这场经典的赛事，甚至还用慢动作播放精彩的第四节，我们以今年封面的颜色表 .42
the table are, of course, identical to the GAAP total in our audited
financial statements.
下表显示Berkshire帐列盈余的主要来源，在这张表中商誉的摊销数与购买法会
计调整数会从个别被投资公司分离出来，单独加总列示，之所以这样做是为了让
旗下各事业的盈余状况，不因我们的投资而有所影响，过去我一再地强调我们认
为这样的表达方式，较之一般公认会计原则要求以个别企业基础做调整，不管是
对投资者或是管理者来说，更有帮助，当然最后损益加总的数字仍然会与经会计
师查核的数字一致。
(in millions)
Pre-Tax Earnings
Berkshire's Share
of Net Earnings
(after taxes and
minority interests)
2000 1999 2000 1999
Operating Earnings:
Insurance Group:
Underwriting -
Reinsurance
$(1,399) $(1,440) $(899) $(927)
Underwriting - GEICO (224) 24 2 (146) 16 1
Underwriting - Other
Primary
38 3 22 2 24 2 14 1
Net Investment Income 2,747 2,74 2,482 2,48 1,929
1,92
1,764
1,76
Finance and Financial Products
Business
556 55 125 12 360 36 86 8
Flight Services 213 21 225 22 126 12 132 13
MidAmerican Energy (76%
owned)
197 19 -- - 109 10 -- -
Retail Operations 175 17 130 13 104 10 77 7
Scott Fetzer (excluding finance
operation)
122 12 147 14 80 8 92 9
Other Businesses 225 22 210 21 134 13 131 13
Purchase-Accounting
Adjustments
(881) (739) (843) (648)
Corporate Interest Expense (92) (109) (61) (70)
Shareholder-Designated
Contributions
(17) (17) (11) (11)
Other 39 25 30
15
Operating Earnings 1,699 1,69 1,085 1,08 936 93 671 67
Capital Gains from Investments 3,955 1,365 2,392 886
Total Earnings - All Entities $5,654
$5,65
$2,450
$2,45
$3,328
$3,32
$1,557
$1,55
====
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====
===
====
===
====
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Most of our manufacturing, retailing and service businesses did at
least reasonably well last year.
The exception was shoes, particularly at Dexter. In our shoe
businesses generally, our attempt to keep the bulk of our production in
domestic factories has cost us dearly. We face another very tough year
in 2001 also, as we make significant changes in how we do business.
去年，我们旗下的制造、零售与服务业的表现都相当不错，唯一的例外是制鞋业，
尤其是Dexter，为了让所有的制造据点尽量留在美国境内，我们付出了极大的
代价，即便我们之后做了一番调整，但2001年仍将是辛苦的一年。
I clearly made a mistake in paying what I did for Dexter in 1993.
Furthermore, I compounded that mistake in a huge way by using
Berkshire shares in payment. Last year, to recognize my error, we
charged off all the remaining accounting goodwill that was attributable
to the Dexter transaction. We may regain some economic goodwill at
Dexter in the future, but we clearly have none at present.
事后看来，我在1993年斥资买下Dexter根本是个错误，更惨的是当时我还是
用Berkshire股份换来的，为此我们在去年将当初帐上购入Dexter所有的商誉
一次打销掉，虽然部份商誉在未来可能有机会回复，但就目前而言，该公司的商
誉可说是一毛不值。
The managers of our shoe businesses are first-class from both a
business and human perspective. They are working very hard at a tough
- and often terribly painful - job, even though their personal financial
circumstances don’t require them to do so. They have my admiration
and thanks.
于公于私我们制鞋事业的经理人都称得上是一流的，他们在非常艰苦的环境下努
力工作，即便他们早已不必为了五斗米而折腰，为此我衷心地佩服并感谢他们。
On a more pleasant note, we continue to be the undisputed leader in
two branches of Aircraft Services - pilot training at FlightSafety (FSI) and
fractional ownership of business jets at Executive Jet (EJA). Both
companies are run by their remarkable founders.
