这场经典的赛事，甚至还用慢动作播放精彩的第四节，我们以今年封面的颜色表 .52
employee and now have 14.8. (I've tried in vain to get JoEllen Rieck to
change her workweek from four days to five; I think she likes the
national recognition she gains by being .8.)
最后我要感谢Berkshire企业总部(占地约5,246平方英呎)那群最棒、生产力最
高的员工，是他们让我的工作轻松愉快，Berkshire去年增加了40,000名员工，
使得员工总数增加到110,000人，为此总部人员编制增加一名成为14.8人(虽
然我试图说服JoEllen Rieck将她的每周上班天数从4天改为5天，不过我想她
还是喜欢当那个0.8)。
The smooth handling of the array of duties that come with our current
size and scope - as well as some additional activities almost unique to
Berkshire, such as our shareholder gala and designated-gifts program -
takes a very special group of people. And that we most definitely have.
以我们目前的规模，为了要顺利处理好所有的日常业务，同时还要加上
Berkshire特有的一些活动-诸如股东盛会及指定捐赠计画等，我们绝对必须有
一群特别的人，而可以肯定的是我们已经找到合适的对象。
February 28, 2002
Warren E. Buffett
Chairman of the Board
华伦．巴菲特
董事会主席
2002年2月28日
Note: The following table appears in the printed Annual Report on the
facing page of the Chairman's Letter and is referred to in that letter.
附注：下表系董事长致股东信的参考资料，并载于年度报告的封面。
Berkshire's Corporate Performance vs. the S&P 500
Berkshire vs S&P 500指数的比较表
Annual Percentage Change
----------------------
in Per-Share in S&P 500
Book Value of with Dividends Relative
Berkshire Included Results
Year (1) (2) (1)-(2)
1965 .................................................. 23.8 10.0 13.8
1966 .................................................. 20.3 (11.7) 32.0
1967 .................................................. 11.0 30.9 (19.9)
1968 .................................................. 19.0 11.0 8.0
1969 .................................................. 16.2 (8.4) 24.6
1970 .................................................. 12.0 3.9 8.1
1971 .................................................. 16.4 14.6 1.8
1972 .................................................. 21.7 18.9 2.8
1973 .................................................. 4.7 (14.8) 19.5
1974 .................................................. 5.5 (26.4) 31.9
1975 .................................................. 21.9 37.2 (15.3)
1976 .................................................. 59.3 23.6 35.7
1977 .................................................. 31.9 (7.4) 39.3
1978 .................................................. 24.0 6.4 17.6
1979 .................................................. 35.7 18.2 17.5
1980 .................................................. 19.3 32.3 (13.0)
1981 .................................................. 31.4 (5.0) 36.4
1982 .................................................. 40.0 21.4 18.6
1983 .................................................. 32.3 22.4 9.9
1984 .................................................. 13.6 6.1 7.5
1985 .................................................. 48.2 31.6 16.6
1986 .................................................. 26.1 18.6 7.5
1987 .................................................. 19.5 5.1 14.4
1988 .................................................. 20.1 16.6 3.5
1989 .................................................. 44.4 31.7 12.7
1990 .................................................. 7.4 (3.1) 10.5
1991 .................................................. 39.6 30.5 9.1
1992 .................................................. 20.3 7.6 12.7
1993 .................................................. 14.3 10.1 4.2
1994 .................................................. 13.9 1.3 12.6
1995 .................................................. 43.1 37.6 5.5
1996 .................................................. 31.8 23.0 8.8
1997 .................................................. 34.1 33.4 .7
1998 .................................................. 48.3 28.6 19.7
1999 .................................................. .5 21.0 (20.5)
2000 .................................................. 6.5 (9.1) 15.6
2001 .................................................. (6.2) (11.9) 5.7
2002 .................................................. 10.0 (22.1) 32.1
Average Annual Gain 1965-2002 22.2 10.0 12.2
Overall Gain 1964-2002 214,433 3,663
--------------------------------------------------
Notes: Data are for calendar years with these exceptions: 1965 and 1966, year ended
9/30; 1967, 15 months ended 12/31.
