这场经典的赛事，甚至还用慢动作播放精彩的第四节，我们以今年封面的颜色表 .49
chronic problems - are constantly working to make reserves
inadequate. Discounting would exacerbate this already-serious
situation and, additionally, would provide a new tool for the companies
that are inclined to fudge.
也由于存在着这种偏差的经验，所以当有人盲目地认为产物意外险的损失准备由
于反应的是未来必须支付的款项，所以在经过现值折算后，应该会小于实际上的
负债，我个人认为这种想法有点可笑，当然损失准备若系经过准确估算，按现值
加以折现或许可以接受，但由于几项不可抗力的因素-举两个存在已久的问题，
保单条款的任意延伸以及医疗通膨，使得损失准备长期以来处于提列不当的景
况，折现只会让原来存在的问题变得更加严重，并且让某些不肖公司平添回旋的
空间。
I'd say that the effects from telling a profit-challenged insurance CEO to
lower reserves through discounting would be comparable to those that
would ensue if a father told his 16-year-old son to have a normal sex
life. Neither party needs that kind of push.
我必须说，告诉一家在获利边缘挣扎的保险公司总经理可以透过折现将损失准备
降低，其结果就好象是一位父亲告诉自己16岁的儿子可以自由地享受正常的性
生活一般，我想两者都不需要这种揠苗式的助长。
Sources of Reported Earnings
帐列盈余的来源
The table that follows shows the main sources of Berkshire's reported
earnings. In this presentation, purchase-accounting adjustments
(primarily relating to "goodwill") are not assigned to the specific
businesses to which they apply, but are instead aggregated and shown
separately. This procedure lets you view the earnings of our businesses
as they would have been reported had we not purchased them. In recent
years, our "expense" for goodwill amortization has been large. Going
forward, generally accepted accounting principles ("GAAP") will no
longer require amortization of goodwill. This change will increase our
reported earnings (though not our true economic earnings) and simplify
this section of the report.
下表显示Berkshire帐列盈余的主要来源，在这张表中商誉的摊销数与购买法会
计调整数会从个别被投资公司分离出来，单独加总列示，之所以这样做是为了让
旗下各事业的盈余状况，不因我们的投资而有所影响，近年来我们在商誉摊销的
金额相当庞大，从今以后，一般公认会计原则将不再要求商誉必须摊销，此举将
提高我们的帐面盈余(虽然实质的经济盈余一点变动都没有)，并大幅简化这部份
的报告。
(in millions)
Pre-Tax Earnings
Berkshire's Share
of Net Earnings
(after taxes and
minority interests)
2001 2000 2001 2000
Operating Earnings:
Insurance Group:
Underwriting - Reinsurance $(4,318) $(1,416) $(2,824) $(911)
Underwriting - GEICO 221 22 (224) 144 14 (146)
Underwriting - Other Primary 30 3 25 2 18 1 16 1
Net Investment Income 2,824 2,82 2,773 2,77 1,968 1,96 1,946
1,94
Building Products(1) 461 46 34 3 287 28 21 2
Finance and Financial Products Business 519 51 530 53 336 33 343 34
Flight Services 186 18 213 21 105 10 126 12
MidAmerican Energy (76% owned) 600 60 197 19 230 23 109 10
Retail Operations 175 17 175 17 101 10 104 10
Scott Fetzer (excluding finance
operation)
129 12 122 12 83 8 80 8
Shaw Industries(2) 292 29 -- - 156 15 -- -
Other Businesses 179 17 221 22 103 10 133 13
Purchase-Accounting Adjustments (726) (881) (699) (843)
Corporate Interest Expense (92) (92) (60) (61)
Shareholder-Designated Contributions (17) (17) (11) (11)
Other 25 39 16 30
Operating Earnings 488 48 1,699 1,69 (47)
936 93
Capital Gains from Investments 1,320 3,955 842 2,392
Total Earnings - All Entities $1,808
$1,80
$5,654
$5,65
$ 795 $ 79
$3,328 $3,32
====
===
====
===
====
===
==== ===
(1) Includes Acme Brick from August 1, 2000; Benjamin Moore from December 18, 2000; Johns
Manville from February 27, 2001;
and MiTek from July 31, 2001.
(2) From date of acquisition, January 8, 2001.
