这场经典的赛事，甚至还用慢动作播放精彩的第四节，我们以今年封面的颜色表 .59
prestige and board fees.
目前正在修正并渴望于近日通过的法令，势必要求Berkshire的董事会进行改组，
在原本的董事外增列符合"独立性"法令规范的独立董事，为此我们认为还必须增加
另外一项相当重要但也不是那么绝对的测试，以认定其独立性，我们将选拔真正拥
有重大权益(也就是其本人或家族投资，而不是由Berkshire透过认股权给予的股
份)，以确保其真正会为了自身的权益而不是名望或董事酬劳来决定其做法。
That gets to an often-overlooked point about directors’ compensation,
which at public companies averages perhaps $50,000 annually. It baffles
me how the many directors who look to these dollars for perhaps 20% or
more of their annual income can be considered independent when Ron
Olson, for example, who is on our board, may be deemed not
independent because he receives a tiny percentage of his very large income
from Berkshire legal fees. As the investment company saga suggests, a
director whose moderate income is heavily dependent on directors’ fees –
and who hopes mightily to be invited to join other boards in order to earn
more fees – is highly unlikely to offend a CEO or fellow directors, who in a
major way will determine his reputation in corporate circles. If regulators
believe that “significant” money taints independence (and it certainly can),
they have overlooked a massive class of possible offenders.
这其中又牵涉到常常被忽视的董事报酬问题，上市公司董事的年平均收入达到5万
美元以上，这让我感到困惑，多数董事在面对这笔超过其年收入20%以上的金钱时，
是如何维持其独立性的，相对地Berkshire的董事之一Ron Olson，就比较不会被
认为不独立，因为他从Berkshire公司收取的法律顾问费只不过占其庞大收入的非
常小部份，就如一位投资公司先知所说的，一位收入普通相当依赖董事酬劳，而且
亟欲受邀担任其它公司董事以获取更多董事报酬的人，他很有可能不敢斗胆冒犯
CEO或其它董事成员，因为后者对于前者在公司业界的名声有相当大的影响力，而
如果管理当局相信高额金钱会影响到独立性(事实也确是如此)，那么他们很有可能
错过了一大群真正敢发出声音的人。
At Berkshire, wanting our fees to be meaningless to our directors, we pay
them only a pittance. Additionally, not wanting to insulate our directors
from any corporate disaster we might have, we don’t provide them with
officers’ and directors’ liability insurance (an unorthodoxy that, not so
incidentally, has saved our shareholders many millions of dollars over the
years). Basically, we want the behavior of our directors to be driven by the
effect their decisions will have on their family’s net worth, not by their
compensation. That’s the equation for Charlie and me as managers, and
we think it’s the right one for Berkshire directors as well.
在Berkshire，为了避免董事报酬占其个人收入的比例太高，我们仅象征性地支付
一点报酬，此外为了不让董事们规避公司发生重大经营意外的风险，我们也不提供
董事经理人责任保险(虽然这在一般公司并非常态，但每年却也为公司节省了好几百
万美元的保险费用)，基本上，我们希望董事们的行为想法跟在处理自家财务一般小
心谨慎，而不只是着眼于董事报酬，这跟查理与我本人在身为Berkshire经营者的
心态一致，我们这样的做法同样也适用于Berkshire的董事们。
To find new directors, we will look through our shareholders list for people
who directly, or in their family, have had large Berkshire holdings – in the
millions of dollars – for a long time. Individuals making that cut should
automatically meet two of our tests, namely that they be interested in
Berkshire and shareholder-oriented. In our third test, we will look for
business savvy, a competence that is far from commonplace.
为了寻找新任董事，我们会先从现有股东名单中着手，挑选个人及家族长期拥有大
量Berkshire股份的股东，金额绝对以百万计，因为达到标准的这些人很自然的已
经符合前两项测试，也就是他们关心Berkshire，同时也以股东权益为导向，至于
第三项测试，我们将挑选具有丰富商业经验的人士，这点的困难度相对就较高。
Finally, we will continue to have members of the Buffett family on the
board. They are not there to run the business after I die, nor will they then
receive compensation of any kind. Their purpose is to ensure, for both
our shareholders and managers, that Berkshire’s special culture will be
nurtured when I’m succeeded by other CEOs.
