这场经典的赛事，甚至还用慢动作播放精彩的第四节，我们以今年封面的颜色表 .39
these factors.
我们最主要的本业就是保险，当然其它事业也相当重要，想要了解Berkshire，
你就必须知道如何去评估一家保险公司，其中主要的关键因素有(1)这个行业所
能产生的浮存金数量(2)以及它的成本(3)最重要的是这些因素长期的展望。
To begin with, float is money we hold but don't own. In an insurance
operation, float arises because premiums are received before losses are
paid, an interval that sometimes extends over many years. During that
time, the insurer invests the money. This pleasant activity typically
carries with it a downside: The premiums that an insurer takes in usually
do not cover the losses and expenses it eventually must pay. That leaves
it running an "underwriting loss," which is the cost of float. An insurance
business has value if its cost of float over time is less than the cost the
company would otherwise incur to obtain funds. But the business is a
lemon if its cost of float is higher than market rates for money.
首先浮存金是一项我们持有但却不属于我们的资金，在保险公司的营运中，浮存
金产生的原因在于保险公司在真正支付损失理赔之前，一般会先向保户收取保
费，在这期间保险公司会将资金运用在其它投资之上，当然这样的好处也必须要
付出代价，通常保险业者收取的保费并不足以因应最后支付出去的相关损失与费
用，于是保险公司便会发生承保损失，这就是浮存金的成本，而当一家公司取得
浮存金成本，就长期而言低于从其它管道取得资金的成本时，它就有存在的价
值，否则一旦保险事业取得浮存金的成本若远高于货币市场利率时，它就像是一
颗极酸的柠檬。
A caution is appropriate here: Because loss costs must be estimated,
insurers have enormous latitude in figuring their underwriting results,
and that makes it very difficult for investors to calculate a company's
true cost of float. Errors of estimation, usually innocent but sometimes
not, can be huge. The consequences of these miscalculations flow
directly into earnings. An experienced observer can usually detect
large-scale errors in reserving, but the general public can typically do
no more than accept what's presented, and at times I have been amazed
by the numbers that big-name auditors have implicitly blessed. Both the
income statements and balance sheets of insurers can be minefields.
有一点必须特别注意的是，因为损失成本必须仰赖估算，所以保险业者对于承保
结算的成绩有相当大伸缩的空间，连带使得投资人很难正确地衡量一家保险公司
真正的浮存金成本，估计错误，通常是无心，但有时却是故意，与真实的结果往
往会有很大的差距，而这种结果直接影响到公司的损益表上，有经验的行家通常
可以经由公司的准备提列情形发现重大的错误，但对于一般投资大众来说，除了
被迫接受财务报表的数字之外，别无他法，而我个人常常被这些经过各大会计师
事务所背书的财务报告所吓到，许多保险公司的损益表与资产负债表上布满了许
多地雷。
At Berkshire, we strive to be both consistent and conservative in our
reserving. But we will make mistakes. And we warn you that there is
nothing symmetrical about surprises in the insurance business: They
almost always are unpleasant.
在Berkshire我们对于损失准备提列尽量采取保守且一贯的做法，但我们仍不免
会犯错，不过我还是要警告大家，保险业本来就会发生很多意外，而且通常都不
会是什么好消息。
The table that follows shows (at intervals) the float generated by the
various segments of Berkshire’s insurance operations since we entered
the business 34 years ago upon acquiring National Indemnity Company
(whose traditional lines are included in the segment "Other Primary").
For the table we have calculated our float - which we generate in large
amounts relative to our premium volume - by adding net loss reserves,
loss adjustment reserves, funds held under reinsurance assumed and
unearned premium reserves, and then subtracting insurance-related
receivables, prepaid acquisition costs, prepaid taxes and deferred
charges applicable to assumed reinsurance. (Don’t panic, there won’t be
a quiz.)
下表中所显示的数字是，Berkshire自取得国家产险公司经营权，进入保险事业
34年以来所贡献的浮存金，(其中传统业务包含在其它主险项下)，在这张计算
浮存金的表中，(相对于收到的保费收入，我们持有的浮存金部位算是相当大的)
我们将所有的损失准备、损失费用调整准备、再保预先收取的资金与未赚取保费
加总后，再扣除应付佣金、预付购并成本、预付税负以及取得再保业务的相关递
延费用后，所得出浮存金的数额，不要紧张，这不是什么考试!
