这场经典的赛事，甚至还用慢动作播放精彩的第四节，我们以今年封面的颜色表 .30
去。
You should be aware that one item regularly working to widen the
amount by which intrinsic value exceeds book value is the annual
charge against income we take for amortization of goodwill -- an
amount now running about $500 million. This charge reduces the
amount of goodwill we show as an asset and likewise the amount that is
included in our book value. This is an accounting matter having nothing
to do with true economic goodwill, which increases in most years. But
even if economic goodwill were to remain constant, the annual
amortization charge would persistently widen the gap between intrinsic
value and book value.
财报中有一个叫做商誉摊销的费用项目是大家要特别注意的，Berkshire每年固
定提列的金额大约在五亿美元左右，这个动作使得资产负债表上商誉的会计数字
逐年递减，但却与实质经济稳定成长的现况背道而驰，而就算是实质的经济商誉
价值维持不变，每年固定提列的商誉摊销费用也会使得帐上的商誉与实际上的商
誉价值间的差距日益扩大。
Though we can't give you a precise figure for Berkshire's intrinsic value,
or even an approximation, Charlie and I can assure you that it far
exceeds our $57.8 billion book value. Businesses such as See's and
Buffalo News are now worth fifteen to twenty times the value at which
they are carried on our books. Our goal is to continually widen this
spread at all subsidiaries.
虽然我们无法给各位一个Berkshire实际价值的确切数字，这实在是很难去估
算，不过查理跟我可以向各位保证，实际的数字绝对远超过578亿美元的帐面
价值，许多事业包含水牛城新闻报与喜斯糖果在内的实际价值大概是帐面价值的
十五到二十倍之间，不过我们的目标是继续让子公司扩大这样的差距。
A Managerial Story You Will Never Read Elsewhere
别处读不到的经营故事
Berkshire's collection of managers is unusual in several important ways.
As one example, a very high percentage of these men and women are
independently wealthy, having made fortunes in the businesses that
they run. They work neither because they need the money nor because
they are contractually obligated to -- we have no contracts at Berkshire.
Rather, they work long and hard because they love their businesses.
And I use the word "their" advisedly, since these managers are truly in
charge -- there are no show-and-tell presentations in Omaha, no
budgets to be approved by headquarters, no dictums issued about
capital expenditures. We simply ask our managers to run their
companies as if these are the sole asset of their families and will remain
so for the next century.
Berkshire的经营团队在许多方面都与众不同，举个例子来说，这些先生女士大
部分都已经相当有钱，靠着自己经营的事业致富，他们之所以愿意继续留在工作
岗位上，并不是因为缺钱或是有任何合约上的限制，事实上Berkshire并没有跟
他们签订任何契约，他们之所以辛勤工作，完全是因为他们热爱自己的事业，而
我之所以用"他们"这个字眼，是因为他们对这些事业完全负全责，不需要到奥玛
哈做演示文稿，也不需要编预算送交总部核准，对于任何开支也没有繁复的规定，我
们只是简单地要他们就像是经营自己祖传百年的事业一样来对待即可。
Charlie and I try to behave with our managers just as we attempt to
behave with Berkshire's shareholders, treating both groups as we would
wish to be treated if our positions were reversed. Though "working"
means nothing to me financially, I love doing it at Berkshire for some
simple reasons: It gives me a sense of achievement, a freedom to act as
I see fit and an opportunity to interact daily with people I like and trust.
Why should our managers -- accomplished artists at what they do --
see things differently?
查理跟我与这些经理人保持互动的模式，与我们和Berkshire所有股东保持的互
动模式一致，那就是试着尽量站在对方的立场为大家设想，虽然我本人早就可以
不必为了经济因素而工作，不过我还是很喜欢现在在Berkshire所做的这些事，
原因很简单，因为这让我很有成就感、可以自由的去做我认为应该做的事，同时
让我每天都有机会与欣赏及信赖的人一起共事，所以为什么我们旗下的经理人-
在各自产业卓然有成的大师，一定要有不同的想法呢?
