这场经典的赛事，甚至还用慢动作播放精彩的第四节，我们以今年封面的颜色表 .63
with pride: Berkshire, we felt, was surely pulling its share of our country’s
fiscal load.
2002年(2003年尚未核定)Berkshire总计缴了17.5亿美元，税务申报书厚达8,905
页，，依规定税务申报书须附两份，叠起来有七英呎高，由在Berkshire的全球总部
区区的15.8个人，拼死拼活赶出报告，因此我们可以大声地说：Berkshire已经尽到
其应尽的纳税义务。
But Ms. Olson sees things otherwise. And if that means Charlie and I need to try
harder, we are ready to do so.
但是Olson女士却有不同的看法，如果这代表查理跟我本人目前所作的努力还不够
的话，我们唯有再加把劲了。
I do wish, however, that Ms. Olson would give me some credit for the progress
I’ve already made. In 1944, I filed my first 1040, reporting my income as a
thirteen-year-old newspaper carrier. The return covered three pages. After I
claimed the appropriate business deductions, such as $35 for a bicycle, my tax
bill was $7. I sent my check to the Treasury and it – without comment –
promptly cashed it. We lived in peace.
不过我还是希望Olson女士能为我过去所做的努力给予一些赞许，回顾1944年当我
还是一个年仅13岁的送报生时，第一次申报所得税，整个1040表只有三页，在减除
35元的脚踏车扣抵之后，结算出应纳税额为7.1美元，我将支票寄给美国国库，并
于不久之后兑现，一直以来，我们都相安无事。
* * * * * * * * * * * *
I can understand why the Treasury is now frustrated with Corporate America
and prone to outbursts. But it should look to Congress and the Administration
for redress, not to Berkshire.
我可以体会为何财政部现在对于美国企业相当感冒，且已经到了忍无可忍的地步，
但他们应该做的是将目标锁定在国会以及行政体系寻求解决之道，而不是将矛头对
准Berkshire。
Corporate income taxes in fiscal 2003 accounted for 7.4% of all federal tax
receipts, down from a post-war peak of 32% in 1952. With one exception
(1983), last year’s percentage is the lowest recorded since data was first
published in 1934.
2003年会计年度，美国企业全体累计缴纳所得税仅占联邦税收的7.4%，远低于1952
年战后32%的巅峰，除了1983年外，去年的比率是自1934年有统计数字以来最低的
一年。
Even so, tax breaks for corporations (and their investors, particularly large
ones) were a major part of the Administration’s 2002 and 2003 initiatives. If
class warfare is being waged in America, my class is clearly winning. Today,
many large corporations – run by CEOs whose fiddle-playing talents make your
Chairman look like he is all thumbs – pay nothing close to the stated federal tax
rate of 35%.
即便如此，企业以及其投资人 (尤其是大股东)享有更多的租税优惠，是2002年及
2003年布什政府减税法案的主轴，如果今天美国发生阶级战争，则属于我们这一阶
级显然将获得大胜，相较于其它美国大企业总裁所玩弄的技巧，本人的程度显然只
能算是个三岁小孩，支付的所得税与法定联邦所得税率35%相差无几。
In 1985, Berkshire paid $132 million in federal income taxes, and all
corporations paid $61 billion. The comparable amounts in 1995 were $286
million and $157 billion respectively. And, as mentioned, we will pay about
$3.3 billion for 2003, a year when all corporations paid $132 billion. We hope
our taxes continue to rise in the future – it will mean we are prospering – but
we also hope that the rest of Corporate America antes up along with us. This
might be a project for Ms. Olson to work on.
1985年Berkshire支付了1.32亿美元的联邦所得税，而所有美国企业合计缴纳了610
亿美元，相较于1995年，Berkshire支付了2.86亿美元的税，而所有美国企业合计缴
纳了1,570亿美元，另外刚刚说过，2003年Berkshire支付了33亿美元的联邦所得
税，但所有美国企业合计缴纳的金额却仅有1,320亿美元，我们期望未来Berkshire
缴纳的所得税金额能够继续增加，因为那代表我们又赚了更多的钱，但在这同时，
我们也希望其它美国企业也能够向我们看齐，我认为这才是Olson女士应该努力的
方向。
Corporate Governance
公司治理
In judging whether Corporate America is serious about reforming itself, CEO pay
remains the acid test. To date, the results aren’t encouraging. A few CEOs,
such as Jeff Immelt of General Electric, have led the way in initiating programs
that are fair to managers and shareholders alike. Generally, however, his
example has been more admired than followed.
