这场经典的赛事，甚至还用慢动作播放精彩的第四节，我们以今年封面的颜色表 .61
ballot, please vote for your preference – but only if you are likely to attend
in the future.
明年我们的股东会将会移师到奥玛哈新落成的会议中心召开，这项变更将得以使我
们自由选择在星期六或星期一举行，只要大多数的股东同意，利用会议通知后附的
选票，请选择你个人的偏好，当然最好是你未来有可能参加再投。
We will make the Saturday/Monday decision based upon a count of
shareholders, not shares. That is, a Class B shareholder owning one share
will have a vote equal to that of a Class A shareholder owning many shares.
If the vote is close, we will go with the preference of out-of-towners.
我们将按股东投票的人头数而非股数来决定在星期六或星期一开会，也就是说持有
一股B股的股东其投票权将与持有大量A股的股东一样，如果投票数过于接近，我们
将以外县市来的股东意愿为优先考量。
Again, please vote only if there is a reasonable chance that you will be
attending some meetings in the future.
再一次提醒大家，只有在将来有可能出席股东大会时，才建议你参与投票。
Warren E. Buffett
February 21, 2003 Chairman of the Board
华伦．巴菲特
董事会主席
2003年2月21日
Warren Buffett's Letters
To Berkshire Shareholders
2003
巴菲特致股东函
2003年版
Note: The following table appears in the printed Annual Report on the
facing page of the Chairman's Letter and is referred to in that letter.
附注：下表系董事长致股东信的参考资料，并载于年度报告的封面。
Berkshire’s Corporate Performance vs. the S&P 500
Annual Percentage Change
in Per-Share in S&P 500
Book Value of with Dividends Relative
Berkshire Included Results
Year (1) (2) (1)-(2)
1965 .................................................. 23.8 10.0 13.8
1966 .................................................. 20.3 (11.7) 32.0
1967 .................................................. 11.0 30.9 (19.9)
1968 .................................................. 19.0 11.0 8.0
1969 .................................................. 16.2 (8.4) 24.6
1970 .................................................. 12.0 3.9 8.1
1971 .................................................. 16.4 14.6 1.8
1972 .................................................. 21.7 18.9 2.8
1973 .................................................. 4.7 (14.8) 19.5
1974 .................................................. 5.5 (26.4) 31.9
1975 .................................................. 21.9 37.2 (15.3)
1976 .................................................. 59.3 23.6 35.7
1977 .................................................. 31.9 (7.4) 39.3
1978 .................................................. 24.0 6.4 17.6
1979 .................................................. 35.7 18.2 17.5
1980 .................................................. 19.3 32.3 (13.0)
1981 .................................................. 31.4 (5.0) 36.4
1982 .................................................. 40.0 21.4 18.6
1983 .................................................. 32.3 22.4 9.9
1984 .................................................. 13.6 6.1 7.5
1985 .................................................. 48.2 31.6 16.6
1986 .................................................. 26.1 18.6 7.5
1987 .................................................. 19.5 5.1 14.4
1988 .................................................. 20.1 16.6 3.5
1989 .................................................. 44.4 31.7 12.7
1990 .................................................. 7.4 (3.1) 10.5
1991 .................................................. 39.6 30.5 9.1
1992 .................................................. 20.3 7.6 12.7
1993 .................................................. 14.3 10.1 4.2
1994 .................................................. 13.9 1.3 12.6
1995 .................................................. 43.1 37.6 5.5
1996 .................................................. 31.8 23.0 8.8
1997 .................................................. 34.1 33.4 .7
1998 .................................................. 48.3 28.6 19.7
1999 .................................................. .5 21.0 (20.5)
2000 .................................................. 6.5 (9.1) 15.6
2001 .................................................. (6.2) (11.9) 5.7
2002 .................................................. 10.0 (22.1) 32.1
2003 .................................................. 21.0 28.7 (7.7)
Average Annual Gain — 1965-2003 22.2 10.4 11.8
Overall Gain — 1964-2003 259,485 4,743
--------------------------------------------------
Notes: Data are for calendar years with these exceptions: 1965 and 1966, year ended
9/30; 1967, 15 months ended 12/31.
