这场经典的赛事，甚至还用慢动作播放精彩的第四节，我们以今年封面的颜色表 .58
为何一向英明且睿智的董事们会如此惨败呢 其实问题并不在法律层面，董事会本
来就应该以捍卫股东利益为最高职志，我认为真正的症结在于我所谓的"董事会习性
"。
It’s almost impossible, for example, in a boardroom populated by wellmannered
people, to raise the question of whether the CEO should be
replaced. It’s equally awkward to question a proposed acquisition that has
been endorsed by the CEO, particularly when his inside staff and outside
advisors are present and unanimously support his decision. (They wouldn’t
be in the room if they didn’t.) Finally, when the compensation committee –
armed, as always, with support from a high-paid consultant – reports on a
megagrant of options to the CEO, it would be like belching at the dinner
table for a director to suggest that the committee reconsider.
举例来说，通常在充满和谐气氛的董事会议上，几乎不可能讨论到是否应该撤换
CEO这类严肃的话题，同样地董事也不可能笨到会去质疑已经由CEO大力背书的购
并案，尤其是当列席的内部幕僚与外部顾问皆一致地支持他英明的决策时，(他们若
不支持的话，可能早就被赶出去了)，最后，当薪资报酬委员会，通常布满了支领高
薪的顾问，报告将给予CEO大量的认股权时，任何提出保留意见的董事，通常会被
视为像是在宴会上打嗝一样地失礼。
These “social” difficulties argue for outside directors regularly meeting
without the CEO – a reform that is being instituted and that I
enthusiastically endorse. I doubt, however, that most of the other new
governance rules and recommendations will provide benefits
commensurate with the monetary and other costs they impose.
在这样的沟通困难下，于是便有让外部董事在CEO不在场的情况下，进行例行聚会
的呼声，这项改革目前正在立法当中，个人对于这样的建议，给予相当正面的肯定，
不过我也怀疑，增加任何的治理规定以及建议，其所必须付出的金钱与其它成本，
可能与因此所得到的利益相当。
The current cry is for “independent” directors. It is certainly true that it is
desirable to have directors who think and speak independently – but they
must also be business-savvy, interested and shareholderoriented. In my
1993 commentary, those are the three qualities I described as essential.
对于目前外界大声疾呼的"独立董事"制度，理论上，公司绝对必须要有思想与言论
上独立的董事存在，但他们同时也必须具有丰富的商业经历、积极的态度，并以股
东利益为导向，我在1993年就曾提到，这是我个人认为绝对必要的三项特质。
Over a span of 40 years, I have been on 19 public-company boards
(excluding Berkshire’s) and have interacted with perhaps 250 directors.
Most of them were “independent” as defined by today’s rules. But the great
majority of these directors lacked at least one of the three qualities I value.
As a result, their contribution to shareholder well-being was minimal at
best and, too often, negative. These people, decent and intelligent though
they were, simply did not know enough about business and/or care
enough about shareholders to question foolish acquisitions or egregious
compensation. My own behavior, I must ruefully add, frequently fell short
as well: Too often I was silent when management made proposals that I
judged to be counter to the interests of shareholders. In those cases,
collegiality trumped independence.
过去40多年来，我曾经担任过19家公开上市公司的董事(Berkshire不算在内)，同
时至少跟250位以上的董事进行过互动，他们其中多数都符合目前"独立董事"的标
准，但这些董事大多至少缺乏我所提到的三项特质之一，这样的结果导致他们对于
股东利益的贡献微乎其微，甚至常常有害股东的利益，这些人虽然彬彬有礼且学识
渊博，但对于产业的了解却极其有限，同时也不会站在股东的立场去质疑不当的购
并决策或不合理的薪资报酬，至于我个人的表现，我必须郁卒地承认，往往做的也
不够好：当公司管理阶层在做出有违股东利益的提案时，通常我只能选择沉默以对，
在这种状况下，和谐感战胜了独立性。
So that we may further see the failings of “independence,” let’s look at a
62-year case study covering thousands of companies. Since 1940, federal
law has mandated that a large proportion of the directors of investment
companies (most of these mutual funds) be independent. The requirement
was originally 40% and now it is 50%. In any case, the typical fund has long
operated with a majority of directors who qualify as independent.