另外一方面，我们很高兴能继续在两项航空服务业中称霸-一是飞行员训练的国
际飞安公司(FSI)，一是部份飞机所有权的主管专机公司(EJA)，两家公司目前依
然由其杰出的创办人经营着。
Al Ueltschi at FSI is now 83 and continues to operate at full throttle.
Though I am not a fan of stock splits, I am planning to split Al’s age 2-
for-1 when he hits 100. (If it works, guess who’s next.)
FSI的Al Ueltschi今年83岁，目前仍然处于全速前进的状态，虽然我本身不喜
欢股票分割这玩意儿，但我却计画在Al 100岁时，将他的年龄一分为二。(如果
此举确实可行，大家应该猜得到下一个会轮到谁!)
We spent $272 million on flight simulators in 2000, and we’ll spend
a similar amount this year. Anyone who thinks that the annual charges
for depreciation don’t reflect a real cost - every bit as real as payroll or
raw materials - should get an internship at a simulator company. Every
year we spend amounts equal to our depreciation charge simply to stay
in the same economic place - and then spend additional sums to grow.
And growth is in prospect for FSI as far as the eye can see.
2000年我们投资2.72亿美元在购买飞行仿真器上头，今年的投资金额也约当
此数，有谁胆敢说每年的折旧费用不算是真正的成本的，应该请他到飞行仿真公
司打打工，让他知道每一分折旧都跟薪资或原料成本一样真实，每一年我们都必
须投入约当于折旧金额的资金在更新设备上，以维持既有的竞争优势，而如果我
们想要成长的话，就必须再投入额外的资金，对于FSI而言，其目前成长的前景
依然可期。
Even faster growth awaits EJA (whose fractional-ownership program
is called NetJetsR). Rich Santulli is the dynamo behind this business.
另一方面，成长更快速的是EJA(其飞机部份所有权称之为NetJet)，Rich Santulli
是背后主要的推手。
Last year I told you that EJA’s recurring revenue from monthly
management fees and hourly usage grew by 46% in 1999. In 2000 the
growth was 49%. I also told you that this was a low-margin business, in
which survivors will be few. Margins were indeed slim at EJA last year, in
part because of the major costs we are incurring in developing our
business in Europe.
去年，我告诉大家EJA 1999年每月固定的管理费加上钟点费成长了46%，到了
2000年成长幅度增加为49%，我也曾向各位报告说这个行业的毛利不高，所以
能够存活的家数不多，去年EJA的利润率确实相当微薄，部份的原因是因为我们
正在努力扩展欧洲的业务当中。
Regardless of the cost, you can be sure that EJA’s spending on safety
will be whatever is needed. Obviously, we would follow this policy under
any circumstances, but there’s some self-interest here as well: I, my
wife, my children, my sisters, my 94-year-old aunt, all but one of our
directors, and at least nine Berkshire managers regularly fly in the
NetJets program. Given that cargo, I applaud Rich’s insistence on
unusually high amounts of pilot training (an average of 23 days a year).
In addition, our pilots cement their skills by flying 800 or so hours a
year. Finally, each flies only one model of aircraft, which means our
crews do no switching around among planes with different cockpit and
flight characteristics.
不论成本有多高，只要是为了安全考量，EJA愿意不惜血本，在任何情况下，我
们都会坚持这项政策，因为这其中还掺杂有个人的因素在里头，包含我本人、内
人、小孩、姊妹、高龄94岁的阿姨、Berkshire的所有董事(除了一位例外)以
及其它9位主要经理人都是NetJet的常客，在这里我要特别为Rich维持飞行员
一年平均达23天高时数训练的坚持给予掌声，此外我们的飞行员一年平均都维
持800小时以上的飞行时数以强化本身的飞行技巧，同时每位飞行员只固定飞
一种机型，这意思是说，他们不必常常在不同种飞机机舱间换来换去。
EJA’s business continues to be constrained by the availability of new
aircraft. Still, our customers will take delivery of more than 50 new jets
in 2001, 7% of world output. We are confident we will remain the world
leader in fractional ownership, in respect to number of planes flying,
quality of service, and standards of safety.