在判断美国企业是否真的有心进行改革，CEO的薪资报酬绝对是最关键的指针之
一，然而直到现在，其结果显然令人感到相当失望，少数的CEO包含GE的Jeff
Immelt带头推动公平对待经理人与股东双方的方案，然而总的来说，他的示范所获
得表面的赞许显然远多于实际的跟进动作。
It’s understandable how pay got out of hand. When management hires
employees, or when companies bargain with a vendor, the intensity of interest
is equal on both sides of the table. One party’s gain is the other party’s loss,
and the money involved has real meaning to both. The result is an honest-to
God negotiation.
我们很容易理解薪资给付为何会失去控制，当管理阶层聘雇员工或是公司与供货商
讨价还价时，双方的利益属于零和游戏，一方得利就等于就是另一方的损失，中间
牵涉的利益对彼此都极具意义，所得结果一般相信较公正客观。
But when CEOs (or their representatives) have met with compensation
committees, too often one side – the CEO’s – has cared far more than the other
about what bargain is struck. A CEO, for example, will always regard the
difference between receiving options for 100,000 shares or for 500,000 as
monumental. To a comp committee, however, the difference may seem
unimportant – particularly if, as has been the case at most companies, neither
grant will have any effect on reported earnings. Under these conditions, the
negotiation often has a “play-money” quality.
但是当CEO(或是其代表)与薪资委员会谈到报酬时，则CEO这边在乎最后敲定的条件
的情况远胜于另一方，比如说，CEO可能会对是否能多争取到10万股的认股权或是
50万美元的年薪而耿耿于怀，然而对于另一边身为配角的委员会来说，这样的差异
看起来似乎无关紧要，尤其是对大部分的公司来说，给或不给对于公司的盈余报表
不会有任何影响，在这样的情况下，谈判的过程往往带点数字游戏性质。
Overreaching by CEOs greatly accelerated in the 1990s as compensation
packages gained by the most avaricious– a title for which there was vigorous
competition – were promptly replicated elsewhere. The couriers for this
epidemic of greed were usually consultants and human relations departments,
which had no trouble perceiving who buttered their bread. As one
compensation consultant commented: “There are two classes of clients you
don’t want to offend – actual and potential.”
CEO越矩的行为在1990年代变本加厉，一旦某个离谱的薪资报酬方案被采纳，其它
经理人立刻就会跟进比照，这种贪婪习气的媒介者，往往就是那些人力资源顾问与
公关部门，他们很清楚谁才是喂奶给他们喝的娘，就像是一位人力资源顾问曾说的
「有两种客户是你绝对不愿意得罪的，现有的以及潜在的」。
In proposals for reforming this malfunctioning system, the cry has been for
“independent” directors. But the question of what truly motivates
independence has largely been neglected.
在导正这个失控系统的改革方案中，呼声最高的是引进”独立”的董事，但问题是真
正促使董事独立的因素却反而被忽视了。
In last year’s report, I took a look at how “independent” directors – as defined
by statute – had performed in the mutual fund field. The Investment Company
Act of 1940 mandated such directors, and that means we’ve had an extended
test of what statutory standards produce. In our examination last year, we
looked at the record of fund directors in respect to the two key tasks board
members should perform – whether at a mutual fund business or any other.
These two all-important functions are, first, to obtain (or retain) an able and
honest manager and then to compensate that manager fairly.
为此我特定检视了一下去年发布的一些年报，看看目前共同基金依照法令设置的独
立董事是如何行使其职权的，独立董事设置的法源 系根据1940年就订定的投资公司
法，这也意味我们可以有一段很长的时间来检视法令订定后的成果，身为董事，不
论是共同基金或是其它行业，有两项最重要的任务，分别是找到或留住才干品行兼
备的经理人，以及给予其适当合理的报酬，因此我们乃针对基金董事有关这两项任
务的表现记录进行检讨。
Our survey was not encouraging. Year after year, at literally thousands of
funds, directors had routinely rehired the incumbent management company,
however pathetic its performance had been. Just as routinely, the directors had
mindlessly approved fees that in many cases far exceeded those that could
have been negotiated. Then, when a management company was sold –
invariably at a huge price relative to tangible assets – the directors experienced
a “counter-revelation” and immediately signed on with the new manager and
accepted its fee schedule. In effect, the directors decided that whoever would
pay the most for the old management company was the party that should
manage the shareholders’ money in the future.
