这场经典的赛事，甚至还用慢动作播放精彩的第四节，我们以今年封面的颜色表 .56
and that is almost certain to be the outcome in 2003 as well. The bald fact
is that airplanes are costly to operate.
虽然NetJets的营业额在2002年创下新高，但该公司仍然处于亏损状态，美国地区
确有小赚但仍抵不过欧洲地区的亏损，总的来说，专机所有权这行业在去年亏了不
少钱，而可以肯定的是2003年约莫也是这样的光景，养机队实在是一项很沉重的
负担。
Over time, this economic reality should work to our advantage, given that
for a great many companies, private aircraft are an essential business tool.
And for most of these companies, NetJets makes compelling sense as
either a primary or supplementary supplier of the aircraft they need.
就长期而言，经济现实终将站在我们这一边，主要系考量私人专机仍是许多大企业
必备的商务工具，而对于这些公司来说，NetJets无疑是他们最主要或次要的飞机供
应厂商。
Many businesses could save millions of dollars annually by flying with us.
Indeed, the yearly savings at some large companies could exceed $10
million. Equally important, these companies would actually increase their
operational capabilities by using us. A fractional ownership of a single
NetJets plane allows a client to have several planes in the air
simultaneously. Additionally, through the interchange arrangement we
make available, an owner of an interest in one plane can fly any of 12 other
models, using whatever plane makes most sense for a mission. (One of my
sisters owns a fraction of a Falcon 2000, which she uses for trips to Hawaii,
but – exhibiting the Buffett gene – she interchanges to a more economical
Citation Excel for short trips in the U.S.)
利用我们的飞机，很多公司每年都可以轻易省下数百万美元的开支，有些大公司节
省的金额甚至可以数千万美元，更重要的是，搭配我们的飞机，这些公司可以大幅
增加自己的飞机调度弹性，只要持有一小部份的飞机所有权，客户甚至可以同时使
用好几架飞机，此外，经由我们提供的机队组合，一位客户可以视状况自由选择12
种不同机型，(我有一个姐姐拥有一架Falcon 2000部份所有权，她经常利用它往来
夏威夷与美国本土之间，但由于血液里同样拥有巴菲特家族的基因，她也经常转换
选用比较经济的Citation Excel 进行美国境内短程的旅行)。
The roster of NetJets users confirms the advantages we offer major
businesses. Take General Electric, for example. It has a large fleet of its
own but also has an unsurpassed knowledge of how to utilize aircraft
effectively and economically. And it is our largest customer.
NetJets的爱用者名单证明了我们能够提供给大企业的种种好处，以奇异电气为例，
由于其公司本身就拥有大批的机队，因此相当了解应该如何有效率地运用其飞机，
事实上，它正是我们的最大客户。
.Our finance and financial products line covers a variety of operations,
among them certain activities in high-grade fixed-income securities that
proved highly profitable in 2002. Earnings in this arena will probably
continue for a while, but are certain to decrease – and perhaps disappear –
in time.
我们的财务及金融产品部门涵盖了各式各样的营运，其中包含一些信用评等高的固
定收益债券，这类交易在2002年的获利特别高，我们预期这方面的高盈余还会持
续一阵子，但就长期而言，这部份的盈余终究会日渐下滑，甚至消失殆尽。
This category also includes a highly satisfactory – but rapidly diminishing –
income stream from our Berkadia investment in Finova (described in last
year’s report). Our partner, Leucadia National Corp., has managed this
operation with great skill, willingly doing far more than its share of the
heavy lifting. I like this division of labor and hope to join with Leucadia in
future transactions.
这其中包含特别令人感到满意，但同时也以极快速度消失的Berkadia来自Finova
投资的收益(这项交易在去年的年报就详述过)，我们的合资伙伴-Leucadia公司以相
当高超的技巧来管理Berkadia，并极愿分担远超过其份的重担，我个人也很愿意将
这重担分给它们，并期望在将来可以与Leucadia共同参与更多的交易。
On the minus side, the Finance line also includes the operations of General
Re Securities, a derivatives and trading business. This entity lost $173
million pre-tax last year, a result that, in part, is a belated
acknowledgment of faulty, albeit standard, accounting it used in earlier
periods. Derivatives, in fact, deserve an extensive look, both in respect to
the accounting their users employ and to the problems they may pose for
both individual companies and our economy.
