这场经典的赛事，甚至还用慢动作播放精彩的第四节，我们以今年封面的颜色表 .55
the net premium it received. Of the total loss, uncollectable receivables
from deadbeat reinsurers account for no less than $90.3 million (including
$19 million charged in 2002). So much for “cheap” reinsurance.
关于GEICO 2002年的盈余有一件事要附带报告，这件事突显了保险公司绝对只能
与最好的再保公司往来的重要性，话说1981年到1983年间，当时负责经营GEICO
的经理人决定要在商业防护及产品责任险上试试身手，这类风险看起来似乎不大，
事实上，公司在当年也不过收取了约305万美元的保费，但却耗费了其中298万美
元投保了再保险，打算将风险限制在一定范围内，总结GEICO仅留下区区7万美元
而已，以作为承担自留风险的对价，谁知这样的安排，竟让公司留下了难以抹灭的
惨痛经验，总计GEICO后来为此承受的损失高达9,410万美元，约当所收取净保费
的1,300倍，在这笔损失中，再保公司应收赔款不算太多，只不过是9,030万美元
而已!!(其中包含2002年认列的1,900万损失)，便宜实在是没好货!
* * * * * * * * * * * *
Ajit Jain’s reinsurance division was the major reason our float cost us so
little last year. If we ever put a photo in a Berkshire annual report, it will be
of Ajit. In color!
Ajit Jain领导的再保险部门是我们去年浮存金成本之所以能够压得这么低的主要原
因，如果Berkshire的年报必须要摆年度风云人物照片，那肯定会是Ajit，而且一定
要用彩色的!
Ajit’s operation has amassed $13.4 billion of float, more than all but a
handful of insurers have ever built up. He accomplished this from a
standing start in 1986, and even now has a workforce numbering only 20.
And, most important, he has produced underwriting profits.
从1986年开始，Ajit的部门，截至目前已经为我们累积了134亿美元的浮存金，这
是其它业者前所未有的成绩，而雇用员工人数不过20人，更重要的是，他还享有承
保利益。
His profits are particularly remarkable if you factor in some accounting
arcana that I am about to lay on you. So prepare to eat your spinach (or,
alternatively, if debits and credits aren’t your thing, skip the next two
paragraphs).
如果各位再将我之前提到过的几项会计因素，这样的成果就更显得难能可贵，所以
各位卜派请准备好你们的大力丸，(如果你对会计借贷事项没兴趣，可以跳过后面两
段不看)。
Ajit’s 2002 underwriting profit of $534 million came after his operation
recognized a charge of $428 million attributable to “retroactive” insurance
he has written over the years. In this line of business, we assume from
another insurer the obligation to pay up to a specified amount for losses
they have already incurred – often for events that took place decades
earlier – but that are yet to be paid (for example, because a worker hurt in
1980 will receive monthly payments for life). In these arrangements, an
insurer pays us a large upfront premium, but one that is less than the
losses we expect to pay. We willingly accept this differential because a) our
payments are capped, and b) we get to use the money until loss payments
are actually made, with these often stretching out over a decade or more.
About 80% of the $6.6 billion in asbestos and environmental loss reserves
that we carry arises from capped contracts, whose costs consequently
can’t skyrocket.
Ajit 2002年的承保利益达5.34亿美元，其中包括所承担4.28亿美元的追溯再保险
损失，经由这类的业务，我们承受其它保险业者已经发生损失但尚未履行完毕的义
务，这类损失通常早在许多年前就已经发生，但理赔金到现在却还没有付完，(举例
来说一件1980年发生的职业灾害，但现在可能还持续按月支付终生的理赔金)，在
这类协议中，由保险业者一次支付一大笔保险费给我们，但金额仍远低于我们将来
预期要付出的总数，而我们之所以愿意这样做，原因在于a)我们支付的金额仍有其
上限，b)在理赔金真正付出之前的空档，期间往往长达数十年以上，我们得以运用
这笔资金)，在我们受理的66亿美元的石绵及环境伤害损失准备中，有80%是有上
限的合约，因此其损失成本不至于无限制飙升。
When we write a retroactive policy, we immediately record both the
premium and a reserve for the expected losses. The difference between the
two is entered as an asset entitled “deferred charges –reinsurance
assumed.” This is no small item: at yearend, for all retroactive policies, it
was $3.4 billion. We then amortize this asset downward by charges to
income over the expected life of each policy. These charges – $440 million
in 2002, including charges at Gen Re – create an underwriting loss, but one
that is intentional and desirable. And even after this drag on reported
results, Ajit achieved a large underwriting gain last year.