我们调查的结果并不乐观，年复一年，成千上万的共同基金，不论其绩效有多惨，
不断地续聘现任的基金管理公司，依照惯例，董事们毫不用心地核准远超过合理程
度的管理费用，之后当管理公司被卖掉，通常会以高于实体净值的价格出售，董事
们突然又”幡然悔改”，立刻与新的经理人签约，并全盘接受其所提出的收费结构，
实际上，董事们的考量是谁愿意出最高价买下原有管理公司的人，就可以在未来管
理投资人的钱。
Despite the lapdog behavior of independent fund directors, we did not conclude
that they are bad people. They’re not. But sadly, “boardroom atmosphere”
almost invariably sedates their fiduciary genes.
尽管这些基金独立董事的摇摆狗行为，但不代表我们认为这些人是坏人，他们显然
不是，但遗憾的是，董事会的气氛让他们的忠诚基因沉寂下来。
On May 22, 2003, not long after Berkshire’s report appeared, the Chairman of
the Investment Company Institute addressed its membership about “The State
of our Industry.” Responding to those who have “weighed in about our
perceived failings,” he mused, “It makes me wonder what life would be like if
we’d actually done something wrong.”
Be careful what you wish for.
2003年5月22日，在Berkshire的年报公布不久之后，投资公司协会的主席对其会员
发表有关”产业现况”的报告时，在有人问到「衡量我们目前感受到的失败气氛」，
他半开玩笑地回答，这让我不禁想到如果我们真的做错了什么事时，结果会怎样。
小心你的期望落空!
Within a few months, the world began to learn that many fund-management
companies had followed policies that hurt the owners of the funds they
managed, while simultaneously boosting the fees of the managers. Prior to
their transgressions, it should be noted, these management companies were
earning profit margins and returns on tangible equity that were the envy of
Corporate America. Yet to swell profits further, they trampled on the interests
of fund shareholders in an appalling manner.
就在几个月内，全世界慢慢开始明了许多基金管理公司过去一直以来，一面进行着
伤害其所管理基金投资人权益的程序，一面又大幅膨胀基金经理人的管理费用，必
须说明的是，这些基金管理公司在大幅越矩之前，本来就享有比一般美国企业还高
的投资报酬率，但为了进一步膨胀获利，他们竟胆敢以骇世惊人的手法，践踏投资
人的利益。
So what are the directors of these looted funds doing? As I write this, I have
seen none that have terminated the contract of the offending management
company (though naturally that entity has often fired some of its employees).
Can you imagine directors who had been personally defrauded taking such a
boyswill- be-boys attitude?
那么这些被掠夺的基金，其董事到底做了些什么 直到我下笔的时刻，我还没有看
到任何一位董事跳出来终止与胆大妄为基金经理公司所签订的合约(虽然这些公司会
意思意思开除几个员工)，我就不相信当这些董事自身的权益被侵害时，还会采取如
此吊儿琅当的态度。
To top it all off, at least one miscreant management company has put itself up
for sale, undoubtedly hoping to receive a huge sum for “delivering” the mutual
funds it has managed to the highest bidder among other managers. This is a
travesty. Why in the world don’t the directors of those funds simply select
whomever they think is best among the bidding organizations and sign up with
that party directly? The winner would consequently be spared a huge “payoff”
to the former manager who, having flouted the principles of stewardship,
deserves not a dime. Not having to bear that acquisition cost, the winner could
surely manage the funds in question for a far lower ongoing fee than would
otherwise have been the case. Any truly independent director should insist on
this approach to obtaining a new manager.
