这场经典的赛事，甚至还用慢动作播放精彩的第四节，我们以今年封面的颜色表 .54
company would otherwise incur to obtain funds. But the business is a
lemon if its cost of float is higher than market rates for money. Moreover,
the downward trend of interest rates in recent years has transformed
underwriting losses that formerly were tolerable into burdens that move
insurance businesses deeply into the lemon category.
首先浮存金是一项我们持有但却不属于我们的资金，在保险公司的营运中，浮存
金产生的原因在于保险公司在真正支付损失理赔之前，一般会先向保户收取保
费，在这期间保险公司会将资金运用在其它投资之上，当然这样的好处也必须要
付出代价，通常保险业者收取的保费并不足以支应最后支付出去的相关损失与费
用，于是保险公司便会发生承保损失，这就是浮存金的成本，而当一家公司取得
浮存金成本，就长期而言低于从其它管道取得资金的成本时，它就有存在的价
值，否则一旦保险事业取得浮存金的成本远高于货币市场利率时，它就像是一颗
极酸的柠檬。
Historically, Berkshire has obtained its float at a very low cost. Indeed, our
cost has been less than zero in many years; that is, we’ve actually been
paid for holding other people’s money. In 2001, however, our cost was
terrible, coming in at 12.8%, about half of which was attributable to World
Trade Center losses. Back in 1983-84, we had years that were even worse.
There’s nothing automatic about cheap float.
根据过去的记录显示，Berkshire 一向能够以很低的成本取得浮存金，确实在
Berkshire经营的这些年来，有半数以上的年头，浮存金的成本甚至低于零，也就
是说这实际上等于是别人要付费请我们帮他们保管资金，然而最近这几年，我们的
成本大幅飙涨，2001年尤其恐怖，资金成本大幅飙涨至12.8%，其中半数归因于世
界贸易大楼损失，回顾过去，我们在1983到1984年间，也曾有过更悲惨的记录，
便宜的浮存金绝非凭空而降。
The table that follows shows (at intervals) the float generated by the
various segments of Berkshire’s insurance operations since we entered the
business 36 years ago upon acquiring National Indemnity Company (whose
traditional lines are included in the segment “Other Primary”). For the table
we have calculated our float — which we generate in large amounts relative
to our premium volume — by adding net loss reserves, loss adjustment
reserves, funds held under reinsurance assumed and unearned premium
reserves, and then subtracting insurance-related receivables, prepaid
acquisition costs, prepaid taxes and deferred charges applicable to
assumed reinsurance. (Got that?)
下表中所显示的数字是，Berkshire自取得国家产险公司经营权，进入保险事业
36年以来所贡献的浮存金，(其中传统业务包含在其它主险项下)，在这张计算
浮存金的表中，(相对于收到的保费收入，我们持有的浮存金部位算是相当大的)
我们将所有的损失准备、损失费用调整准备、再保预先收取的资金与未赚取保费
加总后，再扣除应付佣金、预付购并成本、预付税负以及取得再保业务的相关递
延费用，得出浮存金的数额，弄清楚了吗
Yearend Float (in $ millions)
Other Other
Year GEICO General Re Reinsurance Primary Total
------ ------- --------- ---------- ------- ------
1967 20 20
1977 40 131 171
1987 701 807 1,508
1997 2,917 4,014 455 7,386
1998 3,125 14,909 4,305 415 22,754
1999 3,444 15,166 6,285 403 25,298
2000 3,943 15,525 7,805 598 27,871
2001 4,251 19,310 11,262 685 35,508
2002 4,678 22,207 13,396 943 41,224
Last year our cost of float was 1%. As I mentioned earlier, you should
temper your enthusiasm about this favorable result given that no
megacatastrophe occurred in 2002. We’re certain to get one of these
disasters periodically, and when we do our float-cost will spike.
去年我们的浮存金成本约为1%，不过从前我就曾说过，大家千万不要被这样的结果
冲昏了头，那完全是因为2002年没有发生什么重大的天灾人祸所致，总有一天，
我们会让碰到某些大灾难，届时我们的浮存金成本将激增。
Our 2002 results were hurt by 1) a painful charge at General Re for losses
that should have been recorded as costs in earlier years, and 2) a
“desirable” charge we incur annually for retroactive insurance (see the
next section for more about these items). These costs totaled $1.75 billion,
or about 4.6% of float. Fortunately, our overall underwriting experience
on 2002 business was excellent, which allowed us, even after the charges
noted, to approach a no-cost result.
