这场经典的赛事，甚至还用慢动作播放精彩的第四节，我们以今年封面的颜色表 .47
2.要严格限制承接的业务内容，以确保公司不会因为单一意外及其连带事件
而累积理赔损失，导致公司的清偿能力发生疑虑，同时不遗余力地寻找任何
看似不相关的风险间，彼此可能的潜在关联。
3. They avoid business involving moral risk: No matter what the rate,
trying to write good contracts with bad people doesn't work.
While most policyholders and clients are honorable and ethical,
doing business with the few exceptions is usually expensive,
sometimes extraordinarily so.
3.他们避免涉入可能引发道德风险的业务，不管其费率多么诱人，不要妄想
在坏人身上占到任何便宜，大部分的客户其诚信都值得信赖，所以不必要与
有道德疑虑的人打交道，事后证明通常其成本远比想象中的高。
The events of September 11th made it clear that our implementation of
rules 1 and 2 at General Re had been dangerously weak. In setting prices
and also in evaluating aggregation risk, we had either overlooked or
dismissed the possibility of large-scale terrorism losses. That was a
relevant underwriting factor, and we ignored it.
911事件的发生证明在通用再保，我们对于第一条与第二条的执行力相当的差，
在设定费率及评估累计的可能风险，我们不是忽略就是低估了大规模恐怖事件发
生的可能性，那是一项相当要紧的承保因素，偏偏我们竟把它给忽略了。
In pricing property coverages, for example, we had looked to the past
and taken into account only costs we might expect to incur from
windstorm, fire, explosion and earthquake. But what will be the largest
insured property loss in history (after adding related businessinterruption
claims) originated from none of these forces. In short, all of
us in the industry made a fundamental underwriting mistake by
focusing on experience, rather than exposure, thereby assuming a huge
terrorism risk for which we received no premium.
举例来说，产险在订定价格时，我们通常都会参酌过去的经验，只预期可能会遇
到过去发生诸如飓风、火灾、爆炸及地震等灾害，不过谁也没有想到产险史上最
大的理赔损失(在加上其它相关的业务中断理赔)与上述原因都没有任何关系，简
言之，产险业的所有从业人员都犯下了最基本的承保错误，那就是过于注重过去
的经验，而未顾及真正暴露的风险，其结果导致我们在承担庞大的恐怖份子活动
风险的同时，却没有为此收取任何一分的保费。
Experience, of course, is a highly useful starting point in underwriting
most coverages. For example, it's important for insurers writing
California earthquake policies to know how many quakes in the state
during the past century have registered 6.0 or greater on the Richter
scale. This information will not tell you the exact probability of a big
quake next year, or where in the state it might happen. But the statistic
has utility, particularly if you are writing a huge statewide policy, as
National Indemnity has done in recent years.
经验，当然是承保大部分风险最有用的出发点，举例来说，保险公司在承保加州
地震险时，绝对必须了解过去一百年来，当地地震规模在芮氏六级以上发生的次
数，虽然这类信息无法明确地告诉你明年发生地震的确实机率，或者是可能发生
的地点，但统计数字还是有其效用，尤其当你像国家产险最近几年那样，承受整
个州的地震险时更是如此。
At certain times, however, using experience as a guide to pricing is not
only useless, but actually dangerous. Late in a bull market, for example,
large losses from directors and officers liability insurance ("D&O") are
likely to be relatively rare. When stocks are rising, there are a scarcity of
targets to sue, and both questionable accounting and management
chicanery often go undetected. At that juncture, experience on highlimit
D&O may look great.
不过在某些时候，运用过去的经验当作依据来订定保费价格，不但没有用，有时
反而相当的危险，举例来说，前几年股市正旺时，董事及经理人的责任险(D&O)
实际上发生重大损失的机率少之又少，当股票价格上涨，很难找到适合的目标可
以告，而此时作假帐及管理舞弊通常不会引起太多的注意，在此种情势下，业者
在高上限D&O的经验肯定相当不错。
But that's just when exposure is likely to be exploding, by way of
ridiculous public offerings, earnings manipulation, chain-letter-like
stock promotions and a potpourri of other unsavory activities. When
stocks fall, these sins surface, hammering investors with losses that can
run into the hundreds of billions. Juries deciding whether those losses
should be borne by small investors or big insurance companies can be
expected to hit insurers with verdicts that bear little relation to those
delivered in bull-market days. Even one jumbo judgment, moreover,
can cause settlement costs in later cases to mushroom. Consequently,
the correct rate for D&O "excess" (meaning the insurer or reinsurer will
pay losses above a high threshold) might well, if based on exposure, be
five or more times the premium dictated by experience.