当我们签下一张追溯再保险保单时，我们立即将保费收入入帐，并把预期会发生的
损失提列准备，至于两者的差额则以一项资产科目"递延费用-承受再保险"入帐，这
金额通常都不小，截至年底，帐列资产负债表的这个科目金额就高达34亿美元，之
后我们会按这笔资产的预计年限分年摊销，并列为损益减项，2002年的摊销金额
高达4.4亿美元(含通用再保部份)，这些承保损失是我们事先就预期到的必然科目，
但即便帐列盈余因此受到拖累，Ajit去年依然缔造了可观的承保利益。
We want to emphasize, however, that we assume risks in Ajit’s operation
that are huge – far larger than those retained by any other insurer in the
world. Therefore, a single event could cause a major swing in Ajit’s results
in any given quarter or year. That bothers us not at all: As long as we are
paid appropriately, we love taking on short-term volatility that others wish
to shed. At Berkshire, we would rather earn a lumpy 15% over time than a
smooth 12%. If you see Ajit at our annual meeting, bow deeply.
不过我们想要强调的是，我们早就预期到Ajit营运所承担的风险相当的高，甚至远
高于世界上其它任何保险业者所自留的风险，因此只要任何一季或任何一个年头有
任何单一重大灾害发生，都可能让Ajit的绩效大打折扣，不过这一点一点也不会让
我们感到困扰，只要我们收到的保费合理，我们乐于承担那些别人避之唯恐不及的
短期损益变动，在Berkshire，我们宁愿赚取变动不拘但达平均15%的投资报酬，也
不要稳定的12%报酬，各位如果在股东会上遇到Ajit，记得献上深深的一鞠躬。
* * * * * * * * * * * *
Berkshire’s smaller insurers had an outstanding year. Their aggregate float
grew by 38%, and they realized an underwriting profit of $32 million, or
4.5% of premiums. Collectively, these operations would make one of the
finest insurance companies in the country.
Berkshire其它规模较小的保险公司其表现同样突出，合计浮存金增加了38%，并贡
献了3,200万美元的承保利益，约当保费收入的4.5%，如果这些公司加起来，可以
堪称为全美最好的保险公司之一。
Included in these figures, however, were terrible results in our California
workers’ compensation operation. There, we have work to do. There, too,
our reserving severely missed the mark. Until we figure out how to get this
business right, we will keep it small.
不过除了这些好消息外，我们在加州退休基金的经营绩效却惨不忍睹，关于那边的
业务我们还有许多工作要做，同时提列准备也严重失真，直到我们确信找到把它们
搞定的方法，否则我们宁愿维持目前较小的规模。
For the fabulous year they had in 2002, we thank Rod Eldred, John Kizer,
Tom Nerney, Don Towle and Don Wurster. They added a lot of value to your
Berkshire investment.
感谢Rod Eldred、John Kizer、Tom Nerney、Don Towle及Don Wurster，让2003
年成为美好的一年，是他们让各位在Berkshire的投资平添许多价值。
Sources of Reported Earnings
帐列盈余的来源
The table that follows shows the main sources of Berkshire’s reported
earnings. You will notice that “Purchase-Accounting Adjustments”
dropped sharply in 2002, the reason being that GAAP rules changed then,
no longer requiring the amortization of goodwill. This change increases
our reported earnings, but has no effect on our economic earnings.
