个阿肯萨本秀，包含安排各
个子公司所做的演示文稿、准备短片，有时还要协助来宾解决交通与食宿的问
题
● Debbie Bosanek satisfied the varying needs of the 46 media
organizations (13 of them non-U.S.) that covered the meeting,
and meanwhile, as always, skillfully assisted me in every aspect of
my job.
● Debbie Bosanek满足了46家采访媒体机构各种不同的需求(其中还包
含13家外国媒体)，同时一如往常地协助我处理所有日常事务
● Debbie and Marc assembled the data for our annual report and
oversaw the production and distribution of 165,000 copies. (This
year the number will be 325,000.)
● Debbie及Marc负责整理股东会的报告并负责165,000份年报的制作与
发送(今年的份数将增加至325,000份)
● Marc handled 95% of the details -- and much of the substance -
- connected with our completing two major mergers.
● Marc负责处理95%以上的细节，同时更重要的是完成两件重大购并案的
后续处理工作
● Kelly, Debbie and Deb Ray dealt efficiently with tens of thousands
of requests for annual reports and financial information that came
through the office.
● Kelly、Debbie以及Deb Ray非常快速地处理成千上万要求寄发年报及
相关财务信息的回函
You and I are paying for only 11.8 people, but we are gettin
what would at most places be the output of 100. To all of the 11.8, my
thanks.
虽然我们只支付11.8人份的薪水，但我们所得到的成果却相当于100位人力的
付出，对于这支11.8个人的团队，我衷心地致上个人的感谢之意。
March 1, 1999
Warren E. Buffett
Chairman of the Board
华伦．巴菲特
董事会主席
1999年3月1日
BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC.
波克夏海瑟崴股份有限公司
To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:
致所有股东:
Our gain in net worth during 1999 was $358 million, which increased
the per-share book value of both our Class A and Class B stock by 0.5%.
Over the last 35 years (that is, since present management took over)
per-share book value has grown from $19 to $37,987, a rate of 24.0%
compounded annually.*
本公司1999年的净值增加了3.58亿美元，每股A股或B股的帐面净值皆成长
了0.5%，累计过去35年以来，也就是自从现有经营阶层接手之后，每股净值
由当初的19元成长到现在的37,987美元，年复合成长率约为24.0%*。
*All figures used in this report apply to Berkshire's A shares, the successor to the only stock that
the company had outstanding before 1996. The B shares have an economic interest equal to
1/30th that of the A.
*1在年报中所谓的每股数字系以A级普通股约当数为基础，这是本公司在1996年以前流通在
外唯一的一种股份，B级普通股则拥有A级普通股三十分之一的权利。
The numbers on the facing page show just how poor our 1999 record
was. We had the worst absolute performance of my tenure and,
compared to the S&P, the worst relative performance as well. Relative
results are what concern us: Over time, bad relative numbers will
produce unsatisfactory absolute results.
首页上的数字完全显示出我们1999年的成绩是如何的不理想，这也是个人历年
来表现最差的一年，不管从绝对数字或是与S&P 指数比较皆是如此，当然相对
数字是我们比较在意的，只不过时间一久，相对较差的数字其绝对数值肯定也不
会理想到哪里去。
Even Inspector Clouseau could find last year's guilty party: your
Chairman. My performance reminds me of the quarterback whose
report card showed four Fs and a D but who nonetheless had an
understanding coach. "Son," he drawled, "I think you're spending too
much time on that one subject."
即使是顽皮豹探长也知道谁是去年真正的犯人︰没错! 就是我本人，而我个人的
表现让我想起一位成绩单上满是F跟一个D的四分卫，偏偏又遇到一个体谅人
的教练轻声说到：「孩子，我想你把太多的时间摆在单一的科目之上了。」
My "one subject" is capital allocation, and my grade for 1999 most
assuredly is a D. What most hurt us during the year was the inferior
performance of Berkshire's equity portfolio -- and responsibility for
that portfolio, leaving aside the small piece of it run by Lou Simpson of
GEICO, is entirely mine. Several of our largest investees badly lagged the
market in 1999 because they've had disappointing operating results. We
still like these businesses and are content to have major investments in
them. But their stumbles damaged our performance last year, and it's no
sure thing that they will quickly regain their stride.