不过这正是风险暴露可能爆炸的时候，离谱的公开释股、盈余操控、连环信式的
股票拉抬以及一些无聊的举动等行为大举出笼，然而等到股价暴跌时，所有的罪
恶都一一浮现，总计超过数千亿美元的损失使得投资人一败涂地，而决定这些损
失到底该由小额投资人或是大型保险公司来承担的陪审团，其打击保险公司所采
用的证词是过去股票市场当红时所听不到的，只要出现一个大案子，就有可能导
致以后的理赔损失大幅增加，因此D&O超额保险的正确费率(意思是保险业者及
再保业者赔偿超过上限)若真要考量暴露的风险，极有可能是现行依照经验所订
保费的五倍以上。
Insurers have always found it costly to ignore new exposures. Doing
that in the case of terrorism, however, could literally bankrupt the
industry. No one knows the probability of a nuclear detonation in a
major metropolis this year (or even multiple detonations, given that a
terrorist organization able to construct one bomb might not stop there).
Nor can anyone, with assurance, assess the probability in this year, or
another, of deadly biological or chemical agents being introduced
simultaneously (say, through ventilation systems) into multiple office
buildings and manufacturing plants. An attack like that would produce
astronomical workers' compensation claims.
保险业者往往会发现没有注意到新暴露风险的代价相当的高，而若是遇到恐怖活
动这种情况，更可能造成保险公司实质上的破产，没有人知道今年在主要大都会
发生核子爆炸的可能性(或甚至是连环爆炸，假若恐怖份子组织一旦有能力制造
的话，铁定不会只有一颗)，而也没有人能百分之百确定，今年或明年，致命的
生化武器被大量运用(比如说透过空调系统)进入办公大楼及工厂的机率有多
高，诸如此类的攻击事件有可能造成天文数字的劳保理赔金额。
Here's what we do know:
在这里我们确信：
a. The probability of such mind-boggling disasters, though likely
very low at present, is not zero.
a.这类震慑人心灾难的可能性，现在虽然很低，但绝非没有可能。
b. The probabilities are increasing, in an irregular and immeasurable
manner, as knowledge and materials become available to those
who wish us ill. Fear may recede with time, but the danger won't -
the war against terrorism can never be won. The best the nation
can achieve is a long succession of stalemates. There can be no
checkmate against hydra-headed foes.
b.这种可能性，正以一种不规则且难以衡量的速度逐渐增加当中，随时仇视
我们的敌人渐渐掌握伤害我们的信息及资源，恐惧的心理或许会随着时间慢
慢淡化，但危险却依然存在，对抗恐怖活动的战争永远不会结束，我们能够
得到最好的结果是让问题控制在一定程度之下，对于铲除仇视我们的狂热份
子绝无根治之道。
c. Until now, insurers and reinsurers have blithely assumed the
financial consequences from the incalculable risks I have
described.
c.直到目前为止，保险及再保业者仍然不自知地承担以上我提到的这种无法
预估风险的财务后果。
d. Under a "close-to-worst-case" scenario, which could conceivably
involve $1 trillion of damage, the insurance industry would be
destroyed unless it manages in some manner to dramatically limit
its assumption of terrorism risks. Only the U.S. Government has
the resources to absorb such a blow. If it is unwilling to do so on a
prospective basis, the general citizenry must bear its own risks
and count on the Government to come to its rescue after a
disaster occurs.
d.在最坏的状况下，有可能产生1兆美元的经济损失，整个保险产业将因此
崩溃，除非经营者能够将恐怖攻击风险承担的上限大幅压低在一定的水准以
下，我想只有美国政府本身有能力承受如此大的重击，如果政府不愿意积极
地担下此重责大任，任由人民负担所有的风险，则只有等灾难真的发生之后，
再由政府出面来收拾残局。
Why, you might ask, didn't I recognize the above facts before
September 11th? The answer, sadly, is that I did - but I didn't convert
thought into action. I violated the Noah rule: Predicting rain doesn't
count; building arks does. I consequently let Berkshire operate with a
dangerous level of risk - at General Re in particular. I'm sorry to say
that much risk for which we haven't been compensated remains on
our books, but it is running off by the day.
