这场经典的赛事，甚至还用慢动作播放精彩的第四节，我们以今年封面的颜色表 .34
Shoe Group ............................................17 33 11 23
Purchase-Accounting Adjustments .........(739)(123)(648)(118)
Interest Expense (3) ...............................(109)(100)(70)(63)
Shareholder-Designated Contributions ....(17)(17)(11)(11)
Other ......................................................33 60 (4)20 45 (4)
Operating Earnings ....................................1,085 1,899 671 1,277
Capital Gains from Investments .................1,365 2,415 886 1,553
Total Earnings - All Entities .......................$2,450 $4,314 $1,557 $ 2,830
====================
(1) Includes Executive Jet from August 7, 1998. (3) Excludes interest expense of Finance Businesses.
(2) Includes Jordan's Furniture from November 13,
1999.
(4) Includes General Re operations for ten days in
1998.
Almost all of our manufacturing, retailing and service businesses had
excellent results in 1999. The exception was Dexter Shoe, and there the
shortfall did not occur because of managerial problems: In skills, energy
and devotion to their work, the Dexter executives are every bit the equal
of our other managers. But we manufacture shoes primarily in the U.S.,
and it has become extremely difficult for domestic producers to
compete effectively. In 1999, approximately 93% of the 1.3 billion pairs
of shoes purchased in this country came from abroad, where extremely
low-cost labor is the rule.
回顾1999年，我们旗下的制造、零售与服务业的表现几乎接近完美，Dexter
鞋业除外，不过该公司的问题不在于经营管理，就工作上的经验、活力与认真而
言，Dexter与其它子公司优秀的经理人毫无二致，主要的原因还在于我们的制
造据点位于美国本土，缺乏竞争优势，总计1999年，在美国13亿双的鞋子消
耗量中，93%来自于进口，廉价的劳工成本是主要的关键因素。
Counting both Dexter and H. H. Brown, we are currently the leading
domestic manufacturer of shoes, and we are likely to continue to be. We
have loyal, highly-skilled workers in our U.S. plants, and we want to
retain every job here that we can. Nevertheless, in order to remain
viable, we are sourcing more of our output internationally. In doing that,
we have incurred significant severance and relocation costs that are
included in the earnings we show in the table.
若再加上H.H.Brown，我们是美国本土最大的鞋类生产业者，我们仍将尽力维
持这样的局面，我们的美国工厂拥有最忠诚，且最有经验的工人，我们希望能够
保留每一个职位，但尽管如此，为了保持弹性，我们不得不开始从海外寻找潜在
的代工来源，也因此在下表年度帐上提列部门调整的损失。
A few years back, Helzberg's, our 200-store jewelry operation, needed
to make operating adjustments to restore margins to appropriate levels.
Under Jeff Comment's leadership, the job was done and profits have
dramatically rebounded. In the shoe business, where we have Harold
Alfond, Peter Lunder, Frank Rooney and Jim Issler in charge, I believe we
will see a similar improvement over the next few years.
几年前，在全美拥有200家分店的贺兹柏格钻石，为了恢复原有高毛利而在营
运上做了许多调整，在Jeff Comment的领导下，目标顺利达成，利润率快速
的回升，同样的在鞋业，我们拥有Harold、Peter、Frank以及Jim担纲，我相
信在未来几年内也能有相同的成果。
See's Candies deserves a special comment, given that it achieved a
record operating margin of 24% last year. Since we bought See's for $25
million in 1972, it has earned $857 million pre-tax. And, despite its
growth, the business has required very little additional capital. Give the
credit for this performance to Chuck Huggins. Charlie and I put him in
charge the day of our purchase, and his fanatical insistence on both
product quality and friendly service has rewarded customers,
employees and owners.