最后，巴菲特家族成员也将继续留在Berkshire的董事会中，但这并不代表他们在
我死后会接手经营Berkshire，也不会另外领取其它额外的报酬，他们主要的目标
是替所有公司经理人与股东，确保未来在其它CEO接替我之后，Berkshire能够继
续保有其特有的企业文化。
Any change we make in the composition of our board will not alter the way
Charlie and I run Berkshire. We will continue to emphasize substance over
form in our work and waste as little time as possible during board
meetings in show-and-tell and perfunctory activities. The most important
job of our board is likely to be the selection of successors to Charlie and
me, and that is a matter upon which it will focus.
当然任何董事会的变动都不会影响到查理跟我经营Berkshire的方式，我们还是会
像过去一样重实质而不重形式，并且尽量避免董事会把时间浪费在形式上的问答
上，Berkshire董事会最主要的任务就是决定查理跟我日后的继承人，这才是他们
将来真正应该要做的。
The board we have had up to now has overseen a shareholder-oriented
business, consistently run in accord with the economic principles set forth
on pages 68-74 (which I urge all new shareholders to read). Our goal is to
obtain new directors who are equally devoted to those principles.
截至目前为止，我们的董事会监督的是一家以股东权益为主要导向的企业，并一直
以68-74页所揭示的经营原则(这也是我一向督促新进股东必读的资料)持续运作
中，而我们的目标也是找到同样关心这类原则的新任董事。
The Audit Committee
审计委员会
Audit committees can’t audit. Only a company’s outside auditor can
determine whether the earnings that a management purports to have made
are suspect. Reforms that ignore this reality and that instead focus on the
structure and charter of the audit committee will accomplish little.
审计委员会没有能力进行稽核，唯有公司外部独立的会计师才有能力判断公司管理
当局提出的盈余报告是否可疑，没有正视这项现实而只是将焦点放在审计委员会组
织架构上的任何改革终将徒劳无功。
As we’ve discussed, far too many managers have fudged their company’s
numbers in recent years, using both accounting and operational
techniques that are typically legal but that nevertheless materially mislead
investors. Frequently, auditors knew about these deceptions. Too often,
however, they remained silent. The key job of the audit committee is
simply to get the auditors to divulge what they know.
就像是我们先前讨论过的，近年来太多的经理人在公司的营运数字上动手脚，不管
是会计帐上或是营运统计皆是如此，表面上虽然完全合法，但实际上却严重误导投
资人，在通常的情况下，会计师都相当清楚这些欺骗手法，但偏偏他们选择保持沉
默，所以审计委员会最主要的职责就是让会计师吐露他们所知道的事实。
To do this job, the committee must make sure that the auditors worry more
about misleading its members than about offending management. In
recent years auditors have not felt that way. They have instead generally
viewed the CEO, rather than the shareholders or directors, as their client.
That has been a natural result of day-to-day working relationships and
also of the auditors’ understanding that, no matter what the book says, the
CEO and CFO pay their fees and determine whether they are retained for
both auditing and other work. The rules that have been recently instituted
won’t materially change this reality. What will break this cozy relationship
is audit committees unequivocally putting auditors on the spot, making
them understand they will become liable for major monetary penalties if
they don’t come forth with what they know or suspect.
要达成这项任务，委员会必须确定会计师勇于冒犯管理当局，免于成为同谋误导委
员会的共犯，但很遗憾近年来会计师的想法作为却刚好相反，他们往往把公司的
CEO，而不是股东或董事当作是客户，这是因为平日合作的关系使然，同时会计师
也很清楚，不论公司的报表数字如何，CEO与CFO保证会支付签证公费，并且有权
决定是否由原会计师继续进行签证业务及其它服务，而近来修正的法令依然无法改
变这个根本的现实，想要打破这种暧昧的关系，唯有靠审计委员会明白地告诉会计
师，让他们清楚地了解如果不将所发现或怀疑的事实说出来，他们将必须负担大笔
的金钱赔偿。
In my opinion, audit committees can accomplish this goal by asking four
questions of auditors, the answers to which should be recorded and
reported to shareholders. These questions are:
我个人认为，审计委员会可以经由询问会计师以下四个问题来达到这个目的，同时
必须将他们的回复记录下来，并向股东报告，这四个问题分别是：
1. If the auditor were solely responsible for preparation of the company’s
financial statements, would they have in any way been prepared
differently from the manner selected by management? This question
should cover both material and nonmaterial differences. If the auditor
would have done something differently, both management’s argument and
the auditor’s response should be disclosed. The audit committee should
then evaluate the facts.