或许有人会问，为何我不在911事件发生之前，就提出这项警讯 我的回
答是，我确实有想到这点，但可惜的是我并未将想法化为举体的行动，关于
这点我严重违反了诺亚的原则，「能够准确预测下雨不厉害，重要的是要去
建方舟」，我等于是让Berkshire在相当危险的情况下经营，尤其是通用再
保，而且我必须承认，截至目前我们还在免费为大家承担无可预测的风险，
所幸这种情况已随着时间慢慢减少。
At Berkshire, it should be noted, we have for some years been willing to
assume more risk than any other insurer has knowingly taken on. That's
still the case. We are perfectly willing to lose $2 billion to $2? billion in
a single event (as we did on September 11th) if we have been paid
properly for assuming the risk that caused the loss (which on that
occasion we weren't).
在Berkshire，有一点必须说明的是，多年以来我们一直有强烈的意愿承担比其
他业者更多的风险，即便是现在也是如此，前提是保费要合理，对于单一事件我
们愿意承担最多20亿到25亿美元的可能损失(就像是911那样的损失规模，
只可惜那时我们没有收到一毛钱的保费)。
Indeed, we have a major competitive advantage because of our
tolerance for huge losses. Berkshire has massive liquid resources,
substantial non-insurance earnings, a favorable tax position and a
knowledgeable shareholder constituency willing to accept volatility in
earnings. This unique combination enables us to assume risks that far
exceed the appetite of even our largest competitors. Over time, insuring
these jumbo risks should be profitable, though periodically they will
bring on a terrible year.
确实我们勇于承担钜额损失的意愿，使得我们的竞争优势大幅提高，Berkshire
拥有大量的流动资产、极高的非保险事业盈余、有利的租税架构以及愿意容忍盈
余上下变动的优秀股东阵容，这种独特的组合，让我们可以承担远比其它竞争对
手更高的潜在风险，长期而言，接受这类钜型风险肯定有利可图，虽然在某些年
度的成绩可能惨不忍睹。
The bottom-line today is that we will write some coverage for
terrorist-related losses, including a few non-correlated policies with
very large limits. But we will not knowingly expose Berkshire to losses
beyond what we can comfortably handle. We will control our total
exposure, no matter what the competition does.
目前我们的底限是愿意承接恐怖份子攻击事件的保单，包含一些非相关事件极高
的风险上限，但我们绝不愿意让Berkshire在不知情的情况下，曝露于我们无法
妥善处理的损失，我们会将整体的风险部位控制在一定程度之内，不论外在的市
场竞争状况如何都一样。
Insurance Operations in 2001
2001年保险事业营运状况
Over the years, our insurance business has provided ever-growing,
low-cost funds that have fueled much of Berkshire's growth. Charlie and
I believe this will continue to be the case. But we stumbled in a big way
in 2001, largely because of underwriting losses at General Re.
多年以来，我们旗下的保险事业提供了Berkshire大量低成本，成长所需的资
金，查理跟我都认为这样的态势仍将继续维持下去，谁知道我们竟在2001年跌
了一大跤，主要的原因就在于通用再保大幅的承保亏损。
In the past I have assured you that General Re was underwriting with
discipline - and I have been proven wrong. Though its managers'
intentions were good, the company broke each of the three
underwriting rules I set forth in the last section and has paid a huge
price for doing so. One obvious cause for its failure is that it did not
reserve correctly - more about this in the next section - and therefore
severely miscalculated the cost of the product it was selling. Not
knowing your costs will cause problems in any business. In long-tail
reinsurance, where years of unawareness will promote and prolong
severe underpricing, ignorance of true costs is dynamite.
