这场经典的赛事，甚至还用慢动作播放精彩的第四节，我们以今年封面的颜色表 .64
Eliot Spitzer, and the whistleblowers who aided him, to initiate a
housecleaning. We urge fund directors to continue the job. Like directors
throughout Corporate America, these fiduciaries must now decide whether
their job is to work for owners or for managers.
现在的我就像是站在肥皂箱上，眼见公然露骨的行为不断发生，背叛了数百万投资
人的信任，许多业内人士都相当清楚事件发生的来龙去脉，但就是没有人敢站出来
说一句公道话，最后还是劳驾史匹哲检察官以及其它协助办案的执法同仁，出面来
进行一次大清扫，我们敦促这些共同基金董事们继续执行这些工作，就像是全美其
他企业的董事，这些受托的人士必须决定他们到底是为了投资人或是经理人服务。
Berkshire Governance
Berkshire治理
True independence – meaning the willingness to challenge a forceful CEO when
something is wrong or foolish – is an enormously valuable trait in a director. It is
also rare. The place to look for it is among high-grade people whose interests
are in line with those of rank-and-file shareholders – and are in line in a very
big way.
真正的独立，代表的是当企业发生错误或是愚昧的事情时，董事有勇于挑战强势总
裁的勇气，这是担任董事必须具备最重要的特质之一，可惜这种特质极其罕见，要
找到这种特质必须从品格高尚且利益着眼点与一般股东一致的人士，一定要相当一
致的才行。
We’ve made that search at Berkshire. We now have eleven directors and each
of them, combined with members of their families, owns more than $4 million
of Berkshire stock. Moreover, all have held major stakes in Berkshire for many
years. In the case of six of the eleven, family ownership amounts to at least
hundreds of millions and dates back at least three decades. All eleven directors
purchased their holdings in the market just as you did; we’ve never passed out
options or restricted shares. Charlie and I love such honest-to-God ownership.
After all, who ever washes a rental car?
在Berkshire我们试着从内部寻找这类的人选，我们现在拥有十一位董事，而他们每
一位，包含其家族成员在内，加起来总共持有价值超过400万美元的Berkshire股
票，而且每位持股的时间都相当长，其中六位，其家族持股价值都超过数千万美
元，持有时间甚至长达30年以上，同时所有董事的持股跟其它股东一样都是从公开
市场用钱买来的，我们从来没有发放过选择权或是特别股，查理跟我喜欢这种俯仰
无愧的持股方式，毕竟没有人会喜欢去洗外面租来的车。
In addition, director fees at Berkshire are nominal (as my son, Howard,
periodically reminds me). Thus, the upside from Berkshire for all eleven is
proportionately the same as the upside for any Berkshire shareholder. And it
always will be.
此外，Berkshire董事酬劳平平(我儿子-Howard就时常提醒我这件事)，换句话说，
Berkshire全体董事的利益按比例与其它任何一位Berkshire完全一致，一直以来皆是
如此。
The downside for Berkshire directors is actually worse than yours because we
carry no directors and officers liability insurance. Therefore, if something really
catastrophic happens on our directors’ watch, they are exposed to losses that
will far exceed yours.
不过Berkshire董事们的不利的一面实际上远高于各位股东，因为我们没有投保任何
的董事主管责任险，因此如果有任何可能的灾难发生在董事们身上，他们面临的损
失将远高于各位。
The bottom line for our directors: You win, they win big; you lose, they lose
big. Our approach might be called owner-capitalism. We know of no better way
to engender true independence. (This structure does not guarantee perfect
behavior, however: I’ve sat on boards of companies in which Berkshire had huge
stakes and remained silent as questionable proposals were rubber-stamped.)
我们董事们的最后底线是，如果你们赢，他们就大赢，如果你们输，他们就大输，
我们的方式或许可以被称之为所有者资本主义，我们不知道有什么方法可以维持真
正的独立性，(虽然这样的安排无法保证一定会有完美的结局，但这比起我个人在
Berkshire拥有大量股份的公司董事会担任董事，当大多数有疑问的提案提出时，董
事会往往只能扮演橡皮图章的角色，要好的太多了)。
In addition to being independent, directors should have business savvy, a
shareholder orientation and a genuine interest in the company. The rarest of
these qualities is business savvy – and if it is lacking, the other two are of little
help. Many people who are smart, articulate and admired have no real
understanding of business. That’s no sin; they may shine elsewhere. But they
don’t belong on corporate boards. Similarly, I would be useless on a medical or
scientific board (though I would likely be welcomed by a chairman who wanted
to run things his way). My name would dress up the list of directors, but I
wouldn’t know enough to critically evaluate proposals. Moreover, to cloak my
ignorance, I would keep my mouth shut (if you can imagine that). In effect, I
could be replaced, without loss, by a potted plant.
