这场经典的赛事，甚至还用慢动作播放精彩的第四节，我们以今年封面的颜色表 .48
including losses caused by terrorism, above a $500 million threshold.
We have written many other jumbo risks as well, such as protection for
the World Cup Soccer Tournament and the 2002 Winter Olympics. In all
cases, however, we have attempted to avoid writing groups of policies
from which losses might seriously aggregate. We will not, for example,
write coverages on a large number of office and apartment towers in a
single metropolis without excluding losses from both a nuclear
explosion and the fires that would follow it.
自从911事件发生之后，Ajit就变得异常忙碌，在我们承接且全部自留在公司
帐上的保单，主要有(1)南美洲炼油厂损失超过10亿美元以上的5.78亿美元意
外险(2)数家国际航空公司10亿美元恐怖份子攻击事件不得撤销第三责任险(3)
北海原油平台5亿英镑恐怖份子攻击及恶意破坏的产物意外险，以及超过6亿
英镑以上业者自留或再保损失(4)芝加哥Sears大楼恐怖份子攻击事件超过5亿
美元以上的损失等；此外我们也接了许多项超大型的意外险，例如世界杯足球赛
以及2002年冬季奥运等，但不论是那一件个案，我们都尽量避免会发生连锁反
应大量累积损失的保单，比如说，我们不会一口气接下位于同一个大都会的办公
及住宅大楼大量的意外险，除非排除核子爆炸及后续可能引发的火灾损失。
No one can match the speed with which Ajit can offer huge policies.
After September 11th, his quickness to respond, always important, has
become a major competitive advantage. So, too, has our unsurpassed
financial strength. Some reinsurers - particularly those who, in turn, are
accustomed to laying off much of their business on a second layer of
reinsurers known as retrocessionaires - are in a weakened condition
and would have difficulty surviving a second mega-cat. When a daisy
chain of retrocessionaires exists, a single weak link can pose trouble for
all. In assessing the soundness of their reinsurance protection, insurers
must therefore apply a stress test to all participants in the chain, and
must contemplate a catastrophe loss occurring during a very
unfavorable economic environment. After all, you only find out who is
swimming naked when the tide goes out. At Berkshire, we retain our
risks and depend on no one. And whatever the world's problems, our
checks will clear.
提到承接钜额保单的速度，没有人可以比得上Ajit，在911事件发生之后，他
的快速反应，就变成一个相当重要的竞争优势，当然还有我们引以为傲的财务实
力，某些再保同业，尤其是那些习惯将大部分的风险转嫁给其它再保业者俗称倒
退派的保险公司的情况都相当凄惨，而且很有可能无法在承受第二次大灾难的发
生，当致命的连锁关系产生时，一个微妙的关连可能导致全面的崩溃，当保险业
者在衡量自身再保安排的健全性时，必须谨慎地试探整个连环所有参与者的抗压
性，并深切地思考当一件大灾难万一在非常困难的经济状况下发生时该如何自
处，毕竟只有在退潮时，你才能够发现到底是谁在裸泳，在Berkshire，我们将
所有的风险自留，独立承担绝不依赖他人，而不论世上发生什么问题，我们的支
票保证永远都能够兑现。
Ajit's business will ebb and flow - but his underwriting principles won't
waver. It's impossible to overstate his value to Berkshire.
Ajit的业务量或许会有潮起潮落，但他的承保原则绝不改变，他在Berkshire的
价值永远不可限量。
* * * * * * * * * * * *
GEICO, by far our largest primary insurer, made major progress in 2001,
thanks to Tony Nicely, its CEO, and his associates. Quite simply, Tony is
an owner's dream.
GEICO我们目前最大的初级保险公司，在该公司总裁Tony Nicely及所有同仁
的努力下，于2001年有重大进展，毫无疑问，Tony是老板心目中的明星经理
人。
GEICO's premium volume grew 6.6% last year, its float grew $308
million, and it achieved an underwriting profit of $221 million. This
means we were actually paid that amount last year to hold the $4.25
billion in float, which of course doesn't belong to Berkshire but can be
used by us for investment.