下表显示Berkshire帐列盈余的主要来源，大家或许已经发现，2002年的购买法
会计调整数大幅减少，其原因在于一般公认会计原则已经过修正，不再要求商誉必
须摊销，此举将使得我们的帐面盈余增加，只是这对实质的经济盈余一点影响也没
有。
(in millions)
Berkshire’s Share
of Net Earnings
(after taxes and
Pre-Tax Earnings Minority interests)
2002 2001 2002 2001
Operating Earnings:
Insurance Group:
Underwriting – General Re................................... $(1,393) $(3,671) $(930) $(2,391)
Underwriting – Berkshire Group ........................... 534 (647) 347 (433)
Underwriting – GEICO.......................................... 416 221 271 144
Underwriting – Other Primary ............................... 32 30 20 18
Net Investment Income.......................................... 3,050 2,824 2,096 1,968
Apparel(1) ................................................................. 229 (33) 156 (28)
Building Products(2) ................................................. 516 461 313 287
Finance and Financial Products Business................. 1,016 519 659 336
Flight Services .......................................................... 225 186 133 105
MidAmerican Energy (80% owned)......................... 613 565 359 230
Retail Operations ...................................................... 166 175 97 101
Scott Fetzer (excluding finance operation) ............... 129 129 83 83
Shaw Industries(3)...................................................... 424 292 258 156
Other Businesses....................................................... 256 212 160 131
Purchase-Accounting Adjustments........................... (119) (726) (65) (699)
Corporate Interest Expense....................................... (86) (92) (55) (60)
Shareholder-Designated Contributions..................... (17) (17) (11) (11)
Other ......................................................................... 19 25 12 16
Operating Earnings...................................................... 6,010 453 3,903 (47)
Capital Gains from Investments .................................. 603 1,320 383 842
Total Earnings – All Entities ....................................... $6,613 $1,773 $4,286 $ 795
(1) Includes Fruit of the Loom from April 30, 2002 and Garan from September 4, 2002.
(2) Includes Johns Manville from February 27, 2001 and MiTek from July 31, 2001.
(3) From date of acquisition, January 8, 2001.
Here’s a summary of major developments at our non-insurance
businesses:
以下是2002年我们非保险事业相关的重点摘要：
.MidAmerican Energy’s earnings grew in 2002 and will likely do so again
this year. Most of the increase, both present and expected, results from the
acquisitions described earlier. To fund these, Berkshire purchased
$1,273 million of MidAmerican junior debt (bringing our total holdings of
these 11% obligations to $1,728 million) and also invested $402 million in
a “common-equivalent” stock. We now own (on a fully-diluted basis)
80.2% of MidAmerican’s equity. MidAmerican’s financial statements are
presented in detail on page 37.
中美能源2002年的盈余稳定成长，展望明年仍将维持此一态势，至于盈余成长的
来源，不论是目前或将来，主要皆来自于先前提过的购并案，中美能源为了取得购
并的资金，已由Berkshire买进该公司发行12.73亿美元的次顺位公司债(此举使得
我们累计持有这种年息11%的债权达到17.28亿美元)，另外我们还投资了4.02亿美
元的约当普通股，总计Berkshire现在持有(在完全稀释基础下)中美能源80.2%的股
权，该公司详细的财务报表请参阅37页。
.Last year I told you of the problems at Dexter that led to a huge loss in our
shoe business. Thanks to Frank Rooney and Jim Issler of H.H. Brown, the
Dexter operation has been turned around. Despite the cost of unwinding
our problems there, we earned $24 million in shoes last year, an upward
swing of $70 million from 2001.
去年我曾向各位报告，Dexter是造成我们鞋业大幅亏损的元凶，现在在H.H.Brown
的Frank及Jim的努力下，该公司的营运已回归正轨，尽管解决问题耗费了不少成
本，但去年鞋业仍然赚了2,400万美元的利润，较2001年的亏损，大幅改善了7,000
万美元。
Randy Watson at Justin also contributed to this improvement, increasing
margins significantly while trimming invested capital. Shoes are a tough
business, but we have terrific managers and believe that in the future we
will earn reasonable returns on the capital we employ in this operation.
主管Justin的Randy Watson对于这样的转变也贡献良多，在缩减投资规模的同时
还能大幅提高毛利率，鞋业是一项艰困产业，但所幸我们拥有最优秀的经理人，而
且我也相信在未来我们一定能够赚取合理的投资报酬。
.In a so-so year for home-furnishing and jewelry retailers, our operations
did well. Among our eight retailing operations, the best performer was
Homemaker’s in Des Moines. There, the talented Merschman family
achieved outstanding gains in both sales and profits.
去年对于家具及珠宝零售业来说，算是平平的一年，但我们旗下事业的表现却相当
不错，在我们旗下八家公司当中，表现最好的当属位于Des Moins的家庭服务公司，
才华洋溢的Merschman家族缔造了优异的营业额与获利记录。
Nebraska Furniture Mart will open a new blockbuster store in metropolitan
Kansas City in August. With 450,000 square feet of retail space, it could
well produce the second largest volume of any furniture store in the
country – the Omaha operation being the national champion. I hope
Berkshire shareholders in the Kansas City area will come out for the
opening (and keep coming).
