这场经典的赛事，甚至还用慢动作播放精彩的第四节，我们以今年封面的颜色表 .43
their companies. They are, of course, frequently egged on to do so by
both analysts and their own investor relations departments. They
should resist, however, because too often these predictions lead to
trouble.
最后站在这个肥皂箱上，我再发表一点个人的看法，那就是查理跟我认为CEO
预估公司未来成长率是相当危险且不当的，他们通常是在分析师与公关部门要求
下才这样做的，但我认为他们应该要坚决抗拒，因为这样做通常会惹来许多不必
要的麻烦。
It’s fine for a CEO to have his own internal goals and, in our view, it’s
even appropriate for the CEO to publicly express some hopes about the
future, if these expectations are accompanied by sensible caveats. But
for a major corporation to predict that its per-share earnings will grow
over the long term at, say, 15% annually is to court trouble.
CEO自己心中有一个目标不是件坏事，甚至我们认为CEO公开发表个人心中的
愿景是很好的一件事，如果这些期望能够附带合理的条件，但如果一家大公司公
开的宣称每股盈余长期可以维持15%的年成长率的话，那肯定会招致许多不必
要的麻烦。
That’s true because a growth rate of that magnitude can only be
maintained by a very small percentage of large businesses. Here’s a
test: Examine the record of, say, the 200 highest earning companies
from 1970 or 1980 and tabulate how many have increased per-share
earnings by 15% annually since those dates. You will find that only a
handful have. I would wager you a very significant sum that fewer than
10 of the 200 most profitable companies in 2000 will attain 15% annual
growth in earnings-per-share over the next 20 years.
其原因在于这种高标准只有在极少数的企业才有可能做得到，让我们做一个简单
的测试，根据历史记录，1970年与1980年代，在200家盈余最高的公司当
中，算算到底有几家在此之后能够继续维持15%的年盈余成长率，你会发现，
能够达到这个目标的公司少之又少，我可以跟你打赌，在2000年获利最高的
200家公司当中，能够在接下来的20年年平均成长率达到15%的公司，绝对不
超过10家。
The problem arising from lofty predictions is not just that they
spread unwarranted optimism. Even more troublesome is the fact that
they corrode CEO behavior. Over the years, Charlie and I have observed
many instances in which CEOs engaged in uneconomic operating
maneuvers so that they could meet earnings targets they had
announced. Worse still, after exhausting all that operating acrobatics
would do, they sometimes played a wide variety of accounting games to
"make the numbers." These accounting shenanigans have a way of
snowballing: Once a company moves earnings from one period to
another, operating shortfalls that occur thereafter require it to engage
in further accounting maneuvers that must be even more "heroic."
These can turn fudging into fraud. (More money, it has been noted, has
been stolen with the point of a pen than at the point of a gun.)
过高的预估不但造成没有根据的乐观，麻烦的是此举还会导致CEO行为的腐
化，这么多年来，查理跟我已经看过很多CEO不专注于本业而热衷于运用一些
非经济的手段来达成他们先前所做的盈余预估，更糟的的是，在用尽营运上的各
种手段之后，被逼得走投无路的经理人最后还会运用各种会计方法无所不用其极
的做假帐，这种会计骗术会产生滚雪球效应，一旦今天你挪用以后的盈余，明天
你就要变本加厉地挪用以后的盈余，到最后从造假演变为贪污，(毕竟用笔偷钱
要比用枪抢钱要来得容易得多了)。
Charlie and I tend to be leery of companies run by CEOs who woo
investors with fancy predictions. A few of these managers will prove
prophetic - but others will turn out to be congenital optimists, or even
charlatans. Unfortunately, it’s not easy for investors to know in advance
which species they are dealing with.
查理跟我对于那些习惯以绚丽的盈余预估吸引投资人的CEO所带领的公司，总
是报以怀疑的态度，或许少数的经理人确实能说到做到，但大部分的经理人最后
都变成无可救药的乐观派，甚至可以说是骗子，不幸的是，投资人实在是很难事
先分辨出他们到底是在跟哪一种人打交道。
* * * * * * * * * * * *
I’ve warned you in the past that you should not believe everything
you read or hear about Berkshire - even when it is published or
broadcast by a prestigious news organization. Indeed, erroneous
reports are particularly dangerous when they are circulated by highlyrespected
members of the media, simply because most readers and
listeners know these outlets to be generally credible and therefore
believe what they say.