GEICO去年的保费收入成长了6.6%，浮存金净增加3.08亿美元，并贡献了2.21
亿美元的承保利益，这代表去年我们在帮别人保管42.5亿资金的同时，还有一
笔额外的收入，虽然这笔浮存金不属于Berkshire所有，但却可以为我们运用，
进行各项投资。
The only disappointment at GEICO in 2001 - and it's an important one -
was our inability to add policyholders. Our preferred customers (81% of
our total) grew by 1.6% but our standard and non-standard policies fell
by 10.1%. Overall, policies in force fell .8%.
在2001年，GEICO唯一让人感到失望的是我们无法进一步增加保户数量，我
们的指定保户(约占总保户的81%)成长了1.6%，但标准型与非标准型的保单则
下滑了10.1%，总的来说，有效保单数量减少了0.8%。
New business has improved in recent months. Our closure rate from
telephone inquiries has climbed, and our Internet business continues its
steady growth. We, therefore, expect at least a modest gain in policy
count during 2002. Tony and I are eager to commit much more to
marketing than the $219 million we spent last year, but at the moment
we cannot see how to do so effectively. In the meantime, our operating
costs are low and far below those of our major competitors; our prices
are attractive; and our float is cost-free and growing.
最近几个月，新保单业务有复苏现象，我们的电话行销成交率正在攀升之中，至
于网络行销业务则稳定成长，因此我们预期2002年的保单数量至少将可维持些
许的成长，Tony跟我都急于想要投入比去年2.19亿美元还要多的行销预算，
但直到目前为止，我们仍然找不到如何有效运用的方法，在此同时，我们的营运
成本依旧远低于其它主要的竞争对手，我们的价格相当具吸引力，而我们的浮存
金依旧不须成本且持续成长当中。
* * * * * * * * * * * *
Our other primary insurers delivered their usual fine results last year.
These operations, run by Rod Eldred, John Kizer, Tom Nerney, Michael
Stearns, Don Towle and Don Wurster had combined premium volume of
$579 million, up 40% over 2000. Their float increased 14.5% to $685
million, and they recorded an underwriting profit of $30 million. In
aggregate, these companies are one of the finest insurance operations
in the country, and their 2002 prospects look excellent.
我们其它初级的保险公司去年的表现依旧出色，由Rod、John、Don、Tom、
Michael等人带领的各家保险事业，总计贡献了5.79亿美元的保费收入，较
2000年成长了四成，浮存金则增加14.5%成为6.85亿美元，外加3,000万美
元的承保利益，总的来说，这些公司堪称全美最好的保险公司之一，展望2002
年他们的前景依然可期。
"Loss Development" and Insurance Accounting
损失调整及保险业会计。
Bad terminology is the enemy of good thinking. When companies or
investment professionals use terms such as "EBITDA" and "pro forma,"
they want you to unthinkingly accept concepts that are dangerously
flawed. (In golf, my score is frequently below par on a pro forma basis: I
have firm plans to "restructure" my putting stroke and therefore only
count the swings I take before reaching the green.)
不当的名词是正确思考的敌人，当一家公司或基金经理人使用诸如"EBITDA"(扣
除利息税负及折旧摊销前的盈余)及"pro forma"(拟制)等名词时，通常代表他们
意图引导你错误地接受某些严重偏差的概念，(在高尔夫球场上，我的成绩通常
拟制性地低于par标准杆：关键在于推杆，由于我正在进行一套改造计画，因此
我只将到达果岭以前的杆数列入计算)。
In insurance reporting, "loss development" is a widely used term - and
one that is seriously misleading. First, a definition: Loss reserves at an
insurer are not funds tucked away for a rainy day, but rather a liability
account. If properly calculated, the liability states the amount that an
insurer will have to pay for all losses (including associated costs) that
have occurred prior to the reporting date but have not yet been paid.
When calculating the reserve, the insurer will have been notified of many
of the losses it is destined to pay, but others will not yet have been
reported to it. These losses are called IBNR, for incurred but not
reported. Indeed, in some cases (involving, say, product liability or
embezzlement) the insured itself will not yet be aware that a loss has
occurred.