此外在这里要特别提到喜斯糖果，因为它去年的营业利润高达24%，自从我们
在1972年以2,500万美元买下该公司以来，它已为我们贡献了8.57亿美元的
税前净利，而尽管公司营运维持高成长，本身却不需要额外的资金加以支应，有
鉴于Chuck Huggins过去优异的表现，我们在买下该公司的第一天起就把公司
交给他负责，而他对产品品质与亲切服务的坚持，让顾客、员工与股东都受益良
多。
Chuck gets better every year. When he took charge of See's at age 46,
the company's pre-tax profit, expressed in millions, was about 10% of
his age. Today he's 74, and the ratio has increased to 100%. Having
discovered this mathematical relationship -- let's call it Huggins' Law -
- Charlie and I now become giddy at the mere thought of Chuck's
birthday.
Chuck的表现一天比一天好，记得他接手喜斯时的年纪是46岁，公司的税前获
利(单位百万美元)大概是他年纪的10%，如今他高龄74岁，但这个比率却提高
到100%，在发现这个有趣的数字之后，我们把它称之为Huggins定律，现在
查理跟我只要想到Chuck的生日快到时，就暗自窃喜不已。
* * * * * * * * * * * *
Additional information about our various businesses is given on pages
39 - 54, where you will also find our segment earnings reported on a
GAAP basis. In addition, on pages 63 - 69, we have rearranged
Berkshire's financial data into four segments on a non-GAAP basis, a
presentation that corresponds to the way Charlie and I think about the
company.
有关其它关系企业的信息大家可以在39-54页找到，包含依照一般公认会计准
则编制的部门别信息，此外在63-69页，你还可以找到经过重编，依照Berkshire
四大部门编排的信息(非按一般公认会计准则编制)，这是查理跟我认为最能够完
整呈现Berkshire现况的模式。
Look-Through Earnings
完整透视盈余
Reported earnings are an inadequate measure of economic progress at
Berkshire, in part because the numbers shown in the table presented
earlier include only the dividends we receive from investees -- though
these dividends typically represent only a small fraction of the earnings
attributable to our ownership. Not that we mind this division of money,
since on balance we regard the undistributed earnings of investees as
more valuable to us than the portion paid out. The reason for our
thinking is simple: Our investees often have the opportunity to reinvest
earnings at high rates of return. So why should we want them paid out?
我们认为帐列盈余很难表现Berkshire实际的营运状况，部份原因在于列示在本
公司帐上的股利收入，事实上仅占被投资公司收益的一小部份，其实我们并不要
求盈余一定要分配，事实上对我们而言，我们更重视未分配的那一部份，因为他
们极可能为我们创造出更高的价值，原因很简单，因为我们的被投资公司往往比
母公司更有机会把资金投入到高投资报酬的用途之上，既然如此又何必一定要强
迫他们把盈余分配回来呢?
To depict something closer to economic reality at Berkshire than
reported earnings, though, we employ the concept of "look-through"
earnings. As we calculate these, they consist of: (1) the operating
earnings reported in the previous section, plus; (2) our share of the
retained operating earnings of major investees that, under GAAP
accounting, are not reflected in our profits, less; (3) an allowance for the
tax that would be paid by Berkshire if these retained earnings of
investees had instead been distributed to us. When tabulating
"operating earnings" here, we exclude purchase-accounting
adjustments as well as capital gains and other major non-recurring
items.
为了要更真实的反应Berkshire实际的经营状况，于是乎我们运用了完整透视盈
余的观念，这个数字总共包含(1)前段所提到的帐列盈余，加上(2)主要被投资公
司的保留盈余，按一般公认会计原则未反应在我们公司帐上的盈余，扣除(3)若
这些未反应的盈余分配给我们时，估计可能要缴的所得税。在这里我们所谓的营
业盈余系已扣除资本利得、特别会计调整与企业其它非常态的项目。
The following table sets forth our 1999 look-through earnings, though I
warn you that the figures can be no more than approximate, since they
are based on a number of judgment calls. (The dividends paid to us by
these investees have been included in the operating earnings itemized
on page 13, mostly under "Insurance Group: Net Investment Income.")
