这场经典的赛事，甚至还用慢动作播放精彩的第四节，我们以今年封面的颜色表 .41
$1 million after tax, the entire amount inures to our benefit. If the $1
million is upstreamed to Berkshire, we owe no tax on the dividend. And,
if the earnings are retained and we were to sell the subsidiary - not
likely at Berkshire! - for $1 million more than we paid for it, we would
owe no capital gains tax. That’s because our "tax cost" upon sale would
include both what we paid for the business and all earnings it
subsequently retained.
当然除此之外还有一个重大的财务理由，而且是跟税负有关，根据税法规定，持
有80%以上的股权比起拥有少数股权对Berkshire要有利的多，当一家完全由
我们持有的公司税后赚了100万美元，这笔钱将全数纳到我们的口袋里，
Berkshire不会因为收到股利而被课任何的税，而且如果我们将盈余全数保留，
之后再把这家子公司出售-当然Berkshire是不可能做这样的事，那么就算之后
的卖价超过100万美元，我们也不必为此支付任何的资本利得税，原因在于我
们在税法上的成本包含我们先前买下该公司的成本以及以后年度保留的所有盈
余。
Contrast that situation to what happens when we own an investment
in a marketable security. There, if we own a 10% stake in a business
earning $10 million after tax, our $1 million share of the earnings is
subject to additional state and federal taxes of (1) about $140,000 if it
is distributed to us (our tax rate on most dividends is 14%); or (2) no less
than $350,000 if the $1 million is retained and subsequently captured
by us in the form of a capital gain (on which our tax rate is usually about
35%, though it sometimes approaches 40%). We may defer paying the
$350,000 by not immediately realizing our gain, but eventually we must
pay the tax. In effect, the government is our "partner" twice when we
own part of a business through a stock investment, but only once when
we own at least 80%.
这与我们一般单纯持有上市公司的股票有相当大的不同，如果我们持有一家一年
赚1,000万美元公司10%的股权时，则我们依比例分得的100万美元将必须负
担额外的州政府与联邦所得税，那包含(1)大约14万美元股利税负(我们大部分
的股利税率为14%)或(2)最少35万美元的资本利得税，如果这100万没有分
配，而事后我们又把该公司处分(我们适用的税率约在35%左右，但有时也可能
接近40%)，当然只要我们不处分该项投资，这笔税负将可以一直递延夏去，但
最终我们还是必须支付这笔税金，事实上政府可以说是分享我们利润的主要合伙
人之一，只是投资股票她要分两次，而投资事业则只能分一次。
Leaving aside tax factors, the formula we use for evaluating stocks
and businesses is identical. Indeed, the formula for valuing all assets
that are purchased for financial gain has been unchanged since it was
first laid out by a very smart man in about 600 B.C. (though he wasn’t
smart enough to know it was 600 B.C.).
扣除税负因素不计，我们分析评估股票与事业的公式并无二致，事实上亘古至
今，这个评估所有金融资产投资的公式从来就未曾改变，远从公元前600年某
位先知头一次揭示就是如此，(虽然他可能也没有能力预知当时是公元前600
年)。
The oracle was Aesop and his enduring, though somewhat
incomplete, investment insight was "a bird in the hand is worth two in
the bush." To flesh out this principle, you must answer only three
questions. How certain are you that there are indeed birds in the bush?
When will they emerge and how many will there be? What is the risk-free
interest rate (which we consider to be the yield on long-term U.S.
bonds)? If you can answer these three questions, you will know the
maximum value of the bush - and the maximum number of the birds
you now possess that should be offered for it. And, of course, don’t
literally think birds. Think dollars.
奇迹之一就是在伊索寓言里，那历久弥新但不太完整的投资观念，也就是「二鸟
在林，不如一鸟在手」，要进一步诠释这项原则，你必须再回答三个问题，你如
何确定树丛里有鸟儿? 它们何时会出现，同时数量有多少? 无风险的资金成本是
多少?(这里我们假定以美国长期公债的利率为准) 如果你能回答以上三个问题，
那么你将知道这个树丛最高的价值有多少，以及你可能可以拥有多少鸟儿，当然
小鸟只是比喻，真正实际的标的还是金钱。
Aesop’s investment axiom, thus expanded and converted into
dollars, is immutable. It applies to outlays for farms, oil royalties,
bonds, stocks, lottery tickets, and manufacturing plants. And neither
the advent of the steam engine, the harnessing of electricity nor the
creation of the automobile changed the formula one iota - nor will the
Internet. Just insert the correct numbers, and you can rank the
attractiveness of all possible uses of capital throughout the universe.