资料以历年制为准，除了1965年及1966年系至9/30;1967年则为至12/31的15个月。
Starting in 1979, accounting rules required insurance companies to value the equity
securities they hold at market rather than at the lower of cost or market, which was
previously the requirement. In this table, Berkshire's results through 1978 have been
restated to conform to the changed rules. In all other respects, the results are calculated
using the numbers originally reported.
从1979年开始，会计原则规定保险公司持有的股权投资必须采用市价法取代原先的成本与市价
孰低法，在本表中，1978年以前的资料已依照该原则重新调整，除此之外，其它的数字皆依照
原则的结果未作更动。
The S&P 500 numbers are pre-tax where as the Berkshire numbers are after-tax. If a
corporation such as Berkshire were simply to have owned the S&P 500 and accrued the
appropriate taxes, its results would have lagged the S&P 500 in years when that index
showed a positive return, but would have exceeded the S&P in years when the index
showed a negative return. Over the years, the tax costs would have caused the aggregate
lag to be substantial.
S&P 500指数系以税前为准，而Berkshire的数字则属于税后，如果Berkshire直接投资S&P 500
并依此课征相关税负，则当S&P 500的报酬为正时，Berkshire的表现将不如S&P 500，相反地
若S&P 500的报酬为负时，Berkshire的表现将优于S&P 500，就长期而言，Berkshire额外负
担的税负成本将使得中间的差异日益扩大。
BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC.
波克夏海瑟崴股份有限公司
To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:
致Berkshire公司全体股东:
Our gain in net worth during 2002 was $6.1 billion, which increased the
per-share book value of both our Class A and Class B stock by 10.0%. Over
the last 38 years (that is, since present management took over) per-share
book value has grown from $19 to $41,727, a rate of 22.2% compounded
annually.*
本公司2002年的净值增加了61亿美元，每股A股或B股的帐面净值增加了
10.0%，累计过去38年以来，也就是自从现有经营阶层接手之后，每股净值由当
初的19元成长到现在的41,727美元，年复合成长率约为22.2%*。
--------------------------------
*All figures used in this report apply to Berkshire's A shares, the successor to the only
stock that the company had outstanding before 1996. The B shares have an economic
interest equal to 1/30th that of the A.
*1在年报中所谓的每股数字系以A级普通股约当数为基础，这是本公司在1996年以前流通在
外唯一的一种股份，B级普通股则拥有A级普通股三十分之一的权利。
In all respects 2002 was a banner year. I’ll provide details later, but here’s a
summary:
从任何角度来看，2002年无异是丰收的一年，后面我会再详加说明，以下是几点
总结：
.Our various non-insurance operations performed exceptionally well,
despite a sluggish economy. A decade ago Berkshire’s annual pre-tax
earnings from our non-insurance businesses was $272 million. Now, from
our ever-expanding collection of manufacturing, retailing, service and
finance businesses, we earn that sum monthly.
.尽管外界景气低迷，但Berkshire旗下所有非保险事业的表现都异常优异，十年
前，我们非保险事业的税前盈余为2.72亿美元，但时至今日，在持续大举扩张零售、
制造、服务以及金融事业版图之后，这数字约当我们一个月的获利。
.Our insurance group increased its float to $41.2 billion, a hefty gain of
$5.7 billion. Better yet, the use of these funds in 2002 cost us only 1%.
Getting back to low-cost float feels good, particularly after our poor
results during the three previous years. Berkshire’s reinsurance division
and GEICO shot the lights out in 2002, and underwriting discipline was
restored at General Re.
.2002年我们旗下保险事业的浮存金大幅增加了57亿美元，累积达到412亿美
元，更棒的是，运用这些资金的成本仅为1%，能够回到以往低成本浮存金的感觉真
好，特别是经历过惨淡的前三年，Berkshire的再保险部门以及GEICO车险在2002
年都大放异彩，而General RE的承保纪律也已恢复。
.Berkshire acquired some important new businesses – with economic
characteristics ranging from good to great, run by managers ranging from
great to great. Those attributes are two legs of our “entrance” strategy,
the third being a sensible purchase price. Unlike LBO operators and private
equity firms, we have no “exit” strategy – we buy to keep. That’s one reason
why Berkshire is usually the first – and sometimes the only – choice for
sellers and their managers.