各位可以从下表看出我们是如何计算出1999年透视盈余的，不过我还是要提醒
各位这些数字只不过是估计数，很多都是基于简单的判断，(被投资公司所分配
的股利收入已经列在13页的营业利益之内，大部分包含在保险事业的净投资收
益项下)。
Berkshire's Approximate Berkshire's Share of Undistributed
Berkshire's Major Investees Ownership at Yearend(1) Operating Earnings (in millions)(2)
American Express Company ........... 11.3% $228
The Coca-Cola Company ............... 8.1% 144
Freddie Mac .................................. 8.6% 127
The Gillette Company .................... 9.0% 53
M&T Bank ................................... 6.5% 17
The Washington Post Company ..... 18.3% 30
Wells Fargo & Company ............... 3.6% 108
Berkshire's share of undistributed earnings of major investees 707
Hypothetical tax on these undistributed investee earnings(3) (99)
Reported operating earnings of Berkshire 1,318
Total look-through earnings of Berkshire $ 1,926
=====
(1) Does not include shares allocable to minority interests
(2) Calculated on average ownership for the year
(3) The tax rate used is 14%, which is the rate Berkshire pays on the dividends it receives
Investments
投资
Below we present our common stock investments. Those that had a
market value of more than $750 million at the end of 1999 are itemized.
下表是Berkshire 1999年市价超过七亿五千万美元以上的股票投资。
12/31/99
Shares Company Cost* Market
(dollars in millions)
50,536,900 American Express Company ....... $1,470 $ 8,402
200,000,000 The Coca-Cola Company ........ 1,299 11,650
59,559,300 Freddie Mac ................ 294 2,803
96,000,000 The Gillette Company .......... 600 3,954
1,727,765 The Washington Post Company ....... 11 960
59,136,680 Wells Fargo & Company ........ 349 2,391
Others ...................... 4,180 6,848
Total Common Stocks ............. $8,203 $37,008
===== ======
* Represents tax-basis cost which, in aggregate, is $691 million less than GAAP cost.
We made few portfolio changes in 1999. As I mentioned earlier, several
of the companies in which we have large investments had disappointing
business results last year. Nevertheless, we believe these companies
have important competitive advantages that will endure over time. This
attribute, which makes for good long-term investment results, is one
Charlie and I occasionally believe we can identify. More often, however,
we can't -- not at least with a high degree of conviction. This explains,
by the way, why we don't own stocks of tech companies, even though we
share the general view that our society will be transformed by their
products and services. Our problem -- which we can't solve by studying
up -- is that we have no insights into which participants in the tech field
possess a truly durable competitive advantage.
1999年我们只做了些许的变动，如同先前我曾提到的，去年有几家我们拥有重
大投资部位的被投资公司其经营状况令人不甚满意，尽管如此，我们仍然相信这
些公司拥有相当的竞争优势，可协助其继续稳定经营下去，这种可以让长期投资
有不错成果的特点，是查理跟我还有点自信可以分辨得出的地方，只是有时我们
也不敢百分之百保证一定没问题，这也是为什么我们从来不买高科技股票的原
因，即使我们不得不承认它们所提供的产品与服务将会改变整个社会，问题是-
就算是我们再想破头，也没有能力分辨出在众多的高科技公司中，到底是哪一些
公司拥有长远的竞争优势。
Our lack of tech insights, we should add, does not distress us. After all,
there are a great many business areas in which Charlie and I have no
special capital-allocation expertise. For instance, we bring nothing to
the table when it comes to evaluating patents, manufacturing processes
or geological prospects. So we simply don't get into judgments in those
fields.
不过我必须强调，不懂高科技一点都不会让我感到沮丧，毕竟在这个世界上本来
就有很多产业是查理跟我自认没有什么特殊的经验，举例来说，专利权评估、工
厂制程与地区发展前景等，我们就一窍不通，所以我们从来不会想要在这些领域
妄下评论。
If we have a strength, it is in recognizing when we are operating well
within our circle of competence and when we are approaching the
perimeter. Predicting the long-term economics of companies that
operate in fast-changing industries is simply far beyond our perimeter.