伊索的投资寓言除了可以进一步扩大解释成资金，也一样可以适用在农业、油
田、债券、股票、乐透彩券以及工厂等，就算是蒸汽引擎的发明、电力设备的引
用或汽车的问世一点都不会改变这样的定律，就连网际网络也一样，只能输入正
确的数字，你就可以轻轻松松地选择出世上资金运用的最佳去处。
Common yardsticks such as dividend yield, the ratio of price to
earnings or to book value, and even growth rates have nothing to do
with valuation except to the extent they provide clues to the amount
and timing of cash flows into and from the business. Indeed, growth can
destroy value if it requires cash inputs in the early years of a project or
enterprise that exceed the discounted value of the cash that those
assets will generate in later years. Market commentators and investment
managers who glibly refer to "growth" and "value" styles as contrasting
approaches to investment are displaying their ignorance, not their
sophistication. Growth is simply a component - usually a plus,
sometimes a minus - in the value equation.
一般的准则，诸如股利报酬率、本益比甚至是成长率，除非他们能够提供一家企
业未来现金流入流出的任何线索，否则与价值评估没有一点关联，有时成长甚至
对价值有损，要是这项投资计画早期的现金流出大于之后的现金流入折现值，有
些市场的分析师与基金经理人信誓旦旦地将"成长型"与"价值型"列为两种截然不
同的投资典型，可以说是是无知，那绝不是真知灼见。成长只是一个要素之一，
在评估价值时，可能是正面，也有可能是负面。
Alas, though Aesop’s proposition and the third variable - that is,
interest rates - are simple, plugging in numbers for the other two
variables is a difficult task. Using precise numbers is, in fact, foolish;
working with a range of possibilities is the better approach.
可惜的是，虽然伊索寓言的公式与第三个变量-也就是资金成本相当简单易懂，
但要弄清楚另外两个变量却有相当的困难，想要明确算出这两个变量根本就不可
能，求出两者可能的范围倒是可行的办法。
Usually, the range must be so wide that no useful conclusion can be
reached. Occasionally, though, even very conservative estimates about
the future emergence of birds reveal that the price quoted is startlingly
low in relation to value. (Let’s call this phenomenon the IBT - Inefficient
Bush Theory.) To be sure, an investor needs some general
understanding of business economics as well as the ability to think
independently to reach a well-founded positive conclusion. But the
investor does not need brilliance nor blinding insights.
只不过范围过大通常会导致结论仿真两可，而且估计越保守所得出的价格相较于
价值较越低，也就是树丛最终出现鸟儿的数量，(我们姑且把这个现象称之为IBT-
树丛无效率理论)，可以确定的是，投资人除了必须对于一家企业的经营有一定
的了解外，并且要有能力独立思考以获致立论坚实的肯定结论，除此之外，投资
人不须其它什么大道理或歪理论。
At the other extreme, there are many times when the most brilliant
of investors can’t muster a conviction about the birds to emerge, not
even when a very broad range of estimates is employed. This kind of
uncertainty frequently occurs when new businesses and rapidly
changing industries are under examination. In cases of this sort, any
capital commitment must be labeled speculative.
另一个极端，有很多时候，即使是最聪明的投资人都没有办法提出小鸟确实会出
现的证据，即使是在最宽松的假设下仍是如此，这种不确定性在检验新事业或是
快速变化的产业尤其明显，在这种状况下，任何资金的投入都难脱投机的嫌疑。
Now, speculation - in which the focus is not on what an asset will
produce but rather on what the next fellow will pay for it - is neither
illegal, immoral nor un-American. But it is not a game in which Charlie
and I wish to play. We bring nothing to the party, so why should we
expect to take anything home?