从负面的角度来看，财务金融部门的业务也包含了通用再保证券-这是衍生性金融
商品的买卖业务，这个单位去年税前亏损了1.73亿美元，这个成绩其中也包含了一
部份迟迟未认列的错误损失，虽然当时依照一般公认会计原则，那样的做法相当正
常，事实上对于衍生性金融商品，人们必须施以特别的关照，不管是其所运用的会
计原则或者它对个别公司或整个经济社会可能造成的潜在问题。
Derivatives
衍生性金融商品
Charlie and I are of one mind in how we feel about derivatives and the
trading activities that go with them: We view them as time bombs, both for
the parties that deal in them and the economic system.
对于衍生性金融商品以及其它附带的交易，查理跟我的看法完全一致，我们认为不
论是对参与交易的双方或者是整个经济体系而言，它们就像是一颗颗定时炸弹!
Having delivered that thought, which I’ll get back to, let me retreat to
explaining derivatives, though the explanation must be general because
the word covers an extraordinarily wide range of financial contracts.
Essentially, these instruments call for money to change hands at some
future date, with the amount to be determined by one or more reference
items, such as interest rates, stock prices or currency values. If, for
example, you are either long or short an S&P 500 futures contract, you are
a party to a very simple derivatives transaction – with your gain or loss
derived from movements in the index. Derivatives contracts are of varying
duration (running sometimes to 20 or more years) and their value is often
tied to several variables.
在丢出这个爆炸性的看法后，请容我稍后我再详加说明，现在让我先稍微解释一下
衍生性金融商品，虽然这类的解释相当空泛，因为这个名词代表着相当广泛的金融
交易，基本上，这类交易工具会使得财富在未来的一段时间内进行易手，其金额决
定于某个或数个关键指针，包含利率、股价或汇率等，举例来说，假设你做多或放
空 S&P500指数期权，那么你等于已经参与一项非常简单的衍生性金融商品交易，
你的赚赔取决于指数的变动，衍生性金融商品的期间长短不一而足(有时甚至可能超
过20年以上)，其价值的变化则系于许多变量。
Unless derivatives contracts are collateralized or guaranteed, their ultimate
value also depends on the creditworthiness of the counterparties to them.
In the meantime, though, before a contract is settled, the counterparties
record profits and losses – often huge in amount – in their current earnings
statements without so much as a penny changing hands.
除非衍生性金融商品交易有质押担保或是附带保证，否则其最终的价值还必须取决
于交易双方的履约能力，虽然在交易正式结算之前，交易双方都会随时在各自的损
益表上记录盈亏-且其金额通常都相当庞大-即便实际上还没有任何一块钱进行移
转。
The range of derivatives contracts is limited only by the imagination of man
(or sometimes, so it seems, madmen). At Enron, for example, newsprint
and broadband derivatives, due to be settled many years in the future,
were put on the books. Or say you want to write a contract speculating on
the number of twins to be born in Nebraska in 2020. No problem – at a
price, you will easily find an obliging counterparty.
只要是人想得到的(或者有时应该说是疯狂的人)，都可以被列为衍生性金融商品交
易的标的，举例来说，当初在安隆，就有新闻及宽频衍生性金融商品，虽然要在许
多年后才会结算，但此类交易还是可以入到公司的帐上；或比如说你想要签一个契
约，赌内布拉斯加州2020年双胞胎出生的数目，没有问题，只要你肯出价，保证
你一定找得到有人肯跟你对赌。
When we purchased Gen Re, it came with General Re Securities, a
derivatives dealer that Charlie and I didn’t want, judging it to be
dangerous. We failed in our attempts to sell the operation, however, and
are now terminating it.
当初我们在买下通用再保时，该公司有一家附属的通用再保证券，这是一家衍生性
金融商品经纪商，查理跟我认为它具有相当的危险性，所以并不想保留这个部门，
于是我们试图将这个部门出售，但并没有成功，最后只好将它慢慢清算。
But closing down a derivatives business is easier said than done. It will be a
great many years before we are totally out of this operation (though we
reduce our exposure daily). In fact, the reinsurance and derivatives
businesses are similar: Like Hell, both are easy to enter and almost
impossible to exit. In either industry, once you write a contract – which may
require a large payment decades later – you are usually stuck with it. True,
there are methods by which the risk can be laid off with others. But most
strategies of that kind leave you with residual liability.
