这场经典的赛事，甚至还用慢动作播放精彩的第四节，我们以今年封面的颜色表 .50
produced good returns in the past and has reasonable prospects
for continuing to do so over the next year or two.
在财务及金融商品业务方面，我们目前包含XTRA、通用再保证券(目前
正处于逐渐结束的状态)以及其它一些规模比较小的业务，这部份的资产
与负债的发生，包含我个人亲自管理的三A超高评等的有价证券，起源
于维持固定收益的策略，这部份的业务只有在市场符合某些特定状况存在
时才有用，过去以来一直为我们贡献不错的报酬，展望未来几年内，仍将
维持这样的态势。
Investments
股票投资
Below we present our common stock investments. Those that had a
market value of more than $500 million at the end of 2001 are itemized.
下表是Berkshire 2001年市价超过5亿美元以上的股票投资。
12/31/01
Shares Company Cost Market
(dollars in millions)
151,610,700 American Express Company $ 1,470 $ 5,410
200,000,000 The Coca-Cola Company 1,299 9,430
96,000,000 The Gillette Company 600 3,206
15,999,200 H&R Block, Inc. 255 715
24,000,000 Moody's Corporation 499 957
1,727,765 The Washington Post Company 11 916
53,265,080 Wells Fargo & Company 306 2,315
Others 4,103 5,726
Total Common Stocks $8,543 $28,675
===== =====
We made few changes in our portfolio during 2001. As a group, our
larger holdings have performed poorly in the last few years, some
because of disappointing operating results. Charlie and I still like the
basic businesses of all the companies we own. But we do not believe
Berkshire's equity holdings as a group are undervalued.
我们的投资组合在2001年几乎没有什么变动，总的来说，我们主要的投资部位
近几年来的表现乏善可陈，有些本身的营运本就不尽理想，然而查理跟我还是相
当喜爱这些公司的本业经营现况，不过我们也不认为现在这些投资组合的股价有
受到任何的低估。
Our restrained enthusiasm for these securities is matched by decidedly
lukewarm feelings about the prospects for stocks in general over the
next decade or so. I expressed my views about equity returns in a
speech I gave at an Allen and Company meeting in July (which was a
follow-up to a similar presentation I had made two years earlier) and an
edited version of my comments appeared in a December 10th Fortune
article. I'm enclosing a copy of that article. You can also view the Fortune
version of my 1999 talk at our website www.berkshirehathaway.com.
Charlie and I believe that American business will do fine over time but
think that today's equity prices presage only moderate returns for
investors. The market outperformed business for a very long period,
and that phenomenon had to end. A market that no more than parallels
business progress, however, is likely to leave many investors
disappointed, particularly those relatively new to the game.
我们对于持有股票保留的态度与我们对于当前股市未来十年内的前景不表乐观
的看法相一致，我在七月份一场Allen公司举办会议中的演讲，表达了个人对于
投资股市的看法，(早在两年前我就已经表达过类似的看法)，同时在同年12/10
的财富杂志中有关于个人看法的修正版，我也将之检附在年报之后，各位也可以
在公司的网站上www.berkshirehathaway.com 看到财富杂志1999年版文
章，查理跟我相信就长期而言，我们仍看好美国企业的发展，但目前股票的价格
注定了投资人只能得到一般的报酬，股市的表现已有好一段时间优于公司本身的
表现，而这种现象终将结束，市场不可能永远超越企业本身的发展，我想这将让
许多投资人大失所望，尤其是那些股市新手。
Here's one for those who enjoy an odd coincidence: The Great Bubble
ended on March 10, 2000 (though we didn't realize that fact until some
months later). On that day, the NASDAQ (recently 1,731) hit its all-time
high of 5,132. That same day, Berkshire shares traded at $40,800, their
lowest price since mid-1997.
当然也有一些人偶尔可以享受到特别的例外，就像是在2000/3/10正式结束的
大泡沫(虽然我们实际要等到好几个月后才发现这项事实)，在那天纳斯达克指数
创下5,132点的历史新高(现在约为1,731点)，在同一天，Berkshire的股价则
以自1997年以来的最低价40,800美元收盘。
* * * * * * * * * * * *
During 2001, we were somewhat more active than usual in "junk"
bonds. These are not, we should emphasize, suitable investments for
the general public, because too often these securities live up to their
name. We have never purchased a newly-issued junk bond, which is the
only kind most investors are urged to buy. When losses occur in this
field, furthermore, they are often disastrous: Many issues end up at a
small fraction of their original offering price and some become entirely
worthless.