Here are some highlights (and lowlights) from 2001 relating to our
non-insurance activities:
以下是2001年我们非保险事业相关的重点摘要：
● Our shoe operations (included in "other businesses") lost $46.2
million pre-tax, with profits at H.H. Brown and Justin swamped by
losses at Dexter.
我们的制鞋事业营运(包含在其它事业当中)税前损失为4,620万美元，其
中H.H.Brown有获利，但Justin仍深陷在损失泥沼当中。
I've made three decisions relating to Dexter that have hurt you in
a major way: (1) buying it in the first place; (2) paying for it with
stock and (3) procrastinating when the need for changes in its
operations was obvious. I would like to lay these mistakes on
Charlie (or anyone else, for that matter) but they were mine.
Dexter, prior to our purchase - and indeed for a few years after -
prospered despite low-cost foreign competition that was brutal. I
concluded that Dexter could continue to cope with that problem,
and I was wrong.
至于在Dexter方面，我当初的三项决定，让大家损失惨重：(1)是把她买
下来(2)是用Berkshire股票做交换(3)是在明显需要做改变的时刻却犹豫
迟疑，我实在很想将这些过错推到曼格身上(或者其它任何一个人都可
以)，但无奈这确实是我的错，Dexter在我们正式买下的前后几年，确曾
享受过几年的好光景，一直到面临海外低成本产品的激烈竞争，当时我认
为Dexter应该有能力解决这样的问题，没想到我的判断错误。
We have now placed the Dexter operation - which is still
substantial in size - under the management of Frank Rooney and
Jim Issler at H.H. Brown. These men have performed
outstandingly for Berkshire, skillfully contending with the
extraordinary changes that have bedeviled the footwear industry.
During part of 2002, Dexter will be hurt by unprofitable sales
commitments it made last year. After that, we believe our shoe
business will be reasonably profitable.
现在我们将Dexter的营运重任交付给H.H.Brown的Frank及Jim，这
些人在Berkshire表现优异，即便在鞋业剧烈的产业波动下，仍能运用各
项技巧生存下来，在2002年的前半段，Dexter仍将受到先前所签订不
赚钱的合约所影响，但在那之后，我们的鞋业可望回到合理的获利水准。
● MidAmerican Energy, of which we own 76% on a fully-diluted
basis, had a good year in 2001. Its reported earnings should also
increase considerably in 2002 given that the company has been
shouldering a large charge for the amortization of goodwill and
that this "cost" will disappear under the new GAAP rules.
我们持股76%的中美能源公司，在2001年的表现相当不俗，虽然必须
承担大笔的商誉摊销费用，但预期2002年获利仍将大幅成长，而依照一
般公认会计原则，以后这类帐面成本将不再出现。
Last year MidAmerican swapped some properties in England,
adding Yorkshire Electric, with its 2.1 million customers. We are
now serving 3.6 million customers in the U.K. and are its 2nd
largest electric utility. We have an equally important operation in
Iowa as well as major generating facilities in California and the
Philippines.
去年中美能源买进了一些位于英国的产业，其中包含拥有210万用户的
约克夏电力，目前我们在英国拥有360万的用户，在全英国排名第二位，
此外我们在爱荷华州、加州及菲律宾都拥有重大的发电设施。
At MidAmerican - this may surprise you - we also own the
second-largest residential real estate brokerage business in the
country. We are market-share leaders in a number of large cities,
primarily in the Midwest, and have recently acquired important
firms in Atlanta and Southern California. Last year, operating
under various names that are locally familiar, we handled about
106,000 transactions involving properties worth nearly $20
billion. Ron Peltier has built this business for us, and it's likely he
will make more acquisitions in 2002 and the years to come.
在中美能源公司底下，说来各位可能会相当惊奇，我们还拥有全美第二大
的房屋中介公司，我们在许多大都市的排名都居首位，尤其是中西部的城
市，最近还买下了亚特兰大及南加州几家相当大的中介公司，去年以当地
知名的品牌经营，我们总共处理了10万6,000多件的房屋交易，总成交
值高达200亿美元，负责为我们建立这项事业的是Ron Peltier，而且我
们在2002年以后的几年内，还有可能再继续买下更多的中介公司。
● Considering the recessionary environment plaguing them, our
retailing operations did well in 2001. In jewelry, same-store sales
fell 7.6% and pre-tax margins were 8.9% versus 10.7% in 2000.