但想要关闭一个衍生性金融商品部门，谈何容易，想要摆脱它的纠缠可能要耗费许
多个年头，(虽然我们正逐日降低所曝露的风险)，事实上，再保险业与衍生性金融
商品交易有点类似，两者都像是地狱一样，并没有多大的进入障碍，但想要退出却
难如登天，一旦签了约，你就摆脱不了它，有时甚至要等到几十年后，才突然冒出
来要你支付一大笔钱，确实也有些法子可以让你将风险转嫁给别人，但大多数的做
法还是无法让你免除连带的责任。
Another commonality of reinsurance and derivatives is that both generate
reported earnings that are often wildly overstated. That’s true because
today’s earnings are in a significant way based on estimates whose
inaccuracy may not be exposed for many years.
再保险业与衍生性金融商品交易另一个共同特点就是两者的帐面盈余通常都有过度
高估的情况，这是由于目前的盈余大多系于许多未来的变量，而其正确性却需要很
多年后才能揭晓。
Errors will usually be honest, reflecting only the human tendency to take an
optimistic view of one’s commitments. But the parties to derivatives also
have enormous incentives to cheat in accounting for them. Those who
trade derivatives are usually paid (in whole or part) on “earnings” calculated
by mark-to-market accounting. But often there is no real market (think
about our contract involving twins) and “mark-to-model” is utilized. This
substitution can bring on large-scale mischief. As a general rule, contracts
involving multiple reference items and distant settlement dates increase
the opportunities for counterparties to use fanciful assumptions. In the
twins scenario, for example, the two parties to the contract might well use
differing models allowing both to show substantial profits for many years.
In extreme cases, mark-to-model degenerates into what I would call
mark-to-myth.
但错误瞒的了人，却骗不了自己，其所反应的，不过是人们对于他人的承诺，总是
倾向采取乐观看法的现象，而且交易的双方有极大的动机在会计帐务上作手脚，因
为这些负责买卖衍生性金融商品的人士，其报酬(全部或部份)往往取决于依市价结
算的帐面盈余，但现实的状况是(想想我们刚刚提到的双胞胎合约)那个市场根本就
不存在，所以取而代之的是"依公式结算"，这种替代性的做法有极大的漏洞，在通
常的状况下，由于合约牵涉多个变量在加上结算日期的遥远，使得交易双方无形中
增加许多引用不实假设的机会，以我们刚刚提到的双胞胎案例来说，订立合约的双
方可能使用截然不同的公式使得交易双方连续好几年同时享受钜额的帐面获利，在
最夸张的状况下，所谓的"依公式结算"极可能堕落沦为"依鬼话结算"。
Of course, both internal and outside auditors review the numbers, but
that’s no easy job. For example, General Re Securities at yearend (after ten
months of winding down its operation) had 14,384 contracts outstanding,
involving 672 counterparties around the world. Each contract had a plus or
minus value derived from one or more reference items, including some of
mind-boggling complexity. Valuing a portfolio like that, expert auditors
could easily and honestly have widely varying opinions.
当然，不论是内部的稽核人员或者是外部的会计师，也都看过这些数字，但要弄懂
可不是一件容易的事，举例来说，通用再保证券截至2002年年底(在决定彻底关闭
它的10个月后)仍有14,384件有效合约流落在外，交易对象遍布全世界672个对
手，每一项合约的价值都会随着一个或好几个变量的变化而随时上下变动，其中有
一些变量光是看了就令人觉得头发昏，想要对于这些交易组合进行评价，就算是专
业的会计师，也往往会有不同的意见与看法。
The valuation problem is far from academic: In recent years, some hugescale
frauds and near-frauds have been facilitated by derivatives trades. In
the energy and electric utility sectors, for example, companies used
derivatives and trading activities to report great “earnings” – until the roof
fell in when they actually tried to convert the derivatives-related
receivables on their balance sheets into cash. “Mark-to-market” then
turned out to be truly “mark-to-myth.”
评价难度本身早已超越学术性论证，近几年来，有好几件大规模的舞弊案及疑似舞
弊案都是缘自于衍生性金融商品交易，以公用能源事业来说，许多公司利用衍生性
金融商品交易来创造帐面钜额的获利，直到东窗事发之际，他们还试图将衍生性金
融商品交易相关的应收款项，转换成为现金科目，至此"依市价结算"真正沦为"依鬼
话结算"。
I can assure you that the marking errors in the derivatives business have
not been symmetrical. Almost invariably, they have favored either the
trader who was eyeing a multi-million dollar bonus or the CEO who wanted
to report impressive “earnings” (or both). The bonuses were paid, and the
CEO profited from his options. Only much later did shareholders learn that
the reported earnings were a sham.