Yearend Float (in $ millions)
Year GEICO General Re
Other
Reinsurance
Other
Primary Total
1967 20 20
1977 40 131 171
1987 701 807 1,508
1997 2,917 4,014 455 7,386
1998 3,125 14,909 4,305 415 22,754
1999 3,444 15,166 6,285 403 25,298
2000 3,943 15,525 7,805 598 27,871
We’re pleased by the growth in our float during 2000 but not happy
with its cost. Over the years, our cost of float has been very close to
zero, with the underwriting profits realized in most years offsetting the
occasional terrible year such as 1984, when our cost was a staggering
19%. In 2000, however, we had an underwriting loss of $1.6 billion,
which gave us a float cost of 6%. Absent a mega-catastrophe, we expect
our float cost to fall in 2001 - perhaps substantially - in large part
because of corrections in pricing at General Re that should increasingly
be felt as the year progresses. On a smaller scale, GEICO may
experience the same improving trend.
对于2000年的浮存金成长我们感到相当欣慰，但却对其成本不甚满意，一直以
来，我们浮存金成本通常都维持在接近于零的低水准，有时好的时候，还能享有
可观的承保利益，来弥补像1984年那样糟糕的年度，当年的资金成本高达
19%，不过2000年我们的承保损失却高达16亿美金，这使得我们的浮存金成
本飙高至6%，除非再发生什么重大的灾难，否则我们预期2001年的浮存金成
本将会大幅下降，主要的原因是General RE已经逐渐开始反映调整价格，至于
GEICO虽然规模较小，但也应该会有同样的情形。
There are two factors affecting our cost of float that are very rare at
other insurers but that now loom large at Berkshire. First, a few insurers
that are currently experiencing large losses have offloaded a significant
portion of these on us in a manner that penalizes our current earnings
but gives us float we can use for many years to come. After the loss that
we incur in the first year of the policy, there are no further costs
attached to this business.
相较于其它保险同业，Berkshire现在有两项相当罕见但却越来越重要的因素影
响到其浮存金的成本，第一是部份同业目前正面临相当严重的承保损失，迫使我
们必须跟着分摊，而影响到我们短期的盈余表现，但另一方面也让我们在未来几
年有更多的浮存金可以运用，而在保单第一年的损失发生过后，以后年度将不会
再有这方面的成本。
When these policies are properly priced, we welcome the pain-today,
gain-tomorrow effects they have. In 1999, $400 million of our
underwriting loss (about 27.8% of the total) came from business of this
kind and in 2000 the figure was $482 million (34.4% of our loss). We
have no way of predicting how much similar business we will write in the
future, but what we do get will typically be in large chunks. Because
these transactions can materially distort our figures, we will tell you
about them as they occur.
只要保单的价格合理，我们乐于接受这类先苦后甘的结果，在1999年所有的承
保损失当中，有4亿美元(约占总损失的27.8%)是来自于这类的业务，至于2000
年则有4.82亿美元(约占总损失的34.4%)，我们无法预测以后每年能够接到多
少这类的业务，不过只要有案件金额通常都不小，而也由于这类的交易往往会严
重影响到我们的损益数字，所以只要发生我一定会向各位报告。
Other reinsurers have little taste for this insurance. They simply can’t
stomach what huge underwriting losses do to their reported results,
even though these losses are produced by policies whose overall
economics are certain to be favorable. You should be careful, therefore,
in comparing our underwriting results with those of other insurers.
其它再保业者对这类业务往往没有多大兴趣，因为他们根本就无法接受其财务报
表突然出现重大的损失，即便可以确定这类业务长期的结果都相当不错，所以各
位在拿我们的数字跟其它同业做比较时，要特别注意这一点。
An even more significant item in our numbers - which, again, you
won’t find much of elsewhere - arises from transactions in which we
assume past losses of a company that wants to put its troubles behind
it. To illustrate, the XYZ insurance company might have last year bought
a policy obligating us to pay the first $1 billion of losses and loss
adjustment expenses from events that happened in, say, 1995 and
earlier years. These contracts can be very large, though we always
require a cap on our exposure. We entered into a number of such
transactions in 2000 and expect to close several more in 2001.
