这场经典的赛事，甚至还用慢动作播放精彩的第四节，我们以今年封面的颜色表 .40
如过去十年来持续贡献大量的浮存金，如果把这些公司视为单一独立的企业，那
么他们绝对可以称得上是一家经营绩效优异的保险公司，而因为这些事业隐身在
Berkshire如此庞大的事业体中，外界无法理解他们的努力与成就，但至少我个
人能够深深地体会地，去年我感谢过Rod、John、Don等人，今年则还要再加
上美国责任险的Tom以及Cypress的新任主管Michael。
You may notice that Brad Kinstler, who was CEO of Cypress and
whose praises I’ve sung in the past, is no longer in the list above. That’s
because we needed a new manager at Fechheimer Bros., our
Cincinnati-based uniform company, and called on Brad. We seldom
move Berkshire managers from one enterprise to another, but maybe
we should try it more often: Brad is hitting home runs in his new job,
just as he always did at Cypress.
大家可能会发现过去我常称赞的Brad- Cypress公司的前任总裁，已不在上述
的名单当中，那是因为我们位于辛辛那堤的制服公司-费区海默需要一位新的经
理人，所以我们特地拜托Brad，在Berkshire我们很少调动经理人，不过现在
看来我们应该要再多试一试，因为Brad在新职务上表现相当优异，就如同他原
来在Cypress的表现一般。
GEICO (1-800-847-7536 or GEICO.com)
盖可保险 (1-800-847-7536 or GEICO.com)
We show below the usual table detailing GEICO’s growth. Last year I
enthusiastically told you that we would step up our expenditures on
advertising in 2000 and that the added dollars were the best investment
that GEICO could make. I was wrong: The extra money we spent did not
produce a commensurate increase in inquiries. Additionally, the
percentage of inquiries that we converted into sales fell for the first time
in many years. These negative developments combined to produce a
sharp increase in our per-policy acquisition cost.
下表是用来显示盖可保险成长幅度的一张表，去年我很兴奋地向各位报告我们
2000年在广告行销的大笔投入，并强调每一分钱都节节实实花在刀口上，事实
证明我错了，我们额外投入的经费并没有为我们相对增加询问的电话，而且平均
每通询问电话最后成交的比率几年来也首度下滑，这些不利的发展使得我们平均
每张保单的取得成本大幅增加。
Years
New Auto
Policies(1)
Auto Policies
In-Force(1)
1993 346,882 2,011,055
1994 384,217 2,147,549
1995 443,539 2,310,037
1996 592,300 2,543,699
1997 868,430 2,949,439
1998 1,249,875 3,562,644
1999 1,648,095 4,328,900
2000 1,472,853 4,696,842
(1) "Voluntary" only; excludes assigned risks and the like.
Agonizing over errors is a mistake. But acknowledging and analyzing
them can be useful, though that practice is rare in corporate
boardrooms. There, Charlie and I have almost never witnessed a candid
post-mortem of a failed decision, particularly one involving an
acquisition. A notable exception to this never-look-back approach is
that of The Washington Post Company, which unfailingly and objectively
reviews its acquisitions three years after they are made. Elsewhere,
triumphs are trumpeted, but dumb decisions either get no follow-up or
are rationalized.
事后悔恨犯下的错误固然不对，但勇敢承认并虚心检讨原因却大有助益，虽然这
种景象在美国企业的内部高层会议上并不常见，查理跟我本人几乎很少看到有人
会诚心诚意的检讨一项错误的决策，尤其是跟购并案有关，唯一著名的例外是华
盛顿邮报认真客观地检讨三年前的一项失败的购并案，除此之外，就只看到大家
对成功的案子歌功颂德，至于愚蠢的决定则只字未提，置之不理。
The financial consequences of these boners are regularly dumped
into massive restructuring charges or write-offs that are casually waved
off as "nonrecurring." Managements just love these. Indeed, in recent
years it has seemed that no earnings statement is complete without
them. The origins of these charges, though, are never explored. When it
comes to corporate blunders, CEOs invoke the concept of the Virgin
Birth.