In their relations with Berkshire, our managers often appear to be
hewing to President Kennedy's charge, "Ask not what your country can
do for you; ask what you can do for your country." Here's a remarkable
story from last year: It's about R. C. Willey, Utah's dominant home
furnishing business, which Berkshire purchased from Bill Child and his
family in 1995. Bill and most of his managers are Mormons, and for this
reason R. C. Willey's stores have never operated on Sunday. This is a
difficult way to do business: Sunday is the favorite shopping day for
many customers. Bill, nonetheless, stuck to his principles -- and while
doing so built his business from $250,000 of annual sales in 1954,
when he took over, to $342 million in 1999.
在与Berkshire母公司的关系上，我们的经理人通常恪守甘乃迪总统曾说过的名
言，"不要问国家为你做了什么，问问你为国家做了什么?" 以下就是去年一个最
明显的例子，这是有关R.C.Willey-犹它州家具业的霸主，Berkshire是在1995
年从Bill Child家族买下这家公司的，Bill跟他大部分的经营团队都是摩门教徒，
也因此他们的店星期天从来不开张，这样的惯例实在是不适合用在做生意上，因
为对大部分的顾客来说，星期假日正是他们出外血拼的大好时机，不过尽管如
此，Bill还是坚守这项原则，而且将这家店从1954年他接手时的25万美金营
业额，一路成长到1999年的3.42亿美元。
Bill felt that R. C. Willey could operate successfully in markets outside of
Utah and in 1997 suggested that we open a store in Boise. I was highly
skeptical about taking a no-Sunday policy into a new territory where we
would be up against entrenched rivals open seven days a week.
Nevertheless, this was Bill's business to run. So, despite my
reservations, I told him to follow both his business judgment and his
religious convictions.
Bill认为R.C.Willey应该也能够在犹它州以外的地区成功开拓市场，因此在
1997年我们在Boise设立一家分店，不过我还是相当怀疑这种星期天不营业的
政策能否在陌生的地区抵抗每周七天无休的对手强力的竞争，当然由于这是Bill
负责经营的事业，所以尽管我对这点持保留的态度，但是我还是尊重他的商业判
断与宗教信仰。
Bill then insisted on a truly extraordinary proposition: He would
personally buy the land and build the store -- for about $9 million as it
turned out -- and would sell it to us at his cost if it proved to be
successful. On the other hand, if sales fell short of his expectations, we
could exit the business without paying Bill a cent. This outcome, of
course, would leave him with a huge investment in an empty building. I
told him that I appreciated his offer but felt that if Berkshire was going
to get the upside it should also take the downside. Bill said nothing
doing: If there was to be failure because of his religious beliefs, he
wanted to take the blow personally.
Bill后来甚至提出一个非常特别的提案，那就是他愿意先花九百万美元，以私人
的名义买下土地，等建筑物盖好，确定营运良好之后，再以成本价卖回给我们，
而要是营运不如预期，那么公司可以不必付出一毛钱，虽然这样他必须独力承担
庞大的损失，对此我告诉Bill很感谢他的提议，但若Berkshire想要获取投资的
报酬，那么它也必须同时承担可能的风险，Bill没有多说什么，只是表示如果因
为个人的宗教信仰而使得公司经营不善，他希望能够独力承担这个苦果。
The store opened last August and immediately became a huge success.
Bill thereupon turned the property over to us -- including some extra
land that had appreciated significantly -- and we wrote him a check for
his cost. And get this: Bill refused to take a dime of interest on the
capital he had tied up over the two years.
这家店后来顺利于去年八月开幕，立即造成当地的轰动，Bill随即就将产权办理
过户，另外包含一些地价已高涨的土地，并收下我们以成本价开出的支票，还有
一点必须特别说明，对于两年来陆续投入的资金，Bill婉拒收取任何一毛钱的利
息。
If a manager has behaved similarly at some other public corporation, I
haven't heard about it. You can understand why the opportunity to
partner with people like Bill Child causes me to tap dance to work every
morning.
从来就没有一家公开发行公司的经理人会这样做，至少我个人没有听说过，所以
各位不难想象能够与这样的经理人共事，让我每天早上上班时都雀跃不已。
* * * * * * * * * * * *
A footnote: After our "soft" opening in August, we had a grand opening
of the Boise store about a month later. Naturally, I went there to cut the
ribbon (your Chairman, I wish to emphasize, is good for something). In
my talk I told the crowd how sales had far exceeded expectations,
making us, by a considerable margin, the largest home furnishings
store in Idaho. Then, as the speech progressed, my memory
miraculously began to improve. By the end of my talk, it all had come
back to me: Opening a store in Boise had been my idea.