过去我就一再警告大家千万不要将你在外面听到或读到有关Berkshire的任何
消息信以为真，即使这消息来自最具权威的新闻单位也一样，错误报导的杀伤力
确实相当高，特别是它们是从令人崇敬的媒体人士口中传出来的，因为读者与观
众一向倾向相信这些管道所传出来的讯息。
An example is a glaring error about Berkshire’s activities that
appeared in the December 29 issue of The Wall Street Journal, a
generally excellent paper that I have for all of my life found useful. On
the front page (and above the fold, as they say) The Journal published a
news brief that said, in unequivocal terms, that we were buying bonds of
Conseco and Finova. This item directed the reader to the lead story of
the Money and Investing section. There, in the second paragraph of the
story, The Journal reported, again without any qualification, that
Berkshire was buying Conseco and Finova bonds, adding that Berkshire
had invested "several hundred million dollars" in each. Only in the 18th
paragraph of the story (which by that point had jumped to an inside
page) did the paper hedge a bit, saying that our Conseco purchases had
been disclosed by "people familiar with the matter."
有关Berkshire错误讯息最离谱的是刊登在12月29号华尔街日报的一则新
闻，那是一份一直以来我认为相当有用的报纸，在当天的头版上(而且是头条)，
刊登了一则简短的讯息，以肯定的语气报导Berkshire正大举买进Conseco与
Finova的公司债，这条消息又导引读者到投资理财专栏的专题报导，在那篇文
章的第二段，华尔街日报再一次毫无保留的指出Berkshire正积极买进Conseco
与Finova的公司债，并强调金额已达数亿美元之谱，只有到了文章的第18段(那
时文章已换到新闻的内页)，文章才含蓄地表示买进Conseco的消息是由熟悉内
情的人士所透露。
Well, not that familiar. True, we had purchased bonds and bank debt of
Finova - though the report was wildly inaccurate as to the amount. But
to this day neither Berkshire nor I have ever bought a share of stock or a
bond of Conseco.
嗯! 这篇报导不太对，没错，我们确实买进Finova的公司债与银行债权，只是
金额与报纸所说的有很大的出入，而但到目前为止，Berkshire公司以及我本人
从来就没有买进过Conseco任何的股份或者是债券。
Berkshire is normally covered by a Journal reporter in Chicago who is
both accurate and conscientious. In this case, however, the "scoop" was
the product of a New York reporter for the paper. Indeed, the 29th was a
busy day for him: By early afternoon, he had repeated the story on
CNBC. Immediately, in lemming-like manner, other respected news
organizations, relying solely on the Journal, began relating the same
"facts." The result: Conseco stock advanced sharply during the day on
exceptional volume that placed it ninth on the NYSE most-active list.
有一位芝加哥报纸的记者长期追踪Berkshire，其报导就相当详实严谨，至于这
一回，这则"独家新闻"则是纽约报社记者所捅的偻子，我想29号当天应该是他
相当忙碌的一天，因为下午他又在CNBC重复相同的报导，过了不久，一窝蜂
效应产生，其它的新闻媒体开始跟进争相报导相关新闻，其根据来源就完全只靠
这则报导，结果竟造成Conseco的股价在当天爆量大涨，成为当天纽约交易所
前十大成交量的公司之一。
During all of the story’s iterations, I never heard or read the word
"rumor." Apparently reporters and editors, who generally pride
themselves on their careful use of language, just can’t bring themselves
to attach this word to their accounts. But what description would fit
more precisely? Certainly not the usual "sources say" or "it has been
reported."
在整篇报导当中，我没有看到或听到"谣传"这个字眼，很显然的，一向对于以使
用语言相当谨慎而自豪记者与编辑，实在是很难将这个字眼引用在自己的报导当
中，然而到底该用什么样的方式来形容呢? 我想应该也不是"消息来源指出"或是
"据报导"等。
A column entitled "Today’s Rumors," however, would not equate with
the self-image of the many news organizations that think themselves
above such stuff. These members of the media would feel that
publishing such acknowledged fluff would be akin to L’Osservatore
Romano initiating a gossip column. But rumors are what these
organizations often publish and broadcast, whatever euphemism they
duck behind. At a minimum, readers deserve honest terminology - a
warning label that will protect their financial health in the same way that
smokers whose physical health is at risk are given a warning.
