这场经典的赛事，甚至还用慢动作播放精彩的第四节，我们以今年封面的颜色表 .45
benchmark, but shifted to the S&P 500 when that index became widely
used. Our comparative record since 1965 is chronicled on the facing
page; last year Berkshire’s advantage was 5.7 percentage points.
两年前，在1999年的报告中，我曾提到当时「我们经历了有史以来最惨烈的表
现，不论是从绝对或相对的角度来看」，我还说「我们比较重视相对的结果」，
这个观念从我在1956年5/5成立第一个投资合伙事业时就已成形，犹记得当
天晚上，我与7位有限合伙人开会时，我给了在场的每个人一张便条纸，上面
罗列了一些「基本原则」，其中有一条是这样写的：「我们的成绩到底好不好，
要看整体股市表现而定」，一开始我们是以道琼工业指数为标竿，后来则改用接
受度较高的S&P 500指数，两者从1965年迄今的比较记录列示在年报的首页
上，去年Berkshire以5.7%的差距胜出。
Some people disagree with our focus on relative figures, arguing that
"you can’t eat relative performance." But if you expect - as Charlie
Munger, Berkshire’s Vice Chairman, and I do - that owning the S&P 500
will produce reasonably satisfactory results over time, it follows that, for
long-term investors, gaining small advantages annually over that index
must prove rewarding. Just as you can eat well throughout the year if
you own a profitable, but highly seasonal, business such as See’s (which
loses considerable money during the summer months) so, too, can you
regularly feast on investment returns that beat the averages, however
variable the absolute numbers may be.
有些人并不认同我们将重点摆在相对数字的做法，认为"相对绩效并不保证就能
获利"，但如果你抱持与查理跟我本人一样的观念，预期S&P 500指数长期的绩
效应该会相当不错的话，则就长期而言，只要投资人的绩效每年都能比它好一
点，其结果自然而然也颇为可观，就如同喜斯糖果那般，虽然一年四季营运波动
很大(基本上每年夏天它都是在亏钱)，但每年结算都获利的公司，拥有它保证可
以让你躺着收钱。
Though our corporate performance last year was satisfactory, my
performance was anything but. I manage most of Berkshire’s equity
portfolio, and my results were poor, just as they have been for several
years. Of even more importance, I allowed General Re to take on
business without a safeguard I knew was important, and on September
11th, this error caught up with us. I’ll tell you more about my mistake
later and what we are doing to correct it.
虽然去年我们企业的整体表现还算令人满意，但我个人的表现却刚好相反，我本
身管理Berkshire大部分的股票投资，但其成绩却乏善可陈，而且这情况已经维
持好几年了，更要命的是，我竟允许通用再保在没有安全保障的情况下做生意，
而911事件的发生正好把我们逮个正着，后面我还会向大家报告我所犯的错
误，以及我们要如何来改正它。
Another of my 1956 Ground Rules remains applicable: "I cannot promise
results to partners." But Charlie and I can promise that your economic
result from Berkshire will parallel ours during the period of your
ownership: We will not take cash compensation, restricted stock or
option grants that would make our results superior to yours.
另外还有一条1956年的基本原则，现在看来倒还适用，那就是「我个人不敢保
证绩效」，不过查理跟我可以向各位保证，在持有Berkshire股票期间所得到的
效益，绝对会与我们本身的相同，我们不会靠领取奖金或股票选择权等方式，使
得我们所得到的利益优于各位。
Additionally, I will keep well over 99% of my net worth in Berkshire. My
wife and I have never sold a share nor do we intend to. Charlie and I are
disgusted by the situation, so common in the last few years, in which
shareholders have suffered billions in losses while the CEOs, promoters,
and other higher-ups who fathered these disasters have walked away
with extraordinary wealth. Indeed, many of these people were urging
investors to buy shares while concurrently dumping their own,
sometimes using methods that hid their actions. To their shame, these
business leaders view shareholders as patsies, not partners.
此外，我也将继续将个人99%以上的身家财产摆在Berkshire上面，我和我内
人过去从来就没有卖过任何Berkshire的股份，而且以后也没有打算要卖，查理
跟我对于近年来，许多让公司亏损累累的经理人与公司高层，竟然能够带着丰厚
的利润弃股东们扬长而去感到相当不耻，这些人在公开场合鼓励投资人高价买进
公司股份的同时，自己却暗中将股票倒到市场上，这些可耻的企业领导人简直把
股东当作是自己的禁脔而非伙伴。
Though Enron has become the symbol for shareholder abuse, there is
no shortage of egregious conduct elsewhere in corporate America. One
story I’ve heard illustrates the all-too-common attitude of managers
toward owners: A gorgeous woman slinks up to a CEO at a party and
through moist lips purrs, "I’ll do anything - anything - you want. Just tell
me what you would like." With no hesitation, he replies, "Reprice my
options."
