这场经典的赛事，甚至还用慢动作播放精彩的第四节，我们以今年封面的颜色表 .35
而如果公司获利果真与GDP 预估5%的成长走势相当，那么大家在对美国企业
进行评价时的预期，就不可能过于乐观，若再加计配发的股利，那么你可以得出
的预计股票报酬率，可能远低于大部分投资人过去几年的投资绩效以及未来几年
的投资预期，而如果投资人的期望可以变得更实际一点，我相信总有一天他们一
定会，则股市将会进行一波相当大程度的修正，尤其是投机气氛特别重的那些类
股。
Berkshire will someday have opportunities to deploy major amounts of
cash in equity markets -- we are confident of that. But, as the song
goes, "Who knows where or when?" Meanwhile, if anyone starts
explaining to you what is going on in the truly-manic portions of this
"enchanted" market, you might remember still another line of song:
"Fools give you reasons, wise men never try."
总有一天Berkshire会有机会将大量的资金再度投入股市，这点我们相当有信
心，不过就像有首歌的歌词是这样："不知在何处?不知在何时?"当然要是有人想
要试着跟你解释为何现今股市会如此的疯狂，请记住另一首歌的歌词："笨蛋总
是为不合理的事找理由，而聪明人则避而远之"。
Share Repurchases
买回库藏股
Recently, a number of shareholders have suggested to us that Berkshire
repurchase its shares. Usually the requests were rationally based, but a
few leaned on spurious logic.
最近有一些股东建议Berkshire可以考虑从市场上买回公司的股份，通常这类的
要求合情合理，但有时候他们背后依俟的逻辑却有点奇怪。
There is only one combination of facts that makes it advisable for a
company to repurchase its shares: First, the company has available
funds -- cash plus sensible borrowing capacity -- beyond the near
term needs of the business and, second, finds its stock selling in the
market below its intrinsic value, conservatively-calculated. To this we
add a caveat: Shareholders should have been supplied all the
information they need for estimating that value. Otherwise, insiders
could take advantage of their uninformed partners and buy out their
interests at a fraction of true worth. We have, on rare occasions, seen
that happen. Usually, of course, chicanery is employed to drive stock
prices up, not down.
只有在一定条件下公司买回自家的股份才有意义，首先，公司在扣除短期周转所
需之外还拥有多余的资金，(含现金与银行额度在内)，其次，其股价必须远低于
其实质价值，关于这点我还有一点补充：股东必须还有足够信息来对公司进行评
价，否则的话，公司内部人极有可能运用信息不对称的现象占不知情股东的便
宜，以偏低的价格买到公司的股份，就Berkshire而言，符合上述条件的情形并
不多见，当然一般而言，大部分的公司通常都会诱使股东把股价拉高而非压低。
The business "needs" that I speak of are of two kinds: First,
expenditures that a company must make to maintain its competitive
position (e.g., the remodeling of stores at Helzberg's) and, second,
optional outlays, aimed at business growth, that management expects
will produce more than a dollar of value for each dollar spent (R. C.
Willey's expansion into Idaho).
我提到的公司资金需求大概有两种情况：首先，公司要保留维持其根本的竞争优
势的基本开支(例如贺兹柏格钻石店的重新装潢)，第二，其它每投入一块钱能够
创造出高于一块钱价值的那类支出(例如R.C.Willey家具店在爱达荷州新成立的
据点)。
When available funds exceed needs of those kinds, a company with a
growth-oriented shareholder population can buy new businesses or
repurchase shares. If a company's stock is selling well below intrinsic
value, repurchases usually make the most sense. In the mid-1970s, the
wisdom of making these was virtually screaming at managements, but
few responded. In most cases, those that did made their owners much
wealthier than if alternative courses of action had been pursued. Indeed,
during the 1970s (and, spasmodically, for some years thereafter) we
searched for companies that were large repurchasers of their shares.
This often was a tipoff that the company was both undervalued and run
by a shareholder-oriented management.
