这场经典的赛事，甚至还用慢动作播放精彩的第四节，我们以今年封面的颜色表 .37
negotiated in 1999 and initiated six more. All told, these purchases
have cost us about $8 billion, with 97% of that amount paid in cash and
3% in stock. The eight businesses we’ve acquired have aggregate sales
of about $13 billion and employ 58,000 people. Still, we incurred no
debt in making these purchases, and our shares outstanding have
increased only 1/3 of 1%. Better yet, we remain awash in liquid assets and
are both eager and ready for even larger acquisitions.
去年我们一口气完成八件购并案，其中有两件从1999年就开始谈，这些案子的
金额总计高达80亿美元，所有资金完全依靠自有资金支应，没有举债半毛钱，
其中97%是以现金支付，其余3%则用股票，所以流通在外股份仅增加0.3个百
分点而已，这八家企业的年营业额合计高达130亿美元，雇用员工58,000名，
更棒的是目前我们手上的现金依然满满，随时准备再买下更大的公司。
I will detail our purchases in the next section of the report. But I will
tell you now that we have embraced the 21st century by entering such
cutting-edge industries as brick, carpet, insulation and paint. Try to
control your excitement.
不要太着急，后面我还会再详细跟各位报告合并案的内容，在这里，我要向各位
报告，展望21世纪，我们将大举进军砖块、地毯、隔热品与油漆等实体的尖端
产业。
On the minus side, policyholder growth at GEICO slowed to a halt as
the year progressed. It has become much more expensive to obtain new
business. I told you last year that we would get our money’s worth from
stepped-up advertising at GEICO in 2000, but I was wrong. We’ll
examine the reasons later in the report.
另一方面，GEICO的保户成长速度出现停滞的现象，取得新保单的成本越来越
高，去年我曾跟各位打包票说我们所投入大笔广告经费保证值回票价，事实证明
我的判断是错误的，在报告的后段我们还会再仔细检讨原因。
Another negative - which has persisted for several years - is that we
see our equity portfolio as only mildly attractive. We own stocks of some
excellent businesses, but most of our holdings are fully priced and are
unlikely to deliver more than moderate returns in the future. We’re not
alone in facing this problem: The long-term prospect for equities in
general is far from exciting.
另外还有一项几年来一直存在的负面消息，那就是目前我们的股票投资组合的价
位还是没有太大的吸引力，我们确实拥有一些本质不错的股票，但这些公司的股
价大多已合理反应其价值，所以在未来很难再有爆发性的投资报酬，这绝非单一
现象，目前整体股市的长期前景并不像一般人想的那么乐观。
Finally, there is the negative that recurs annually: Charlie Munger,
Berkshire’s Vice Chairman and my partner, and I are a year older than
when we last reported to you. Mitigating this adverse development is
the indisputable fact that the age of your top managers is increasing at a
considerably lower rate - percentage-wise - than is the case at almost
all other major corporations. Better yet, this differential will widen in the
future.
最后还有一项每年都会发生的坏消息，那就是查理曼格-Berkshire的副董事长
兼主要合伙人以及我本人，相较于去年又都老了一岁，所幸比起其它美国大企业
来说，我们的主要经理人老化的速度可以说要慢得多(年度/年龄)，而且这种差
异以后还会越来越大。
Charlie and I continue to aim at increasing Berkshire’s per-share
value at a rate that, over time, will modestly exceed the gain from
owning the S&P 500. As the table on the facing page shows, a small
annual advantage in our favor can, if sustained, produce an anythingbut-
small long-term advantage. To reach our goal we will need to add a
few good businesses to Berkshire’s stable each year, have the
businesses we own generally gain in value, and avoid any material
increase in our outstanding shares. We are confident about meeting the
last two objectives; the first will require some luck.
就长期而言，查理跟我还是一样把Berkshire每股实质价值成长的速度锁定在稍
微超过S&P500指数的目标上，如同封面上那张表所显示的，虽然只是每年几
个百分点的差异，但只要能够持之以恒，久而久之也能产生不少的差距，当然每
年为了达到这个目标，我们都必须固定再为Berkshire增添几家好公司，并让原
先就已经拥有这些好公司的价值保持成长，同时还要避免流通在外的股数继续大
幅膨胀，个人觉得要做到后两点没有太大问题，但第一点则真的要碰运气。
It’s appropriate here to thank two groups that made my job both
easy and fun last year - just as they do every year. First, our operating
managers continue to run their businesses in splendid fashion, which
allows me to spend my time allocating capital rather than supervising
them. (I wouldn’t be good at that anyway.)
