这场经典的赛事，甚至还用慢动作播放精彩的第四节，我们以今年封面的颜色表 .46
for the purchase - and was earning about $3 million pre-tax, earnings
that could be sheltered by the tax position of P&R. And, oh yes: Fully $9
million of the remaining $12.5 million due was satisfied by noninterest-
bearing notes, payable from 50% of any earnings Union had in
excess of $1 million. (Those were the days; I get goosebumps just
thinking about such deals.)
这样的信仰在P&R决定以1,500万美元从Jack Goldfarb手中买下联合内衣公
司时获得了丰厚的回报，联合公司(虽然它只是被授权生产的厂商)当时专门生产
Fruit of the Loom的内衣，该公司拥有500万美元的现金-其中250万美元被
P&R用来购并用，另外每年约300万美元的税前盈余，将因P&R本身亏损部位
而得到免税的利益，另外更棒的是在剩下的1,250万美元尾款当中，有整整900
万美元是开出免付利息的票据，由联合公司日后年度盈余超过100万美元时提
拨半数支付，(真是令人怀念的往日时光，每当想起这类的交易就让我雀跃不
已)。
Subsequently, Union bought the licensor of the Fruit of the Loom name
and, along with P&R, was merged into Northwest Industries. Fruit went
on to achieve annual pre-tax earnings exceeding $200 million.
后来，联合公司进一步买下Fruit of the Loom的商标权，同时跟着P&R并入
西北工业，Fruit后来累计的税前获利超过2亿美元。
John Holland was responsible for Fruit’s operations in its most bountiful
years. In 1996, however, John retired, and management loaded the
company with debt, in part to make a series of acquisitions that proved
disappointing. Bankruptcy followed. John was then rehired, and he
undertook a major reworking of operations. Before John’s return,
deliveries were chaotic, costs soared and relations with key customers
deteriorated. While correcting these problems, John also reduced
employment from a bloated 40,000 to 23,000. In short, he’s been
restoring the old Fruit of the Loom, albeit in a much more competitive
environment.
John Holland是Fruit营运最辉煌时期的经营者，然而John却于1996年宣布
退休，之后的管理当局竟大幅举债，其中部份的资金被用来购并一堆没有效益的
公司，公司最后终于宣布破产，John后来又回锅走马上任，并对于营运进行大
幅改造，在John回来之前，交货总是一团混乱、成本激增、与主要客户之间的
关系日益恶化，而John在陆续解决这些问题之后，也开始裁减公司不当的冗员，
将员工人数由40,000人减为23,000人，简言之，他又让Fruit of the Loom
回复到原来的模样，只是外在的产业环境竞争却日益激烈。
Stepping into Fruit’s bankruptcy proceedings, we made a proposal to
creditors to which we attached no financing conditions, even though our
offer had to remain outstanding for many months. We did, however,
insist on a very unusual proviso: John had to be available to continue
serving as CEO after we took over. To us, John and the brand are Fruit’s
key assets.
在Fruit进入破产程序之后，我们提出了一项提案，其中并无任何融资计画，且
有效期间长达数个月，不过在此同时我们也坚持几项特殊的条款，首先我们要求
在接手之后，John必须继续担任公司的总裁，因为在我们看来，John跟Fruit
的商标是该公司最主要的资产。
I was helped in this transaction by my friend and former boss, Micky
Newman, now 81. What goes around truly does come around.
在这项合并交易中，我得到昔日老板兼好友，现年61岁的麦克纽曼相当多的帮
助，我们的友情常在。
* * * * * * * * * * * *
Our operating companies made several "bolt-on" acquisitions during
the year, and I can’t resist telling you about one. In December, Frank
Rooney called to tell me H.H. Brown was buying the inventory and
trademarks of Acme Boot for $700,000.
我们旗下的子公司在去年也进行了几项购并案，其中有一件我一定要提，去年十
二月，Frank Rooney 打电话给我表示H.H. Brown正打算以70万美元买下
Acme 靴子的存货及商标权。
That sounds like small potatoes. But - would you believe it? - Acme was
the second purchase of P&R, an acquisition that took place just before I
left Graham-Newman in the spring of 1956. The price was $3.2 million,
part of it again paid with non-interest bearing notes, for a business with
sales of $7 million.