当一家公司的资金超过前述的资金需求，一家以成长导向的公司股东可以考虑买
进新事业或是买回公司自家的股份，要是公司的股价远低于其实质的价值，买回
股份通常最有利，在1970年代，投资大众就曾大声呼吁公司的经营阶层采取类
似的做法，不过当时却很少有公司响应，真正落实的事后证明大大增进了股东的
利益，而为多余资金另外找出路的公司则惨不忍睹，确实在1970年代(以及以
后断断续续好几年)，我们专门锁定那些大量买回自家股份的公司，因为这种举
动通常暗示这是一家公司股价被低估，同时又拥有相当注重股东权益的经营阶
层。
That day is past. Now, repurchases are all the rage, but are all too often
made for an unstated and, in our view, ignoble reason: to pump or
support the stock price. The shareholder who chooses to sell today, of
course, is benefitted by any buyer, whatever his origin or motives. But
the continuing shareholder is penalized by repurchases above intrinsic
value. Buying dollar bills for $1.10 is not good business for those who
stick around.
不过这种情况已成昨日黄花，虽然现在买回自家股份的公司比比皆是，但我们认
为大部分的背后都隐含着一个令人鄙夷的动机，那就是为了要拉抬或支撑公司股
价，这当然有利于在当时有意出售股份的股东，因为他们能够以不错的价格顺利
出场，不管他的背景或出售的动机是什么，不过留下来的股东却因为公司以高于
实质价值的价格买回股份而蒙受其害，以1.1美元的价格买进1块钱美钞的生
意很明显的并不划算。
Charlie and I admit that we feel confident in estimating intrinsic value
for only a portion of traded equities and then only when we employ a
range of values, rather than some pseudo-precise figure. Nevertheless,
it appears to us that many companies now making repurchases are
overpaying departing shareholders at the expense of those who stay. In
defense of those companies, I would say that it is natural for CEOs to be
optimistic about their own businesses. They also know a whole lot more
about them than I do. However, I can't help but feel that too often
today's repurchases are dictated by management's desire to "show
confidence" or be in fashion rather than by a desire to enhance pershare
value.
查理跟我承认我们对于估计股票的实质价值还有点自信，但这也只限于一个价值
区间，而绝非一个准确的数字，不过即便如此，我们还是很明显地可以看出许多
公司目前以高价买回股份的举动，等于是让卖出股份的股东占尽留下来股东的便
宜，当然站在公司的立场来看，大部分的主管对于自家公司有信心也是人之常
情，但他们其实比我们更知道公司的一些内情，不管怎样，这些买回的举动总是
让我认为压根就不是为了想要增进股东权益，而只不过是经营阶层想要展现自信
或者一窝蜂跟进的心态而已。
Sometimes, too, companies say they are repurchasing shares to offset
the shares issued when stock options granted at much lower prices are
exercised. This "buy high, sell low" strategy is one many unfortunate
investors have employed -- but never intentionally! Managements,
however, seem to follow this perverse activity very cheerfully.
有时有的公司也会为了抵消先前发行低价认股选择权而买回股份，这种买高卖低
的策略跟一般投资人无知的做法并无二致，但这种做法绝不像后者一样是无心
的，然而这些经营阶层好象相当热衷于这种对于公司明显不利的举动。
Of course, both option grants and repurchases may make sense -- but
if that's the case, it's not because the two activities are logically related.
Rationally, a company's decision to repurchase shares or to issue them
should stand on its own feet. Just because stock has been issued to
satisfy options -- or for any other reason -- does not mean that stock
should be repurchased at a price above intrinsic value. Correspondingly,
a stock that sells well below intrinsic value should be repurchased
whether or not stock has previously been issued (or may be because of
outstanding options).
当然发放认股选择权与买回股份不见得就没有道理，但这是两码子事绝不能混为
一谈，一家公司要决定买回自家的股份或发行新股，一定要有充分的理由，如果
只是因为公司发行的认股权被行使或其它莫名其妙的原因，就要强迫公司以高于
实质价值的代价买回股份，实在是没有什么道理，相反的，只要公司的股价远低
于其合理的价值，则不管公司先前是否发行过多的股份或选择权，都应该积极买
回流通在外的股份。
You should be aware that, at certain times in the past, I have erred in not
making repurchases. My appraisal of Berkshire's value was then too
conservative or I was too enthused about some alternative use of funds.
We have therefore missed some opportunities -- though Berkshire's
trading volume at these points was too light for us to have done much
buying, which means that the gain in our per-share value would have
been minimal. (A repurchase of, say, 2% of a company's shares at a 25%
discount from per-share intrinsic value produces only a ?% gain in that
value at most -- and even less if the funds could alternatively have been
deployed in value-building moves.)