这类错误投资最后的下场往往是在财报上一次打销提列非常损失，专业经理人最
喜欢这样搞，这使得近年来这类"不常"发生的科目，反而成为一般公司的损益表
上的常客，至于它发生的原因则没有人愿意花时间去深究，CEO通常将它们归
类为无性生殖。
To get back to our examination of GEICO: There are at least four
factors that could account for the increased costs we experienced in
obtaining new business last year, and all probably contributed in some
manner.
回到GEICO的检讨，去年取得成本大幅增加主要归咎于四个原因，且全部都有
一个共通点。
First, in our advertising we have pushed "frequency" very hard, and
we probably overstepped in certain media. We’ve always known that
increasing the number of messages through any medium would
eventually produce diminishing returns. The third ad in an hour on a
given cable channel is simply not going to be as effective as the first.
首先，我们的广告频率过高，在某些媒体的曝光实在是过度频繁，大家知道大量
且密集透过媒体传递讯息的效果绝对是递减的，同样在有线电视，一个小时内连
续第三波的广告，其效果绝对比不上第一波。
Second, we may have already picked much of the low-hanging fruit.
Clearly, the willingness to do business with a direct marketer of
insurance varies widely among individuals: Indeed, some percentage of
Americans - particularly older ones - are reluctant to make direct
purchases of any kind. Over the years, however, this reluctance will ebb.
A new generation with new habits will find the savings from direct
purchase of their auto insurance too compelling to ignore.
其次，所有的软柿子可能都已经被我们给捡光了，很明显的，虽然愿意经由直效
行销参与投保的客户群分布甚广，但不论如何，老一辈的人就是不愿透过这种管
道投保，当然时间站在我们这一边，这种排斥感终究会消退，新一代乐于接受新
事物的年轻人，很快就会发现透过直接投保可以为他们省下大笔的保费。
Another factor that surely decreased the conversion of inquiries into
sales was stricter underwriting by GEICO. Both the frequency and
severity of losses increased during the year, and rates in certain areas
became inadequate, in some cases substantially so. In these instances,
we necessarily tightened our underwriting standards. This tightening,
as well as the many rate increases we put in during the year, made our
offerings less attractive to some prospects.
另外一个肯定会降低成交率的因素是GEICO的投保资格审核趋严，去年不管是
事故发生的频率与严重性都提高，使得某些地区的费率变得不合理，在这种情况
下，我们必须提高承保的标准，同时提高费率，这两项变动使得我们相对于其它
对手的竞争力略微下降。
A high percentage of callers, it should be emphasized, can still save
money by insuring with us. Understandably, however, some prospects
will switch to save $200 per year but will not switch to save $50.
Therefore, rate increases that bring our prices closer to those of our
competitors will hurt our acceptance rate, even when we continue to
offer the best deal.
当然我必须强调，对于大部分打电话上门投保的顾客来说，还他们是可以省下一
大笔钱，不过比起过去可以省下200美元，现在只能省50美元，其吸引力确
实大不如前，所以费率提升使得我们的价格与其它同业相近，绝对会影响我们在
客户间受欢迎的程度。
Finally, the competitive picture changed in at least one important
respect: State Farm - by far the largest personal auto insurer, with about
19% of the market - has been very slow to raise prices. Its costs,
however, are clearly increasing right along with those of the rest of the
industry. Consequently, State Farm had an underwriting loss last year
from auto insurance (including rebates to policyholders) of 18% of
premiums, compared to 4% at GEICO. Our loss produced a float cost for
us of 6.1%, an unsatisfactory result. (Indeed, at GEICO we expect float,
over time, to be free.) But we estimate that State Farm’s float cost in
2000 was about 23%. The willingness of the largest player in the
industry to tolerate such a cost makes the economics difficult for other
participants.
最后，产险业的竞争版图产生了一项重大变化，那就是目前排名第一市占率约
19%的State Farm，对于费率调整的反应速度相当缓慢，虽然他的成本的增加
幅度肯定与其它同业不相上下，State Farm去年的承保损失率(包含回馈保户的
退佣)高达18%，相较之下GEICO则只有4%，即便如此我们浮存金的成本也高
达6.1%，(相对于我们预估长期成本为零，这种结果当然不令人满意)，我们估
算State Farm 2000年的浮存金成本将高达23%，而当市场上最大的玩家，竟
然愿意忍受如此高的经营成本，其它业者的处境就可想而知了。
That does not take away from the fact that State Farm is one of
America’s greatest business stories. I’ve urged that the company be
studied at business schools because it has achieved fabulous success
while following a path that in many ways defies the dogma of those
institutions. Studying counter-evidence is a highly useful activity,
though not one always greeted with enthusiasm at citadels of learning.