此外2002年我们的绩效受到 1)补提通用再保先前年度未认列的损失 2)追溯再保
险业务每年固定必须提列的损失成本(在后面还会有详细的说明)，这些成本金额总
计17.5亿美元，约为浮存金的4.6%，可喜的是，除此之外，2002年我们整体的承
保经验相当不错，这使得我们即便在提列以上损失之后，仍然接近损益两平。
Absent a megacatastrophe, I expect our cost of float in 2003 to again be
very low – perhaps even less than zero. In the rundown of our insurance
operations that follows, you will see why I’m optimistic that, over time, our
underwriting results will both surpass those achieved by the industry and
deliver us investable funds at minimal cost.
除非再发生什么重大的天灾人祸，否则我预期2003年的浮存金成本将可以压得非
常低，甚至有可能在零以下，在以下保险子公司的营运概述中，各位将可以明了为
何我会那么有信心，就长期而言，我相信我们的承保绩效一定可以超越同业的平均
水准，从而让我们以相当低的成本取得投资所需的资金。
Insurance Operations
保险事业营运状况
If our insurance operations are to generate low-cost float over time, they
must: (a) underwrite with unwavering discipline; (b) reserve conservatively;
and (c) avoid an aggregation of exposures that would allow a supposedly
“impossible” incident to threaten their solvency. All of our major
insurance businesses, with one exception, have regularly met those tests.
如果我们的保险事业长期以来想要产生低成本的浮存金，必须要做到以下几点，(a)
必须有毫不妥协的承保纪律(b)稳健保守地提列准备(c)避免那些看起来"不可能发生
"意外所累积的风险部位影响到公司的偿债能力，除了一家公司以外，我们其它所有
主要的保险事业大致都能谨守这些原则。
The exception is General Re, and there was much to do at that company
last year to get it up to snuff. I’m delighted to report that under Joe
Brandon’s leadership, and with yeoman assistance by Tad Montross,
enormous progress has been made on each of the fronts described.
这个例外正是通用再保，所幸去年该公司进行了许多的改进动作，现在我很高兴地
向各位报告，那就是在Joe Brandon的领导，以及Tad Montross尽心尽力的辅佐
下，该公司在以上提到的这几点皆有重大的进展。
When I agreed in 1998 to merge Berkshire with Gen Re, I thought that
company stuck to the three rules I’ve enumerated. I had studied the
operation for decades and had observed underwriting discipline that was
consistent and reserving that was conservative. At merger time, I detected
no slippage in Gen Re’s standards.
当我在1998年同意由Berkshire购并通用再保时，我以为该公司早已谨守以上我所
揭示的三项原则，因为我已追踪该公司营运达数十年，也发现到其承保纪律相当一
致，同时损失准备提列也相当保守，可以说在购并的当头，我并未发现到通用再保
的标准有任何漏洞。
I was dead wrong. Gen Re’s culture and practices had substantially
changed and unbeknownst to management – and to me – the company was
grossly mispricing its current business. In addition, Gen Re had
accumulated an aggregation of risks that would have been fatal had, say,
terrorists detonated several largescale nuclear bombs in an attack on the
U.S. A disaster of that scope was highly improbable, of course, but it is up
to insurers to limit their risks in a manner that leaves their finances rocksolid
if the “impossible” happens. Indeed, had Gen Re remained
independent, the World Trade Center attack alone would have threatened
the company’s existence.
不过事后证明我的看法大错特错，通用再保的文化以及作风在近年来已彻底的变
质，而管理当局，包含我本人在内却不自知，这家公司的业务很明显地订价不当，
此外通用再保在更不知不觉地累积了致命的风险，例如，恐怖份子就有可能连续引
爆大规模的核子炸弹来攻击美国，虽然发生这样灾难的机率微乎其微，但保险公司
却绝对必须谨慎地将风险限制在让公司的财务稳若盘石的境地，以防万一这种不可
能的事情果真发生，事实上，我们可以说当初通用再保要是没有并进Berkshire的
话，单单世界贸易大楼攻击事件的损失就足以危及公司的经营。
When the WTC disaster occurred, it exposed weaknesses in Gen Re’s
operations that I should have detected earlier. But I was lucky: Joe and Tad
were on hand, freshly endowed with increased authority and eager to
rapidly correct the errors of the past. They knew what to do – and they did
it.