2001年我们在垃圾债券市场的活动较以往频繁，但我们必须强调，这类投资并
不适合一般投资大众，因为在通常的情况下，这些债券正如其名，我们从来没有
买过一般投资人最热衷的初次发行垃圾债券，因为一旦发生违约，其损失必定惨
重，有许多债券投资者最后仅能收回一小部份的资金，有的最后甚至变成壁纸，
使得投资人血本无归。
Despite these dangers, we periodically find a few - a very few - junk
securities that are interesting to us. And, so far, our 50-year experience
in distressed debt has proven rewarding. In our 1984 annual report, we
described our purchases of Washington Public Power System bonds
when that issuer fell into disrepute. We've also, over the years, stepped
into other apparent calamities such as Chrysler Financial, Texaco and
RJR Nabisco - all of which returned to grace. Still, if we stay active in
junk bonds, you can expect us to have losses from time to time.
Occasionally, a purchase of distressed bonds leads us into something
bigger. Early in the Fruit of the Loom bankruptcy, we purchased the
company's public and bank debt at about 50% of face value. This was an
unusual bankruptcy in that interest payments on senior debt were
continued without interruption, which meant we earned about a 15%
current return. Our holdings grew to 10% of Fruit's senior debt, which
will probably end up returning us about 70% of face value. Through this
investment, we indirectly reduced our purchase price for the whole
company by a small amount.
尽管风险颇大，我们不时还是可以找到少数-非常少数能够引起我们兴趣的垃圾
债券，而截至目前为止，总计个人50多年的垃圾债投资经验感觉还算不错，在
1984年的年报中，我们曾提到当初投资经营发生状况的华盛顿公用电力系统公
司债，而这些年来我们也陆续介入其它有问题的公司债，诸如克莱斯勒金融公
司、德士古石油及RJR 纳贝斯可饼干等，事后这些公司也都能重返光采，然而
如果我们一直积极投入垃圾债券市场的话，总有一天我们会发生损失，不过偶尔
买进一些问题债也有可能让我们钓到大鱼，在Fruit of the Loom宣布破产的初
期，我们以相当于面额50%的价格买进该公司的债券与银行债权，该公司的破
产个案相当特殊，因为公司并未停止支付有担保债务的利息，这等于让我们一年
得到约当15%的收益，目前我们持有Fruit of the Loom有担保债权的比例提高
到10%，而且最后我们很有可能收回相当于面额70%的本金，经由这笔投资，
我们等于间接降低了整个购并案的投资金额。
In late 2000, we began purchasing the obligations of FINOVA Group, a
troubled finance company, and that, too, led to our making a major
transaction. FINOVA then had about $11 billion of debt outstanding, of
which we purchased 13% at about two-thirds of face value. We expected
the company to go into bankruptcy, but believed that liquidation of its
assets would produce a payoff for creditors that would be well above
our cost. As default loomed in early 2001, we joined forces with
Leucadia National Corporation to present the company with a
prepackaged plan for bankruptcy.
在2000年底，我们开始陆续买进FINOVA公司的债权，那是一家发生问题的
财务金融公司，而此举又间接促成了另一笔投资案，FINOVA当时约有110亿
美元的债务流通在外，我们以面额三分之二的价位买进了其中约13%的债权，
我们预估这家公司将难逃破产的命运，但确信在清算这家公司之后，债权人估计
可以收回的金额将超过当初投资的成本，而该公司果然在2001年初无法清偿债
务，于是我们乃联合Leucadia公司向FINOVA提出一项解决方案。
The plan as subsequently modified (and I'm simplifying here) provided
that creditors would be paid 70% of face value (along with full interest)
and that they would receive a newly-issued 7?% note for the 30% of
their claims not satisfied by cash. To fund FINOVA's 70% distribution,
Leucadia and Berkshire formed a jointly-owned entity - mellifluently
christened Berkadia - that borrowed $5.6 billion through FleetBoston
and, in turn, re-lent this sum to FINOVA, concurrently obtaining a
priority claim on its assets. Berkshire guaranteed 90% of the Berkadia
borrowing and also has a secondary guarantee on the 10% for which
Leucadia has primary responsibility. (Did I mention that I am
simplifying?).