这听起来好象没什么大不了， 但你知道吗? Acme是继P&R之后的第二件购并
案，时间大约是我在1956年春天离开葛拉罕-纽曼公司之前不久，当时的交易
价格是320万美元，其中也包含无息分期支票，买下年营业额700万美元的公
司。
After P&R merged with Northwest, Acme grew to be the world’s largest
bootmaker, delivering annual profits many multiples of what the
company had cost P&R. But the business eventually hit the skids and
never recovered, and that resulted in our purchasing Acme’s remnants.
而在P&R与西北公司合并后，Acme持续成长跃居全世界规模最大的靴子制造
商，每年的获利是当初P&R投资成本的好几倍，不过后来该公司的营运还是不
免逐渐走下坡，乃至于剩下最后残存的资产被我们所收买。
In the frontispiece to Security Analysis, Ben Graham and Dave Dodd
quoted Horace: "Many shall be restored that now are fallen and many
shall fall that are now in honor." Fifty-two years after I first read those
lines, my appreciation for what they say about business and
investments continues to grow.
在葛拉罕与陶德所着的证券分析一书中，开头引用Horace的一句名言，「十年
河东，十年河西。」在我头一次听到这句话的52年后，我个人对于这句话描写
企业与投资真理的体认日益加深。
* * * * * * * * * * * *
In addition to bolt-on acquisitions, our managers continually look for
ways to grow internally. In that regard, here’s a postscript to a story I
told you two years ago about R.C. Willey’s move to Boise. As you may
remember, Bill Child, R.C. Willey’s chairman, wanted to extend his
home-furnishings operation beyond Utah, a state in which his company
does more than $300 million of business (up, it should be noted, from
$250,000 when Bill took over 48 years ago). The company achieved this
dominant position, moreover, with a "closed on Sunday" policy that
defied conventional retailing wisdom. I was skeptical that this policy
could succeed in Boise or, for that matter, anyplace outside of Utah.
After all, Sunday is the day many consumers most like to shop.
除了这些附带的购并案，我们的经理人仍然不断的寻找内部自我成长的方法，关
于这一点，这里有一则两年前我告诉各位R.C.Willey进军Boise的后话，大家
应该还记得，R.C.Willey的董事长Bill Child想将业务拓展到犹他州以外的地
区，他的公司在当地的年营业额超过3亿美元，(Bill在48年前接手时的营业额
只有25万美元)，这家公司是在违反商业法则，坚持星期天不营业的情形下达成
独霸的地位，然而我还是很怀疑这项原则是否也能在Boise地区或是任何犹他州
以外的地方成功推行，毕竟星期天是许多消费者出外血拼的日子。
Bill then insisted on something extraordinary: He would invest $11
million of his own money to build the Boise store and would sell it to
Berkshire at cost (without interest!) if the venture succeeded. If it failed,
Bill would keep the store and eat the loss on its disposal. As I told you in
the 1999 annual report, the store immediately became a huge success -
and it has since grown.
Bill 当时很坚持一件特别的事，那就是他希望先用自己的钱投资1,100万美元
成立Boise的分店，然后等分店经营顺遂后，再以成本卖回给Berkshire(而且
不算利息)，而万一如果失败，Bill将自行负担开店的损失，而正如我在1999年
年报中提过的，该店事后证明相当成功而且业绩持续成长。
Shortly after the Boise opening, Bill suggested we try Las Vegas, and this
time I was even more skeptical. How could we do business in a
metropolis of that size and be closed on Sundays, a day that all of our
competitors would be exploiting? Buoyed by the Boise experience,
however, we proceeded to locate in Henderson, a mushrooming city
adjacent to Las Vegas.
在Boise分店开张后不久，Bill又建议可以到Las Vegas试试看，这次我则抱持
更怀疑的态度，我们怎么可能在这个规模如此大的城市开店，同时还在同业大发
利市的星期天打烊，不过受到Boise经验的鼓舞，我们还是决定进军Hendersn-
一个邻近Las Vegas的新兴城市。
The result: This store outsells all others in the R.C. Willey chain, doing a
volume of business that far exceeds the volume of any competitor and
that is twice what I had anticipated. I cut the ribbon at the grand
opening in October - this was after a "soft" opening and a few weeks of
exceptional sales - and, just as I did at Boise, I suggested to the crowd
that the new store was my idea.