1.如果今年是由 贵会计师单独负责本公司的财务报表编制，那么你的做法会不会与
现在管理当局准备的报表有所不同? 不论是重大或不重大的差异，都必须答复，如
果 贵会计师的做法有任何不同，包含管理当局的论述以及会计师的回复都必须揭
露，然后由审计委员会来评估现实的状况。
2. If the auditor were an investor, would he have received – in plain
English – the information essential to his understanding the company’s
financial performance during the reporting period?
2.如果 贵会计师身为投资人，那么你是否认为已经收到了-讲的白一点-你认为了
解这家公司在签证期间财务经营状况，所需的所有必要信息?
3. Is the company following the same internal audit procedure that would
be followed if the auditor himself were CEO? If not, what are the differences
and why?
3.如果 贵会计师是本公司的CEO，那么你认为本公司是否已经遵循了所有必要的内
部稽核程序? 如果没有，是哪边有差异，以及其原因为何?
4. Is the auditor aware of any actions – either accounting or operational –
that have had the purpose and effect of moving revenues or expenses from
one reporting period to another?
4. 贵会计师是否知悉管理当局有任何可能挪移公司的收入或费用的举动，不管是会
计帐面或者是营运统计上的数字?
If the audit committee asks these questions, its composition – the focus of
most reforms – is of minor importance. In addition, the procedure will save
time and expense. When auditors are put on the spot, they will do their
duty. If they are not put on the spot . . . well, we have seen the results of
that.
我相信如果审计委员会能确实询问会计师以上四个问题，那么其组织架构(这是大部
分改革计画的重点)就一点也不重要了，此外，这样的做法可以大大节省时间跟成
本，当会计师被推上火线，保证他们会乖乖负起职责，但如果让他们静静地躲在角
落，嗯! 届时你就知道结果如何。
The questions we have enumerated should be asked at least a week before
an earnings report is released to the public. That timing will allow
differences between the auditors and management to be aired with the
committee and resolved. If the timing is tighter – if an earnings release is
imminent when the auditors and committee interact – the committee will
feel pressure to rubberstamp the prepared figures. Haste is the enemy of
accuracy. My thinking, in fact, is that the SEC’s recent shortening of
reporting deadlines will hurt the quality of information that shareholders
receive. Charlie and I believe that rule is a mistake and should be
rescinded.
我们列举的这些问题必须要财务报表正式对外公布的前一个礼拜提出，这段时间应
该足够让委员会了解会计师与管理当局间的差异在哪里，并把问题解决，因为如果
时间太紧，将会面临财报发布在即，但会计师与委员会却还在沟通的窘境，这将使
委员会迫于压力沦为橡皮图章的老路，时间越赶，准确度就越差，就像是我个人认
为，证管会最近缩短财报公布的时程的做法，将严重影响到股东们接收财务信息的
品质，查理跟我认为这样的规定根本就是个错误，应该要立即加以改正。
The primary advantage of our four questions is that they will act as a
prophylactic. Once the auditors know that the audit committee will require
them to affirmatively endorse, rather than merely acquiesce to,
management’s actions, they will resist misdoings early in the process, well
before specious figures become embedded in the company’s books. Fear
of the plaintiff’s bar will see to that.
我们这四个问题最主要的优点在于，它们将能够发挥防范于未然的效果，一旦会计
师了解到审计委员会将会要求他们肯定地为管理当局的行为背书，而不是默默地姑
息他们时，会计师就能够在事情刚发生的初期就出面制止，让有问题的数字不在会
计帐上出现，可能的牢狱威胁保证会发生效用。
* * * * * * * * * * * *
The Chicago Tribune ran a four-part series on Arthur Andersen last
September that did a great job of illuminating how accounting standards
and audit quality have eroded in recent years. A few decades ago, an Arthur
Andersen audit opinion was the gold standard of the profession. Within the
firm, an elite Professional Standards Group (PSG) insisted on honest
reporting, no matter what pressures were applied by the client. Sticking
to these principles, the PSG took a stand in 1992 that the cost of stock
options should be recorded as the expense it clearly was. The PSG’s
position was reversed, however, by the “rainmaking” partners of Andersen
who knew what their clients wanted – higher reported earnings no matter
what the reality. Many CEOs also fought expensing because they knew that
the obscene megagrants of options they craved would be slashed if the
true costs of these had to be recorded.
