这场经典的赛事，甚至还用慢动作播放精彩的第四节，我们以今年封面的颜色表 .57
本体质不错的公司很有可能因为其它公司发生问题而受到拖累，当这种连锁反应的
威胁存在在产业中时，就绝对有必要尽量降低彼此间的牵连，这正是我们目前在再
保业采取的做法，同样这也是我们选择退出衍生性金融商品交易的原因之一。
Many people argue that derivatives reduce systemic problems, in that
participants who can’t bear certain risks are able to transfer them to
stronger hands. These people believe that derivatives act to stabilize the
economy, facilitate trade, and eliminate bumps for individual participants.
And, on a micro level, what they say is often true. Indeed, at Berkshire, I
sometimes engage in large-scale derivatives transactions in order to
facilitate certain investment strategies.
许多人声称衍生性金融商品交易可以有效降低系统风险，透过这类交易让原本无法
承担特定风险的人可以将风险移转到他人身上，这些人相信衍生性金融商品成为稳
定经济的力量、让商业交易得以遂行同时降低个别参与者的变量，就个体层面而言，
他们的说法或许确是事实，就像是在Berkshire，我有时也会搭配一些大规模的衍
生性金融商品交易好让某些投资策略得以遂行。
Charlie and I believe, however, that the macro picture is dangerous and
getting more so. Large amounts of risk, particularly credit risk, have
become concentrated in the hands of relatively few derivatives dealers,
who in addition trade extensively with one other. The troubles of one could
quickly infect the others. On top of that, these dealers are owed huge
amounts by non-dealer counterparties. Some of these counterparties, as
I’ve mentioned, are linked in ways that could cause them to
contemporaneously run into a problem because of a single event (such as
the implosion of the telecom industry or the precipitous decline in the
value of merchant power projects). Linkage, when it suddenly surfaces, can
trigger serious systemic problems.
然而查理跟我本人认为，以总体经济的角度来看，这却是相当危险，而且风险更有
日益加重的趋势，大量的风险，尤其是信用风险，目前已逐渐累积在少数几家衍生
性金融商品交易商身上，而且彼此的交易更是相当频繁，这使得一家公司在发生问
题后，将很快地传染给其它公司，到最后这些交易商将积欠非交易商的交易对方钜
额欠款，而这些交易对方，如我刚刚提到的，由于彼此关系过于紧密，将导致一个
单一事件让他们同时出现问题，(比如说电信产业的崩溃或者民间电力事业的价值大
幅减损等)，关联度过高-在问题浮现时，便有可能引发系统性的风险。
Indeed, in 1998, the leveraged and derivatives-heavy activities of a single
hedge fund, Long-Term Capital Management, caused the Federal Reserve
anxieties so severe that it hastily orchestrated a rescue effort. In later
Congressional testimony, Fed officials acknowledged that, had they not
intervened, the outstanding trades of LTCM – a firm unknown to the
general public and employing only a few hundred people – could well have
posed a serious threat to the stability of American markets. In other words,
the Fed acted because its leaders were fearful of what might have
happened to other financial institutions had the LTCM domino toppled.
And this affair, though it paralyzed many parts of the fixed-income market
for weeks, was far from a worst-case scenario.
就像是1998年大量从事高杠杆操作衍生性金融商品的避险基金-长期资本管理公
司LTCM就搞得大家焦头烂额，最后使得联准会不得不火速施出紧急援助，在后来
的国会听证会中，联准会官员坦承当初若非他们介入，这家名声响亮但仅有数百名
员工的神秘公司LTCM，很有可能对于美国资本社会的稳定造成极严重的威胁，换
句话说，联准会之所以甘冒大不讳打破惯例介入干预，完全是因为主事者害怕类似
的事件会发生在其它金融机构的身上进而引发骨牌效应，而这次的事件虽然导致大
部份固定收益市场一度瘫痪达数个星期之久，但个人认为，这还不是最坏的状况。
One of the derivatives instruments that LTCM used was total-return swaps,
contracts that facilitate 100% leverage in various markets, including
stocks. For example, Party A to a contract, usually a bank, puts up all of the
money for the purchase of a stock while Party B, without putting up any
capital, agrees that at a future date it will receive any gain or pay any loss
that the bank realizes.