虽然EJA的业务依然受限于飞机供给有限的数量，但是2001年至少有50架飞
机会加入服务的行列，这约占全世界飞机出厂数量的7%，我们有信心可以继续
在部份飞机所有权这行业中维持领先的地位，不管是以飞机数量、服务品质以及
安全可靠性来说，皆是如此。
* * * * * * * * * *
Additional information about our various businesses is given on
pages 42-58, where you will also find our segment earnings reported
on a GAAP basis. In addition, on pages 67-73, we have rearranged
Berkshire’s financial data into four segments on a non-GAAP basis, a
presentation that corresponds to the way Charlie and I think about the
company.
有关其它关系企业的信息大家可以在42-58页找到，包含依照一般公认会计准
则编制的部门别信息，此外在67-73页，你还可以找到经过重编，依照Berkshire
四大部门编排的信息(非按一般公认会计准则编制)，这是查理跟我认为最能够完
整呈现Berkshire现况的模式。
Look-Through Earnings
完整透视盈余
Reported earnings are an inadequate measure of economic progress
at Berkshire, in part because the numbers shown in the table on page 15
include only the dividends we receive from investees - though these
dividends typically represent only a small fraction of the earnings
attributable to our ownership. To depict something closer to economic
reality at Berkshire than reported earnings, though, we employ the
concept of "look-through" earnings. As we calculate these, they consist
of: (1) the operating earnings reported on page 15; plus; (2) our share of
the retained operating earnings of major investees that, under GAAP
accounting, are not reflected in our profits, less; (3) an allowance for the
tax that would be paid by Berkshire if these retained earnings of
investees had instead been distributed to us. When tabulating
"operating earnings" here, we exclude purchase-accounting
adjustments as well as capital gains and other major non-recurring
items.
我们认为帐列盈余很难表现Berkshire实际的营运状况，部份原因在于第15页
列示在本公司帐上的股利收入，事实上仅占被投资公司收益的一小部份，为了要
更真实的反应Berkshire实际的经营状况，于是乎我们运用了完整透视盈余的观
念，这个数字总共包含(1)前段第15页所提到的帐列盈余，加上(2)主要被投资
公司的保留盈余，按一般公认会计原则未反应在我们公司帐上的盈余，扣除(3)
若这些未反应的盈余分配给我们时，估计可能要缴的所得税。在这里我们所谓的
营业盈余系已扣除资本利得、特别会计调整与企业其它非常态的项目。
The following table sets forth our 2000 look-through earnings,
though I warn you that the figures can be no more than approximate,
since they are based on a number of judgment calls. (The dividends paid
to us by these investees have been included in the operating earnings
itemized on page 15, mostly under "Insurance Group: Net Investment
Income.")
各位可以从下表看出我们是如何计算出2000年透视盈余的，不过我还是要提醒
各位这些数字只不过是估计数，很多都是基于简单的判断，(被投资公司所分配
的股利收入已经列在15页的营业利益之内，大部分包含在保险事业的净投资收
益项下)。
Berkshire's Major Investees
Berkshire's Approximate
Ownership at Yearend(1)
Berkshire's Share of
Undistributed
Operating Earnings (in
millions)(2)
American Express Company 11.4% $265 $26
The Coca-Cola Company 8.1% 160 16
Freddie Mac 0.3% 106 10
The Gillette Company 9.1% 51 5
M&T Bank 7.2% 23 2
The Washington Post
Company 18.3% 18 1
Wells Fargo & Company 3.2% 117
Berkshire's share of undistributed earnings of major investees 740 74
Hypothetical tax on these undistributed investee earnings(3) (104)
Reported operating earnings of Berkshire 1,779 1,77
Total look-through earnings of Berkshire $ 2,415 $ 2,41
===== ====
(1) Does not include shares allocable to minority interests
(2) Calculated on average ownership for the year
(3) The tax rate used is 14%, which is the rate Berkshire pays on most dividends it receives
Full and Fair Reporting
详实客观的财务报告
At Berkshire, full reporting means giving you the information that we
would wish you to give to us if our positions were reversed. What Charlie
and I would want under that circumstance would be all the important
facts about current operations as well as the CEO’s frank view of the
long-term economic characteristics of the business. We would expect
both a lot of financial details and a discussion of any significant data we
would need to interpret what was presented.