虽然恩隆公司已经成为企业弊案的典型案例，但这种贪婪的行为在美国企业当中
却绝非特例，就像我个人就曾听过一个故事，显示经理人心中普遍存在对待股东
的一种心态，在一场宴会上，有位美丽媱娇的女士溜到一位总裁的面前，用那性
感的嘴唇说到，「只要你想要，我愿意为你做任何事!」，只见这位总裁立刻毫
不犹豫地回答说：「那好，请给我更多的股票选择权!」
One final thought about Berkshire: In the future we won’t come close to
replicating our past record. To be sure, Charlie and I will strive for
above-average performance and will not be satisfied with less. But two
conditions at Berkshire are far different from what they once were:
Then, we could often buy businesses and securities at much lower
valuations than now prevail; and more important, we were then working
with far less money than we now have. Some years back, a good $10
million idea could do wonders for us (witness our investment in
Washington Post in 1973 or GEICO in 1976). Today, the combination of
ten such ideas and a triple in the value of each would increase the net
worth of Berkshire by only ? of 1%. We need "elephants" to make
significant gains now - and they are hard to find.
最后再补充一点看法，那就是往后Berkshire将很难再维持以往的盛况，虽然查
理跟我仍然会尽力维持水准以上的表现，且永远不会感到自满，无奈现今有两个
环境条件已与过去截然不同，在以前我们可以很容易的就买到许多价廉物美的公
司及股票，同时我们当时运用的资金规模也比现在少得多，许多年以前，一个
1,000万美金的好案子就可以让我们雀跃不已，比如说像1973年的华盛顿邮
报或1976年的GEICO保险等投资，然而时至今日，就算是30个这样的案子，
也仅仅能让Berkshire的净值增加0.25%而已，我们需要像大象般的大案子才
有可能使得净值大幅成长，只不过这样的个案实在是少之又少。
On the positive side, we have as fine an array of operating managers as
exists at any company. (You can read about many of them in a new book
by Robert P. Miles: The Warren Buffett CEO.) In large part, moreover,
they are running businesses with economic characteristics ranging from
good to superb. The ability, energy and loyalty of these managers is
simply extraordinary. We now have completed 37 Berkshire years
without having a CEO of an operating business elect to leave us to work
elsewhere.
从好的方面来看，我们拥有一群坚强的经理人阵容，(大家可以在Robert Miles
刚出版的新书-华伦巴菲特的经理人-中，读到更多有关他们的事迹)，而且大部
分由他们所经营的事业，其竞争力在各自的产业中，可以说都是数一数二的，他
们的能力、精力与忠诚度都属最优等，个人经营Berkshire 37年以来，旗下还
没有任何一位经理人离开我们跳槽到别家公司的。
Our star-studded group grew in 2001. First, we completed the
purchases of two businesses that we had agreed to buy in 2000 - Shaw
and Johns Manville. Then we acquired two others, MiTek and XTRA, and
contracted to buy two more: Larson-Juhl, an acquisition that has just
closed, and Fruit of the Loom, which will close shortly if creditors
approve our offer. All of these businesses are led by smart, seasoned
and trustworthy CEOs.
我们星光满布的经营团队在2001年又增添了一群生力军，首先我们完成了二件
从2000年就开始谈的案子，Shaw地毯及Johns Manville，此外又买下了另外
两家公司-MiTek及XTRA，同时手上还有其它两件个案-Larson-Juhl最近才刚
结案以及Fruit of the Loom纺织，后者只等债权人会议通过我们的提案，以上
这些企业皆由兼具智能、理性以及值得信赖的CEO所领导。
Additionally, all of our purchases last year were for cash, which means
our shareholders became owners of these additional businesses without
relinquishing any interest in the fine companies they already owned. We
will continue to follow our familiar formula, striving to increase the
value of the excellent businesses we have, adding new businesses of
similar quality, and issuing shares only grudgingly.