资料以历年制为准，除了1965年及1966年系至9/30;1967年则为至12/31的15个月。
Starting in 1979, accounting rules required insurance companies to value the equity
securities they hold at market rather than at the lower of cost or market, which was
previously the requirement. In this table, Berkshire's results through 1978 have been
restated to conform to the changed rules. In all other respects, the results are calculated
using the numbers originally reported.
从1979年开始，会计原则规定保险公司持有的股权投资必须采用市价法取代原先的成本与市价
孰低法，在本表中，1978年以前的资料已依照该原则重新调整，除此之外，其它的数字皆依照
原则的结果未作更动。
The S&P 500 numbers are pre-tax where as the Berkshire numbers are after-tax. If a
corporation such as Berkshire were simply to have owned the S&P 500 and accrued the
appropriate taxes, its results would have lagged the S&P 500 in years when that index
showed a positive return, but would have exceeded the S&P in years when the index
showed a negative return. Over the years, the tax costs would have caused the aggregate
lag to be substantial.
S&P 500指数系以税前为准，而Berkshire的数字则属于税后，如果Berkshire直接投资S&P 500
并依此课征相关税负，则当S&P 500的报酬为正时，Berkshire的表现将不如S&P 500，相反地
若S&P 500的报酬为负时，Berkshire的表现将优于S&P 500，就长期而言，Berkshire额外负
担的税负成本将使得中间的差异日益扩大。
BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC.
波克夏海瑟崴股份有限公司
To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:
致Berkshire公司全体股东:
Our gain in net worth during 2003 was $13.6 billion, which increased the pershare
book value of both our Class A and Class B stock by 21%. Over the last 39
years (that is, since present management took over) per-share book value has
grown from $19 to $50,498, a rate of 22.2% compounded annually.*
经结算本公司2003年的净值增加了136亿美元，A股或B股每股的帐面净值增加了
21.0%，累计过去39年以来，也就是自从现有经营阶层接手之后，每股净值由当
初的19元成长到现在的50,498美元，年复合成长率约为22.2%*。
It’s per-share intrinsic value that counts, however, not book value. Here, the
news is good: Between 1964 and 2003, Berkshire morphed from a struggling
northern textile business whose intrinsic value was less than book into a widely
diversified enterprise worth far more than book. Our 39-year gain in intrinsic
value has therefore somewhat exceeded our 22.2% gain in book. (For a better
understanding of intrinsic value and the economic principles that guide Charlie
Munger, my partner and Berkshire’s vicechairman, and me in running Berkshire,
please read our Owner’s Manual, beginning on page 69.)
我们真正在乎的是实质价值，而非帐面价值，而庆幸的是，从1964年到2003年期
间，Berkshire已经从一家原本摇摇欲坠的北方纺织公司，蜕变成一个跨足各个产业
的大型集团，其实质价值大幅超越帐面价值，39年来实质价值的成长率甚至远超过
帐面价值22.2%的成长率，(想要对实质价值与本人与查理孟格经营Berkshire的原则
有更多的了解的人，我建议大家阅读69页的股东手册)。
Despite their shortcomings, book value calculations are useful at Berkshire as a
slightly understated gauge for measuring the long-term rate of increase in our
intrinsic value. The calculation is less relevant, however, than it once was in
rating any single year’s performance versus the S&P 500 index (a comparison
we display on the facing page). Our equity holdings, including convertible
preferreds, have fallen considerably as a percentage of our net worth, from an
average of 114% in the 1980s, for example, to an average of 50% in 2000-03.
Therefore, yearly movements in the stock market now affect a much smaller
portion of our net worth than was once the case.