这个提案后来经过修正(过程简单说明如下)，每位债权人可以先拿到面额70%的
本金(以及所有利息)，至于剩下的30%则领取利率7.5%的分期应付票据，而为
了让FINOVA顺利支付这70%的本金，Leucadia跟Berkshire合组一家新公司
-结合两者取了一个相当好听的名字Berkadia，由这家新公司向FleetBoston
金融公司借了56亿美元，然后再将这笔资金转借给FINOVA，并由其取得
FINOVA资产第一顺位的抵押权，Berkshire则提供Berkadia 借款金额90%的
保证，剩下的10%则由Leucadia负责担保，Berkshire则为第二顺位的保证人
(我刚刚有说要简单说明了吗?)。
There is a spread of about two percentage points between what
Berkadia pays on its borrowing and what it receives from FINOVA, with
this spread flowing 90% to Berkshire and 10% to Leucadia. As I write
this, each loan has been paid down to $3.9 billion.
在Berkadia付给FleetBoston的利息费用与收到FINOVA的利息收入间，有
2%的差距，这2%的利差分成90%与10%由Berkshire与Leucadia分配，而截
至我写年报为止，这笔借款已经还到剩下39亿美元。
As part of the bankruptcy plan, which was approved on August 10,
2001, Berkshire also agreed to offer 70% of face value for up to $500
million principal amount of the $3.25 billion of new 7?% bonds that
were issued by FINOVA. (Of these, we had already received $426.8
million in principal amount because of our 13% ownership of the
original debt.) Our offer, which was to run until September 26, 2001,
could be withdrawn under a variety of conditions, one of which became
operative if the New York Stock Exchange closed during the offering
period. When that indeed occurred in the week of September 11th, we
promptly terminated the offer.
在2001/8/10通过的破产计画中，Berkshire同意以面额70%的价格买下
FINOVA预备发行总额32.5亿美元7.5%的分期票券中的5亿美元，(在这之前，
我们已先收到4.268亿美元，这是我们先前投资13%债权所收回的本金)，我们
这项报价除了几项特殊的状况外，在2001/9/26前都有效，其中一条就是纽约
证券交易所在报价期间不会关闭，谁知后来竟发生911事件，于是我们马上取
消这项提案。
Many of FINOVA's loans involve aircraft assets whose values were
significantly diminished by the events of September 11th. Other
receivables held by the company also were imperiled by the economic
consequences of the attack that day. FINOVA's prospects, therefore, are
not as good as when we made our proposal to the bankruptcy court.
Nevertheless we feel that overall the transaction will prove satisfactory
for Berkshire. Leucadia has day-to-day operating responsibility for
FINOVA, and we have long been impressed with the business acumen
and managerial talent of its key executives.
FINOVA许多贷款的价值系于飞机资产，在911事件发生后，这些资产价值大
为减损，而其它应收帐款在该事件发生后也产生相当大的质变，也因此FINOVA
的本质与前景已不若当初我们向破产法庭提案时那般，尽管如此，我们还是觉得
整个交易对Berkshire来说还算有利，Leucadia对于FINOVA每日的营运付全
责，我们一直对于其主要经理人精细的商业判断能力与管理才能印象深刻。
* * * * * * * * * * * *
It's deja vu time again: In early 1965, when the investment partnership I
ran took control of Berkshire, that company had its main banking
relationships with First National Bank of Boston and a large New York
City bank. Previously, I had done no business with either.
Fast forward to 1969, when I wanted Berkshire to buy the Illinois
National Bank and Trust of Rockford. We needed $10 million, and I
contacted both banks. There was no response from New York. However,
two representatives of the Boston bank immediately came to Omaha.
They told me they would supply the money for our purchase and that we
would work out the details later.
又到了似曾相识的时间了，早在1965年，当投资合伙事业正式入主Berkshire
时，公司主要的往来银行是波士顿的第一国家银行以及纽约花旗银行，不过在此
之前我个人与这两家并无往来，后来到了1969年，当Berkshire有意买下伊利
诺州国家银行以及洛克福信托公司时，我们需要1,000万美元的资金，于是我
连络这两家银行，花旗银行方面没有任何响应，但另一方面波士顿银行却立即派
了两位代表到奥玛哈，他们明确表示愿意提供购并所需的资金，至于详细细节可
以等稍后再谈。
For the next three decades, we borrowed almost nothing from banks.