附带一提的是，在八月简单的开幕仪式之后，一个月后我们在Boise举行了盛大
的开幕仪式，自然我也受邀参加开幕剪彩，(我必须强调看来你们的董事长还是
有点用处的)，在致词时我告诉在场的来宾销售状况远超过我们当初的预期，让
我们成为Idaho地区最大的家具店，远远将其它同业拋在脑后，而等到致词快
结束时，我突然想起来，当初决定在Boise开店的，正是我的主意。
The Economics of Property/Casualty Insurance
产物意外险的经营
Our main business -- though we have others of great importance -- is
insurance. To understand Berkshire, therefore, it is necessary that you
understand how to evaluate an insurance company. The key
determinants are: (1) the amount of float that the business generates;
(2) its cost; and (3) most critical of all, the long-term outlook for both of
these factors.
保险是我们最主要的本业，当然其它事业也相当重要，想要了解Berkshire，你
就必须知道如何去评估一家保险公司，其中主要的关键因素有(1)这个行业所能
产生的浮存金数量(2)以及它的成本(3)最重要的是这些因素长期的展望。
To begin with, float is money we hold but don't own. In an insurance
operation, float arises because premiums are received before losses are
paid, an interval that sometimes extends over many years. During that
time, the insurer invests the money. This pleasant activity typically
carries with it a downside: The premiums that an insurer takes in usually
do not cover the losses and expenses it eventually must pay. That leaves
it running an "underwriting loss," which is the cost of float. An insurance
business has value if its cost of float over time is less than the cost the
company would otherwise incur to obtain funds. But the business is a
lemon if its cost of float is higher than market rates for money.
首先浮存金是一项我们持有但却不属于我们的资金，在保险公司的营运中，浮存
金产生的原因在于保险公司在真正支付损失理赔之前，一般会先向保户收取保
费，在这期间保险公司会将资金运用在其它投资之上，当然这样的好处也必须要
付出代价，通常保险业者收取的保费并不足以因应最后支付出去的相关损失与费
用，于是保险公司便会发生承保损失，这就是浮存金的成本，而当一家公司取得
浮存金成本，就长期而言低于从其它管道取得资金的成本时，它就有存在的价
值，否则一旦保险事业取得浮存金的成本若远高于货币市场利率时，它就像是一
颗极酸的柠檬。
A caution is appropriate here: Because loss costs must be estimated,
insurers have enormous latitude in figuring their underwriting results,
and that makes it very difficult for investors to calculate a company's
true cost of float. Errors of estimation, usually innocent but sometimes
not, can be huge. The consequences of these miscalculations flow
directly into earnings. An experienced observer can usually detect
large-scale errors in reserving, but the general public can typically do
no more than accept what's presented, and at times I have been amazed
by the numbers that big-name auditors have implicitly blessed. In 1999
a number of insurers announced reserve adjustments that made a
mockery of the "earnings" that investors had relied on earlier when
making their buy and sell decisions. At Berkshire, we strive to be
conservative and consistent in our reserving. Even so, we warn you that
an unpleasant surprise is always possible.
有一点必须特别注意的是，因为损失成本必须仰赖估算，所以保险业者对于承保
结算的成绩有相当大伸缩的空间，连带使得投资人很难正确地衡量一家保险公司
真正的浮存金成本，估计错误，通常是无心，但有时却是故意，与真实的结果往
往会有很大的差距，而这种结果直接反映在公司的损益表上，有经验的行家通常
可以经由公司的准备提列情形发现重大的错误，但对于一般投资大众来说，除了
被迫接受财务报表的数字之外，别无他法，而我个人常常被这些经过各大会计师
事务所背书的财务报告所吓到，1999年有许多保险业者宣布对先前不当提列准
备而导致投资人形成错误决策的骗术进行调整，不过在Berkshire，我们在提列
准备时，都尽量采取最保守的做法，不过我还是要警告大家，保险业所发生的意
外，通常都不会是什么好消息。
The table that follows shows (at intervals) the float generated by the
various segments of Berkshire's insurance operations since we entered
the business 33 years ago upon acquiring National Indemnity Company
(whose traditional lines are included in the segment "Other Primary").