.Berkshire购并了几项重要的新事业，其产业竞争力在各自的业界均堪称数一数
二，并由优秀的经理人所管理，这些特点是我们"进入"策略决定关键的两只脚，至
于合理的价格则是第三只脚，不过不同于一般融资购并者LBO及私人投资银行，我
们并没有所谓的"退出"策略，在买进以后，我们就把它们好好地放着，这也是为何
Berkshire往往成为许多卖方以及其经理人，心目中的首选，有时甚至是唯一的选
择。
.Our marketable securities outperformed most indices. For Lou Simpson,
who manages equities at GEICO, this was old stuff. But, for me, it was a
welcome change from the last few years, during which my investment
record was dismal.
.我们的股票投资组合表现超越市场上大多数的指数，对于负责管理GEICO保险资
金的Lou Simpson来说，这是司空见惯的事，但就我个人而言，却是在经历过好几
个悲惨的年头后，终于获得翻身。
The confluence of these favorable factors in 2002 caused our book-value
gain to outstrip the performance of the S&P 500 by 32.1 percentage points.
This result is aberrational: Charlie Munger, Berkshire’s vice chairman and
my partner, and I hope to achieve – at most – an average annual advantage
f a few points. In the future, there will be years in which the S&P soundly
trounces us. That will in fact almost certainly happen during a strong bull
market, because the portion of our assets committed to common stocks
has significantly declined. This change, of course, helps our relative
performance in down markets such as we had in 2002.
综合以上这些有利的因素，造就我们的帐面净值大幅超越S&P 500指数达到32.1个
百分点，这样的成绩有点反常，Berkshire的副董事长兼主要合伙人-查理曼格跟我
本人最希望的是Berkshire每年都能稳定的超越指数几个百分点就好，我想在以后
的某些年度，极有可能会看到S&P指数大幅超越我们的表现，尤其是当股市大幅上
涨的年头，主要的原因在于目前我们在股市投资占总资产的比例已大幅下降，当然
也由于是这样的转变，让我们在2002年股市大幅回档之际，仍能维持不错的绩效。
I have another caveat to mention about last year’s results. If you’ve been a
reader of financial reports in recent years, you’ve seen a flood of “proforma”
earnings statements – tabulations in which managers invariably
show “earnings” far in excess of those allowed by their auditors. In these
presentations, the CEO tells his owners “don’t count this, don’t count that –
just count what makes earnings fat.” Often, a forget-all-this-bad-stuff
message is delivered year after year without management so much as
blushing.
关于去年的结果，我还有一点要补充，如果你经常阅读最近几年上市公司的财务报
表，你会发现满是所谓"拟制性盈余"这类的报表-这种报表所显示的盈余数字往往都
远高于经过会计师签证的查核数，而公司高阶经理人会告诉股东们，"不要理这个，
不要管那个，只要算那些会让盈余数字好看一点的就好了"，而管理当局对于这类"
过去种种，譬如昨日死"的现象年复一年地出现，早就习以为常，一点都不会感到脸
红。
We’ve yet to see a pro-forma presentation disclosing that audited earnings
were somewhat high. So let’s make a little history: Last year, on a proforma
basis, Berkshire had lower earnings than those we actually reported.
我们还没有看过有那家公司的拟制报表，其盈余是低于会计师查核数字的，现在就
让我们来编一个故事，故事的大纲是：去年就拟制基础而言，Berkshire的盈余数
字远低于会计师的查核数字。
That is true because two favorable factors aided our reported figures. First,
in 2002 there was no megacatastrophe, which means that Berkshire (and
other insurers as well) earned more from insurance than if losses had been
normal. In years when the reverse is true – because of a blockbuster
hurricane, earthquake or man-made disaster – many insurers like to
report that they would have earned X “except for” the unusual event. The
implication is that since such megacats are infrequent, they shouldn’t be
counted when “true” earnings are calculated. That is deceptive nonsense.