我可以向各位保证，在衍生性金融商品交易所发生的错误，绝对无法让交易双方的
帐对得平，几乎不例外的，他们都会偏坦有机会得到百万奖金的营业员或特别希望
帐面拥有亮丽的报表数字的一方(或甚至是双方)，而最后往往要等到奖金支付给营
业员，而CEO因为认股权大发利市后，股东们才会发现所谓亮丽的财报数字根本就
是一场骗局。
Another problem about derivatives is that they can exacerbate trouble that
a corporation has run into for completely unrelated reasons. This pile-on
effect occurs because many derivatives contracts require that a company
suffering a credit downgrade immediately supply collateral to
counterparties. Imagine, then, that a company is downgraded because of
general adversity and that its derivatives instantly kick in with their
requirement, imposing an unexpected and enormous demand for cash
collateral on the company. The need to meet this demand can then throw
the company into a liquidity crisis that may, in some cases, trigger still
more downgrades. It all becomes a spiral that can lead to a corporate
meltdown.
衍生性金融商品交易的另一项问题是它可能因为一些毫不相关的原因，让一家公司
的问题更为加重，这种滚雪球效应之所以会发生主要在于许多衍生性金融商品交易
的合约都要求对方一旦其信用评等遭到调降时，必须立刻提供质押担保给交易对
方，大家可以想象到当一家公司面临困境而被调降信用评等的同时，衍生性金融交
易却又立即登门要求提供事先完全没有设想到且金额庞大的现金时的情景，此举可
能让公司进一步陷入流动性的危机，而通常这又会让公司的信用评等再度向下调
降，恶性循环的结果可能导致一家原本好好的公司因此垮台。
Derivatives also create a daisy-chain risk that is akin to the risk run by
insurers or reinsurers that lay off much of their business with others. In
both cases, huge receivables from many counterparties tend to build up
over time. (At Gen Re Securities, we still have $6.5 billion of receivables,
though we’ve been in a liquidation mode for nearly a year.) A participant
may see himself as prudent, believing his large credit exposures to be
diversified and therefore not dangerous. Under certain circumstances,
though, an exogenous event that causes the receivable from Company A to
go bad will also affect those from Companies B through Z. History teaches
us that a crisis often causes problems to correlate in a manner undreamed
of in more tranquil times.
衍生性金融商品交易也有可能造成骨牌效应的风险，这是因为许多保险业及再保业
者习惯将风险分散给其它保险公司，在这类的情况下，钜额的应收款项将随着交易
对象的日趋复杂而持续累积，(以通用再保证券来说，虽然已经经过将近一年的清算
期，目前仍有高达65亿美元的应收款项流通在外)，交易的一方或许对于自己相当
有信心，认为其钜额的信用风险已经经过适度的分散，因此不会发生任何危险，只
有等到某种特殊状况下，一个外部事件导致A公司的应收帐款发生问题，从而影响B
公司，乃至于一路到Z公司，历史教训告诉我们危机的发生往往是我们在太平盛世
时所梦想不到一连串问题串连所导致的。
In banking, the recognition of a “linkage” problem was one of the reasons
for the formation of the Federal Reserve System. Before the Fed was
established, the failure of weak banks would sometimes put sudden and
unanticipated liquidity demands on previously-strong banks, causing
them to fail in turn. The Fed now insulates the strong from the troubles of
the weak. But there is no central bank assigned to the job of preventing the
dominoes toppling in insurance or derivatives. In these industries, firms
that are fundamentally solid can become troubled simply because of the
travails of other firms further down the chain. When a “chain reaction”
threat exists within an industry, it pays to minimize links of any kind.
That’s how we conduct our reinsurance business, and it’s one reason we
are exiting derivatives.
在金融体系中，早期发现到连锁反应的问题严重性是联邦准备理事会成立的主要原
因之一，在联准会成立以前，体质不佳的银行倒闭有时可能会对一些原本体质还不
错的银行造成突然没有预期到的流动性压力，导致它们跟着出现问题，联准会于是
建立一道防火墙将有问题的金融机构隔绝开，但是在保险业或是衍生性金融商品交
易，却没有类似中央银行的控管机制来防止骨牌效应的发生，在这些产业，一家原