另外还有一个影响更大的因素，也是你在别的地方找不到的，那就是有些公司想
要把过去发生但却不确定的损失解决掉，简单的说，有家XYZ保险公司在去年
向我们买了一张保单，约定我们必须支付头10亿美元的损失再加上以前年度，
比如说1995年后续的损失调整费用，这些合约的金额有可能相当大，当然不论
如何，我们还是会定一个上限，我们在2000年签了几件这类的合约，到了2001
年也会再签下几件。
Under GAAP accounting, this "retroactive" insurance neither benefits
nor penalizes our current earnings. Instead, we set up an asset called
"deferred charges applicable to assumed reinsurance," in an amount
reflecting the difference between the premium we receive and the
(higher) losses we expect to pay (for which reserves are immediately
established). We then amortize this asset by making annual charges to
earnings that create equivalent underwriting losses. You will find the
amount of the loss that we incur from these transactions in both our
quarterly and annual management discussion. By their nature, these
losses will continue for many years, often stretching into decades. As an
offset, though, we have the use of float - lots of it.
依据一般公认会计原则，这类追溯型的保险对于当年度的盈余不会有任何的影
响，反倒是我们的报表因此增加了一项叫做"再保递延支出"的会计科目，将收到
的保费收入与估计将支付的理赔损失(当然在此之前已先提列准备)的差额计
入，之后我们再将分年摊销在这个科目项下的金额列为承保的损失，大家可以在
季报与年报的经营说明中看到相关的信息，依其特性，这类的损失会持续发生很
多年，甚至达几十年，当然相对的我们可以得到大笔浮存金的运用权利。
Clearly, float carrying an annual cost of this kind is not as desirable
as float we generate from policies that are expected to produce an
underwriting profit (of which we have plenty). Nevertheless, this
retroactive insurance should be decent business for us.
很明显的，这类浮存金所负担的成本不像其它一般业务能够为我们带来承保利益
(这种好康的我们可是有很多)，尽管如此，追溯保险对我们来说，仍然算是不错
的买卖。
The net of all this is that a) I expect our cost of float to be very
attractive in the future but b) rarely to return to a "no-cost" mode
because of the annual charge that retroactive reinsurance will lay on us.
Also - obviously - the ultimate benefits that we derive from float will
depend not only on its cost but, fully as important, how effectively we
deploy it.
综合以上因素最后得到的结果是a)我预期以后浮存金的成本可以压得非常低，
b)但由于必须负担前述提到的追溯再保险每年提列的费用，因此可能没有办法像
以前一样完全不用成本。当然很明显的，这些浮存金对我们到底是好是坏，除了
当初取得的成本外，我们运用这笔资金的效率高低也同等重要。
Our retroactive business is almost single-handedly the work of Ajit
Jain, whose praises I sing annually. It is impossible to overstate how
valuable Ajit is to Berkshire. Don’t worry about my health; worry about
his.
而我们追溯再保险业务几乎完全由Ajit Jain一手包办，每年照例我都会给他褒
奖一番，实在是很难去估计Ajit在Berkshire所代表的价值，大家除了关心我
的健康之外，更应该关心他的健康。
Last year, Ajit brought home a $2.4 billion reinsurance premium,
perhaps the largest in history, from a policy that retroactively covers a
major U.K. company. Subsequently, he wrote a large policy protecting
the Texas Rangers from the possibility that Alex Rodriguez will become
permanently disabled. As sports fans know, "A-Rod" was signed for
$252 million, a record, and we think that our policy probably also set a
record for disability insurance. We cover many other sports figures as
well.
去年，Ajit光靠着一家英国的主要保险公司的追溯再保险，就替我们收到24亿
美元的再保费收入，这有可能创下业界的历史新高，之后，他又接了美国大联盟
德州游骑兵队一张钜额保单，投保强打者Alex Rodrriguez可能终身不遂的风
险，喜爱棒球的人士都知道，A-Rod曾以2.52亿美元的天价签约，我想我们的
这张保单应该又创下了失能险的保额记录，此外我们也受理许多运动明星的保
险。
In another example of his versatility, Ajit last fall negotiated a very
interesting deal with Grab.com, an Internet company whose goal was to
attract millions of people to its site and there to extract information
from them that would be useful to marketers. To lure these people,
Grab.com held out the possibility of a $1 billion prize (having a $170
million present value) and we insured its payment. A message on the
site explained that the chance of anyone winning the prize was low, and
indeed no one won. But the possibility of a win was far from nil.
