这场经典的赛事，甚至还用慢动作播放精彩的第四节，我们以今年封面的颜色表 .62
full year we operated National Indemnity, the initial acquisition we made as we
began to expand Berkshire’s business.
基于这样的背景，我们决定以1968年做为基期，来描述Berkshire盈余成长的幅度，
并且另外再以每五年为间距计算成长率，一系列不同的计算方式主要是想让大家得
以自行判断选择最合理的解释，之所以选择1968年，是因为那年是我们开始经营国
家产险的年头，该公司是Berkshire第一家对外扩张的购并对象。
I don’t believe that using 2003 as the terminal year distorts our calculations. It
was a terrific year for our insurance business, but the big boost that gave to
earnings was largely offset by the pathetically low interest rates we earned on
our large holdings of cash equivalents (a condition that will not last). All figures
shown below, it should be noted, exclude capital gains.
另外我也不认为选择2003年为末期就会大幅改变我们的计算结果，虽然当年我们保
险事业表现极佳，但是这部份的高获利，却被手头上大量闲置资金赚取的微薄利息
所抵消掉(相信这种情况不会维持太久)，有一点必须特别说明的是，以下所有显示
的数字并未包含资本利得在内。
Operating Earnings Operating Earnings Subsequent Compounded
in $ millions Per Share in$ Growth Rate of Per-Share Earnings
Year
1964 .2 .15 Not meaningful (1964-2003)
1968 2.7 2.69 22.8% (1968-2003)
1973 11.9 12.18 20.8% (1973-2003)
1978 30.0 29.15 21.1% (1978-2003)
1983 48.6 45.60 24.3% (1983-2003)
1988 313.4 273.37 18.6% (1988-2003)
1993 477.8 413.19 23.9% (1993-2003)
1998 1,277.0 1,020.49 28.2% (1998-2003)
2003 5,422.0 3,531.32
We will continue the capital allocation practices we have used in the past. If
stocks become significantly cheaper than entire businesses, we will buy them
aggressively. If selected bonds become attractive, as they did in 2002, we will
again load up on these securities. Under any market or economic conditions, we
will be happy to buy businesses that meet our standards. And, for those that
do, the bigger the better. Our capital is underutilized now, but that will happen
periodically. It’s a painful condition to be in – but not as painful as doing
something stupid. (I speak from experience.)
往后我们仍将维持过去惯用的资金分配方式，如果买股票比买整家公司便宜，我们
就会大肆采购，如果特定的债券够吸引人，就像是2002年一样，我们就会买进满手
的这类债券，而不管市场或经济状况如何，我们随时都很乐意买进符合我们标准的
企业，而且规模最好越大越好，目前我们的资金并未被充分利用，这种情况时而有
之，虽然这让人感到不太好受，但那总比干蠢事好得多，(我可是我从惨痛的教训学
来)。
Overall, we are certain Berkshire’s performance in the future will fall far short
of what it has been in the past. Nonetheless, Charlie and I remain hopeful that
we can deliver results that are modestly above average. That’s what we’re
being paid for.
总的来说，可以确定的是Berkshire往后的表现肯定远不及过去的绩效，但尽管如
此，查理跟我还是希望我们的成绩能够高于一般平均，这也是我们存在的意义。
Acquisitions
购并活动
As regular readers know, our acquisitions have often come about in strange
ways. None, however, had a more unusual genesis than our purchase last year
of Clayton Homes.
熟悉的读者都知道，我们的购并案的来源通常都很特殊，但再也没有比去年买进
Clayton房屋更特别的了。
The unlikely source was a group of finance students from the University of
Tennessee, and their teacher, Dr. Al Auxier. For the past five years, Al has
brought his class to Omaha, where the group tours Nebraska Furniture Mart and
Borsheim’s, eats at Gorat’s and then comes to Kiewit Plaza for a session with
me. Usually about 40 students participate.
这件购并案的构想系出自于田纳西大学一群财经系的学生以及老师Al Auxier博士，
过去五年来，Al 每年都会带他的学生到Omaha进行参访，参观NFM家具店及波仙珠
宝店、到Gorat’s吃牛排，之后再到Kiewit大楼与我一叙，通常学生人数在40位左
右。
After two hours of give-and-take, the group traditionally presents me with a
thank-you gift. (The doors stay locked until they do.) In past years it’s been
items such as a football signed by Phil Fulmer and a basketball from
Tennessee’s famous women’s team.