我所指的单一科目就是"资金的分配"，而很显然的我在1999年所获得的成绩就
只有D，除此之外表现最惨的要算是Berkshire的股票投资组合了，至于该为这
件事负责的，除了少部份的投资是由GEICO公司的Lou Simpson管理外，其
余全部都要归咎于我本人，我们几件大型的投资标的，由于本身1999年的经营
情况不佳，导致公司股价表现远落后于大盘，不过我们仍然对它们所处的产业情
有独钟，同时也愿意继续与它们同在，只是它们的挫败严重影响到我们去年的表
现，而且也不确定何时才能够回归正轨。
The fallout from our weak results in 1999 was a more-thancommensurate
drop in our stock price. In 1998, to go back a bit, the
stock outperformed the business. Last year the business did much
better than the stock, a divergence that has continued to the date of this
letter. Over time, of course, the performance of the stock must roughly
match the performance of the business.
Berkshire 1999年积弱不振的表现，更导致公司的股价大幅下滑，相较之下，
1998年的股价反而表现的比本业还好，去年可说是刚好相反，直到年报发布之
日止仍是如此，当然就长期而言，公司股价的表现大致上还是会与本业的表现相
当。
Despite our poor showing last year, Charlie Munger, Berkshire's Vice
Chairman and my partner, and I expect that the gain in Berkshire's
intrinsic value over the next decade will modestly exceed the gain from
owning the S&P. We can't guarantee that, of course. But we are willing to
back our conviction with our own money. To repeat a fact you've heard
before, well over 99% of my net worth resides in Berkshire. Neither my
wife nor I have ever sold a share of Berkshire and -- unless our checks
stop clearing -- we have no intention of doing so.
尽管去年表现不佳，不过Berkshire 主要的合伙人-查理孟格，跟我本人仍然预
期Berkshire未来十年实质价值的成长率应该可以略微超越S&P 指数同期的表
现，当然这种事没人敢打包票，不过我们依旧愿意以我们所有的身家作为担保，
大家应该都知道，我个人的身家有99%以上都摆在Berkshire，我跟我内人从来
就没有卖过一张Berkshire的股票，而且除非哪一天真的不够钱花，否则我们永
远不会考虑出售任何一张股票。
Please note that I spoke of hoping to beat the S&P "modestly." For
Berkshire, truly large superiorities over that index are a thing of the
past. They existed then because we could buy both businesses and
stocks at far more attractive prices than we can now, and also because
we then had a much smaller capital base, a situation that allowed us to
consider a much wider range of investment opportunities than are
available to us today.
请注意我说的是"略微"超越S&P，因为对Berkshire来说，大幅超越S&P指数的
情况已经成为历史，当初能够有这样的成绩，主要是因为那时不管企业或是股票
的价格都相当低廉，而我们的资本规模相对也较小，那使得我们比现在有更多的
投资机会可供选择。
Our optimism about Berkshire's performance is also tempered by the
expectation -- indeed, in our minds, the virtual certainty -- that the S&P
will do far less well in the next decade or two than it has done since
1982. A recent article in Fortune expressed my views as to why this is
inevitable, and I'm enclosing a copy with this report.
此外我之所以对Berkshire未来的表现如此有信心的原因在于，我认为S&P在
未来一、二十年的表现将远远不如过去十几年的表现，在最近的财星杂志我发表
了一篇文章解释这种无可避免的缘由，在年报后面我也附了一份供大家参考。
Our goal is to run our present businesses well -- a task made easy
because of the outstanding managers we have in place -- and to acquire
additional businesses having economic characteristics and managers
comparable to those we already own. We made important progress in
this respect during 1999 by acquiring Jordan's Furniture and
contracting to buy a major portion of MidAmerican Energy. We will talk
more about these companies later in the report but let me emphasize
one point here: We bought both for cash, issuing no Berkshire shares.
Deals of that kind aren't always possible, but that is the method of
acquisition that Charlie and I vastly prefer.
我们的目标是把现有的事业给经营好-这点对于现有优秀的经营阶层来说是件很
简单的事，同时再设法取得具有相同竞争优势与优秀经理人的新事业，去年我们
在这方面大有进展，不但买下了Jordan家具，同时还签约买下了MidAmerican
能源大部分的股权，在报告的后段我还会详加介绍这两家公司，不过有一点我要
强调的是，这两项购并案Berkshire全部皆以现金进行交易，没有发行任何新
股，虽然这样的交易方式可遇不可求，但却也是查理跟我比较偏好的。
Guides to Intrinsic Value
实质价值简介
I often talk in these pages about intrinsic value, a key, though far from
precise, measurement we utilize in our acquisitions of businesses and
common stocks. (For an extensive discussion of this, and other
investment and accounting terms and concepts, please refer to our
Owner's Manual on pages 55 - 62. Intrinsic value is discussed on page
60.)