此外，去年所有的购并案全部皆以现金买断，这代表我们的股东可以不必牺牲原
先就拥有优秀企业的任何权益，同时还能成为这些新加入公司的幕后老板，往后
我们仍将继续维持这个策略，在想尽办法增加现有优秀企业的价值，以及寻找新
的优秀企业加入的同时，还能不轻易的增加流通在外的股份。
Acquisitions of 2001
2001年的购并案
A few days before last year’s annual meeting, I received a heavy package
from St. Louis, containing an unprepossessing chunk of metal whose
function I couldn’t imagine. There was a letter in the package, though,
from Gene Toombs, CEO of a company called MiTek. He explained that
MiTek is the world’s leading producer of this thing I’d received, a
"connector plate," which is used in making roofing trusses. Gene also
said that the U.K. parent of MiTek wished to sell the company and that
Berkshire seemed to him the ideal buyer. Liking the sound of his letter, I
gave Gene a call. It took me only a minute to realize that he was our kind
of manager and MiTek our kind of business. We made a cash offer to the
U.K. owner and before long had a deal.
就在去年股东会的前几天，我收到从圣路易寄来的一个大包裹，里面装了一块看
不出做何用途的金属，包裹里还有一封信，署名Gene Toombs-他是一家叫做
MiTek公司的总裁，他解释说MiTek是专门制造这玩意儿的世界级领导厂商，
也就是用来做屋梁的连接板，他进一步表示MiTek的英国母公司有意出售这家
公司，他认为Berkshire应该是最合适的买家，我相当欣赏他写这封信的语气，
所以当下打电话给他，几分钟的谈话，我就发觉他是属于我们类型的经理人，而
MiTek也是我们想要的公司类型，于是我们报了一个价给其英国母公司，没多
久后就正式成交。
Gene’s managerial crew is exceptionally enthusiastic about the
company and wanted to participate in the purchase. Therefore, we
arranged for 55 members of the MiTek team to buy 10% of the company,
with each putting up a minimum of $100,000 in cash. Many borrowed
money so they could participate.
Gene所带领的经营团队对于公司相当有信心，愿意参与这次的购并交易，所以
最后我们安排由55位经营成员取得10%的股权，每人最低的投资金额为10万
美元，其中很多人都是靠借钱参与投资。
As they would not be if they had options, all of these managers are true
owners. They face the downside of decisions as well as the upside. They
incur a cost of capital. And they can’t "reprice" their stakes: What they
paid is what they live with.
这些没有认股选择权的经理人真的称得上是公司的拥有者，完全站在股东的立场
设想，他们真正愿意与公司同甘共苦，自己承担资金成本，也没有办法让自己的
认股价格重新修正，要怎么收获先怎么栽。
Charlie and I love the high-grade, truly entrepreneurial attitude that
exists at MiTek, and we predict it will be a winner for all involved.
查理跟我欣赏存在MiTek的这种高格调、真正的企业家精神，我们相信这绝对
可以创造出多赢的局面。
* * * * * * * * * * * *
In early 2000, my friend, Julian Robertson, announced that he would
terminate his investment partnership, Tiger Fund, and that he would
liquidate it entirely except for four large holdings. One of these was
XTRA, a leading lessor of truck trailers. I then called Julian, asking
whether he might consider selling his XTRA block or whether, for that
matter, the company’s management might entertain an offer for the
entire company. Julian referred me to Lew Rubin, XTRA’s CEO. He and I
had a nice conversation, but it was apparent that no deal was to be
done.
2000年初，我的好朋友Julian Robertson宣布将结束其投资合伙事业-老虎基
金，除了四项主要的持股投资之外，其余的投资将全部予以结算，其中包含了
XTRA公司-货柜拖车租赁的领导业者，于是我打电话给Julian问到他及公司的
经营团队是否有意将整家公司出售，Julian建议我直接连络XTRA的总裁-Lew
Rubin，后来我们两个人相谈甚欢，可惜的是双方似乎很难达成交易。
Then in June 2001, Julian called to say that he had decided to sell his
XTRA shares, and I resumed conversations with Lew. The XTRA board
accepted a proposal we made, which was to be effectuated through a
tender offer expiring on September 11th. The tender conditions included
the usual "out," allowing us to withdraw if the stock market were to
close before the offer’s expiration. Throughout much of the 11th, Lew
went through a particularly wrenching experience: First, he had a sonin-
law working in the World Trade Center who couldn’t be located; and
second, he knew we had the option of backing away from our purchase.
The story ended happily: Lew’s son-in-law escaped serious harm, and
Berkshire completed the transaction.