结果是：这家店的营业额打破R.C.Willey其它连锁店的记录，业绩比当地所有
的竞争对手都还要好，业绩达到我原先预估的两倍，在进行几个礼拜的试卖会
后，我受邀在10月的正式开幕仪式莅临剪彩，而如同我在Boise时一样，向在
场来宾暗示这是我个人的构想。
It didn’t work. Today, when I pontificate about retailing, Berkshire
people just say, "What does Bill think?" (I’m going to draw the line,
however, if he suggests that we also close on Saturdays.)
不过此举显然无效，现在每当我对于零售业侃侃而谈时，公司的人一定会说，喔!
那Bill又是怎么想呢? (不过我必须先说明我最后的底线，如果他敢提议星期六也
休息就给我走着瞧)。
The Economics of Property/Casualty Insurance
产物意外险的经营
Our main business - though we have others of great importance - is
insurance. To understand Berkshire, therefore, it is necessary that you
understand how to evaluate an insurance company. The key
determinants are: (1) the amount of float that the business generates;
(2) its cost; and (3) most critical of all, the long-term outlook for both of
these factors.
我们最主要的本业就是保险，当然其它事业也相当重要，想要了解Berkshire，
你就必须知道如何去评估一家保险公司，其中主要的关键因素有(1)这个行业所
能产生的浮存金数量(2)以及它的成本(3)最重要的是这些因素长期的展望。
To begin with, float is money we hold but don't own. In an insurance
operation, float arises because premiums are received before losses are
paid, an interval that sometimes extends over many years. During that
time, the insurer invests the money. This pleasant activity typically
carries with it a downside: The premiums that an insurer takes in usually
do not cover the losses and expenses it eventually must pay. That leaves
it running an "underwriting loss," which is the cost of float. An insurance
business has value if its cost of float over time is less than the cost the
company would otherwise incur to obtain funds. But the business is a
lemon if its cost of float is higher than market rates for money.
首先浮存金是一项我们持有但却不属于我们的资金，在保险公司的营运中，浮存
金产生的原因在于保险公司在真正支付损失理赔之前，一般会先向保户收取保
费，在这期间保险公司会将资金运用在其它投资之上，当然这样的好处也必须要
付出代价，通常保险业者收取的保费并不足以支应最后支付出去的相关损失与费
用，于是保险公司便会发生承保损失，这就是浮存金的成本，而当一家公司取得
浮存金成本，就长期而言低于从其它管道取得资金的成本时，它就有存在的价
值，否则一旦保险事业取得浮存金的成本远高于货币市场利率时，它就像是一颗
极酸的柠檬。
Historically, Berkshire has obtained its float at a very low cost. Indeed,
our cost has been less than zero in about half of the years in which we've
operated; that is, we've actually been paid for holding other people's
money. Over the last few years, however, our cost has been too high,
and in 2001 it was terrible.
根据过去的记录显示，Berkshire 一向能够以很低的成本取得浮存金，确实在
Berkshire经营的这些年来，有半数以上的年头，浮存金的成本甚至低于零，也
就是说这实际上等于是别人要付费请我们帮他们保管资金，然而最近这几年，我
们的成本大幅飙涨，而2001年尤其恐怖。
The table that follows shows (at intervals) the float generated by the
various segments of Berkshire's insurance operations since we entered
the business 35 years ago upon acquiring National Indemnity Company
(whose traditional lines are included in the segment "Other Primary").
For the table we have calculated our float - which we generate in large
amounts relative to our premium volume - by adding net loss reserves,
loss adjustment reserves, funds held under reinsurance assumed and
unearned premium reserves, and then subtracting insurance-related
receivables, prepaid acquisition costs, prepaid taxes and deferred
charges applicable to assumed reinsurance. (Got that?)