在保险业的会计制度中，"损失调整"是被广泛运用的工具，但同时也是被严重误
导的名词，首先，关于是它的定义：保险业者提列的损失准备并非业者提拨以备
雨天不时之需的资金，实际上它应该是一个负债科目，如果能经由合理地估算，
这项负债代表业者在财务报表截止日已经发生所有损失但尚未支付的可能金额
(包含所有相关成本)，在计算损失时，保险业者除了已经被正式告知必须支付的
损失外，还必须包含那些尚未被告知的潜在损失，后者通称为IBNR(意即已经发
生但尚未告知)的损失，事实上，在某些情况下(比如说产品责任险或员工忠诚
险)，被保人本身甚至还不知道损失已经发生了。
It's clearly difficult for an insurer to put a figure on the ultimate cost of
all such reported and unreported events. But the ability to do so with
reasonable accuracy is vital. Otherwise the insurer's managers won't
know what its actual loss costs are and how these compare to the
premiums being charged. GEICO got into huge trouble in the early
1970s because for several years it severely underreserved, and
therefore believed its product (insurance protection) was costing
considerably less than was truly the case. Consequently, the company
sailed blissfully along, underpricing its product and selling more and
more policies at ever-larger losses.
对于保险公司来说，实在是很难事先去准确地算出这些已告知及未告知意外事件
的最终成本，但具备合理估计的能力却相当重要，否则保险业的经理人将无从得
知本身真实的经营成本，从而订定合理的保费，GEICO在1970年代发生经营
危机，就是因为它连续好几年严重低估了损失准备，因而大大低估了其产品的成
本，导致公司在不知情的状况下，以不当的价格出售其保单，卖得越多，亏得就
越多。
When it becomes evident that reserves at past reporting dates
understated the liability that truly existed at the time, companies speak
of "loss development." In the year discovered, these shortfalls penalize
reported earnings because the "catch-up" costs from prior years must
be added to current-year costs when results are calculated. This is what
happened at General Re in 2001: a staggering $800 million of loss costs
that actually occurred in earlier years, but that were not then recorded,
were belatedly recognized last year and charged against current
earnings. The mistake was an honest one, I can assure you of that.
Nevertheless, for several years, this underreserving caused us to believe
that our costs were much lower than they truly were, an error that
contributed to woefully inadequate pricing. Additionally, the overstated
profit figures led us to pay substantial incentive compensation that we
should not have and to incur income taxes far earlier than was
necessary.
当保险公司在期后发现，损失准备明显地与现实的潜在负债不一致时，公司便将
"损失调整"这个科目搬出来，这些以前年度遗留下来的补提成本，却必须在实际
发现的年度报表上认列，这正是2001年通用再保身上所发生的案例，以前年度
总计8亿美元的累积损失，一口气在去年的财务报表上显现出来，我可以向各
位保证，这个数字应该是相当中肯的了，尽管如此，多年来的准备提列不当，让
我们误以为我们的成本远低于实际数字，这又导致我们不当的订价，除此之外，
过度高估的盈余数字，也让我们为此支付额外的奖金以及所得税。
We recommend scrapping the term "loss development" and its equally
ugly twin, "reserve strengthening." (Can you imagine an insurer, upon
finding its reserves excessive, describing the reduction that follows as
"reserve weakening"?) "Loss development" suggests to investors that
some natural, uncontrollable event has occurred in the current year, and
"reserve strengthening" implies that adequate amounts have been
further buttressed. The truth, however, is that management made an
error in estimation that in turn produced an error in the earnings
previously reported. The losses didn't "develop" - they were there all
along. What developed was management's understanding of the losses
(or, in the instances of chicanery, management's willingness to finally
fess up).
因此我们强烈建议废除"损失调整"这个会计科目，以及另外一个类似的丑陋字眼
"强化损失准备"(那么要是有保险公司因为发现其先前提列的准备过高，而在冲回
损失准备时，是不是该用"削减损失准备"的字眼呢?)。表面上，"损失调整"告诉
投资人，某些自然，不可控制的事件在最近年度发生，至于"损失准备强化"则暗
示损失准备已被适当地补提增强。然而事实却是，管理当局在先前的估计发生错
误，导致以前年度的盈余不实，损失本身并没有任何改变，它一直都在哪里，改
变的是管理当局对于损失的认知(或是在管理当局明知故犯的情况下，最后终于
承认其所犯的错误)。
A more forthright label for the phenomenon at issue would be "loss
costs we failed to recognize when they occurred" (or maybe just "oops").