在过去，Berkshire确实有一段期间错过了买回自家股份的机会，一方面是由于
我本身对于Berkshire的评价本来就比较保守，也因为当时我将大部分的注意力
摆在如何将资金更有效地运用在其它方面之上，此外由于Berkshire本身的交易
量本来就不大，实在是很难有机会买回足够的量，也就是说想要透过买回
Berkshire股份提高公司实质价值的可能性实在是很低，举例来说，假设我们有
机会以低于实质价值25%的价格买回2%流通在外的股份，也只不过是让公司每
股的实质价值增加0.5%而已，更何况还要再考量把这些资金运用到其它更能够
创造价值的其它用途之上所代表的机会成本。
Some of the letters we've received clearly imply that the writer is
unconcerned about intrinsic value considerations but instead wants us
to trumpet an intention to repurchase so that the stock will rise (or quit
going down). If the writer wants to sell tomorrow, his thinking makes
sense -- for him! -- but if he intends to hold, he should instead hope
the stock falls and trades in enough volume for us to buy a lot of it.
That's the only way a repurchase program can have any real benefit for a
continuing shareholder.
在我们收到的这些信件中，有的仅仅是要求我们对外释放买回股份的讯息，以藉
此拉抬公司股价(或阻止股价进一步下滑)，但其实一点也不关心公司的实质价
值，我们认为若是这些人明天就打算出售股份，那么这样的想法还算合理，至少
就他本身立场而言，然而要是他根本就没打算处分持股，则他应该祈祷公司的股
价进一步下滑，好让我们有机会可以进场买回足够的股份，这是Berkshire唯一
有可能藉由买回股份以增进股东权益的情况。
We will not repurchase shares unless we believe Berkshire stock is
selling well below intrinsic value, conservatively calculated. Nor will we
attempt to talk the stock up or down. (Neither publicly or privately have
I ever told anyone to buy or sell Berkshire shares.) Instead we will give all
shareholders -- and potential shareholders -- the same valuationrelated
information we would wish to have if our positions were
reversed.
除非我们认为Berkshire的股价远低于其实质价值(经过保守的估算)，否则我们
不会考虑买回自家股份，我们也不会发表任何意见来影响股价的高低走势，(不
管是公开或私人的场合，我从来不会告诉任何人该买进或卖出Berkshire的股
份)，相反的我们会设身处地的提供信息给所有的股东，也包含可能加入的潜在
股东，藉此评估公司的价值。
Recently, when the A shares fell below $45,000, we considered making
repurchases. We decided, however, to delay buying, if indeed we elect to
do any, until shareholders have had the chance to review this report. If
we do find that repurchases make sense, we will only rarely place bids
on the New York Stock Exchange ("NYSE"). Instead, we will respond to
offers made directly to us at or below the NYSE bid. If you wish to offer
stock, have your broker call Mark Millard at 402-346-1400. When a
trade occurs, the broker can either record it in the "third market" or on
the NYSE. We will favor purchase of the B shares if they are selling at
more than a 2% discount to the A. We will not engage in transactions
involving fewer than 10 shares of A or 50 shares of B.
最近当A股的股价跌落到45,000美元以下时，我们一度曾考虑要开始买回股
份，不过后来我们还是决定要等看看，至少等股东们有机会看到年度报告后再
说，而如果我们真的要买进，我们将不会经由纽约证券交易所(NYSE)下单，我们
只会接受那些直接找上门的卖单，因此如果你有意卖回股份，请要求你的经纪人
直接打电话402-346-1400给Mark Millard，成交之后，经纪人可以第三市
场或在NYSE申报，若是有B股愿意以A股2%以上的折价卖回我们也很乐意接
受，但A股低于10股或B股低于50股的交易恕不受理。
Please be clear about one point: We will never make purchases with the
intention of stemming a decline in Berkshire's price. Rather we will make
them if and when we believe that they represent an attractive use of the
Company's money. At best, repurchases are likely to have only a very
minor effect on the future rate of gain in our stock's intrinsic value.