不过这仍然无损于State Farm身为美国企业最伟大的传奇故事之一，我不断建
议商学院应该把这家成功的企业列为课堂的教材，因为他的成功过程有许多是挑
战学术单位的教条，研究相反的例证是相当有用的方法，虽然并不是所有人都喜
欢在学术殿堂中热烈地把它拿来讨论。
State Farm was launched in 1922, by a 45-year-old, semi-retired
Illinois farmer, to compete with long-established insurers - haughty
institutions in New York, Philadelphia and Hartford - that possessed
overwhelming advantages in capital, reputation, and distribution.
Because State Farm is a mutual company, its board members and
managers could not be owners, and it had no access to capital markets
during its years of fast growth. Similarly, the business never had the
stock options or lavish salaries that many people think vital if an
American enterprise is to attract able managers and thrive.
State Farm成立于1922年，由伊利诺州一位45岁半退休的农夫所创立，当
初他是为了与纽约、费城与Hartfold长期垄断的傲慢保险业者对抗才成立State
Farm的，相对于前者拥有资本、信誉与通路等强大优势，由于State Farm是
合作社性质，所以他的董事与经理人不得拥有股份，因此在早期高成长时期，无
法得到资本市场的资金挹注，同时他们也没有一般公司认为吸引优秀经理人赖以
生存绝对必要的认股选择权或高额薪水。
In the end, however, State Farm eclipsed all its competitors. In fact,
by 1999 the company had amassed a tangible net worth exceeding that
of all but four American businesses. If you want to read how this
happened, get a copy of The Farmer from Merna.
然后到最后，State Farm竟击败所有竞争对手，事实上截至1999年，该公司
的净值仅次于其它四家美国大企业，如果你想知道他们是如何办到的，想办法弄
一本"来自Merna的农夫"来看看。
Despite State Farm’s strengths, however, GEICO has much the better
business model, one that embodies significantly lower operating costs.
And, when a company is selling a product with commodity-like
economic characteristics, being the low-cost producer is all-important.
This enduring competitive advantage of GEICO - one it possessed in
1951 when, as a 20-year-old student, I first became enamored with its
stock - is the reason that over time it will inevitably increase its market
share significantly while simultaneously achieving excellent profits. Our
growth will be slow, however, if State Farm elects to continue bearing
the underwriting losses that it is now suffering.
尽管面对State Farm的强大优势，GEICO依然拥有更好的商业模式，其营运成
本相当低，这个特点在一个已经一般商品化的产业中尤其重要，GEICO这项竞
争优势早上1951年，我还是一个21岁的学生时便是如此，当时我便因此为这
家公司着迷，并认为随着时间的过去，他的市场占有率以及获利绝对能够稳定提
升，当然如果State Farm决定继续忍受现在这样的承保损失的话，GEICO的成
长势必将受到影响而减缓。
Tony Nicely, GEICO’s CEO, remains an owner’s dream. Everything he
does makes sense. He never engages in wishful thinking or otherwise
distorts reality, as so many managers do when the unexpected happens.
As 2000 unfolded, Tony cut back on advertising that was not costeffective,
and he will continue to do that in 2001 if cutbacks are called
for (though we will always maintain a massive media presence). Tony
has also aggressively filed for price increases where we need them. He
looks at the loss reports every day and is never behind the curve. To
steal a line from a competitor, we are in good hands with Tony.