如今投机主义-亦即不管资产真实的价值，只看下一个人会用多少价格买进的观
念-事实上，这不但不违法、也不算不道德，甚至不能说是非美国式，但也绝非
查理跟我愿意玩的游戏，既然我们两手空空参加派对，那么我们又如何期望能从
派对中满载而归呢?
The line separating investment and speculation, which is never
bright and clear, becomes blurred still further when most market
participants have recently enjoyed triumphs. Nothing sedates rationality
like large doses of effortless money. After a heady experience of that
kind, normally sensible people drift into behavior akin to that of
Cinderella at the ball. They know that overstaying the festivities - that
is, continuing to speculate in companies that have gigantic valuations
relative to the cash they are likely to generate in the future - will
eventually bring on pumpkins and mice. But they nevertheless hate to
miss a single minute of what is one helluva party. Therefore, the giddy
participants all plan to leave just seconds before midnight. There’s a
problem, though: They are dancing in a room in which the clocks have
no hands.
投资与投机之间永远是一线之隔，尤其是当所有市场的参与者都沉浸在欢愉的气
氛当中时更是如此，再也没有比大笔不劳而获的金钱更让人失去理性，在经历过
这类经验之后，再正常的人也会像参加舞会的灰姑娘一样被冲昏了头，他们明知
在舞会中多待一会-也就是继续将大笔的资金投入到投机的活动之上，番瓜马车
与老鼠驾驶现出原形的机率就越高，但他们还是舍不得错过这场盛大舞会的任何
一分钟，所有人都打算继续待到最后一刻才离开，但问题是这场舞会中的时钟根
本就没有指针!
Last year, we commented on the exuberance - and, yes, it was
irrational - that prevailed, noting that investor expectations had grown
to be several multiples of probable returns. One piece of evidence came
from a Paine Webber-Gallup survey of investors conducted in December
1999, in which the participants were asked their opinion about the
annual returns investors could expect to realize over the decade ahead.
Their answers averaged 19%. That, for sure, was an irrational
expectation: For American business as a whole, there couldn’t possibly
be enough birds in the 2009 bush to deliver such a return.
去年我们对于这种失序的状态大加批评，这实在是太不合理了，我们赫然发现投
资人的预期得到超过数倍他们可能得到的报酬，一份潘伟伯证券公司在1999年
进行的调查报告显示，当投资人被问到自己预期未来十年内的年平均投资报酬有
多少，答案平均是19%，这很明显的是不当的预期，对整个美国树丛来说，到
2009年为止，根本就不可能藏有这么多鸟儿。
Far more irrational still were the huge valuations that market
participants were then putting on businesses almost certain to end up
being of modest or no value. Yet investors, mesmerized by soaring
stock prices and ignoring all else, piled into these enterprises. It was as
if some virus, racing wildly among investment professionals as well as
amateurs, induced hallucinations in which the values of stocks in certain
sectors became decoupled from the values of the businesses that
underlay them.
更夸张的是，目前市场参与者对于一些长期而言明显不可能产生太高价值或甚至
根本就没有任何价值的公司，给予极高的市值评价，然而投资人依然被持续飙涨
的股价所迷惑，不顾一切地将资金蜂拥投入到这类企业，这情形就好象是病毒一
样，在专业法人与散户间广为散播，引发不合理的股价预期而与其本身应有的价
值明显脱钩。
This surreal scene was accompanied by much loose talk about "value
creation." We readily acknowledge that there has been a huge amount of
true value created in the past decade by new or young businesses, and
that there is much more to come. But value is destroyed, not created, by
any business that loses money over its lifetime, no matter how high its
interim valuation may get.
伴随着这种不切实际的景况而来的，还有一种荒唐的说法叫做「价值创造」，我
们承诺过去数十年来，许多新创事业确实为这个世界创造出许多价值，而且这种
情况还会继续发生，但我们打死都不相信，那些终其一生不赚钱，甚至是亏钱的
企业能够创造出什么价值，他们根本是摧毁价值，不管在这期间他们的市值曾经
有多高都一样。
What actually occurs in these cases is wealth transfer, often on a
massive scale. By shamelessly merchandising birdless bushes,
promoters have in recent years moved billions of dollars from the
pockets of the public to their own purses (and to those of their friends
and associates). The fact is that a bubble market has allowed the
creation of bubble companies, entities designed more with an eye to
making money off investors rather than for them. Too often, an IPO, not
profits, was the primary goal of a company’s promoters. At bottom, the
"business model" for these companies has been the old-fashioned chain
letter, for which many fee-hungry investment bankers acted as eager
postmen.