更惨的是，至少有一家为非作歹的管理公司公开对外标售，明目张胆的意图将自己
掌管的资金出卖给出价最高的竞标者，这完全是一场拙劣的闹剧，为何这些董事就
不能选出一个真心替投资人着想的管理公司，同时直接跟对方签约? 如此得标者就
可以省下一笔原本必须给前任经理人的钜额补偿金，因为这位奢言治理原则的经理
人根本就不配拿到任何一毛钱，而由于不必承担这笔购并的成本，接任者肯定会接
受以远比通常管理费率还低的收费来管理公司，我相信任何一位真正独立的董事都
应该坚持采用这种方式选任新的基金经理人。
The reality is that neither the decades-old rules regulating investment company
directors nor the new rules bearing down on Corporate America foster the
election of truly independent directors. In both instances, an individual who is
receiving 100% of his income from director fees – and who may wish to enhance
his income through election to other boards – is deemed independent. That is
nonsense. The same rules say that Berkshire director and lawyer Ron Olson,
who receives from us perhaps 3% of his very large income, does not qualify as
independent because that 3% comes from legal fees Berkshire pays his firm
rather than from fees he earns as a Berkshire director. Rest assured, 3% from
any source would not torpedo Ron’s independence. But getting 20%, 30% or 50%
of their income from director fees might well temper the independence of
many individuals, particularly if their overall income is not large. Indeed, I
think it’s clear that at mutual funds, it has.
现实的情况是几十年规范投资公司董事的老规矩或者是压倒美国企业的新规定都无
法选任出真正具独立性的董事，在两种情况下，一旦有人可以百分之百靠收取董事
酬劳过活，那么他一定会想法子再去争取担任其它公司的董事，而离谱的是，这样
的做法竟然还可以被视为独立，这实在完全没有道理，另一方面，根据相同的规
定，在Berkshire董事之一的Ron Olson律师反而变得不独立，虽然他从Berkshire所
得的收入仅占其整体收入的3%，但他不被视为独立的理由，竟然是因为他领的是法
律顾问费而非董事的酬劳，我想大家可以确定的是，不论这3%的来源为何，都不会
妨碍到Ron的独立性，反之我认为不论名目为何，只要你从任何一个地方拿到20%、
30%或50%，那肯定就会影响到独立性，尤其考量到其它收入相对微薄之时，而我可
以相当肯定的是在共同基金界的情况就是如此。
* * * * * * * * * * *
Let me make a small suggestion to “independent” mutual fund directors. Why
not simply affirm in each annual report that “(1) We have looked at other
management companies and believe the one we have retained for the upcoming
year is among the better operations in the field; and (2) we have negotiated a
fee with our managers comparable to what other clients with equivalent funds
would negotiate.”
在这里让我对共同基金的董事们给予一个衷心的建议，大家为何不在基金年报上做
出以下的声明。：(1)在征询过其它基金管理公司后，我们确信目前选定的公司堪称
业界一时之选；(2)我们已经与基金经理人商议过管理费用，并获得与规模相当同业
一致的收费水准。
It does not seem unreasonable for shareholders to expect fund directors – who
are often receiving fees that exceed $100,000 annually – to declare themselves
on these points. Certainly these directors would satisfy themselves on both
matters were they handing over a large chunk of their own money to the
manager. If directors are unwilling to make these two declarations,
shareholders should heed the maxim “If you don’t know whose side someone is
on, he’s probably not on yours.”
我想投资人期望基金董事们能够做到上述这些声明的要求并不过分，尤其考量这些
董事每年平均收到超过十万美元以上的高额酬劳，而且我们可以肯定的是如果他们
在处理个人金钱的时候，他们也一定会做到以上这些事情，而如果有董事不愿做出
以上这两点声明，投资人就必须要特别小心，俗谚有云：如果你不确信他是不是站
在你这边，那么他很可能就是敌人。
Finally, a disclaimer. A great many funds have been run well and
conscientiously despite the opportunities for malfeasance that exist. The
shareholders of these funds have benefited, and their managers have earned
their pay. Indeed, if I were a director of certain funds, including some that
charge above-average fees, I would enthusiastically make the two declarations I
have suggested. Additionally, those index funds that are very low-cost (such as
Vanguard’s) are investor-friendly by definition and are the best selection for
most of those who wish to own equities.
最后，是一项声明，许多基金的运作相当正常良好，即使舞弊的机会确实存在，这
些基金的投资人依然因此受惠，经理人也赚取其应得之份，确实如果我担任某些基
金的董事，包含那些我认为收费过高的基金，我一定会积极地做出以上的那些声
明，此外，还有一些收费相当低廉的指数型基金(比如说先锋基金)其本质相当适合
某些投资人，我认为对于某些想要投资股票的人来说，算是相当不错的选择。
I am on my soapbox now only because the blatant wrongdoing that has occurred
has betrayed the trust of so many millions of shareholders. Hundreds of industry
insiders had to know what was going on, yet none publicly said a word. It took