在这里要特别感谢两组团队让我去年的工作一如往年般的轻松愉快，首先，我们
旗下事业的经理人依然继续坚守岗位表现杰出，完全不让我操心，(当然这本来
就不是我的专长)，使我可以将大部分的心思摆在如何运用资金之上。
Our managers are a very special breed. At most large companies, the
truly talented divisional managers seldom have the job they really want.
Instead they yearn to become CEOs, either at their present employer or
elsewhere. Indeed, if they stay put, they and their colleagues are likely
to feel they have failed.
我们旗下的经理人是非常特殊的一群，在大部分的公司，真正有能力的部门经理
很少乐在本身的工作，他们通常渴望能够尽快晋升成为总裁，不论是在现在的公
司或跳槽到别家公司都可以，而要是他们不积极争取，他自己本身以及其同事，
反而会认定他为懦夫。
At Berkshire, our all-stars have exactly the jobs they want, ones that
they hope and expect to keep throughout their business lifetimes. They
therefore concentrate solely on maximizing the long-term value of the
businesses that they "own" and love. If the businesses succeed, they
have succeeded. And they stick with us: In our last 36 years, Berkshire
has never had a manager of a significant subsidiary voluntarily leave to
join another business.
在Berkshire，我们所有的明星经理人都乐在本身的工作，一份他们想要而且期
望能够终生拥有的事业，也因此他们可以完全专注在如何把这份他们拥有且热爱
事业的长期价值极大化，如果这份事业成功了，也就等于他们本身成功了，他们
一直与我们同在，在Berkshire过去36年来，还没有听说过任何一位旗下事业
经理人自动跳槽离开Berkshire的。
The other group to which I owe enormous thanks is the home-office
staff. After the eight acquisitions more than doubled our worldwide
workforce to about 112,000, Charlie and I went soft last year and added
one more person at headquarters. (Charlie, bless him, never lets me
forget Ben Franklin’s advice: "A small leak can sink a great ship.") Now
we have 13.8 people.
还有另外一群伙伴，我要深深致上谢意，那就是Berkshire企业总部的员工，在
新购并的八个事业加入之后，我们全球的员工总数增加到112,000人，为此查
理跟我的态度稍微软化，答应让总部人员编制增加一名成为13.8人(查理这小
子，总是提醒我富兰克林的名言，为山九仞，功亏一篑)。
This tiny band works miracles. In 2000 it handled all of the details
connected with our eight acquisitions, processed extensive regulatory
and tax filings (our tax return covers 4,896 pages), smoothly produced
an annual meeting to which 25,000 tickets were issued, and accurately
dispensed checks to 3,660 charities designated by our shareholders. In
addition, the group dealt with all the routine tasks served up by a
company with a revenue run-rate of $40 billion and more than 300,000
owners. And, to add to all of this, the other 12.8 are a delight to be
around.
这一小群菁英再次创造了奇迹，2000年他们一口气处理了八件购并案大大小小
各项事宜、应付例行法令行政规范与税务申报(光是申报书就厚达4,896页)、让
总计25,000名股东出席的股东会圆满落幕并正确无误地发出股东指定捐赠的
支票给3,660家慈善机构，除此之外，对于一家集团营业额高达400亿美金、
股东超过30万人的大公司，其日常行政事务有多少可想而知，说到这里，有这
12.8人在身边感觉真好。
I should pay to have my job.
我实在是不应该领薪水，而要付薪水。
Acquisitions of 2000
2000年的购并案
Our acquisition technique at Berkshire is simplicity itself: We answer
the phone. I’m also glad to report that it rings a bit more often now,
because owners and/or managers increasingly wish to join their
companies with Berkshire. Our acquisition criteria are set forth on page
23, and the number to call is 402-346-1400.
在Berkshire，我们的购并策略极其简单-那就是静待电话铃响，可喜的是，现
在电话好象有点应接不暇，原因在于有越来越多的公司及其经理人慕名而来想要
加入Berkshire的行列，关于我们购并公司的标准请参见年报23页，或请电
402-346-1400。
Let me tell you a bit about the businesses we have purchased during
the past 14 months, starting with the two transactions that were
initiated in 1999, but closed in 2000. (This list excludes some smaller
purchases that were made by the managers of our subsidiaries and that,
in most cases, will be integrated into their operations.)