在所有衍生性金融商品中，全收益交换是LTCM经常使用的工具之一，这类的合约
使得该公司可以运用100%的杠杆在各种市场进行套利，也包含股票市场，举例来
说，合约的一方A，通常是一家银行，必须投入百分之百的资金买进股票，而在此
同时，合约的另一方B，却可以不必投入任何资金，B公司就可以约定在未来的某个
日子时，取得或负担A银行所实现的利益或损失。
Total-return swaps of this type make a joke of margin requirements.
Beyond that, other types of derivatives severely curtail the ability of
regulators to curb leverage and generally get their arms around the risk
profiles of banks, insurers and other financial institutions. Similarly, even
experienced investors and analysts encounter major problems in analyzing
the financial condition of firms that are heavily involved with derivatives
contracts. When Charlie and I finish reading the long footnotes detailing
the derivatives activities of major banks, the only thing we understand is
that we don’t understand how much risk the institution is running.
这类全收益交换合约竟然连保证金都可以不需要，除此之外，其它种类的衍生性金
融商品也严重危害到主管机关抑制银行、保险公司及其它金融单位采取高杠杆及风
险控管的强力铁腕，同时，即便是经验老道的投资者及分析师在看到这类布满衍生
性金融商品交易公司的财务状况时，也束手无策，记得当查理跟我自己在看完几家
大型银行有关衍生性金融商品交易冗长的财务报表附注时，我们唯一可以确定的是
我们根本就不晓得这些金融机构到底承担了多少的风险。
The derivatives genie is now well out of the bottle, and these instruments
will almost certainly multiply in variety and number until some event
makes their toxicity clear. Knowledge of how dangerous they are has
already permeated the electricity and gas businesses, in which the eruption
of major troubles caused the use of derivatives to diminish dramatically.
Elsewhere, however, the derivatives business continues to expand
unchecked. Central banks and governments have so far found no effective
way to control, or even monitor, the risks posed by these contracts.
衍生性金融商品交易鬼怪现在已从仙朵拉瓶子中窜出，而这类交易还会继续以各种
不同形式自我复制，直至这个祸害所造成的危害为众人所知时为止，它们的危险程
度从近年来弥漫在电力能源产业的几件个案可以略窥一二，在事件发生之后，衍生
性金融商品交易急速减少，然而在其它产业，衍生性金融商品交易却照样毫无节制
的急速扩张中，中央银行及美国政府到目前为止依然找不到有效克制的办法，甚至
连监控这些合约所构成风险的机制都没有。
Charlie and I believe Berkshire should be a fortress of financial strength –
for the sake of our owners, creditors, policyholders and employees. We try
to be alert to any sort of megacatastrophe risk, and that posture may make
us unduly apprehensive about the burgeoning quantities of long-term
derivatives contracts and the massive amount of uncollateralized
receivables that are growing alongside. In our view, however, derivatives
are financial weapons of mass destruction, carrying dangers that, while
now latent, are potentially lethal.
查理跟我相信Berkshire依然是所有股东、债权人、保户及员工最坚强的财务堡垒，
我们对于任何可能的潜在重大意外都戒慎恐惧，或许对于长期性衍生性金融商品的
大量交易及钜额膨胀的无担保应收款项的保留态度，让我们看起有点过虑了，但我
们还是认为衍生性金融商品是财务金融的毁灭性武器，其所带来的危险，虽然是潜
在不可知，但绝对是致命的可能。
Investments
股票投资
Below we show our common stock investments. Those that had a market
value of more than $500 million at the end of 2002 are itemized.
下表是Berkshire 2002年市价超过5亿美元以上的股票投资。
12/31/02
Shares Company Cost Market
------- -------
(dollars in millions)
151,610,700 American Express Company ............. $ 1,470 $ 5,359
200,000,000 The Coca-Cola Company ..................... 1,299 8,768
96,000,000 The Gillette Company.................. 600 2,915
15,999,200 H&R Block, Inc................................... 255 643
6,708,760 M&T Bank......................................... 103 532
24,000,000 Moody’s Corporation...................... 499 991
1,727,765 The Washington Post Company .................... 11 1,275
53,265,080 Wells Fargo & Company ......................... 306 2,497
Others ............................................. 4,621 5,383
------- -------
Total Common Stocks ................... $9,164 $28,363
We continue to do little in equities. Charlie and I are increasingly
comfortable with our holdings in Berkshire’s major investees because most
of them have increased their earnings while their valuations have
decreased. But we are not inclined to add to them. Though these
enterprises have good prospects, we don’t yet believe their shares are
undervalued.