若把这个专栏取名为"今日谣传"，这实在是很难让新闻媒体将之与自我形象划上
等号，这些新闻从业人员可能会觉得刊登这类明显的错误就好象是
L'Osservatore Romano(编按:该报专门追踪教宗与教廷的讯息)开辟了一个小
道消息专栏一样，这些媒体机构确实经常广泛报导各种未经证实的谣言，不管他
们用了多少借口作推托，最起码，读者应该看到诚实的用语-以保护投资人本身
的财产身家，这就好象香烟盒上都会印有请吸烟者注意本身身体健康的警语。
The Constitution’s First Amendment allows the media to print or say
almost anything. Journalism’s First Principle should require that the
media be scrupulous in deciding what that will be.
美国宪法第一修正案允许媒体自由刊登或发表任何信息，但新闻学的第一项原则
却要求媒体在判断此真义时必须要小心谨慎。
Miscellaneous
其它事项
In last year’s report we examined the battle then raging over the use
of "pooling" in accounting for mergers. It seemed to us that both sides
were voicing arguments that were strong in certain respects and
seriously flawed in others. We are pleased that the Financial Accounting
Standards Board has since gone to an alternative approach that strikes
us as very sound.
去年年报我们检讨企业购并时是否能使用"权益结合法"的论战，看起来两方的论
点各有其立场，但也有各自的缺点，在此之后，我们欣然见到财务会计准则委员
会提出了一个替代方法让我们觉得相当满意。
If the proposed rule becomes final, we will no longer incur a large
annual charge for amortization of intangibles. Consequently, our
reported earnings will more closely reflect economic reality. (See page
65.) None of this will have an effect on Berkshire’s intrinsic value. Your
Chairman, however, will personally benefit in that there will be one less
item to explain in these letters.
如果这个提案获得采用，以后我们每年将可以不必再提列大笔的无形资产摊销费
用，我们的帐列盈余也因此更能够真实反映实际的经营状况，(请参阅第65页)，
虽然这些都不会影响到Berkshire本身的实质价值，但身为公司的董事会主席，
我个人将可因此不必在这一方面再多费唇舌。
* * * * * * * * * * * *
I’m enclosing a report - generously supplied by Outstanding
Investor Digest - of Charlie’s remarks at last May’s Wesco annual
meeting. Charlie thinks about business economics and investment
matters better than anyone I know, and I’ve learned a lot over the years
by listening to him. Reading his comments will improve your
understanding of Berkshire.
这里我检附了一份广为杰出投资人文摘散发的报告-那是查理在去年五月
Wesco股东年会的一番谈话，查理在企业经营与股票投资方面的见解一向比我
更深刻，而我个人更从他身上受益匪浅，阅读他的评论绝对有助于你对
Berkshire的了解。
* * * * * * * * * * * *
In 1985, we purchased Scott Fetzer, acquiring not only a fine
business but the services of Ralph Schey, a truly outstanding CEO, as
well. Ralph was then 61. Most companies, focused on the calendar
rather than ability, would have benefited from Ralph’s talents for only a
few years.
1985年我们买下史考特飞兹，买到的不但一家公司，还附带一位优秀的经理人
-Ralph Schey，当时Ralph 61岁，对大部分注重年龄而非能力的公司来说，
Ralph为其服务的时日可能已不多。
At Berkshire, in contrast, Ralph ran Scott Fetzer for 15 years until his
retirement at the end of 2000. Under his leadership, the company
distributed $1.03 billion to Berkshire against our net purchase price of
$230 million. We used these funds, in turn, to purchase other
businesses. All told, Ralph’s contributions to Berkshire’s present value
extend well into the billions of dollars.
但是在Berkshire却正好相反，Ralph之后又在史考特飞兹待了15年，直到
2000年底他正式退休为止，在他的领导的期间，相较于当初2.3亿美元的买进
成本，该公司前前后后总共贡献了10.3亿美元的盈余给Berkshire，而我们又
利用这些资金再买进其它的企业，算下来，Ralph为Berkshire所贡献的价值可
能已超过数十亿美元。
As a manager, Ralph belongs in Berkshire’s Hall of Fame, and Charlie
and I welcome him to it.