接下来让我详细向各位报告过去十四个月以来，我们到底买进了哪些公司，先说
说两件从1999年就开始谈，并于2000年敲定的个案，(本表并未包含旗下子
公司零零星星所买下规模较小的个案，通常它们都会被统一纳入个别子公司的营
运报告中)。
● I described the first purchase - 76% of MidAmerican Energy - in
last year’s report. Because of regulatory constraints on our voting
privileges, we perform only a "one-line" consolidation of
MidAmerican’s earnings and equity in our financial statements. If
we instead fully consolidated the company’s figures, our revenues
in 2000 would have been $5 billion greater than we reported,
though net income would remain the same.
● 第一个案子是中美能源76%的股权，在去年的报告中，我就曾提到，由
于行政法规限制我们对该公司的控制权，所以我们只能透过长期投资权益
法，将该公司的盈余与权益纳入母公司的财务报表之上，事实上要是能够
将该公司的财务数字充分反应在母公司的帐上，则Berkshire的营收将至
少增加50亿美元以上，当然损益数字并不会有任何变化。
● On November 23, 1999, I received a one-page fax from Bruce
Cort that appended a Washington Post article describing an
aborted buyout of CORT Business Services. Despite his name,
Bruce has no connection with CORT. Rather, he is an airplane
broker who had sold Berkshire a jet in 1986 and who, before the
fax, had not been in touch with me for about ten years.
1999年11月23号我收到由Bruce Cort署名的传真，后附一篇刊登在
华盛顿邮报有关CORT商业服务公司标购失败的新闻，事实上，除了名
字巧合之外，Bruce Cort与CORT公司完全没有关系，这位先生是一位
中古飞机中介商，巧合的是，他本人还曾经在1986年卖过一架飞机给
Berkshire，在这张传真之前，我已经有十年没有跟他有过任何接触。
I knew nothing about CORT, but I immediately printed out its SEC
filings and liked what I saw. That same day I told Bruce I had a
possible interest and asked him to arrange a meeting with Paul
Arnold, CORT’s CEO. Paul and I got together on November 29,
and I knew at once that we had the right ingredients for a
purchase: a fine though unglamorous business, an outstanding
manager, and a price (going by that on the failed deal) that made
sense.
在此之前，我对CORT公司一无所知，但我马上调出该公司向证管会申
报的文件，一看之下大喜过望，就在当天，我向Bruce表示我对该公司
很有兴趣，并请他立即帮我安排与该公司总裁Paul Arnold会面，不久后
Paul跟我在11月29号碰面，当下我就知道我们很有可能会成交，那是
一家朴实无华的好公司，同时价格也合理(当然多多少少受到先前流标的
影响)。
Operating out of 117 showrooms, CORT is the national leader in
"rent-to-rent" furniture, primarily used in offices but also by
temporary occupants of apartments. This business, it should be
noted, has no similarity to "rent-to-own" operations, which
usually involve the sale of home furnishings and electronics to
people having limited income and poor credit.
拥有117个外部展示点，CORT是全美办公室家具出租(也有临时公寓使
用者)的领导品牌，必须说明一点，这个行业与分期付款租赁并不相同，
后者通常将目标锁定在推销电子产品及家具，给经济能力有限且信用记录
不佳客户者。
We quickly purchased CORT for Wesco, our 80%-owned
subsidiary, paying about $386 million in cash. You will find more
details about CORT’s operations in Wesco’s 1999 and 2000
annual reports. Both Charlie and I enjoy working with Paul, and
CORT looks like a good bet to beat our original expectations.
我们很快地透过持有80%股权的子公司Wesco名义以3.86亿美元的现
金买下CORT，大家可以在Wesco 1999年及2000年的年报中找到更
多有关CORT的讯息，查理跟我都很喜欢与Paul一起共事，而CORT的
表现更超乎我们的预期，我们算是押对宝了。
● Early last year, Ron Ferguson of General Re put me in contact with
Bob Berry, whose family had owned U.S. Liability for 49 years. This
insurer, along with two sister companies, is a medium-sized,
highly-respected writer of unusual risks - "excess and surplus
lines" in insurance jargon. After Bob and I got in touch, we agreed
by phone on a half-stock, half-cash deal.