在股票投资方面，我们依旧没有什么动作，查理跟我对于Berkshire目前主要的持
股部位越来越感到满意，一方面由于被投资公司的盈余逐渐增加，同时间其股价反
而下滑，不过现在我们还是无意增加持股部位，虽然这些公司的前景都相当不错，
但截至目前为止，我们还是不认为他们的股价有受到低估的可能。
In our view, the same conclusion fits stocks generally. Despite three years
of falling prices, which have significantly improved the attractiveness of
common stocks, we still find very few that even mildly interest us. That
dismal fact is testimony to the insanity of valuations reached during The
Great Bubble. Unfortunately, the hangover may prove to be proportional
to the binge.
我们认为，这种看法也适用于一般的股市，尽管股市连续三年下跌，相对大大增加
了投资股票的吸引力，但我们还是很难找到真正能够引起我们兴趣的投资标的，这
可谓是先前网络泡沫所遗留下来的后遗症，而很不幸的，狂欢之后所带来的宿醉截
至目前而止仍然尚未完全消退。
The aversion to equities that Charlie and I exhibit today is far from
congenital. We love owning common stocks – if they can be purchased at
attractive prices. In my 61 years of investing, 50 or so years have offered
that kind of opportunity. There will be years like that again. Unless,
however, we see a very high probability of at least 10% pre-tax returns
(which translate to 6?-7% after corporate tax), we will sit on the sidelines.
With short-term money returning less than 1% after-tax, sitting it out is no
fun. But occasionally successful investing requires inactivity.
查理跟我现在对于股票退避三宿的态度，并非天生如此，事实上，我们非常喜欢投
资股票，我是说如果可以以合理的价格进行的话，在我个人61年的投资生涯中，大
约有50个年头以上，都有这样的机会出现，我想以后也还会有相当多类似的机会，
只不过，除非是我们发现至少可以获得税前10%报酬的机率相当高时，(在扣除企业
所得税后，净得6.5%到7%的报酬)，否则我们宁可在旁观望，虽然必须忍受短期闲
置资金不到1%的税后报酬，但成功的投资本来就必须要有耐性。
Last year we were, however, able to make sensible investments in a few
“junk” bonds and loans. Overall, our commitments in this sector
sextupled, reaching $8.3 billion by yearend.
所幸，去年我们得以将部份资金运用在一些不错的垃圾债券及债权投资之上，至去
年底我们在这方面的累计投资金额增加了6倍，达到83亿美元之谱。
Investing in junk bonds and investing in stocks are alike in certain ways:
Both activities require us to make a price-value calculation and also to scan
hundreds of securities to find the very few that have attractive reward/risk
ratios. But there are important differences between the two disciplines as
well. In stocks, we expect every commitment to work out well because we
concentrate on conservatively financed businesses with strong competitive
strengths, run by able and honest people. If we buy into these companies
at sensible prices, losses should be rare. Indeed, during the 38 years we
have run the company’s affairs, gains from the equities we manage at
Berkshire (that is, excluding those managed at General Re and GEICO) have
exceeded losses by a ratio of about 100 to one.
投资垃圾债券跟投资股票在许多方面相当雷同，两者都需要评估价格与价值比，并
在成千上万个标的中挑选出少数风险/报酬比率最佳者，当然两者在原则上也有许
多明显的不同，在投资股票时，我们预期每一笔投资都会成功，因为我们已将资金
锁定在少数几家财务稳健、具备竞争优势并由才干诚信兼具的经理人所经营的公司
身上，如果我们以合理的价格买进这类公司时，损失发生的机率通常非常小，确实
在我们经营Berkshire 的38年当中(扣除通用再保与GEICO的投资)，投资获利的个
案比起投资亏损的比例约为100比1。
Purchasing junk bonds, we are dealing with enterprises that are far more
marginal. These businesses are usually overloaded with debt and often
operate in industries characterized by low returns on capital.
Additionally, the quality of management is sometimes questionable.
Management may even have interests that are directly counter to those of
debtholders. Therefore, we expect that we will have occasional large losses
in junk issues. So far, however, we have done reasonably well in this field.