世贸大楼攻击事件的发生，严重地凸显了通用再保营运上的缺失，这是我早该注意
却偏偏没有注意到的一点，所幸我的运气还算不错，有Joe跟Tad在身边，随时准备
好被赋予重任，并充满改变过去陋规的企图心，他们很清楚该怎么做，而且也确实
做到了。
It takes time for insurance policies to run off, however, and 2002 was well
along before we managed to reduce our aggregation of nuclear, chemical
and biological risk (NCB) to a tolerable level. That problem is now behind
us.
虽然保险契约有时间递延性，不过2002年整体的结果还算令人满意，虽然我们仍
未将核子生化等事故(简称NCB)累积的风险降到可以忍受的限度之内，但目前这个
问题已成过去式。
On another front, Gen Re’s underwriting attitude has been dramatically
altered: The entire organization now understands that we wish to write
only properly-priced business, whatever the effect on volume. Joe and Tad
judge themselves only by Gen Re’s underwriting profitability. Size simply
doesn’t count.
在另外一方面，通用再保的承保心态也已做了彻底的转变，目前整个团队相当明了
我们只愿意接受价格合理业务的态度，至于金额则没有上限，Joe跟Tad只惟通用再
保的获利结果是问，至于规模问题则完全不用顾虑。
Finally, we are making every effort to get our reserving right. If we fail at
that, we can’t know our true costs. And any insurer that has no idea what
its costs are is heading for big trouble.
最后，我们正尽可能地提列适当的损失准备，如果我们做不到这一点，那么我们可
能根本就不知道我们真实的成本，任何一家不了解自家公司成本的保险业者，将来
肯定会发生大纰漏。
At yearend 2001, General Re attempted to reserve adequately for all losses
that had occurred prior to that date and were not yet paid – but we failed
badly. Therefore the company’s 2002 underwriting results were penalized
by an additional $1.31 billion that we recorded to correct the estimation
mistakes of earlier years. When I review the reserving errors that have been
uncovered at General Re, a line from a country song seems apt: “I wish I
didn’t know now what I didn’t know then.”
记得在2001年底，通用再保试图将以前年度提列已发生但未支付的损失准备补
足，但事后证明我们做的还差得很远，这使得该公司必须在2002年再补提13.1亿
美元的损失，以修正以前年度所发生的估计错误，当我在检视通用再保后来才被发
现的准备提列疏失时，我突然想到有一首乡村歌曲的歌词形容的相当贴切，「真希望
现在的我没有发现以前我不知情的那段往事」。
I can promise you that our top priority going forward is to avoid inadequate
reserving. But I can’t guarantee success. The natural tendency of most
casualty-insurance managers is to underreserve, and they must have a
particular mindset – which, it may surprise you, has nothing to do with
actuarial expertise – if they are to overcome this devastating bias.
Additionally, a reinsurer faces far more difficulties in reserving properly
than does a primary insurer. Nevertheless, at Berkshire, we have generally
been successful in our reserving, and we are determined to be at General
Re as well.
我可以向各位保证，未来我们的首要目标就是避免损失准备提列的不当，当然我无
法保证一定做得到，保险公司经理人大多倾向少提列一些准备，而想要克服这种糟
糕的偏差，他们必须将其特殊的心态做个调整，说起来或许你会讶异，这完全与精
算专业无关，同时，相对于初级保险业者，再保业者适当提列准备的难度更高，不
过即便如此，在Berkshire，我们在损失准备提列这点做得还算不错，而我们也将
努力让通用再保比照办理。
In summary, I believe General Re is now well positioned to deliver huge
amounts of no-cost float to Berkshire and that its sink-the-ship
catastrophe risk has been eliminated. The company still possesses the
important competitive strengths that I’ve outlined in the past. And it
gained another highly significant advantage last year when each of its
three largest worldwide competitors, previously rated AAA, was demoted
by at least one rating agency. Among the giants, General Re, rated AAA
across-the-board, is now in a class by itself in respect to financial
strength.
总的来说，我相信通用再保现在已准备好要为Berkshire贡献大量无成本的浮存
金，整家公司倒闭的风险可说已被排除，该公司仍然拥有过去我一再提到的竞争优
势，同时在去年它又获得另外一项重要的竞争优势，那就是其它三家原本同列三A
最高信用评等的世界级主要竞争同业，在去年至少都被调降一个评等等级，在这些
保险巨擘当中，唯有通用再保一路维持三A评等，在象征财务实力的领域中取得独
占鳌头的地位。
No attribute is more important. Recently, in contrast, one of the world’s
largest reinsurers – a company regularly recommended to primary insurers
by leading brokers – has all but ceased paying claims, including those
both valid and due. This company owes many billions of dollars to
hundreds of primary insurers who now face massive write-offs. “Cheap”
reinsurance is a fool’s bargain: When an insurer lays out money today in
exchange for a reinsurer’s promise to pay a decade or two later, it’s
dangerous – and possibly life-threatening – for the insurer to deal with any
but the strongest reinsurer around.