在经过二小时的你来我往之后，参访团按例都会赠送一份纪念品给我，(不拿上来，
门是不会开的)，往年的礼物，不是Phil Fulmer亲自签名的足球，不然就是田纳西
州著名女子篮球队的篮球。
This past February, the group opted for a book – which, luckily for me, was the
recently-published autobiography of Jim Clayton, founder of Clayton Homes. I
already knew the company to be the class act of the manufactured housing
industry, knowledge I acquired after earlier making the mistake of buying some
distressed junk debt of Oakwood Homes, one of the industry’s largest
companies. At the time of that purchase, I did not understand how atrocious
consumer-financing practices had become throughout most of the
manufactured housing industry. But I learned: Oakwood rather promptly went
bankrupt.
不过今年二月，参访团却选择赠送给我一本书- 那是Clayton房屋创办人-Jim
Clayton当时刚出版的自传，我很久以前就知道该公司是组合房屋建筑业的金字招
牌，这源于过去我投资另一家同业Oakwood房屋垃圾债券的惨痛教训，刚开始在我
买进的当头，我本来不清楚这行业的消费贷款竞争情况是如此的惨烈，不过不用多
久，当Oakwood破产后，我就晓得了。
Manufactured housing, it should be emphasized, can deliver very good value to
home purchasers. Indeed, for decades, the industry has accounted for more
than 15% of the homes built in the U.S. During those years, moreover, both the
quality and variety of manufactured houses consistently improved.
但是有一点必须强调的是，组合房屋业对于购屋者来说，绝对是一大福音，事实上
过去数十年来，这行业提供的房屋约占全美建造房屋的15%，更重要的是，所建造
房屋的品质与类型一直不断在提升当中。
Progress in design and construction was not matched, however, by progress in
distribution and financing. Instead, as the years went by, the industry’s
business model increasingly centered on the ability of both the retailer and
manufacturer to unload terrible loans on naive lenders. When “securitization”
then became popular in the 1990s, further distancing the supplier of funds from
the lending transaction, the industry’s conduct went from bad to worse. Much
of its volume a few years back came from buyers who shouldn’t have bought,
financed by lenders who shouldn’t have lent. The consequence has been huge
numbers of repossessions and pitifully low recoveries on the units repossessed.
然而设计与建造技术的改良，却远不及行销与融资方式的演进，到最后这几年，这
行经营的诀窍逐渐变质成如何将零售商与制造商背负的不良贷款转嫁到不知情的金
主身上，当权益证券化开始在1990年代盛行时，进一步使得资金提供者无法提供借
贷，业者的行径也越加脱轨，导致几年来许多不该买房子的人进场买房子，不该借
钱给人的人借钱给人，最后的结果是大量的房屋产权被收回，即便顺利收回也损失
不贷。
Oakwood participated fully in the insanity. But Clayton, though it could not
isolate itself from industry practices, behaved considerably better than its
major competitors.
Oakwood从头到尾都参与了这场闹剧，反观Clayton虽然无法完全撇清，但情况比
起其它主要竞争对手来说，要轻微许多。
Upon receiving Jim Clayton’s book, I told the students how much I admired his
record and they took that message back to Knoxville, home of both the
University of Tennessee and Clayton Homes. Al then suggested that I call Kevin
Clayton, Jim’s son and the CEO, to express my views directly. As I talked with
Kevin, it became clear that he was both able and a straight-shooter.
在收到Jim Clayton的自传后，我向在场的学生们表示个人相当崇拜他的事迹，于是
他们将这项讯息带回家乡Knoxville，那也是田纳西大学与Clayton房屋的所在地，
随后Al更建议我打通电话给Jim Clayton的儿子，Clayton房屋现任总裁-Kevin，直接
表达我个人的看法，在我跟Kevin一聊之后，马上就了解他是一个能干且有话直说
的人。
Soon thereafter, I made an offer for the business based solely on Jim’s book,
my evaluation of Kevin, the public financials of Clayton and what I had learned
from the Oakwood experience. Clayton’s board was receptive, since it
understood that the large-scale financing Clayton would need in the future
might be hard to get. Lenders had fled the industry and securitizations, when
possible at all, carried far more expensive and restrictive terms than was
previously the case. This tightening was particularly serious for Clayton, whose
earnings significantly depended on securitizations.