Return on invested capital remains high.
即便在景气衰退的大环境底下，我们的零售业在2001年的表现仍可圈可
点，其中珠宝业的单店平均营业额虽然下滑了7.6%，税前获利由2000
年的10.7%降为8.9%，不过股东投资报酬率仍然相当的高。
Same-store sales at our home-furnishings retailers were
unchanged and so was the margin - 9.1% pre-tax - these
operations earned. Here, too, return on invested capital is
excellent.
至于家具的单店营业额则维持不变，税前营利依然保持在9.1%的高檔，
整体的股东投资报酬依旧相当出色。
We continue to expand in both jewelry and home-furnishings. Of
particular note, Nebraska Furniture Mart is constructing a
mammoth 450,000 square foot store that will serve the greater
Kansas City area beginning in the fall of 2003. Despite Bill Child's
counter-successes, we will keep this store open on Sundays.
不论是在珠宝或是家具业，我们仍然持续扩张，其中要特别提到的是内布
拉斯加家具店NFM目前正在兴建一座45万平方公尺超大的旗舰店，预
计在2003年秋天落成，届时将可服务堪萨斯市广大的群众，虽然有Bill
Childs成功的反面例证在前面，我们还是决定在星期天开张营业。
● The large acquisitions we initiated in late 2000 - Shaw, Johns
Manville and Benjamin Moore - all came through their first year
with us in great fashion. Charlie and I knew at the time of our
purchases that we were in good hands with Bob Shaw, Jerry Henry
and Yvan Dupuy, respectively - and we admire their work even
more now. Together these businesses earned about $659 million
pre-tax.
至于我们在2000年底进行的几项购并案-Shaw地毯、Johns Manville
耐火材料及Benjanmin油漆等公司，都顺利圆满地渡过了与我们在一起
的第一个年头，查理跟我在买下她们的当头，就知道Bob Shaw、Jerry
Henry及Yvan Dupuy都是个别产业的个中好手，但现在我们更感谢他
们为我们所做的一切，这些公司去年总计为我们赚进了6.59亿美元的税
前盈余。
Shortly after yearend we exchanged 4,740 Berkshire A shares (or
their equivalent in B shares) for the 12.7% minority interest in
Shaw, which means we now own 100% of the company. Shaw is
our largest non-insurance operation and will play a big part in
Berkshire's future.
在年度结束的不久之后，我们又以4,740股的Berkshire A股(或等值的
B股)买下Shaw地毯剩余的12.7%股权，意思是说在此之后，我们将持
有该公司100%的股权，Shaw地毯目前是我们非保险的最大事业，在未
来也将在Berkshire扮演重要角色。
● All of the income shown for Flight Services in 2001 - and a bit
more - came from FlightSafety, our pilot-training subsidiary. Its
earnings increased 2.5%, though return on invested capital fell
slightly because of the $258 million investment we made last year
in simulators and other fixed assets. My 84-year-old friend, Al
Ueltschi, continues to run FlightSafety with the same enthusiasm
and competitive spirit that he has exhibited since 1951, when he
invested $10,000 to start the company. If I line Al up with a bunch
of 60-year-olds at the annual meeting, you will not be able to
pick him out.
2001年的航空服务所有盈余都来自我们的飞行员训练子公司-飞安公
司，实际盈余数字还超过此数，虽然股东投资报酬因为去年大笔投资2.58
亿美元在添购飞行仿真器等设备上而略微下降，但盈余仍成长了2.5%，
我84岁的老友Al Ueltschi继续以当初在1951年用1万美元创立公司
时，同样的热情与毅力来经营飞安公司，如果我在股东会上让Al跟一群
60几岁的老先生坐在一起，你可能分辨不出他来。
After September 11th, training for commercial airlines fell, and
today it remains depressed. However, training for business and
general aviation, our main activity, is at near-normal levels and
should continue to grow. In 2002, we expect to spend $162
million for 27 simulators, a sum far in excess of our annual
depreciation charge of $95 million. Those who believe that
EBITDA is in any way equivalent to true earnings are welcome to
pick up the tab.