芝加哥论坛报在去年九月刊登了四天连载，详细报导近年来安达信会计师事务所是
如何让会计准则与审计品质腐化到如此地步，十几年前，安达信事务所出具的意见
可以说是业界的金字招牌，在事务所内部，由一群菁英组成的专业准则小组(PSG)，
不管面对来自客户多少的压力，仍坚持财务报表必须诚实编制，为了坚持这项原则，
PSG在1992年坚持选择权本来就应该列为费用的立场，然而曾几何时，PSG在另一
群"呼风唤雨"的合伙人推动下，对于此立场做了180度的转变，他们相当清楚客户
心里最渴望的东西-那就是亮丽的盈余数字，不论实际的状况如何。而许多CEO也
极力反对将选择权成本列为费用，因为他们相当清楚，如果这些高额选择权成本如
实反应在公司帐上的话，他们渴望已久的大笔选择权将会马上被取消。
Soon after the Andersen reversal, the independent accounting standards
board (FASB) voted 7-0 for expensing options. Predictably, the major
auditing firms and an army of CEOs stormed Washington to pressure the
Senate – what better institution to decide accounting questions? – into
castrating the FASB. The voices of the protesters were amplified by their
large political contributions, usually made with corporate money belonging
to the very owners about to be bamboozled. It was not a sight for a civics
class.
在安达信立场转变后不久，独立的会计准则委员会(FASB)以7比0的票数通过将选择
权成本列为费用，而如预期的，大型会计师事务所以及大群的CEO蜂拥赶赴首府华
盛顿向参议院施压企图废掉FASB，到底是哪一个单位最适合来处理会计问题啊! 抗
议者的声音透过大笔的政治献金大量传送出去，讽刺的是他们用的是原来属于被欺
瞒股东所拥有的公司资金，这实在不是文明社会应该有的现象。
To its shame, the Senate voted 88-9 against expensing. Several prominent
Senators even called for the demise of the FASB if it didn’t abandon its
position. (So much for independence.) Arthur Levitt, Jr., then Chairman of
the SEC – and generally a vigilant champion of shareholders – has since
described his reluctant bowing to Congressional and corporate pressures
as the act of his chairmanship that he most regrets. (The details of this
sordid affair are related in Levitt’s excellent book, Take on the Street.)
可耻的是，参议院竟以88对9票通过反对选择权列为费用，几位资深的参议员甚至
扬言废掉FASB，如果它依然坚持原来的立场(真是好有独立性啊!)，当时的证管会主
席Arthur Levitt，他一向也是股东权益的捍卫先锋，后来表示当时迫于压力向国会
及企业低头，是他在担任证管会主席任内最感到遗憾的一件事，(有关这件遗憾的往
事，相关的细节可参考Levitt所写的好书-挑战华尔街)。
With the Senate in its pocket and the SEC outgunned, corporate America
knew that it was now boss when it came to accounting. With that, a new era
of anything-goes earnings reports – blessed and, in some cases,
encouraged by big-name auditors – was launched. The licentious behavior
that followed quickly became an air pump for The Great Bubble.
在参议院成为其囊中物，而证管会又不敌火力的情况下，美国企业了解到他们在会
计方面已经是天下无敌，就这样"随只我高兴，有什么不可以"盈余报告的新时代于
焉到来，更理想的是，还有知名的大会计师在后面推波助澜，。
After being threatened by the Senate, FASB backed off its original position
and adopted an “honor system” approach, declaring expensing to be
preferable but also allowing companies to ignore the cost if they wished.
The disheartening result: Of the 500 companies in the S&P, 498 adopted
the method deemed less desirable, which of course let them report higher
“earnings.” Compensation-hungry CEOs loved this outcome: Let FASB
have the honor; they had the system.
面临来自参议院的威胁，FASB也从原来的立场退缩，转而采取"自我要求"的荣誉制
度做法，声明费用化为优先但也容许公司依个别喜好忽略此成本不计，这是多么令
人感到伤痛的结果，在S&P 500大公司当中，共有498家选择采取比较不理想的方
法，好让他们的帐列盈余好看一点，想钱想疯了的CEO们当然很高兴最后的结果，
FASB赢得了面子，而他们却赢得了里子。