不久之后，我便出价打算买下这家公司，其判断依据仅仅基于Jim的自传、我个人
对于Kevin的评价、Clayton房屋公开的财务信息以及个人从投资Oakwood所得的经
验，Clayton董事会采取接受的态度，因为他们深知未来很难再为Clayton找到所需
如此大规模的融资来源，金主大举逃离这产业，至于唯一可行的权益证券化却必须
付出比以往更高昂的成本与更严格的条件，这种压迫的感觉，在盈余偏向依赖资产
证券化的Clayton身上尤其明显。
Today, the manufactured housing industry remains awash in problems.
Delinquencies continue high, repossessed units still abound and the number of
retailers has been halved. A different business model is required, one that
eliminates the ability of the retailer and salesman to pocket substantial money
up front by making sales financed by loans that are destined to default. Such
transactions cause hardship to both buyer and lender and lead to a flood of
repossessions that then undercut the sale of new units. Under a proper model –
one requiring significant down payments and shorter-term loans – the industry
will likely remain much smaller than it was in the 90s. But it will deliver to
home buyers an asset in which they will have equity, rather than
disappointment, upon resale.
直到现在，组合房屋建筑业乃未摆脱问题的沉岢，逾期放款依旧高涨、收回余屋量
可观，而中介零售商仅剩一半存活下来，实在有必要发展出一套全新的经营模式，
一套可以防止中介商及业务员将注定会违约的交易所得的大笔佣金放入私人口袋的
有效方法，这类的交易使得买方与借贷方双双陷入困境，另一方面大量涌现的断头
户，更将导致新建的成屋去化不易，在这套合理的制度下，买方将必须支付一大笔
订金，并签订期间较短的借款合约，虽然此举将导致整个产业的规模远较90年代大
幅萎缩，但此举将让购屋者在日后出售房屋时，真正靠此资产受益，而不是一连串
的懊悔。
In the “full circle” department, Clayton has agreed to buy the assets of
Oakwood. When the transaction closes, Clayton’s manufacturing capacity,
geographical reach and sales outlets will be substantially increased. As a
byproduct, the debt of Oakwood that we own, which we bought at a deep
discount, will probably return a small profit to us.
为了使得交易更加圆满，Clayton也已经同意买下Oakwood的资产，在这项交易完
成之后，Clayton组合房屋的产能、经营区域以及销售通路将大幅增长，另外附带的
是，我们当初以大幅折价买进的Oakwood垃圾债券，现在不但债权收回有望，甚至
还能小赚一笔。
And the students? In October, we had a surprise “graduation” ceremony in
Knoxville for the 40 who sparked my interest in Clayton. I donned a
mortarboard and presented each student with both a PhD (for phenomenal,
hard-working dealmaker) from Berkshire and a B share. Al got an A share. If you
meet some of the new Tennessee shareholders at our annual meeting, give
them your thanks. And ask them if they’ve read any good books lately.
至于那40位有功的学生，我们十月在Knoxville举办了一次特别的毕业典礼，我身着
学士帽，亲自颁发每位学生一张Berkshire PhD(专门用以表彰对于Berkshire购并有
功人员)外加每人一股Berkshire B股，至于Al教授则获赠一股A股，所以如果各位在
今年的股东大会上遇到来自田纳西州的新股东，请向他们表示感谢，并记得顺便问
问他们最近读了什么新书。
* * * * * * * * * * * *
In early spring, Byron Trott, a Managing Director of Goldman Sachs, told me
that Wal-Mart wished to sell its McLane subsidiary. McLane distributes groceries
and nonfood items to convenience stores, drug stores, wholesale clubs, mass
merchandisers, quick service restaurants, theaters and others. It’s a good
business, but one not in the mainstream of Wal-Mart’s future. It’s made to
order, however, for us.
今年初春，高盛证券一位执行董事-Byron Trott告诉我，威名百货有意出售其子公
司-McLane，该公司专门为便利商店、药妆店、量贩店、快餐店、戏院等通路，提
供配送杂货以及非食品等物流服务，这是一家好公司，可惜却不是威名百货未来发
展的核心事业，然而对我们来说，她却有如量身订做。
McLane has sales of about $23 billion, but operates on paper-thin margins –
about 1% pre-tax – and will swell Berkshire’s sales figures far more than our
income. In the past, some retailers had shunned McLane because it was owned
by their major competitor. Grady Rosier, McLane’s superb CEO, has already
landed some of these accounts – he was in full stride the day the deal closed –
and more will come.
McLane的年营业额高达230亿美元，但利润却相当微薄，税前利润率约当1%，所以
其对Berkshire营收的膨胀将远大于盈余的贡献，在过去，某些通路商碍于McLane
为主要对手的子公司而放弃她的服务，然而在该公司杰出经理人Grady Rosier的带
领下，已经成功攻下部份市场，即便是交易完成当头，他依然在大步迈进当中。
For several years, I have given my vote to Wal-Mart in the balloting for Fortune
Magazine’s “Most Admired” list. Our McLane transaction reinforced my opinion.