但在投资垃圾债券时，我们面对的企业体质就比较差了，这些公司通常都背负大笔
的负债，同时所处产业的投资报酬率都相当低，此外管理当局的素质有时也有问题，
其利益有时甚至与债权人相冲突，因此我们预期这类投资难免会出现亏损，所幸到
目前为止，我们在这部份的投资绩效还算相当不错。
Corporate Governance
公司治理
Both the ability and fidelity of managers have long needed monitoring.
Indeed, nearly 2,000 years ago, Jesus Christ addressed this subject,
speaking (Luke 16:2) approvingly of “a certain rich man” who told his
manager, “Give an account of thy stewardship; for thou mayest no longer
be steward.”
长久以来，管理当局的能力与诚信本就必须受到严密的检视，事实上，在2000多
年以前，耶稣基督就曾对这个议题发表过看法，祂在路加福音16:2提到：「一位财
主叫管家来，请你把所管的事情交代清楚，因为你不再是我的管家」。
Accountability and stewardship withered in the last decade, becoming
qualities deemed of little importance by those caught up in the Great
Bubble. As stock prices went up, the behavioral norms of managers went
down. By the late ’90s, as a result, CEOs who traveled the high road did not
encounter heavy traffic.
过去10多年来，企业诚信度与领导风范日渐式微，在网络泡沫巅峰时期，这些特质
不再受到人们的重视，当公司股价上涨的同时，经理人的行为举止却向下沉沦，这
使得90年代末期，那些高格调的CEO几乎遇不到同路人。
Most CEOs, it should be noted, are men and women you would be happy to
have as trustees for your children’s assets or as next-door neighbors. Too
many of these people, however, have in recent years behaved badly at the
office, fudging numbers and drawing obscene pay for mediocre business
achievements. These otherwise decent people simply followed the career
path of Mae West: “I was Snow White but I drifted.”
不过必须注意的是，大部分的CEO私底下就像是你会想要把子女的资产付托或就像
是邻居般亲切的好好先生女士，不过这里面有很多人，近年来在职场上的表现却每
下愈况，不但表现平庸，还假造数字，藉以榨取高额不当的利益，这群美中不足的
人士，遵循的不过是Mae West生涯规划：「曾经我是位白雪公主，但如今我已不再
清白。」
In theory, corporate boards should have prevented this deterioration of
conduct. I last wrote about the responsibilities of directors in the 1993
annual report. (We will send you a copy of this discussion on request, or
you may read it on the Internet in the Corporate Governance section of the
1993 letter.) There, I said that directors “should behave as if there was a
single absentee owner, whose long-term interest they should try to further
in all proper ways.” This means that directors must get rid of a manager
who is mediocre or worse, no matter how likable he may be. Directors must
react as did the chorus-girl bride of an 85-yearold multimillionaire when
he asked whether she would love him if he lost his money. “Of course,” the
young beauty replied, “I would miss you, but I would still love you.”
理论上，公司董事会应该要能够预防这类恶质行为的发生，最近一次我在1993年
的年报上曾提到过董事们应尽的责任，(若有需要，可向我们索取这篇文章，或者大
家可以透过网络直接下载1993年有关企业治理的篇章)，当时我曾表示「我认为董
事会的行为举止，应该要像是公司背后有一个因事未出席的大股东一样，在各种情
况下，都要能够确保这位虚拟大股东的长期利益不会受到损害」，这句话的意思是，
董事会绝对不能容许公司让一个平庸或甚至是差劲的经理人存在，不管他是如何受
到所有人的爱戴皆然，董事们应该要像是一位年轻的辣妹在下嫁给85岁的亿万富翁
时，被问到：「如果我身无分文的话，你是否还会爱我?」时的反应一样，这位年轻
女郎回答说：「虽然我爱你，但我会更想念你」。
In the 1993 annual report, I also said directors had another job: “If able but
greedy managers overreach and try to dip too deeply into the
shareholders’ pockets, directors must slap their hands.” Since I wrote that,
over-reaching has become common but few hands have been slapped.
在1993年的年报中，我也曾说过董事的另外一项责任：「要是能干的经营阶层过于
贪心，不时地想要从股东的口袋里捞钱，那么董事会就必须适时地出手制止并给予
警告」，只可惜自从那以后，尽管经理人掏空口袋的行为司空见惯，但却不见有人出
面制止。
Why have intelligent and decent directors failed so miserably? The answer
lies not in inadequate laws – it’s always been clear that directors are
obligated to represent the interests of shareholders – but rather in what I’d
call “boardroom atmosphere.”