在这些案例中，真正产生的只是财富移转的效应，而且通常都是大规模的，部份
可耻的不肖商人利用根本就没有半只鸟的树丛，从社会大众的口袋中骗走大笔的
金钱，(这其中也包含他们自己的朋友与亲人)，事实证明泡沫市场创造出泡沫公
司，这是一种赚走投资人手中的钱而不是帮投资人赚钱的幌子，通常这些幕后推
手的最终目标不是让公司赚钱，而是让公司上市挂牌，说穿了这只不过老式连锁
信骗局的现代版，而靠手续费维生的证券商就成了专门送信的邮差帮凶。
But a pin lies in wait for every bubble. And when the two eventually
meet, a new wave of investors learns some very old lessons: First, many
in Wall Street - a community in which quality control is not prized - will
sell investors anything they will buy. Second, speculation is most
dangerous when it looks easiest.
然而任何的泡沫都经不起针刺，当泡沫破灭，不可避免的会有一大票菜鸟学到教
训，第一课，不论是什么东西，只要有人要买，华尔街那帮人都会想办法弄来卖
给你，第二课，投机这玩意儿看似简单，其实岸潮汹涌。
At Berkshire, we make no attempt to pick the few winners that will
emerge from an ocean of unproven enterprises. We’re not smart enough
to do that, and we know it. Instead, we try to apply Aesop’s 2,600-
year-old equation to opportunities in which we have reasonable
confidence as to how many birds are in the bush and when they will
emerge (a formulation that my grandsons would probably update to "A
girl in a convertible is worth five in the phonebook."). Obviously, we can
never precisely predict the timing of cash flows in and out of a business
or their exact amount. We try, therefore, to keep our estimates
conservative and to focus on industries where business surprises are
unlikely to wreak havoc on owners. Even so, we make many mistakes:
I’m the fellow, remember, who thought he understood the future
economics of trading stamps, textiles, shoes and second-tier
department stores.
在Berkshire，我们从来没有妄想要从一堆不成气候的公司中，挑出幸运儿，我
们自认没有这种超能力，这点我们绝对有自知之明，相反的我们试着遵循2,600
年来既有的古老伊索寓言，耐心研究某些树丛里到底有多少鸟儿，以及他们出现
的时机，(或许以后我的孙子可能会把它改为五个电话簿上的女孩，不如一个敞
篷车上的女孩)，当然我们永远没有办法精准地预估一家公司每年现金流入与流
出的状况，所以我们试着用比较保守的角度去估算，同时将重心锁定在那些比较
不会让股东错估情势的公司上头，即便是如此，我们还是常常犯错，大家可能还
记得我本人就曾经自称是相当熟悉集邮、纺织、制鞋以及二流百货公司等产业的
人士。
Lately, the most promising "bushes" have been negotiated
transactions for entire businesses, and that pleases us. You should
clearly understand, however, that these acquisitions will at best provide
us only reasonable returns. Really juicy results from negotiated deals
can be anticipated only when capital markets are severely constrained
and the whole business world is pessimistic. We are 180 degrees from
that point.
近来，我们最看好的树丛要算是经由协议买下整家公司，这种方法确实让我们感
到相当满意，不过大家要记住，这类的购并交易顶多让我们有一个合理的回报，
想要有超额的报酬一定要等到资本市场非常惨淡，整个企业界普遍感到悲观之
时，机会才会出现，目前我们离那种状况还很远。
Sources of Reported Earnings
帐列盈余的来源
The table that follows shows the main sources of Berkshire's
reported earnings. In this presentation, purchase-accounting
adjustments are not assigned to the specific businesses to which they
apply, but are instead aggregated and shown separately. This procedure
lets you view the earnings of our businesses as they would have been
reported had we not purchased them. For the reasons discussed on
page 65, this form of presentation seems to us to be more useful to
investors and managers than one utilizing generally accepted
accounting principles (GAAP), which require purchase-premiums to be
charged off business-by-business. The total net earnings we show in