虽然并非完美，但计算帐面价值仍不失为于衡量实质价值长期成长率的有效工具，
只是单一年度净值的表现与S&P 500指数的比较(相关比较参阅首页)，其意义已不若
以往，主要原因在于我们股票投资部位，包含可转换特别股在内，占我们净值的比
重已经大幅下降，从1980年代早期的114%，到2000-03年的50%，也因此股市波动对
于我们净值影响的程度已经大不如前。
Nonetheless, Berkshire’s long-term performance versus the S&P remains allimportant.
Our shareholders can buy the S&P through an index fund at very low
cost. Unless we achieve gains in per-share intrinsic value in the future that
outdo the S&P’s performance, Charlie and I will be adding nothing to what you
can accomplish on your own.
不过即便如此，Berkshire相对于S&P长期的表现还是顶重要的，因为股东们现在可
以非常低的手续费买到指数型基金，间接投资S&P，因此除非在未来我们能够以高
于S&P的速度累积每股实质价值，否则查理跟我就没有存在的价值。
If we fail, we will have no excuses. Charlie and I operate in an ideal
environment. To begin with, we are supported by an incredible group of men
and women who run our operating units. If there were a Corporate
Cooperstown, its roster would surely include many of our CEOs. Any shortfall in
Berkshire’s results will not be caused by our managers.
如果做不到，我们将没有任何借口，因为查理跟我拥有相当理想的工作环境，首先
我们背后拥有超级坚强的经营团队支持我们的营运，如果有企业名人堂(译注：
Cooperstown为美国职棒名人堂所在地)，那么我们旗下许多经理人肯定可以名列其
中，所以错误一定不会是我们这些明星经理人造成的。
Additionally, we enjoy a rare sort of managerial freedom. Most companies are
saddled with institutional constraints. A company’s history, for example, may
commit it to an industry that now offers limited opportunity. A more common
problem is a shareholder constituency that pressures its manager to dance to
Wall Street’s tune. Many CEOs resist, but others give in and adopt operating
and capital allocation policies far different from those they would choose if left
to themselves.
此外，我们在管理上享有极其罕见的自由弹性，大部分的公司身上都背负了组织的
包袱，举例来说，企业过去辉煌的历史可能使得其受困于前景有限的产业，更常见
的问题是来自于股东的压力，迫使其经理人必须随着华尔街的基调起舞，虽然多数
经理人抗拒，但还是有不少人屈服，被迫改采不同的营运与资金运用政策。
At Berkshire, neither history nor the demands of owners impede intelligent
decision-making. When Charlie and I make mistakes, they are – in tennis
parlance – unforced errors.
在Berkshire，我们完全没有历史或股东的压力来妨碍我们做出明智的决定，所以当
查理跟我本人犯错时，套句网球界常用的术语-那肯定是「非受迫性失误」。
-----------------------
*All figures used in this report apply to Berkshire’s A shares, the successor to the only stock
that the company had outstanding before 1996. The B shares have an economic interest equal
to 1/30th that of the A.
-----------------------
*在年报中所谓的每股数字系以A级普通股约当数为基础，这是本公司在1996年以前流通在
外唯一的一种股份，B级普通股则拥有A级普通股三十分之一的权利。
Operating Earnings
营业利益
When valuations are similar, we strongly prefer owning businesses to owning
stocks. During most of our years of operation, however, stocks were much the
cheaper choice. We therefore sharply tilted our asset allocation in those years
toward equities, as illustrated by the percentages cited earlier.
当评估出来的价值差不多，我们强烈偏爱拥有一整家企业胜于持有部份股票，当然
在我们经营的大多数年头里，股票往往还是比较便宜的选择，也因此在我们的资产
组合中，股票投资还是占大多数，其比例如同先前所提到的。
In recent years, however, we’ve found it hard to find significantly undervalued
stocks, a difficulty greatly accentuated by the mushrooming of the funds we
must deploy. Today, the number of stocks that can be purchased in large
enough quantities to move the performance needle at Berkshire is a small
fraction of the number that existed a decade ago. (Investment managers often
profit far more from piling up assets than from handling those assets well. So
when one tells you that increased funds won’t hurt his investment
performance, step back: His nose is about to grow.)