内布拉斯加家具店NFM将于今年八月在堪萨斯市开立一家全新的大型购物中心，总
楼地板面积高达45万平方英呎，它将成为全美单店营业额第二位的家具店，仅次于
其位于奥玛哈的本店，我希望住在堪萨斯地区的Berkshire股东能够一起莅临开幕
剪彩(当然以后更要继续惠顾)。
.Our home and construction-related businesses – Acme Brick, Benjamin
Moore Paint, Johns-Manville, MiTek and Shaw – delivered $941 million of
pre-tax earnings last year. Of particular significance was Shaw’s gain from
$292 million in 2001 to $424 million. Bob Shaw and Julian Saul are terrific
operators. Carpet prices increased only 1% last year, but Shaw’s
productivity gains and excellent expense control delivered significantly
improved margins.
至于我们住宅建筑相关行业-包含Acme砖块、Benjamin油漆、Johns-Manville防
火材料、MiTek材料及Shaw地毯等事业，去年总计贡献了9.41亿美元的税前获利，
其中要特别提到的是Shaw地毯的表现，其税前获利从2001年的2.92亿美元大幅提
高到20002年的4.24亿美元，Bob Shaw及Julian Saul堪称经营高手，去年地毯的
价格涨幅平均不过1%，但Shaw本身的生产力提升以及绝佳的成本控管使得该公司
的毛利率依然大幅提高。
We cherish cost-consciousness at Berkshire. Our model is the widow who
went to the local newspaper to place an obituary notice. Told there was a
25-cents-a-word charge, she requested “Fred Brown died.” She was then
informed there was a seven-word minimum. “Okay” the bereaved woman
replied, “make it ‘Fred Brown died, golf clubs for sale’.”
在Berkshire我们特别强调成本意识，我们的模范是一位准备刊登丈夫讣文的寡
妇，报社告诉她每登一个字要二毛五，于是她要求刊登「Fred死了」，但报社又表
示每则至少要七个字，于是这位哀伤的妇人回复到，那就改为「Fred死了，售高球
证」。
.Earnings from flight services increased last year – but only because we
realized a special pre-tax gain of $60 million from the sale of our 50%
interest in FlightSafety Boeing. Without this gain, earnings from our
training business would have fallen slightly in concert with the slowdown in
business-aviation activity. FlightSafety training continues to be the gold
standard for the industry, and we expect growth in the years to come.
航空服务去年的盈余略微成长，但那纯粹是因为我们出售持股50%的飞安波音股权
所获得6,000万美元特别利益的关系，扣除这项利益，我们训练业务的盈余略微下
滑，主要反应商务飞行业务的下滑，飞安公司的训练业务依旧是这个产业的最高标
准，而我们预期未来几年将会持续成长。
At NetJets, our fractional-ownership operation, we are the runaway leader
of the four-company field. FAA records indicate that our industry share in
2002 was 75%, meaning that clients purchased or leased planes from us
that were valued at triple those recorded by our three competitors
combined. Last year, our fleet flew 132.7 million nautical miles, taking
clients to 130 countries.
至于专机部份所有权NetJets的营运，我们在这行大幅领先市场上其它三家同业，
FAA的记录显示我们2002年的市场占有率高达75%，这代表客户购买或租赁我们飞
机的总金额是其它三家同业的三倍，去年我们的机队发行哩程数高达1.327亿海
哩，搭载客户到全世界130个国家。
Our preeminence is directly attributable to Rich Santulli, NetJets’ CEO. He
invented the business in 1986 and ever since has exhibited an unbending
devotion to the highest levels of service, safety and security. Rich, Charlie
and I insist on planes (and personnel) worthy of carrying our own families –
because they regularly do.
我们的优势完全要归功于Netjets的CEO-Rich Santulli，他在1986年开创这个行
业，至此之后，他便展现不折不挠的决心提供最顶级、最安全的服务，Rich、查理
跟我本人一向坚持必须培养足堪信赖的机队与机组人员，因为我们自己本身的家人
就经常使用搭乘。
Though NetJets revenues set a record in 2002, the company again lost
money. A small profit in the U.S. was more than offset by losses in Europe.
Overall, the fractional-ownership industry lost significant sums last year,