请大家特别注意一点，我们绝对不会为了要阻止Berkshire股价下滑而买回股
份，我们之所以会这样做，完全是因为我们认为这样的资金运用对公司最有利，
毕竟买回库藏股对提高公司股份未来的报酬率的影响实在是有限。
Shareholder-Designated Contributions
股东指定捐赠计划
About 97.3% of all eligible shares participated in Berkshire's 1999
shareholder-designated contributions program, with contributions
totaling $17.2 million. A full description of the program appears on
pages 70 - 71.
大约有97.3%的有效股权参与1999年的股东指定捐赠计划，捐出的款项总计
约1,720万美元，有关本计画详细的信息请参阅70-71页。
Cumulatively, over the 19 years of the program, Berkshire has made
contributions of $147 million pursuant to the instructions of our
shareholders. The rest of Berkshire's giving is done by our subsidiaries,
which stick to the philanthropic patterns that prevailed before they were
acquired (except that their former owners themselves take on the
responsibility for their personal charities). In aggregate, our
subsidiaries made contributions of $13.8 million in 1999, including
in-kind donations of $2.5 million.
累计过去19年以来，Berkshire总计已依照股东意愿捐赠出高达1.47亿美元
的款项，除了之外，Berkshire还透过旗下的子公司进行捐赠，而这些慈善活动
都是早在他们被我们购并以前就行之有年的(先前的老板自行本身负责的个人捐
赠计画之外除外)，总的来说，我们旗下的关系企业在1999年总计捐出1,380
万美元，其中包含250万美元等值的物品。
To participate in future programs, you must own Class A shares that are
registered in the name of the actual owner, not the nominee name of a
broker, bank or depository. Shares not so registered on August 31,
2000, will be ineligible for the 2000 program. When you get the
contributions form from us, return it promptly so that it does not get
put aside or forgotten. Designations received after the due date will not
be honored.
想要参加这项计画者，必须拥有A级普通股，同时确定您的股份是登记在自己
而非股票经纪人或保管银行的名下，同时必须在2000年8月31日之前完成登
记，才有权利参与2000年的捐赠计画，当你收到表格后，请立即填写后寄回，
以免被丢在一旁给忘记了，逾期恕不受理。
The Annual Meeting
年度股东大会
This year's Woodstock Weekend for Capitalists will follow a format
slightly different from that of recent years. We need to make a change
because the Aksarben Coliseum, which served us well the past three
years, is gradually being closed down. Therefore, we are relocating to
the Civic Auditorium (which is on Capitol Avenue between 18th and 19th,
behind the Doubletree Hotel), the only other facility in Omaha offering
the space we require.
今年资本家的伍斯达克周末将与往来的形态略有不同，由于前几年年会固定的举
办地点-阿肯萨本体育馆即将关闭，所以今年我们将移师市立体育馆(位于首都
街，双树饭店后方)，全奥玛哈地区大概只剩这里拥有足够我们使用的空间。
The Civic, however, is located in downtown Omaha, and we would create
a parking and traffic nightmare if we were to meet there on a weekday.
We will, therefore, convene on Saturday, April 29, with the doors
opening at 7 a.m., the movie beginning at 8:30 and the meeting itself
commencing at 9:30. As in the past, we will run until 3:30 with a short
break at noon for food, which will be available at the Civic's concession
stands.
由于市立体育馆位于奥玛哈的市中心，可想而知要是我们于周末期间在那里举行
股东会，铁定会造成停车与交通的梦魇，因此我们决定在4月29日星期六举行
股东会，大门会在星期一早上七点开放，同时电影短片照例会在八点半播放，正
式会议则从九点半开始，扣除中午短暂的休息时间，(市立体育馆外备有各类点
心摊)，整个会议将一直进行到下午三点半。
An attachment to the proxy material that is enclosed with this report
explains how you can obtain the credential you will need for admission
to the meeting and other events. As for plane, hotel and car
reservations, we have again signed up American Express (800-799-
6634) to give you special help. In our normal fashion, we will run buses
from the larger hotels to the meeting. After the meeting, the buses will
make trips back to the hotels and to Nebraska Furniture Mart,
Borsheim's and the airport. Even so, you are likely to find a car useful.
后面附有股东会开会投票的相关资料，向各位解释如何拿到入场所许的识别证，
由于预期会有相当多的人与会，我们建议大家最好先预订机位与住宿，美国运通
(电话800-799-6634)将会很高兴为您提供相关安排服务，如同以往，我们会