To make the McLane deal, I had a single meeting of about two hours with Tom
Schoewe, Wal-Mart’s CFO, and we then shook hands. (He did, however, first
call Bentonville). Twenty-nine days later Wal-Mart had its money. We did no
“due diligence.” We knew everything would be exactly as Wal-Mart said it
would be – and it was. I should add that Byron has now been instrumental in
three Berkshire acquisitions. He understands Berkshire far better than any
investment banker with whom we have talked and – it hurts me to say this –
earns his fee. I’m looking forward to deal number four (as, I am sure, is he).
多年来，个人一直将财富杂志每年固定举办的年度最佳企业奖投给威名百货，在
McLane的交易完成后，更加加深我的看法，在交易过程中，我只跟威名百货的财务
长Tom Schoewe有过一次二小时的单独会面，之后双方就握手达成共识，(那也是
他第一次造访Bentonville)，29天之后，威名百货就拿到钱，我们没有执行任何实
地查核程序，我们确信所有情况都会像威名所说的那样，事后证明确实如此，有一
点我要特别强调的是，截至目前为止，Byron累计已对三件Berkshire购并案有所启
发，他比过去任何一位与我们有过接触的投资银行家都了解Berkshire，而且我也不
得不承认，他已赚了我们不少顾问费，不过我还是深深期待第四件案子发生，(而我
相信他也还期待!)。
Taxes
租税
On May 20, 2003, The Washington Post ran an op-ed piece by me that was
critical of the Bush tax proposals. Thirteen days later, Pamela Olson, Assistant
Secretary for Tax Policy at the U.S. Treasury, delivered a speech about the new
tax legislation saying, “That means a certain midwestern oracle, who, it must
be noted, has played the tax code like a fiddle, is still safe retaining all his
earnings.” I think she was talking about me.
2003年5月20号，华盛顿邮报的社论版面刊登了本人关于布什减税政策的评论，13
天后，美国财政部主管税务政策的助理秘书Pamela Olson，在一场租税新法令的演
讲中提到，「这代表，我必须这样说，某位擅长玩弄税法的中西部圣人，将可以放
心地留住他赚到的所有钱」，我想她讲的正是我本人!
Alas, my “fiddle playing” will not get me to Carnegie Hall – or even to a high
school recital. Berkshire, on your behalf and mine, will send the Treasury $3.3
billion for tax on its 2003 income, a sum equaling 2.% of the total income tax
paid by all U.S. corporations in fiscal 2003. (In contrast, Berkshire’s market
valuation is about 1% of the value of all American corporations.) Our payment
will almost certainly place us among our country’s top ten taxpayers. Indeed, if
only 540 taxpayers paid the amount Berkshire will pay, no other individual or
corporation would have to pay anything to Uncle Sam. That’s right: 290 million
Americans and all other businesses would not have to pay a dime in income,
social security, excise or estate taxes to the federal government. (Here’s the
math: Federal tax receipts, including social security receipts, in fiscal 2003
totaled $1.782 trillion and 540 “Berkshires,” each paying $3.3 billion, would
deliver the same $1.782 trillion.)
可惜的是，我的琴技不要说无法让我进入卡内基音乐厅，甚至可能连高中音乐会都
派不上用场，Berkshire 2003年总计缴交了33亿美元的所得税，约占全美所有企业
缴交国库的2.5%，(相对之下，Berkshire的市值仅占全美企业总值的1%)，这金额肯
定可以让我们名列全美纳税大户前十名，没错，假使全只要有540个像Berkshire这
样的纳税人，不论是企业或是个人，其它所有人都可以不必再缴一毛的税给美国政
府，让我再说一次，全美其余2.9亿的人民以及其它公司不必再支付一毛的所得税、
社会保险费、不动产契税给联邦政府，(这里有一个简单的数学算式，2003年联邦
政府税收，包含社会保险费在内，金额为1.782兆美元，只要有540个像Berkshire，
每位缴纳33亿美元就足矣!)。
Our federal tax return for 2002 (2003 is not finalized), when we paid $1.75
billion, covered a mere 8,905 pages. As is required, we dutifully filed two
copies of this return, creating a pile of paper seven feet tall. At World
Headquarters, our small band of 15.8, though exhausted, momentarily flushed