然而近年来，我们发现越来越难再找到股价被低估的股票，尤其是当我们手头上可
运用的资金不断地大量涌入，时至今日，规模足以撼动Berkshire绩效指针的股票种
类已屈指可数，(基金经理人通常依靠累积基金规模而非基金绩效而获益，所以如果
有人告诉你基金规模不会影响绩效的话，小心点!注意他的鼻子是否开始变长)。
The shortage of attractively-priced stocks in which we can put large sums
doesn’t bother us, providing we can find companies to purchase that (1) have
favorable and enduring economic characteristics; (2) are run by talented and
honest managers and (3) are available at a sensible price. We have purchased a
number of such businesses in recent years, though not enough to fully employ
the gusher of cash that has come our way. In buying businesses, I’ve made some
terrible mistakes, both of commission and omission. Overall, however, our
acquisitions have led to decent gains in per-share earnings.
找不到大量价格便宜的股票对我们并不会造成困扰，只要我们能够找到具备以下三
项特点的公司(1)拥有长期竞争优势；(2)由才德兼具的经理人所经营，以及(3)可以
用合理的价格买到。近年来，尽管仍不足以消化源源不断流入的资金，我们确实买
进不少这类的企业，在企业购并方面，我犯过许多可怕的错误，不论是已经造成的
或是该做未做的，然而总的来说，这些购并案还是让我们每股盈余有不错的表现。
Below is a table that quantifies that point. But first we need to warn you that
growth-rate presentations can be significantly distorted by a calculated
selection of either initial or terminal dates. For example, if earnings are tiny in
a beginning year, a long-term performance that was only mediocre can be
made to appear sensational. That kind of distortion can come about because
the company at issue was minuscule in the base year – which means that only a
handful of insiders actually benefited from the touted performance – or
because a larger company was then operating at just above breakeven. Picking
a terminal year that is particularly buoyant will also favorably bias a calculation
of growth.
下表足以量化以上的论点，但首先我要提醒大家的是，成长率可能因为基期或末期
期间点选择的不同而有相当大的差异，比如说，如果所选择的基期盈余很低，那么
一个寻常的绩效也可能让人觉得很可观，实际上却只有少数人能够受惠，或只是一
家赚取微薄利润的大公司，同样地，选定盈余偏高的末期也可以让成长率特别好
看。
The Berkshire Hathaway that present management assumed control of in 1965
had long been sizable. But in 1964, it earned only $175,586 or 15 cents per
share, so close to breakeven that any calculation of earnings growth from that
base would be meaningless. At the time, however, even those meager earnings
looked good: Over the decade following the 1955 merger of Berkshire Fine
Spinning Associates and Hathaway Manufacturing, the combined operation had
lost $10.1 million and many thousands of employees had been let go. It was not
a marriage made in heaven.
自1965年现有经营阶层取得控制权以来，Berkshire的规模就已经相当大，但1964年
这家公司只不过赚了175,586美元，每股盈余约当15美分，这几乎仅仅勉强打平，
因此以此基期所计算的成长率可以说毫无意义，但是考量当时的时空背景，如此微
薄的盈余也聊胜于无，自从1955年Berkshire纺织与Hathaway工业合并后的十年，
该公司累计亏损了1,010万美元，数千名员工被解雇，这显然不是天作之合。
Against this background, we give you a picture of Berkshire’s earnings growth
that begins in 1968, but also includes subsequent base years spaced five years
apart. A series of calculations is presented so that you can decide for yourself
which period is most meaningful. I’ve started with 1968 because it was the first