身为一位专业经理人，Ralph绝对可以列入Berkshire的名人堂，查理跟我本身
欢迎他的加入。
* * * * * * * * * * * *
A bit of nostalgia: It was exactly 50 years ago that I entered Ben
Graham’s class at Columbia. During the decade before, I had enjoyed -
make that loved - analyzing, buying and selling stocks. But my results
were no better than average.
又到了怀旧时间，约莫50年前，我在哥伦比亚大学修了葛拉罕老师的课，在此
之前的十年，我一直盲目地从事分析、买进然后卖出股票的动作，但当时的成绩
却是平平。
Beginning in 1951 my performance improved. No, I hadn’t changed
my diet or taken up exercise. The only new ingredient was Ben’s ideas.
Quite simply, a few hours spent at the feet of the master proved far
more valuable to me than had ten years of supposedly original thinking.
从1951年起我的投资绩效开始改善，并非我改变饮食或运动习惯，唯一的改变
是其间增加了葛拉罕的观念，当时在大师面前沈浸几个小时的效果远远大于我个
人过去十年来独自的摸索。
In addition to being a great teacher, Ben was a wonderful friend. My
debt to him is incalculable.
除了是一位伟大的老师，葛拉罕更是一位难得的挚友，他对我的恩情比天高比海
深。
Shareholder-Designated Contributions
股东指定捐赠计划
About 97% of all eligible shares participated in Berkshire's 2000
shareholder-designated contributions program, with contributions
totaling $16.9 million. A full description of the program appears on
pages 74-75.
大约有97%的有效股权参与2000年的股东指定捐赠计划，捐出的款项总计约
1,690万美元，有关本计画详细的信息请参阅74-75页。
Cumulatively, over the 20 years of the program, Berkshire has made
contributions of $164 million pursuant to the instructions of our
shareholders. The rest of Berkshire's giving is done by our subsidiaries,
which stick to the philanthropic patterns that prevailed before they were
acquired (except that their former owners themselves take on the
responsibility for their personal charities). In aggregate, our
subsidiaries made contributions of $18.3 million in 2000, including
in-kind donations of $3 million.
累计过去20年以来，Berkshire总计已依照股东意愿捐赠出高达1.64亿美元
的款项，除了之外，Berkshire还透过旗下的子公司进行捐赠，而这些慈善活动
都是早在他们被我们购并以前就行之有年的(先前的老板自行本身负责的个人捐
赠计画之外除外)，总的来说，我们旗下的关系企业在2000年总计捐出1,830
万美元，其中包含300万美元等值的物品。
To participate in future programs, you must own Class A shares that
are registered in the name of the actual owner, not the nominee name of
a broker, bank or depository. Shares not so registered on August 31,
2001 will be ineligible for the 2001 program. When you get the
contributions form from us, return it promptly so that it does not get
put aside or forgotten. Designations received after the due date will not
be honored.
想要参加这项计画者，必须拥有A级普通股，同时确定您的股份是登记在自己
而非股票经纪人或保管银行的名下，同时必须在2001年8月31日之前完成登
记，才有权利参与2001年的捐赠计画，当你收到表格后，请立即填写后寄回，
以免被丢在一旁给忘记了，逾期恕不受理。
The Annual Meeting
年度股东大会
Last year we moved the annual meeting to the Civic Auditorium, and
it worked very well for us. We will meet there again on Saturday, April
28. The doors will open at 7 a.m., the movie will begin at 8:30, and the
meeting itself will commence at 9:30. There will be a short break at
noon for food, with sandwiches available at the Civic’s concession
stands. Except for that interlude, Charlie and I will answer questions
until 3:30.
去年我们将股东会举办的地点移到市立体育馆，结果令人相当满意，今年4月
28号星期六我们将再度在这里聚会，大门会在当天早上七点开放，同时电影短
片照例会在八点半播放，正式会议则从九点半开始，扣除中午短暂的休息时间，
(会场外备有三明治等各类点心)，除了中午休息时间外，查理跟我本人会在现场
回答大家各类问题直到下午三点半为止。
For the next couple of years, the Civic is our only choice. We must
therefore hold the meeting on either Saturday or Sunday to avoid the