Tom Nicely-GEICO公司的CEO，依然还是老板们梦寐以求的经营长才，他所
作的一切都切中要点，当意外发生时，他从来不会像其它经理人一样将时间浪费
在妄想逃避或扭曲事实上，2000年开始，他大举砍掉不具成本效益的广告，展
望2001年若有必要他仍将继续维持相同的做法，(虽然我们依然会维持大量的
媒体曝光率)，若有需要，Tony绝对会大幅的调涨保费价格，他每天都盯着报表，
永远不落于人后，想要从竞争对手那边扳回一城，我们绝对是Tony的好帮手。
I’ve told you about our profit-sharing arrangement at GEICO that
targets only two variables - growth in policies and the underwriting
results of seasoned business. Despite the headwinds of 2000, we still
had a performance that produced an 8.8% profit-sharing payment,
amounting to $40.7 million.
过去我曾经向各位说明，GEICO的利润分享计画主要系于两项因素1)是保费收
入增长的比率；2)是续约保户的承保获利表现，尽管面对2000年的产业逆境，
我们仍然发出了约当8.8%年薪的奖金，金额约为4,070万美元。
GEICO will be a huge part of Berkshire’s future. Because of its rockbottom
operating costs, it offers a great many Americans the cheapest
way to purchase a high-ticket product that they must buy. The company
then couples this bargain with service that consistently ranks high in
independent surveys. That’s a combination inevitably producing growth
and profitability.
GEICO在Berkshire的未来仍将扮演相当重要的角色，由于其彻头彻尾的低营
运成本，它能够提供美国大众最低消费最高品质的产品，这家公司所提供的服务
在各项消费者调查报告中一直名列前茅，这样的组合将可确保公司继续维持成长
与获利的态势。
In just the last few years, far more drivers have learned to associate
the GEICO brand with saving money on their insurance. We will pound
that theme relentlessly until all Americans are aware of the value that we
offer.
近几年来，越来越多的驾驶人知道与GEICO投保可以省下大笔的保费，我们仍
将继续大力宣传直到所有美国人都知道我们的价值所在为止。
Investments
股票投资
Below we present our common stock investments. Those that had a
market value of more than $1 billion at the end of 2000 are itemized.
下表是Berkshire 2000年市价超过十亿美元以上的股票投资。
12/31/00
Shares Company Cost Market
(dollars in millions)
151,610,700 American Express Company $1,470 $ 8,329
200,000,000 The Coca-Cola Company 1,299 12,188
96,000,000 The Gillette Company 600 3,468
1,727,765 The Washington Post Company 11 1,066
55,071,380 Wells Fargo & Company 319 3,067
Others
6,703
9,501
Total Common Stocks $10,402 $37,619
====== ======
In 2000, we sold nearly all of our Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae
shares, established 15% positions in several mid-sized companies,
bought the high-yield bonds of a few issuers (very few - the category is
not labeled junk without reason) and added to our holdings of highgrade,
mortgage-backed securities. There are no "bargains" among our
current holdings: We’re content with what we own but far from excited
by it.
在2000年我们几乎将所有Freddie Mac与Fannie Mae的持股出清，同时利
用15%的资金买进几家中型的公司以及一些高收益的债券(少部份-并不属于垃
圾债券等级)，另外加码一些优先顺位的抵押证券，目前我们的投资组合并没有
太大的潜在利益，虽然对于这样的投资组合我们感到满意，但却没有什么可以令
人期待的地方。
Many people assume that marketable securities are Berkshire’s first
choice when allocating capital, but that’s not true: Ever since we first
published our economic principles in 1983, we have consistently stated
that we would rather purchase businesses than stocks. (See number 4
on page 60.) One reason for that preference is personal, in that I love
working with our managers. They are high-grade, talented and loyal.
And, frankly, I find their business behavior to be more rational and
owner-oriented than that prevailing at many public companies.
许多人以为股票是Berkshire投资时的第一选择，这样的想法不太正确，自从
1983年我们开始公开揭露经营准则后，我们就一再公开表示我们偏爱买下整家
公司而非部份股权，其中一部份是私人理由，那就是我喜欢与经理人一起共事，
他们是一群高水平、有才干同时忠诚度高的伙伴，而我必须坦言他们的行为远较
一般上市大公司的经理人还要理性，还要以公司股东的利益为重。
But there’s also a powerful financial reason behind the preference,
and that has to do with taxes. The tax code makes Berkshire’s owning
80% or more of a business far more profitable for us, proportionately,
than our owning a smaller share. When a company we own all of earns