“Except for” losses will forever be part of the insurance business, and they
will forever be paid with shareholders’ money.
我之所以会如此说，也并非全然凭空捏造，去年有两项有利的因素，让我们的财报
数字特别好看，第一，由于2002年没有发生什么重大的灾难，所以Berkshire(也包
括其它所有保险业者)赚取的盈余比一般正常的年度要多得多，反之亦然。然而奇怪
的是要是遇到飓风、地震与其它人为灾害频传的歹年冬时，许多保险同业往往会声
明"要是"没有发生XX灾难，本公司的盈余应可达到预计目标，意思是说，由于这类
灾难的发生相当特殊，所以不应该列入"正常"的盈余科目计算，这根本就是一派胡
言，要知道"特殊灾难"损失本来就是保险业司空见惯的事，而且绝对必须要由公司
背后的股东来买单。
Nonetheless, for the purposes of this exercise, we’ll take a page from the
industry’s book. For last year, when we didn’t have any truly major
disasters, a downward adjustment is appropriate if you wish to “normalize”
our underwriting result.
不论如何，我们还是继续完成这次的练习，由于去年我们没有遇到什么重大的灾难，
所以实有必要将帐面盈余向下调整，以算出正常合理的承保绩效。
Secondly, the bond market in 2002 favored certain strategies we employed
in our finance and financial products business. Gains from those strategies
will certainly diminish within a year or two – and may well disappear.
其次，2002年的债券市场特别有利于我们金融产品部门的策略运作，这类的利得
在未来一两年内很可能会逐渐缩减，甚至完全消失。
Soooo . . . “except for” a couple of favorable breaks, our pre-tax earnings
last year would have been about $500 million less than we actually
reported. We’re happy, nevertheless, to bank the excess. As Jack Benny
once said upon receiving an award: “I don’t deserve this honor – but, then,
I have arthritis, and I don’t deserve that either.”
所以呢. . . 在"扣除"这几项有利的短暂因素后，我们去年实际的税前获利将比帐面
减少约5亿美元，当然没有人会嫌盈余太多，就像是Jack Benny在得奖后所发表的
感言：「我实在是不配得到这个奖项，但这就像是我不应该得到关节炎一样」。
* * * * * * * * * * * *
We continue to be blessed with an extraordinary group of managers, many
of whom haven’t the slightest financial need to work. They stick around,
though: In 38 years, we’ve never had a single CEO of a subsidiary elect to
leave Berkshire to work elsewhere. Counting Charlie, we now have six
managers over 75, and I hope that in four years that number increases by
at least two (Bob Shaw and I are both 72). Our rationale: “It’s hard to teach
a new dog old tricks.” Berkshire’s operating CEOs are masters of their
crafts and run their businesses as if they were their own. My job is to stay
out of their way and allocate whatever excess capital their businesses
generate. It’s easy work.
Berkshire旗下一直有一大群杰出的经理人为我们打拼着，且其中绝大部分都已经
可以不必再为这份薪水工作，但他们依然坚守岗位，38年来还没有任何一位经理人
离开Berkshire跳槽到他处上班，包含查理在内，目前我们共有6位经理人的年龄超
过75岁，预期4年后还会再增加2名(那就是Bob Shaw跟我本人，我们现年都是72
岁)，我们的观念是，「实在是很难教新狗老把戏!」Berkshire的所有经理人都是各
自行业的佼佼者，并把公司当作是自己的事业一样在经营，至于我的任务其实相当
简单，那就是站在旁边默默鼓励，尽量不要碍着他们，并好好地运用他们所赚来的
大笔资金。
My managerial model is Eddie Bennett, who was a batboy. In 1919, at age
19, Eddie began his work with the Chicago White Sox, who that year went
to the World Series. The next year, Eddie switched to the Brooklyn Dodgers,