去年初，通用再保的董事长Ron Ferguson帮我联络上Bob Berry，其家
族49年来一直拥有美国责任险公司，这家保险公司，加上其它两家姊妹
公司都是属于中小型、声誉卓著的特殊险保险公司，套句保险业界的行
话，那是好又多的业务，而Bob在与我接触之后，也同意以一半股票，
一半现金的方式进行交易。
In recent years, Tom Nerney has managed the operation for the
Berry family and has achieved a rare combination of excellent
growth and unusual profitability. Tom is a powerhouse in other
ways as well. In addition to having four adopted children (two
from Russia), he has an extended family: the Philadelphia Belles, a
young-teen girls basketball team that Tom coaches. The team
had a 62-4 record last year and finished second in the AAU
national tournament.
近几年来，都是由Tom Nerney为Berry家族经营这家公司，不论是成
长速度或是获利能力的表现都相当突出，Tom本身更是精力充沛，不但
亲自认养四名小孩(其中有两个来自俄国)，他本身还担任教练带领一支来
自费城的青少女篮球队，这只球队去年拥有62胜4败的辉煌战绩，并在
AAU全国锦标赛中夺得亚军。
Few property-casualty companies are outstanding businesses.
We have far more than our share, and U.S. Liability adds luster to
the collection.
好的产物意外险公司本来就不多，但我们却拥有不少，这超过我们应得之
份，美国责任险公司的加入，无异为我们更增添辉煌。
● Ben Bridge Jeweler was another purchase we made by phone,
prior to any face-to-face meeting between me and the
management. Ed Bridge, who with his cousin, Jon, manages this
65-store West Coast retailer, is a friend of Barnett Helzberg, from
whom we bought Helzberg Diamonds in 1995. Upon learning that
the Bridge family proposed to sell its company, Barnett gave
Berkshire a strong recommendation. Ed then called and explained
his business to me, also sending some figures, and we made a
deal, again half for cash and half for stock.
Ben Bridge珠宝公司是另外一件靠电话成交的个案，在这之前我们双方
连面对面谈话都没有，Ed Bridge是Barnett Helzberg的好朋友，1995
年我们向Barnett买下贺兹柏格珠宝，Ed跟他的侄子Jon共同经营这家
位于西岸拥有65家分店的珠宝公司，在听到Bridge有意出售公司之后，
Barnett立刻强烈建议Berkshire买进，于是Ed打电话向我说明公司营
运的状况，同时送了一些报表资料过来，然后双方就此成交，这次一样是
一半现金，一半股票。
Ed and Jon are fourth generation owner-managers of a business
started 89 years ago in Seattle. Both the business and the family -
including Herb and Bob, the fathers of Jon and Ed - enjoy
extraordinary reputations. Same-store sales have increased by
9%, 11%, 13%, 10%, 12%, 21% and 7% over the past seven years, a
truly remarkable record.
早从89年前，该公司在西雅图创立之后，到现在Ed与Jon已经是第四
代了，经营成员还包括Herb及Bob，他们分别是Jon与Ed的父亲，在
当地享有盛誉，过去七年来，该公司的营业额分别成长了9%、11%、13%、
10%、12%、21%及7%，这个记录真是惊人。
It was vital to the family that the company operate in the future as
in the past. No one wanted another jewelry chain to come in and
decimate the organization with ideas about synergy and cost
saving (which, though they would never work, were certain to be
tried). I told Ed and Jon that they would be in charge, and they
knew I could be believed: After all, it’s obvious that your
Chairman would be a disaster at actually running a store or selling
jewelry (though there are members of his family who have earned
black belts as purchasers).
对于该家族而言，公司的运作能否一如往常，至关重要，没有人愿意坐视
其它珠宝连锁商趁虚而入，或是因为提出综效及降低成本等馊主意让公司
营运走下坡(虽然大家可以预知这一点效果都不会有，但还是一定会被要
求试看看)，然而我却明确告知仍由Ed及Jon负全责，他们也知道我说话
算话，毕竟本人还有自知之明，要我负责经营一家珠宝专卖店，铁定会是
一场灾难，虽然我的家人买珠宝买到可以获颁黑带的荣衔。
In their typically classy way, the Bridges allocated a substantial
portion of the proceeds from their sale to the hundreds of coworkers
who had helped the company achieve its success. We’re
proud to be associated with both the family and the company.
令人敬佩的是，Bridges家族将出售事业的所得，与协助公司成功的数百
位员工一起分享，我们很荣幸可以与这样的家族及公司建立关系。
● In July we acquired Justin Industries, the leading maker of Western