之后到了2001年六月，Julian打电话给我表示他决定出售XTRA的股份，于是
我恢复与Lew的谈判，终于XTRA的董事会接受了我们的提案，由我们对外提
出公开收购，截止日订为9/11，这项公开收购案订有一项例行条款，约定买方
有退出的权利，如果在收购截止日前，股市有重大异常的变化，谁也没想到9/11
当天，Lew竟经历了上上下下煎熬的难忘经验，一开始，他有一位在纽约世贸
中心上班的女婿下落不明，其次，他很清楚我们有权取消整个收购案，所幸最后
故事有个圆满的结局，Lew的女婿侥幸逃过一劫，而Berkshire则如原先预期
完成了收购案。
Trailer leasing is a cyclical business but one in which we should earn
decent returns over time. Lew brings a new talent to Berkshire, and we
hope to expand in leasing.
货柜车租赁业的景气循环相当明显，不过它仍是一个我们预期能够得到长期合理
报酬的行业，Lew为Berkshire带来一项我们欠缺的Know-how，我们期望将
来能够扩张在租赁业的布局。
* * * * * * * * * * * *
On December 3rd, I received a call from Craig Ponzio, owner of Larson-
Juhl, the U.S. leader in custom-made picture frames. Craig had bought
the company in 1981 (after first working at its manufacturing plant
while attending college) and thereafter increased its sales from $3
million to $300 million. Though I had never heard of Larson-Juhl before
Craig’s call, a few minutes talk with him made me think we would strike
a deal. He was straightforward in describing the business, cared about
who bought it, and was realistic as to price. Two days later, Craig and
Steve McKenzie, his CEO, came to Omaha and in ninety minutes we
reached an agreement. In ten days we had signed a contract.
12/3我收到Larson-Juhl老板Craig Ponzio的一通电话，该公司是美国订制
相框的领导厂商，Craig是在1981年买下这家公司的(这也是他大学时代打工
的第一家公司)，自此公司的营业额从300万美元成长到3亿美元，虽然在Craig
打电话给我之前，我完全不知道有这家公司的存在，不过几分钟的谈话令我感到
我们很有可能达成交易，他对于企业现况坦率直言，同时也在乎买方的来历背
景，至于所提价格也相当合理，两天之后，Craig跟公司总裁Steve McKenzie
来到奥玛哈，前后只花了90分钟双方就达成共识，并于十天后正式签订合约。
Larson-Juhl serves about 18,000 framing shops in the U.S. and is also
the industry leader in Canada and much of Europe. We expect to see
opportunities for making complementary acquisitions in the future.
Larson-Juhl提供服务给全美18,000家相馆，同时也是加拿大及欧洲大部分地
区的领导厂商，我们期望在不久的未来还有类似的购并机会。
* * * * * * * * * * *
As I write this letter, creditors are considering an offer we have made for
Fruit of the Loom. The company entered bankruptcy a few years back, a
victim both of too much debt and poor management. And, a good many
years before that, I had some Fruit of the Loom experience of my own.
在我写这封信的同时，Fruit of the Loom的债权人正在考虑接受我们的提案，
这家公司由于负债过于沉重加上管理不当，在几年前宣布破产，而事实上，在许
多年以前，我个人也曾与Fruit of the Loom有过接触的经验。
In August 1955, I was one of five employees, including two secretaries,
working for the three managers of Graham-Newman Corporation, a
New York investment company. Graham-Newman controlled
Philadelphia and Reading Coal and Iron ("P&R"), an anthracite producer
that had excess cash, a tax loss carryforward, and a declining business.
At the time, I had a significant portion of my limited net worth invested
in P&R shares, reflecting my faith in the business talents of my bosses,
Ben Graham, Jerry Newman and Howard (Micky) Newman.
1955年八月，当时我还是纽约一家投资公司，葛拉罕-纽曼公司仅有的五位员
工之一(包含三位经理加上二位秘书)，当时葛拉罕-纽曼所掌控一家专门生产无
烟煤，名叫费城碳铁的公司(P&R)，该公司拥有多余的资金、可扣抵的税务亏损
以及日益下滑的业务，在当时我将个人有限资金的大部份投资在这家公司上头，
此举充分反映我对老板们-包含班哲明葛拉罕、杰瑞纽曼以及霍华纽曼等人投资
哲学的信仰。
This faith was rewarded when P&R purchased the Union Underwear
Company from Jack Goldfarb for $15 million. Union (though it was then
only a licensee of the name) produced Fruit of the Loom underwear. The
company possessed $5 million in cash - $2.5 million of which P&R used