在接下来的这一段，我要谈谈常常提到实质价值的观念，这是一个我们在进行企
业购并与股票投资时，很重要但却很难明确界定的标准，(有关这个议题的广泛
讨论，也包含其它投资与会计名词观念，请参阅股东手册)。
In our last four reports, we have furnished you a table that we regard as
useful in estimating Berkshire's intrinsic value. In the updated version of
that table, which follows, we trace two key components of value. The
first column lists our per-share ownership of investments (including
cash and equivalents but excluding assets held in our financial products
operation) and the second column shows our per-share earnings from
Berkshire's operating businesses before taxes and purchase-accounting
adjustments (discussed on page 61), but after all interest and corporate
expenses. The second column excludes all dividends, interest and
capital gains that we realized from the investments presented in the
first column. In effect, the columns show how Berkshire would look if it
were split into two parts, with one entity holding our investments and
the other operating all of our businesses and bearing all corporate
costs.
在最近四年的年报中，我们提供了我们认为可以最能够估计Berkshire实质价值
的一张表，在今年刚刚更新资料的表中，我们以拟制的方式将通用再保的数字加
入其中，也就是假设该公司自年度一开始就为我们所拥有，第一栏的数字代表我
们拥有每股的投资金额(包括现金与约当现金，但扣除财务金融单位持有的证
券)，第二栏则是每股在扣除利息与营业费用之后，Berkshire来自本业的营业利
益(但未扣除所得税与购买法会计调整数)，当然后者已经扣除了所有来自第一栏
投资所贡献的股利收入、利息收入与资本利得，事实上，从这张表可以看出若是
把Berkshire分拆成两部份的话会变成怎样，其结果就等于是一家持有我们投资
部位的控股公司，以及另一家经营旗下所有事业负担全部成本盈亏的营利事业。
Pre-tax Earnings
(Loss) Per Share
Investments With All Income from
Year Per Share Investments Excluded
1969 ........ $ 45 $ 4.39
1979 ........ 577 13.07
1989 ........ 7,200 108.86
1999 ........ 47,339 (458.55)
Here are the growth rates of the two segments by decade:
下表是这两个部份每十年的成长率：
Pre-tax Earnings
Per Share
Investments With All Income
from
Decade
Ending
Per Share Investments
Excluded
1979 ............................................. 29.0% 11.5%
1989 ............................................. 28.7% 23.6%
1999 .............................................
............................................. 20.7% N.A.
Annual Growth Rate, 1969-1999 ................. 25.4% N.A.
In 1999, our per-share investments changed very little, but our
operating earnings, affected by negatives that overwhelmed some
strong positives, fell apart. Most of our operating managers deserve a
grade of A for delivering fine results and for having widened the
difference between the intrinsic value of their businesses and the value
at which these are carried on our balance sheet. But, offsetting this, we
had a huge -- and, I believe, aberrational -- underwriting loss at
General Re. Additionally, GEICO's underwriting profit fell, as we had
predicted it would. GEICO's overall performance, though, was terrific,
outstripping my ambitious goals.
1999年，我们每股投资金额变化不大，但是每股营业利益却因为几个重大的负
面因素而大幅滑落，我们大部分的经理人都得到A级以上的评价，大幅增加各
自事业的实质价值与显示在资产负债表上的帐面价值，只不过可惜的是这一切的
努力通通都被通用再保异常的承保损失给抵消掉了，此外GEICO的承保利益也
一如预期地下滑，虽然其整体表现仍然远远超越当初我订下的严格目标。
We do not expect our underwriting earnings to improve in any dramatic
way this year. Though GEICO's intrinsic value should grow by a highly
satisfying amount, its underwriting performance is almost certain to
weaken. That's because auto insurers, as a group, will do worse in 2000,
and because we will materially increase our marketing expenditures. At
General Re, we are raising rates and, if there is no mega-catastrophe in
2000, the company's underwriting loss should fall considerably. It takes
some time, however, for the full effect of rate increases to kick in, and
General Re is therefore likely to have another unsatisfactory
underwriting year.
展望今年我们并不预期承保获利能够大幅改进，虽然GEICO的实质价值应该还
是能够以一个令人满意的幅度增加，但其承保成绩却一定会滑落，原因在于车险
业者在2000年整体的表现肯定不佳，也因为我们将投入大笔的行销经费，至于
通用再保，我们已开始调高保费，只要2000年不要再发生重大的意外灾害的
话，该公司的承保损失应该会大幅减少，不过保费调整的效果要完全显现，可能
需要一段时间，所以可以预期的是通用再保明年的承保成绩肯定也不会好到哪里