If others claim predictive skill in those industries -- and seem to have
their claims validated by the behavior of the stock market -- we neither
envy nor emulate them. Instead, we just stick with what we understand.
If we stray, we will have done so inadvertently, not because we got
restless and substituted hope for rationality. Fortunately, it's almost
certain there will be opportunities from time to time for Berkshire to do
well within the circle we've staked out.
如果说我们有什么能力，那就是我们深知要在具竞争优势的范围内，把事情尽量
做好，以及明了可能的极限在哪里，而要预测在变化快速产业中经营的公司，其
长期的经营前景如何，很明显的已超过我们的能力范围之外，如果有人宣称有能
力做类似的预测，且以公司的股价表现做为左证，则我们一点也不会羡慕，更不
会想要去仿效，相反的，我们会回过头来坚持我们所了解的东西，如果不幸偏离
轨道，那也一定是不小心的，绝非慌张莽撞想要得到合理的解释，还好可以确信
的是Berkshire永远有机会找到它能力范围内可以做的事。
Right now, the prices of the fine businesses we already own are just not
that attractive. In other words, we feel much better about the businesses
than their stocks. That's why we haven't added to our present holdings.
Nevertheless, we haven't yet scaled back our portfolio in a major way: If
the choice is between a questionable business at a comfortable price or
a comfortable business at a questionable price, we much prefer the
latter. What really gets our attention, however, is a comfortable business
at a comfortable price.
目前我们拥有的这些好公司的股票价格其实不甚吸引人，从另外一个角度来看，
我们认为它们的本质比起股价表现要好得多，这也是为什么我们并不急着增加持
股，尽管如此，我们也没有大幅降低持股部位，如果要在股价令人满意但有问题
的公司与股价有问题但令人满意的公司作选择，我们宁愿选择后者，当然真正会
引起我们兴趣的，是那种公司令人满意，同时股价也令人满意的标的。
Our reservations about the prices of securities we own apply also to the
general level of equity prices. We have never attempted to forecast what
the stock market is going to do in the next month or the next year, and
we are not trying to do that now. But, as I point out in the enclosed
article, equity investors currently seem wildly optimistic in their
expectations about future returns.
我们对于目前大盘的股价表现与先前对于本身持股投资组合股价的看法一致，我
们从来不会想要试图去预估下个月或下一年度的股市走势，过去不会，现在也不
会，不过如同我在附录的文章中指出的，股市投资人现在对于目前持股未来可能
的投资报酬实在是显得过于乐观。
We see the growth in corporate profits as being largely tied to the
business done in the country (GDP), and we see GDP growing at a real
rate of about 3%. In addition, we have hypothesized 2% inflation. Charlie
and I have no particular conviction about the accuracy of 2%. However,
it's the market's view: Treasury Inflation-Protected Securities (TIPS) yield
about two percentage points less than the standard treasury bond, and
if you believe inflation rates are going to be higher than that, you can
profit by simply buying TIPS and shorting Governments.
我们认为企业获利的成长幅度，与一个国家的国内生产毛额(GDP)的成长率成一
定关系，而我们估计目前GDP的年增率大概只有3%左右，此外再加上2%预估
通货膨胀，当然查理跟我无法对于2%的准确性做任何保证，但这至少市场上一
般的共识，预防通膨的国库券(TIPS)的利率大约也是一般政府公债减2个百分点
左右，当然如果你感觉通货膨胀可能比这个数字还高，你大可以买进TIPS，同
时放空政府公债。
If profits do indeed grow along with GDP, at about a 5% rate, the
valuation placed on American business is unlikely to climb by much
more than that. Add in something for dividends, and you emerge with
returns from equities that are dramatically less than most investors
have either experienced in the past or expect in the future. If investor
expectations become more realistic -- and they almost certainly will --
the market adjustment is apt to be severe, particularly in sectors in
which speculation has been concentrated.