现在让我们更进一步来探讨丧失独立性的现象，看看过去62年以来涵盖数千家公司
的个案研究就可看出端倪，自从1940年以来，联邦法令规定投资公司(其中绝大部
份为共同基金)一定比例的董事必须维持独立，原本的要求是40%，目前则提高为
50%，但不论如何，共同基金的董事会组织运作一般都符合独立性的条件。
These directors and the entire board have many perfunctory duties, but in
actuality have only two important responsibilities: obtaining the best
possible investment manager and negotiating with that manager for the
lowest possible fee. When you are seeking investment help yourself, those
two goals are the only ones that count, and directors acting for other
investors should have exactly the same priorities. Yet when it comes to
independent directors pursuing either goal, their record has been
absolutely pathetic.
这些董事及整个董事会依功能区分背负许多责任，但实务上的运作，通常只有两项
重要的任务，一是找到最优秀的基金经理人，一是协调争取最低的管理费，我想当
一个人在为自己寻求投资的协助时，这两项目标应该是最要紧的，同样地当董事们
接受其它投资人托咐时，也应该会有相同的考量，然而实证显示，这些独立董事在
这方面的表现却是令人感到叹息。
Many thousands of investment-company boards meet annually to carry out
the vital job of selecting who will manage the savings of the millions of
owners they represent. Year after year the directors of Fund A select
manager A, Fund B directors select manager B, etc. … in a zombie-like
process that makes a mockery of stewardship. Very occasionally, a board
will revolt. But for the most part, a monkey will type out a Shakespeare play
before an “independent” mutual-fund director will suggest that his fund
look at other managers, even if the incumbent manager has persistently
delivered substandard performance. When they are handling their own
money, of course, directors will look to alternative advisors – but it never
enters their minds to do so when they are acting as fiduciaries for others.
成千上万的投资公司董事会每年都会聚会行使投资人赋予他们的重大责任-为其背
后所代表的数百万投资人选择适当的人选来管理其身家财产，只是我们发现，年复
一年董事会只不过是装出掌握控制权的表面假象，A基金公司永远选择A经理人、B
基金公司也总是选择B经理人，其制式程序就像僵尸般食古不化，当然偶尔也会有
董事会突锤，但大部分的时候，就算现任的基金经理人的表现有多差劲也一样视而
不见，我想要等这些独立行使职务的董事愿意开始建议寻找其它合适的经理人人
选，恐怕连猴子都有办法写出莎士比亚歌剧了，吊诡的是，当这些人在处理自己的
资产时，只要发现苗头不对，他们肯定立刻见风转舵，另觅贤能，实在是无法理解
当他们在受托帮他人管理资产时，为何脑筋偏偏就转不过来呢?
The hypocrisy permeating the system is vividly exposed when a fund
management company – call it “A” – is sold for a huge sum to Manager
“B”. Now the “independent” directors experience a “counterrevelation”
and decide that Manager B is the best that can be found – even though B
was available (and ignored) in previous years. Not so incidentally, B also
could formerly have been hired at a far lower rate than is possible now that
it has bought Manager A. That’s because B has laid out a fortune to acquire
A, and B must now recoup that cost through fees paid by the A
shareholders who were “delivered” as part of the deal. (For a terrific
discussion of the mutual fund business, read John Bogle’s Common Sense
on Mutual Funds.)
当一家基金公司-我们姑且称之为A公司，被一位经理人B以极高价位买断时，弥漫
在这个系统内的伪善气氛就会被特别凸显，这时我们立刻可以发现这些独立董事们
终于开始"自我反省"，认为B先生才是最佳的基金经理人，尽管B先生不是今天才存
在这个业界(其实是被刻意忽略)，而且通常很不凑巧的，B先生在自A先生手中买下
A公司后，其薪资价码肯定比原本的薪资水准高得许多，我想主要原因在于，为了
取得A公司，B先生已经砸下了大笔的银子，非得从连带移转过来A公司的股东们支
付(这也是交易的附带条件)的管理费中捞回来不可，(如果想要多了解基金公司的内
幕，建议各位读一读John Bogle的著作-共同基金的常识一书)。
A few years ago, my daughter was asked to become a director of a family of
funds managed by a major institution. The fees she would have received as
a director were very substantial, enough to have increased her annual
income by about 50% (a boost, she will tell you, she could use!). Legally,
she would have been an independent director. But did the fund manager
who approached her think there was any chance that she would think
independently as to what advisor the fund should employ? Of course not. I
am proud to say that she showed real independence by turning down the
offer. The fund, however, had no trouble filling the slot (and – surprise –
the fund has not changed managers).