Underreserving, it should be noted, is a common - and serious -
problem throughout the property/casualty insurance industry. At
Berkshire we told you of our own problems with underestimation in
1984 and 1986. Generally, however, our reserving has been
conservative.
我认为关于这种现象更贴切的名词应该是"未能及时发现的损失成本"或者可以
简称为"哦!哦!"，必须说明的是损失提列不足是产险业界普遍存在的严重问题，
在Berkshire，我们就曾在1984年及1986年告诉大家，我们发生过的估计不
足问题，不过通常来说，我们的损失提列政策算是相当的稳健保守。
Major underreserving is common in cases of companies struggling for
survival. In effect, insurance accounting is a self-graded exam, in that
the insurer gives some figures to its auditing firm and generally doesn't
get an argument. (What the auditor gets, however, is a letter from
management that is designed to take his firm off the hook if the
numbers later look silly.) A company experiencing financial difficulties -
of a kind that, if truly faced, could put it out of business - seldom proves
to be a tough grader. Who, after all, wants to prepare his own execution
papers?
损失严重提列不足的现象在经营状况不佳的保险公司尤其常见，事实上，保险业
的会计可以说是一项自己评分的考试，对于保险业者自结的财务报表数字，查核
的会计师通常都不会有太大的意见，(会计师要的通常是一封，万一数字发生重
大偏差，可以用来撇清关系的客户声明书)，一家面临财务困难的公司，通常对
于自我评分的要求都不会太高，以免真得经营不下去，毕竟没有人会想要替自己
签下处以死刑的判决书。
Even when companies have the best of intentions, it's not easy to
reserve properly. I've told the story in the past about the fellow traveling
abroad whose sister called to tell him that their dad had died. The
brother replied that it was impossible for him to get home for the
funeral; he volunteered, however, to shoulder its cost. Upon returning,
the brother received a bill from the mortuary for $4,500, which he
promptly paid. A month later, and a month after that also, he paid $10
pursuant to an add-on invoice. When a third $10 invoice came, he called
his sister for an explanation. "Oh," she replied, "I forgot to tell you. We
buried dad in a rented suit."
而且就算公司有足够的诚意，还是很难保证能够适当地提列损失，我曾经说过一
个关于一位旅居海外人士的故事，话说有天这位仁兄接到姐姐告知父亲过世的消
息，他回复表示可能无法回到家乡参加父亲的葬礼，不过倒是愿意负担所有的丧
葬费用，后来他果然收到一张4,500元美金的帐单，二话不说他立即付清，可
是谁知不久之后，他又收到一张10美元的收据，月覆一月，皆是如此，他不解
的询问姐姐到底是怎么一回事，他姐姐回复道：「哦!我忘了告诉你，爸的寿衣
是用租的。」
There are a lot of "rented suits" buried in the past operations of
insurance companies. Sometimes the problems they signify lie dormant
for decades, as was the case with asbestos liability, before virulently
manifesting themselves. Difficult as the job may be, it's management's
responsibility to adequately account for all possibilities. Conservatism is
essential. When a claims manager walks into the CEO's office and says
"Guess what just happened," his boss, if a veteran, does not expect to
hear it's good news. Surprises in the insurance world have been far from
symmetrical in their effect on earnings.
在保险业经营中，有许多这类租来的寿衣，有时候这类的问题甚至会隐藏数十年
不被发现，就像是石绵赔偿问题，但一发就不可收拾，虽然这项工作有点棘手，
但管理当局有责任适当的将所有可能性列入考量，保守稳健绝对有其必要，当损
失理赔部门的经理走进总经理的办公室说到：「猜猜发生了什么事?」他的老板，
如果是老鸟，应该知道肯定不会是什么好消息，保险世界的意外，对于盈余的影
响通常不会非常一致。
Because of this one-sided experience, it is folly to suggest, as some are
doing, that all property/casualty insurance reserves be discounted, an
approach reflecting the fact that they will be paid in the future and that
therefore their present value is less than the stated liability for them.
Discounting might be acceptable if reserves could be precisely
established. They can't, however, because a myriad of forces - judicial
broadening of policy language and medical inflation, to name just two