此外Ajit也展现他多才多艺的天份，去年秋天他与一家网络公司Grab.com协
商订出一张相当有趣的保单，该公司成立的目标是希望吸引数百万的网友到其网
站，并从其中撷取有用的资料给行销公司，而为了要吸引网友上门，Grab.com
推出了一个10亿美元的大奖(约等于1.7亿美元的现值)，万一真的有人中奖时，
由我们保证支付这笔款项，当然网站上也强调得到这笔奖金的机会微乎其微，事
后证明没有人得到，但在当时中奖的机率并非全无可能。
Writing such a policy, we receive a modest premium, face the
possibility of a huge loss, and get good odds. Very few insurers like that
equation. And they’re unable to cure their unhappiness by reinsurance.
Because each policy has unusual - and sometimes unique -
characteristics, insurers can’t lay off the occasional shock loss through
their standard reinsurance arrangements. Therefore, any insurance CEO
doing a piece of business like this must run the small, but real, risk of a
horrible quarterly earnings number, one that he would not enjoy
explaining to his board or shareholders. Charlie and I, however, like any
proposition that makes compelling mathematical sense, regardless of
its effect on reported earnings.
签下这类的保单，我们将可以预先收到为数可观的保费，但同样也必须面临潜在
的重大损失，所幸机率上对我们有利，并不是所有的保险业者都爱玩这种游戏，
因为他们没办法利用再保险来克服这样的不愉快感，由于每一张保单都不寻常，
甚至有时拥有其独特性，保险业者通常无法透过一般的再保安排来规避这类突发
的潜在重大损失，也因此几乎所有的保险公司总裁在经营事业时都必须面临这种
机率不大但却又不容忽视可能深深影响单一季盈余数字的风险，这简直是有如芒
刺在背，我想没有任何一位经理人会喜欢向董事会或股东会解释这中间的为难，
不过对于查理跟我本人而言，只要算盘拨起来合理，我们根本就不在乎其对帐面
损益数字可能的影响。
At General Re, the news has turned considerably better: Ron
Ferguson, along with Joe Brandon, Tad Montross, and a talented
supporting cast took many actions during 2000 to bring that company’s
profitability back to past standards. Though our pricing is not fully
corrected, we have significantly repriced business that was severely
unprofitable or dropped it altogether. If there’s no mega-catastrophe in
2001, General Re’s float cost should fall materially.
至于General RE，情况变得比以前好多了，Ron Ferguson加上Joe Brandon
与Tad Montross以及一班能干的团队在2000年实行了许多做法，让公司的
获利回到过去的水平，虽然我们的订价还无法完全修正过来，但对于获利情况最
差的那部份业务，我们已大幅调整价格或干脆舍弃掉，如果2001年没有再发生
什么重大的天灾人祸，General RE的浮存金成本可望大幅下降。
The last couple of years haven’t been any fun for Ron and his crew.
But they have stepped up to tough decisions, and Charlie and I applaud
them for these. General Re has several important and enduring business
advantages. Better yet, it has managers who will make the most of them.
过去几年，对于Ron跟他的团队来说并不好过，但所幸他们已经做出最困难的
抉择，查理跟我仍然给予其肯定的掌声，General RE拥有许多重要且稳定的竞
争优势，更棒的是，我相信其经理人一定能够充分发挥运用这些优势。
In aggregate, our smaller insurance operations produced an
excellent underwriting profit in 2000 while generating significant float -
just as they have done for more than a decade. If these companies were
a single and separate operation, people would consider it an
outstanding insurer. Because the companies instead reside in an
enterprise as large as Berkshire, the world may not appreciate their
accomplishments - but I sure do. Last year I thanked Rod Eldred, John
Kizer, Don Towle and Don Wurster, and I again do so. In addition, we
now also owe thanks to Tom Nerney at U.S. Liability and Michael
Stearns, the new head of Cypress.
总的来说，其它规模较小的保险业务在2000年产生了可观的承保利益，同时一