几年前，我的女儿受一家大型的基金机构的邀请担任该公司的董事，担任董事的报
酬非常可观，大概可以让她的年收入一下子增加50%以上，(关于增加的部份，她个
人保证有能力可以运用)，在法律形式上，她将会是一位独立的董事，但骨子里基金
经理人真的会认为她能够独立地提供任何有用的建议吗 当然不，然而我也很自傲
的跟各位报告，她果然很独立地拒绝了这项优渥的提案，当然该基金也绝对不愁找
不到有人来替代(倒是令人惊讶的该基金并未更换基金经理人)。
Investment company directors have failed as well in negotiating
management fees (just as compensation committees of many American
companies have failed to hold the compensation of their CEOs to sensible
levels). If you or I were empowered, I can assure you that we could easily
negotiate materially lower management fees with the incumbent managers
of most mutual funds. And, believe me, if directors were promised a
portion of any fee savings they realized, the skies would be filled with
falling fees. Under the current system, though, reductions mean nothing to
“independent” directors while meaning everything to managers. So guess
who wins?
投资公司的董事同样也没有能够好好地为投资人协调争取合理的管理费(就像是很
多美国大企业的薪资委员会未能将该公司总裁的薪资限制在合理的范围内一样)，我
想如果是你我受命委托，我可以跟各位打包票，我们绝对可以轻易地跟绝大多数现
任的基金经理人谈判，大幅降低其所收取的管理费，而且相信我，如果董事被告知
可以分到节省下来的部份所得，我保证管理费用一定降翻天，然而在现有制度下，
降低管理费对于独立的董事们来说一点好处都没有，但却又是基金经理人最最在乎
的地方，所以很明显的胜负立判。
Having the right money manager, of course, is far more important to a
fund than reducing the manager’s fee. Both tasks are nonetheless the job
of directors. And in stepping up to these all-important responsibilities,
tens of thousands of “independent” directors, over more than six decades,
have failed miserably. (They’ve succeeded, however, in taking care of
themselves; their fees from serving on multiple boards of a single “family”
of funds often run well into six figures.)
当然找到一位好的基金经理人要远比一昧地删减管理费重要的多，但不论如何，两
者都是董事最主要的职责，只是在谈到这些最最重要的责任时，数万名独立董事，
六十多年来的经验显示，他们的成绩实在是惨不忍睹，(不过对于自己的权益，他们
倒是保护的不错，即便是同时担任同一家基金公司不同基金的董事，其酬劳往往轻
易地超过六位数)。
When the manager cares deeply and the directors don’t, what’s needed is a
powerful countervailing force – and that’s the missing element in today’s
corporate governance. Getting rid of mediocre CEOs and eliminating
overreaching by the able ones requires action by owners – big owners. The
logistics aren’t that tough: The ownership of stock has grown increasingly
concentrated in recent decades, and today it would be easy for institutional
managers to exert their will on problem situations. Twenty, or even fewer,
of the largest institutions, acting together, could effectively reform
corporate governance at a given company, simply by withholding their
votes for directors who were tolerating odious behavior. In my view, this
kind of concerted action is the only way that corporate stewardship can be
meaningfully improved.
当基金经理人非常在乎而董事却漠不关心，这时就需要有一股强而有力的反制力量
存在，但偏偏这却是今日公司治理最缺乏的要点，想要能够摆脱平庸CEO的纠缠，
寻找真正的能人取而代之，股东们，尤其是大股东必须要站起来有所行动，这样的
道理并没有多大的学问，近年来股权的集中程度有增无减，机构投资法人在面对问
题发生时，可以很容易依照其意志提出解决方案，只要少数比如说20家大型的投资
机构联合采取行动，就可以有效地改革任何一家公司的企业治理程度，只要不把票
投给那些容忍脱序行为发生的董事就成了，就我个人的看法，唯有采取这种的团结
一致的行动才可能让企业治理获得明显的改善。
Unfortunately, certain major investing institutions have “glass house”
problems in arguing for better governance elsewhere; they would shudder,
for example, at the thought of their own performance and fees being
closely inspected by their own boards. But Jack Bogle of Vanguard fame,
Chris Davis of Davis Advisors, and Bill Miller of Legg Mason are now
offering leadership in getting CEOs to treat their owners properly. Pension
funds, as well as other fiduciaries, will reap better investment returns in
the future if they support these men.