过去我一再保证，通用再保的承保一向相当有原则，事实证明我的看法有误，虽
然管理阶层的出发点甚佳，但公司还是违反了前面我提到的三项原则，更为此付
出极大的代价，其中一个失败的主要原因就在于损失准备提列不当，在后段我还
会再详细说明，从而因此严重低估了某些尚在销售的保单成本，对许多企业来
说，搞不清楚自己的成本是相当严重的问题，在长天期的再保险业，多年的无知
将导致保费订价过低的影响加重，不了解成本结构就像是一颗不定时的炸弹。
Additionally, General Re was overly-competitive in going after, and
retaining, business. While all concerned may intend to underwrite with
care, it is nonetheless difficult for able, hard-driving professionals to
curb their urge to prevail over competitors. If "winning," however, is
equated with market share rather than profits, trouble awaits. "No" must
be an important part of any underwriter's vocabulary.
此外，通用再保过于热衷追求或保有客户，即便所有人都知道要小心谨慎地承接
业务，但还是很难让有才干又肯努力的杰出经理人克制压倒竞争对手的欲望，但
如果胜利的定义是争取市场占有率而非获利率的话，那么麻烦就随时准备上门，
勇敢地说"不"字，是任何保险从业人员字典里应该必备的一个字。
At the risk of sounding Pollyannaish, I now assure you that underwriting
discipline is being restored at General Re (and its Cologne Re subsidiary)
with appropriate urgency. Joe Brandon was appointed General Re's CEO
in September and, along with Tad Montross, its new president, is
committed to producing underwriting profits. Last fall, Charlie and I
read Jack Welch's terrific book, Jack, Straight from the Gut (get a copy!).
In discussing it, we agreed that Joe has many of Jack's characteristics:
He is smart, energetic, hands-on, and expects much of both himself
and his organization.
虽然听起来有点过度乐观，不过我还是向各位保证通用再保(以及其子公司科隆
再保)的承保纪律目前正在恢复当中，Joe Brandon已在九月被任命为通用再保
的新任总裁，再加上新任总经理Tad Montross皆致力于转亏为盈，去年秋天，
查理跟我在读了奇异总裁-杰克威尔许的新书-直言无讳(赶快去买一本来看)，在
经过讨论后，我们都认为Joe拥有许多杰克谈到的特点，他相当聪明、有活力、
经验也够，同时对本身及组织都有深切的自我期许。
When it was an independent company, General Re often shone, and now
it also has the considerable strengths Berkshire brings to the table. With
that added advantage and with underwriting discipline restored,
General Re should be a huge asset for Berkshire. I predict that Joe and
Tad will make it so.
当她还是一家独立的公司时，通用再保就相当出色，如今她又有Berkshire在背
后提供许多奥援，在增添助力以及承保纪律逐渐恢复的情况下，我们想通用再保
应该可以成为Berkshire最重要的资产之一，我预期Joe跟Tad一定办得到。
* * * * * * * * * * * *
At the National Indemnity reinsurance operation, Ajit Jain continues to
add enormous value to Berkshire. Working with only 18 associates, Ajit
manages one of the world's largest reinsurance operations measured by
assets, and the largest, based upon the size of individual risks assumed.
I have known the details of almost every policy that Ajit has written since
he came with us in 1986, and never on even a single occasion have I
seen him break any of our three underwriting rules. His extraordinary
discipline, of course, does not eliminate losses; it does, however,
prevent foolish losses. And that's the key: Just as is the case in
investing, insurers produce outstanding long-term results primarily by
avoiding dumb decisions, rather than by making brilliant ones.
在国家产险的再保业务方面，Ajit Jain继续为Berkshire增添了许多价值，只靠
着18位同仁的协助，Ajit管理全世界前几大(以资产计)的再保险业务，而若以
承担的整体风险来算，更是全世界第一，自从他1986年加入以来，对于他承接
的所有保单，我知之甚详，但我从来没有发现他违背前述三项原则，虽然他严格
的纪律无法保证绝不会发生损失，但他确实可以避免不必要的错误，这就是关
键，就像是我们在投资时一样，保险业者想要有优异的长期绩效，靠的不是少数
的成功个案，而是如何持续避免做出愚蠢的决定。
Since September 11th, Ajit has been particularly busy. Among the
policies we have written and retained entirely for our own account are
(1) $578 million of property coverage for a South American refinery
once a loss there exceeds $1 billion; (2) $1 billion of non-cancelable
third-party liability coverage for losses arising from acts of terrorism at
several large international airlines; (3) ￡500 million of property
coverage on a large North Sea oil platform, covering losses from
terrorism and sabotage, above ￡600 million that the insured retained or
reinsured elsewhere; and (4) significant coverage on the Sears Tower,