For the table we have calculated our float -- which we generate in large
amounts relative to our premium volume -- by adding net loss reserves,
loss adjustment reserves, funds held under reinsurance assumed and
unearned premium reserves, and then subtracting agents balances,
prepaid acquisition costs, prepaid taxes and deferred charges
applicable to assumed reinsurance. (Got that?)
下表中所显示的数字是，Berkshire自取得国家产险公司经营权，进入保险事业
33年以来所贡献的浮存金，(其中传统业务包含在其它主险项下)，在这张计算
浮存金的表中，(相对于收到的保费收入，我们持有的浮存金部位算是相当大的)
我们将所有的损失准备、损失费用调整准备、再保预先收取的资金与未赚取保费
加总后，再扣除应付佣金、预付购并成本、预付税负以及取得再保业务的相关递
延费用，得出浮存金的数额，弄清楚了吗
Yearend Float (in $ millions)
Year GEICO General Re
Other
Reinsurance
Other
Primary Total
1967 20 20
1977 40 131 171
1987 701 807 1,508
1997 2,917 4,014 455 7,386
1998 3,125 14,909 4,305 415 22,754
1999 3,444 15,166 6,285 403 25,298
Growth of float is important -- but its cost is what's vital. Over the years
we have usually recorded only a small underwriting loss -- which means
our cost of float was correspondingly low -- or actually had an
underwriting profit, which means we were being paid for holding other
people's money. Indeed, our cumulative result through 1998 was an
underwriting profit. In 1999, however, we incurred a $1.4 billion
underwriting loss that left us with float cost of 5.8%. One mildly
mitigating factor: We enthusiastically welcomed $400 million of the loss
because it stems from business that will deliver us exceptional float
over the next decade. The balance of the loss, however, was decidedly
unwelcome, and our overall result must be judged extremely poor.
Absent a mega-catastrophe, we expect float cost to fall in 2000, but any
decline will be tempered by our aggressive plans for GEICO, which we
will discuss later.
浮存金持续成长虽然很重要，但是取得它的成本却更关键，多年以来，我们的承
保损失一直控制在相当低的限度，这代表我们浮存金的成本也非常的低，有时甚
至还有承保的利益，这等于是由别人付费来保管他们的钱，就像是我们1998年
结算下来就有承保利益，只不过很不幸的，我们1999年发生了14亿美元的承
保损失，这使得我们浮存金的成本一下暴增到5.8%，令人庆幸的是，其中有一
笔4亿美元的损失，将可以在未来十年内提供给我们一笔高额的浮存金，当然
其它的损失就让人觉得不太愉快，这样的成绩很明显的让人无法接受，除非再发
生重大的天灾人祸，我们预期2000年的浮存金成本将会下降，不过任何的下降
都必须面临GEICO强力行销计画的阻拦，关于这点在后面我还会再详细叙述。
There are a number of people who deserve credit for manufacturing so
much "no-cost" float over the years. Foremost is Ajit Jain. It's simply
impossible to overstate Ajit's value to Berkshire: He has from scratch
built an outstanding reinsurance business, which during his tenure has
earned an underwriting profit and now holds $6.3 billion of float.
能够取得这笔免成本的浮存金要归功于许多人，这其中贡献最大的当属Ajit
Jain，他对于Berkshire贡献的价值实在是难以估算，在他的任期间，从无到有
一手建立起Berkshire的再保险事业，如今不但持有63亿美元的浮存金，同时
每年还维持稳定的承保获利。
In Ajit, we have an underwriter equipped with the intelligence to
properly rate most risks; the realism to forget about those he can't
evaluate; the courage to write huge policies when the premium is
appropriate; and the discipline to reject even the smallest risk when the
premium is inadequate. It is rare to find a person possessing any one of
these talents. For one person to have them all is remarkable.
在Ajit的身上，我们看到一位核保人员如何运用智能将风险合理的订价，能够
理性回绝无法衡量的风险，同时又能勇敢地接受高额但合理的保单，纪律地拒绝
任何不合理订价的微小风险，我们很难在一般人身上找到这类的特点，而要三者
合一更是绝无仅有。
Since Ajit specializes in super-cat reinsurance, a line in which losses are