不幸的是，某些大型的投资机构根本上存在着"玻璃屋"的问题，声称可以从其它地
方着手加强企业治理，比如说，它们一想到董事会要来严密检视其绩效及管理费时，
就感到惊惧不已，但先锋基金的Jack Bogle、Davis投顾的Chris Davis及Legg
Mason的Bill Miller现在都站出来引导CEO朝向公平对待股东的路上迈进，而如果
退休基金以及其它信托基金也能够一起站出来支持这群人，个人相信这些机构在未
来一定可以得到更佳的投资报酬。
The acid test for reform will be CEO compensation. Managers will
cheerfully agree to board “diversity,” attest to SEC filings and adopt
meaningless proposals relating to process. What many will fight, however,
is a hard look at their own pay and perks.
办别改革真伪的最好方法就是看看CEO的待遇报酬，经理人一般都相当赞同董事会
的多元化，以符合证管会的法令要求，并依规范遵循一些没有太大意义的作业程序，
然而多数经理人真正关心的，还是如何争取对自己最有利的待遇及福利。
In recent years compensation committees too often have been tailwagging
puppy dogs meekly following recommendations by consultants, a
breed not known for allegiance to the faceless shareholders who pay their
fees. (If you can’t tell whose side someone is on, they are not on yours.)
True, each committee is required by the SEC to state its reasoning about
pay in the proxy. But the words are usually boilerplate written by the
company’s lawyers or its human-relations department.
近年来，薪资报酬委员会往往扮演摇尾乞怜的摇摆狗，有如橡皮章一样被动遵循顾
问们的建议，就是那群由股东们付高薪却不懂得效忠其主之流，(如果你不清楚这群
人到底是站在那一边，那么它们肯定不是跟你一国的)，确实每一个委员会在委托书
件中都会被证券主管机关要求说明其报酬的缘由，但其用词遣字往往是由公司律师
或者是公关部门事先安排好的例行法律用字。
This costly charade should cease. Directors should not serve on
compensation committees unless they are themselves capable of
negotiating on behalf of owners. They should explain both how they think
about pay and how they measure performance. Dealing with shareholders’
money, moreover, they should behave as they would were it their own.
这类画蛇添足的行为实无存在之必要，董事们不应担任薪资委员会成员，除非他们
自认为有能力为股东们喉舌争取权益，同时他们必须说明对于经理人报酬的看法以
及如何来评估其绩效，在代投资人管理资金时，他们必须像是在处理自己的金钱一
样用心。
In the 1890s, Samuel Gompers described the goal of organized labor as
“More!” In the 1990s, America’s CEOs adopted his battle cry. The upshot
is that CEOs have often amassed riches while their shareholders have
experienced financial disasters.
1890年代，美国劳工联盟创盟主席 Samuel Gompers形容劳工组织的主要目标就
是"我要更多"，1990年代美国企业的CEO们采取相同的口号，而最终的结果往往是
CEO们累积了大量的财富的同时，股东们却遭受重大的财务损失。
Directors should stop such piracy. There’s nothing wrong with paying well
for truly exceptional business performance. But, for anything short of that,
it’s time for directors to shout “Less!” It would be a travesty if the bloated
pay of recent years became a baseline for future compensation.
Compensation committees should go back to the drawing boards.
董事会绝对必须要阻止这样的劣行，虽然支付高薪给表现真正优秀的经理人本是天
经地义的事，但如果不是那么一回事的话，董事们就有必要大胆说句"够了"，否则
要是近年来这类夸张的薪资报酬成为往后薪资报酬的底限时岂不荒唐，关于此事薪
资委员会实有必要再好好重长计议一番。
* * * * * * * * * * * *
Rules that have been proposed and that are almost certain to go into effect
will require changes in Berkshire’s board, obliging us to add directors who
meet the codified requirements for “independence.” Doing so, we will add
a test that we believe is important, but far from determinative, in fostering
independence: We will select directors who have huge and true ownership
interests (that is, stock that they or their family have purchased, not been
given by Berkshire or received via options), expecting those interests to
influence their actions to a degree that dwarfs other considerations such as