911事件发生之后，商业飞机训练业务受到严重影响，而且截至目前为
止依旧没有改善的迹象，不过我们的业务大宗-商务及一般飞行的训练则
维持在近乎正常的水准，并有可能继续维持成长，展望2002年，我们预
计斥资1.62亿美元添购27架飞行仿真器，这笔投资金额远超过我们一
年的9,500万美元的折旧金额，我们欢迎那些爱用EBITDA(扣除利息税
负及折旧摊销前的盈余)的人士来为我们买单。
Our NetJetsR fractional ownership program sold a record number
of planes last year and also showed a gain of 21.9% in service
income from management fees and hourly charges. Nevertheless,
it operated at a small loss, versus a small profit in 2000. We made
a little money in the U.S., but these earnings were more than
offset by European losses. Measured by the value of our
customers' planes, NetJets accounts for about half of the industry.
We believe the other participants, in aggregate, lost significant
money.
去年我们的NetJets飞机部份所有权计画卖出了创纪录的飞机架数，同时
管理费收入及钟点费也大幅成长了21.9%，但即便如此，相较于2000
年的小赚，其营运还是呈现小幅亏损，虽然我们在美国的业务有获利，但
这些盈余却不足以弥补我们在欧洲发生的损失，若以我们客户拥有的飞机
价值来看，NetJets的占有率大概超过整个产业的半数，因此我们推断其
他竞争对手肯定大幅亏损。
Maintaining a premier level of safety, security and service was
always expensive, and the cost of sticking to those standards was
exacerbated by September 11th. No matter how much the cost, we
will continue to be the industry leader in all three respects. An
uncompromising insistence on delivering only the best to his
customers is embedded in the DNA of Rich Santulli, CEO of the
company and the inventor of fractional ownership. I'm delighted
with his fanaticism on these matters for both the company's sake
and my family's: I believe the Buffetts fly more fractionalownership
hours - we log in excess of 800 annually - than does
any other family. In case you're wondering, we use exactly the
same planes and crews that serve NetJet's other customers.
要维持高等级的安全服务水准，其代价肯定相当高昂，这种情况在911
事件发生之后更是如此，不过不论成本有多高，我们还是努力在这些方面
成为产业趋势的领导者，对于服务丝毫不打折扣的坚持早已深植在该公司
总裁兼飞机部份所有权创始人Rich Santulli的基因里头，于公于私，我
个人对于Santulli的执着皆感到相当欣慰，我相信巴菲特家族是全世界使
用飞机部份所有权时数最频繁的家庭-去年整个家族的飞行总时数超过
800个小时，大家不必怀疑，我们所使用的飞机与机组员与其它所有客
户并无二致。
NetJets experienced a spurt in new orders shortly after September
11th, but its sales pace has since returned to normal. Percustomer
usage declined somewhat during the year, probably
because of the recession.
在911事件发生之后，NetJets的订单曾经出现短暂爆增的情况，但不久
之后其销售速度就回到正常的水准，每位客户平均使用的时数甚至略微下
滑，我想这多少跟景气不佳有些关联。
Both we and our customers derive significant operational benefits
from our being the runaway leader in the fractional ownership
business. We have more than 300 planes constantly on the go in
the U.S. and can therefore be wherever a customer needs us on
very short notice. The ubiquity of our fleet also reduces our
"positioning" costs below those incurred by operators with
smaller fleets.
由于NetJets在产业的领导地位，使得我们及客户皆受益良多，目前我们
拥有遍布全美300架飞机，让客户在很短的时间内就能得到想要的服
务，这种特性让我们可以大幅减少飞机停在地面上的成本。
These advantages of scale, and others we have, give NetJets a
significant economic edge over competition. Under the
competitive conditions likely to prevail for a few years, however,
our advantage will at best produce modest profits.
我们拥有的规模经济等优点让NetJets在面临竞争时拥有强大的优势，只
是在前几年竞争如此激烈的情况下，这些优势顶多只能让我们获得些许利
润。
● Our finance and financial products line of business now includes
XTRA, General Re Securities (which is in a run-off mode that will
continue for an extended period) and a few other relatively small
operations. The bulk of the assets and liabilities in this segment,
however, arise from a few fixed-income strategies, involving
highly-liquid AAA securities, that I manage. This activity, which
only makes sense when certain market relationships exist, has