下表中所显示的数字是，Berkshire自取得国家产险公司经营权，进入保险事业
35年以来所贡献的浮存金，(其中传统业务包含在其它主险项下)，在这张计算
浮存金的表中，(相对于收到的保费收入，我们持有的浮存金部位算是相当大的)
我们将所有的损失准备、损失费用调整准备、再保预先收取的资金与未赚取保费
加总后，再扣除应付佣金、预付购并成本、预付税负以及取得再保业务的相关递
延费用，得出浮存金的数额，弄清楚了吗
Yearend Float (in $ millions)
Year GEICO General Re
Other
Reinsurance
Other
Primary Total
1967 20 20
1977 40 131 171
1987 701 807 1,508
1997 2,917 4,014 455 7,386
1998 3,125 14,909 4,305 415 22,754
1999 3,444 15,166 6,285 403 25,298
2000 3,943 15,525 7,805 598 27,871
2001 4,251 19,310 11,262 685 35,508
Last year I told you that, barring a mega-catastrophe, our cost of float
would probably drop from its 2000 level of 6%. I had in mind natural
catastrophes when I said that, but instead we were hit by a man-made
catastrophe on September 11th - an event that delivered the insurance
industry its largest loss in history. Our float cost therefore came in at a
staggering 12.8%. It was our worst year in float cost since 1984, and a
result that to a significant degree, as I will explain in the next section,
we brought upon ourselves.
去年我曾告诉各位，除非发生什么重大的灾难，否则我们浮存金的成本将可由
2000年6%的高档往下降，当时我心里想到的是自然天灾之类的意外，但任谁
也想不到发生的竟是911恐怖份子攻击事件这样的人祸，它造成保险业有史以
来最重大的损失，也让我们的浮存金成本大举飙高到12.8%，这是自1984年
以来最惨的记录，而且大部分的责任，在后段我还会再详加解释，要归咎于我们
自己。
If no mega-catastrophe occurs, I - once again - expect the cost of our
float to be low in the coming year. We will indeed need a low cost, as will
all insurers. Some years back, float costing, say, 4% was tolerable
because government bonds yielded twice as much, and stocks
prospectively offered still loftier returns. Today, fat returns are nowhere
to be found (at least we can't find them) and short-term funds earn less
than 2%. Under these conditions, each of our insurance operations, save
one, must deliver an underwriting profit if it is to be judged a good
business. The exception is our retroactive reinsurance operation (a
business we explained in last year's annual report), which has desirable
economics even though it currently hits us with an annual underwriting
loss of about $425 million.
如果没有发生重大的灾害，我个人再度预期，明年度我们的浮存金成本将会大幅
降低，我们确实极需要降低成本，我想其它业者也是一样，几年前，4%的浮存
金成本还算可以忍受，因为当时政府的公债利率是其两倍以上，而股市预期也能
提供相当不错的报酬，然而时至今日，丰厚的投资报酬已不复见(至少我们无法
找到)，短期资金的报酬低于2%，在这种情况下，我们旗下所有的保险事业，除
了追溯再保险业务(去年的年报曾详加介绍过，虽然目前一年让我们必须额外承
担4.25亿美元的承保损失，但就长期而言却有相当的经济价值)，都必须能够创
造出承保获利才能称得上是好公司。
Principles of Insurance Underwriting
保险业承保的几项原则
When property/casualty companies are judged by their cost of float,
very few stack up as satisfactory businesses. And interestingly - unlike
the situation prevailing in many other industries - neither size nor
brand name determines an insurer's profitability. Indeed, many of the
biggest and best-known companies regularly deliver mediocre results.
What counts in this business is underwriting discipline. The winners are
those that unfailingly stick to three key principles:
当产物意外险公司以浮存金成本来判定公司的好坏时，很少有公司的成绩可以令
人感到满意，而有趣的是，不像一些产业普遍存在的现象，规模或品牌并非保险
公司获利的关键，事实上许多最大最有名的保险公司其成绩表现大多平平，这个
行业最要紧的是承保的纪律原则，真正成功的公司必须坚守以下三项重要原则：
1. They accept only those risks that they are able to properly
evaluate (staying within their circle of competence) and that, after
they have evaluated all relevant factors including remote loss
scenarios, carry the expectancy of profit. These insurers ignore
market-share considerations and are sanguine about losing
business to competitors that are offering foolish prices or policy
conditions.
1.他们只接受能够妥善衡量的风险，(也就是谨守自己的能力范围)，在谨慎评
估所有相关因素，包含最微小的损失可能在内，然后得出获利的期望值，这
些公司从来不以市场占有率为意，同时在看到同业为抢夺客户而杀价竞争或
提供不合理的理赔条件时，也不会跃跃欲试。
2. They limit the business they accept in a manner that guarantees
they will suffer no aggregation of losses from a single event or
from related events that will threaten their solvency. They
ceaselessly search for possible correlation among seemingly
unrelated risks.