再没有其它特点比这个更重要了，相较之下，最近某家世界级的大型再保公司-该
公司通常名列保险经纪人推荐给客户的首选，目前已暂停支付损失理赔金，包含那
些有效且到期的部份，该公司积欠高达数十亿美元的理赔金，这迫使其数百家保险
客户必须面临大幅冲销应收款的命运，"便宜"对再保业来说，绝对是愚蠢的交易，
当保险业者今天将资金付给再保业者以换取一、二十年后的保障承诺时，唯有跟实
力最强的再保业者打交道，才有可能避免无谓且有时甚至危及企业生存的风险。
Berkshire shareholders owe Joe and Tad a huge thank you for their
accomplishments in 2002. They worked harder during the year than I
would wish for anyone – and it is paying off.
Berkshire的全体股东应该深深感谢，Joe跟Tad在2002年为我们所做的一切，他们
去年一整年尤其特别的辛苦，当然这一切的努力现在已获得回报。
* * * * * * * * * * * *
At GEICO, everything went so well in 2002 that we should pinch ourselves.
Growth was substantial, profits were outstanding, policyholder retention
was up and sales productivity jumped significantly. These trends continue
in early 2003.
在GEICO，2002年所有的事都再顺利也不过了，好到甚至让我们无法置信，成长
的幅度相当可观，获利也相当突出，保户续约率持续提升，同时业务生产力也大幅
跃升，而且这些现象在2003年依然继续维持。
Thank Tony Nicely for all of this. As anyone who knows him will attest,
Tony has been in love with GEICO for 41 years – ever since he went to work
for the company at 18 – and his results reflect this passion. He is proud of
the money we save policyholders – about $1 billion annually versus what
other insurers, on average, would have charged them. He is proud of the
service we provide these policyholders: In a key industry survey, GEICO was
recently ranked above all major competitors. He is proud of his 19,162
associates, who last year were awarded profit-sharing payments equal to
19% of their base salary because of the splendid results they achieved. And
he is proud of the growing profits he delivers to Berkshire shareholders.
感谢Tony Nicely为我们所做的一切，认识他的人都知道，他跟GEICO结缘已达41
个年头，当时他的年龄只有18岁，而他的成绩有目共睹，他一向对于能为客户节省
保费感到相当自傲，相较于其它保险业者，GEICO平均每年可为保户省下10亿美元
的保费，同时他也对GEICO提供的服务相当有信心，根据业界的一项调查，GEICO
目前名列消费者满意度第一名，同时他更对旗下19,162位同仁引以为傲，去年这些
同仁因为优异的表现，总共为自己赚取了相当于19%底薪的奖金，最后他也对持续
为Berkshire贡献稳定成长的获利感到自豪。
GEICO took in $2.9 billion in premiums when Berkshire acquired full
ownership in 1996. Last year, its volume was $6.9 billion, with plenty of
growth to come. Particularly promising is the company’s Internet
operation, whose new business grew by 75% last year. Check us out at
GEICO.com (or call 800-847-7536). In most states, shareholders get a
special 8% discount.
1996年在我们完全买下GEICO时，它的年度保费收入约为29亿美元，去年这个数
字增加到69亿美元，而后续成长依然可期，其中尤以网络行销最具潜力，去年这个
部门成长率高达75%，记得到GEICO.com看看(或电800-847-7536)，在大部分的
州，股东都可以得到8%的特别折扣。
Here’s one footnote to GEICO’s 2002 earnings that underscores the need
for insurers to do business with only the strongest of reinsurers. In
1981-1983, the managers then running GEICO decided to try their hand at
writing commercial umbrella and product liability insurance. The risks
seemed modest: the company took in only $3,051,000 from this line and
used almost all of it – $2,979,000 – to buy reinsurance in order to limit its
losses. GEICO was left with a paltry $72,000 as compensation for the minor
portion of the risk that it retained. But this small bite of the apple was more
than enough to make the experience memorable. GEICO’s losses from
this venture now total a breathtaking $94.1 million or about 130,000% of