(Debt is a four-letter word around Berkshire.) Then, in February, when
we were structuring the FINOVA transaction, I again called Boston,
where First National had morphed into FleetBoston. Chad Gifford, the
company's president, responded just as Bill Brown and Ira Stepanian had
back in 1969 - "you've got the money and we'll work out the details
later."
在这之后的数十年内，我们几乎不向银行借钱，(债务对Berkshire来说不过是
一个普通的名词而已)，不过到了去年二月，当我们在规划FINOVA的投资架构
时，我再度打电话给位于波士顿的这家银行，当时的第一国家银行已经改名为
FleetBoston，该银行的总裁-Chad Gifford的响应与当初1969年Bill Brown
及Ira Stepanian一模一样，"没关系!钱你先拿去用，细节稍后再谈"。
And that's just what happened. FleetBoston syndicated a loan for $6
billion (as it turned out, we didn't need $400 million of it), and it was
quickly oversubscribed by 17 banks throughout the world. Sooooo . . . if
you ever need $6 billion, just give Chad a call - assuming, that is, your
credit is AAA.
事情一如这般，由FleetBoston出面主办的一项60亿美元的联贷案(结果实际
上也没有用到那么多)，立刻得到全世界17家银行的超额认购，所以如果你需要
60亿美元的资金，可以打电话给Chad，…只要你的信用评等是三A最高等级。
* * * * * * * * * * * *
One more point about our investments: The media often report that
"Buffett is buying" this or that security, having picked up the "fact" from
reports that Berkshire files. These accounts are sometimes correct, but
at other times the transactions Berkshire reports are actually being
made by Lou Simpson, who runs a $2 billion portfolio for GEICO that is
quite independent of me. Normally, Lou does not tell me what he is
buying or selling, and I learn of his activities only when I look at a GEICO
portfolio summary that I receive a few days after the end of each month.
Lou's thinking, of course, is quite similar to mine, but we usually end up
in different securities. That's largely because he's working with less
money and can therefore invest in smaller companies than I. Oh, yes,
there's also another minor difference between us: In recent years, Lou's
performance has been far better than mine.
关于投资还有一点要说明，报章媒体经常报导说"巴菲特正在买进"这支或那支股
票，其中大多是媒体经由Berkshire向主管机关申报的文件中推敲出蛛丝马迹，
这些报导有时正确，但有时Berkshire申报的交易也有可能是Lou Simpson的
杰作，他个人独立管理GEICO 20亿美元的投资部位，通常Lou不会告诉我，
他正在买进或卖出什么股票，而通常我是在每个月结束后几天看到投资月报表时
才知道他的进出动作，当然Lou的思考模式与我非常相近，但通常我们买进的
股票截然不同，主要的原因在于他管理的资金相较于我这边规模小了许多，因此
他只能投资一些小型类股，哦! 当然我们之间还有一点不太相同，那就是他的投
资绩效比起我来要好太多了。
Charitable Contributions
慈善捐赠
Berkshire follows a highly unusual policy in respect to charitable
contributions - but it's one that Charlie and I believe is both rational and
fair to owners.
关于慈善捐赠，Berkshire所采取的做法与其它企业有显著的不同，但这却是查
理跟我认为对股东们最公平且合理的做法。
First, we let our operating subsidiaries make their own charitable
decisions, requesting only that the owners/managers who once ran
these as independent companies make all donations to their personal
charities from their own funds, instead of using company money. When
our managers are using company funds, we trust them to make gifts in
a manner that delivers commensurate tangible or intangible benefits to
the operations they manage. Last year contributions from Berkshire
subsidiaries totaled $19.2 million.
首先，我们让旗下个别的子公司依其个别状况决定各自的捐赠，只要求先前经营
该企业的老板与经理人在捐赠给私人的基金会时，必须改用私人的钱，而非公
款，当他们运用公司的资金进行捐赠时，我们则相信他们这么做，可以为所经营
的事业增加有形或无形的收益，总计去年，Berkshire的子公司捐赠金额高达
1,920万美元。
At the parent company level, we make no contributions except those