在Berkshire，所谓详实的报告代表着今天如果角色互换，我希望各位能够提供
所有我们想要知道的信息，这包含了目前经营的重大讯息以及CEO对于公司长
远发展的真正看法，当然要解释这些讯息必须辅以相关的财务资料。
When Charlie and I read reports, we have no interest in pictures of
personnel, plants or products. References to EBITDA make us shudder -
does management think the tooth fairy pays for capital expenditures?
We’re very suspicious of accounting methodology that is vague or
unclear, since too often that means management wishes to hide
something. And we don’t want to read messages that a public relations
department or consultant has turned out. Instead, we expect a
company’s CEO to explain in his or her own words what’s happening.
当查理跟我在阅读财务报告时，我们对于人员、工厂或产品的介绍没有多大兴
趣，有关扣除折旧摊销税负利息前的盈余(EBITDA)的引用更让我们胆颤心惊，
难道经营阶层真的认为拿牙齿就可以换来大笔的资本支出吗?(注:美国小孩相信
牙齿掉时，只要把牙齿藏在枕头底下，tooth fairy就会拿钱来换你的牙齿)，对
于那些仿真不清的会计原则，我们一向抱持怀疑的态度，因为经营阶层通常都会
藉此掩盖来一些事实，此外我们也不想读那些由公关部门或顾问所提供的资料，
我们希望能够由CEO自己亲自解释实际发生的状况。
For us, fair reporting means getting information to our 300,000
"partners" simultaneously, or as close to that mark as possible. We
therefore put our annual and quarterly financials on the Internet
between the close of the market on a Friday and the following morning.
By our doing that, shareholders and other interested investors have
timely access to these important releases and also have a reasonable
amount of time to digest the information they include before the
markets open on Monday. This year our quarterly information will be
available on the Saturdays of May 12, August 11, and November 10. The
2001 annual report will be posted on March 9.
对我们来说，详实的报告代表我们30万位合伙人可以同时得到相同的信息，至
少能够尽可能地做到，因此我们习惯将季报与年报在星期五收盘后透过网络统一
对外公布，如此一来，股东们与所有关心Berkshire的投资人都可以及时的得到
重要的讯息，同时在星期一开盘之前，有足够的时间吸收消化相关的信息，今年
我们的季报分别会在5月12号、8月11号及11月10号星期六公布，至于
2001年的年报则会在3月9号公开。
We applaud the work that Arthur Levitt, Jr., until recently Chairman
of the SEC, has done in cracking down on the corporate practice of
"selective disclosure" that had spread like cancer in recent years.
Indeed, it had become virtually standard practice for major corporations
to "guide" analysts or large holders to earnings expectations that were
intended either to be on the nose or a tiny bit below what the company
truly expected to earn. Through the selectively dispersed hints, winks
and nods that companies engaged in, speculatively-minded institutions
and advisors were given an information edge over investment-oriented
individuals. This was corrupt behavior, unfortunately embraced by both
Wall Street and corporate America.
对于证管会主席Arthur Levitt近来大力打击企业如癌症般扩散的选择性透露做
法喝采，确实近年来许多大企业习惯引导分析师或大股东的盈余预估刚好符合公
司本身的盈余预期(或只差一点)几乎已成常态，透过选择性地揭露信息，不论公
司是如何挤眉弄眼，投机性的机构法人与投资顾问因此得到比以投资为导向的散
户更多的内线，这实在是一种堕落的行为，不幸的这在华尔街与美国企业间广受
欢迎。
Thanks to Chairman Levitt, whose general efforts on behalf of
investors were both tireless and effective, corporations are now
required to treat all of their owners equally. The fact that this reform
came about because of coercion rather than conscience should be a
matter of shame for CEOs and their investor relations departments.
由于Levitt主席为投资人所做的努力，美国企业现在才得以被要求要公平对待
所有的股东与投资人，同时我们也为这些CEO与公关部门基于被动而非主动才
这样做感到羞耻。
One further thought while I’m on my soapbox: Charlie and I think it
is both deceptive and dangerous for CEOs to predict growth rates for