除了要维持独立性，董事们也必须具备丰富的商务经验、以股东利益为导向再加上
在这家公司拥有真正的利益，在这三样条件中，第一项尤为难得，如果缺乏这一
项，其它两项的作用就不大，社会上有许多聪明、有思想且受人景仰的知名人物，
但他们对企业却没有充足的了解，这并不是他们的错，或许他们可以在别的领域发
光发亮，但他们并不适合待在企业的董事会内，就像我本人也不适合待在医学或科
学的委员会一样(虽然我可能也会是一些想要为所欲为的主席所欢迎的对象)，我个
人的名声或许可以让董事会的组成更添光彩，但我却相当清楚自己没有足够的能力
在这类的董事会上评论所提方案的可行性，更有甚者，为了要掩饰个人的无知，我
可能会选择紧闭双唇(大家可以想象哪种景况)，事实上，如果我的位置可以由一个
花盆来取代可能也无伤大雅。
Last year, as we moved to change our board, I asked for self-nominations from
shareholders who believed they had the requisite qualities to be a Berkshire
director. Despite the lack of either liability insurance or meaningful
compensation, we received more than twenty applications. Most were good,
coming from owner-oriented individuals having family holdings of Berkshire
worth well over $1 million. After considering them, Charlie and I – with the
concurrence of our incumbent directors – asked four shareholders who did not
nominate themselves to join the board: David Gottesman, Charlotte Guyman,
Don Keough and Tom Murphy. These four people are all friends of mine, and I
know their strengths well. They bring an extraordinary amount of business
talent to Berkshire’s board.
去年，我们着手调整董事会组织，我公开征求自认符合各项条件的股东自告奋勇担
任Berkshire董事，尽管没有董事责任险或者高额的董事报酬，我们还是接到超过20
件以上的申请，大部分申请者的条件都相当不错，许多以股东利益为导向的个人连
同家族持股都超过百万美元，但在考量这些报名者后，查理跟我，在其它现任董事
们的同意之下，我们还是邀请其它四位未提名自己担任董事的人士加入董事会，他
们分别是David Gottesman、Charlotte Guyman、Don Keough以及Tom Murphy，
这四位都是我个人的好朋友，我很了解他们的能力，他们也会为Berkshire董事会增
添了不少商业色彩。
The primary job of our directors is to select my successor, either upon my
death or disability, or when I begin to lose my marbles. (David Ogilvy had it
right when he said: “Develop your eccentricities when young. That way, when
you get older, people won’t think you are going gaga.” Charlie’s family and
mine feel that we overreacted to David’s advice.)
董事会的主要责任就是选任未来接替我的人选，不管是在我死亡、失去能力或理智
之后，(奥美广告创办人David Ogilvy曾说，在年轻时应该培养怪僻，这样等你老了
之后，就没有人会认为你是阿达怪脚)，查理跟我本人的家族都觉得我们俩对于
Ogilvy的建议反应过度。
At our directors’ meetings we cover the usual run of housekeeping matters. But
the real discussion – both with me in the room and absent – centers on the
strengths and weaknesses of the four internal candidates to replace me.
在董事会开会时，我们除了进行例行的公式之外，真正实质的讨论-不论我有没有出
席-主要的议题就是围绕在内部可能接替我四位人选各自的优缺点。
Our board knows that the ultimate scorecard on its performance will be
determined by the record of my successor. He or she will need to maintain
Berkshire’s culture, allocate capital and keep a group of America’s best
managers happy in their jobs. This isn’t the toughest task in the world – the
train is already moving at a good clip down the track – and I’m totally
comfortable about it being done well by any of the four candidates we have
identified. I have more than 99% of my net worth in Berkshire and will be happy
to have my wife or foundation (depending on the order in which she and I die)
continue this concentration.
我们的董事会相当了解，其功过将由其选定接任我的继承者实际的成绩来论定，他
或是她必须要能够维持Berkshire的企业文化、分配资金同时让这群全美最优秀的经
理人乐在各位的岗位上，这绝非世界上最困难的任务，因为我们的事业早已步入正
轨，而我个人对于目前四位可能接替我的人选都感到相当放心，目前我个人将超过
99%的身家都摆在Berkshire之上，而往后我也很乐见我太太或基金会(这取决于我跟
她谁先死)将财产继续集中在Berkshire。
Sector Results
部门成绩
As managers, Charlie and I want to give our owners the financial information
and commentary we would wish to receive if our roles were reversed. To do
this with both clarity and reasonable brevity becomes more difficult as
Berkshire’s scope widens. Some of our businesses have vastly different
economic characteristics from others, which means that our consolidated
statements, with their jumble of figures, make useful analysis almost
impossible.
身为经理人，查理跟我希望能够提供给股东，若是角色互换，我们希望经营阶层能
够提供给我们所有的财务信息与看法，而随着Berkshire的版图日益扩大，要做到透
明化与合理简洁化其难度越来越高，我们旗下有些企业的经营性质与其它企业截然
不同，这也代表着我们合并之后庞杂的数字与报表，实在难以进行任何合理有意义
的分析。
On the following pages, therefore, we will present some balance sheet and
earnings figures from our four major categories of businesses along with
commentary about each. We particularly want you to understand the limited
circumstances under which we will use debt, since typically we shun it. We will
not, however, inundate you with data that has no real value in calculating
Berkshire’s intrinsic value. Doing so would likely obfuscate the most important
facts. One warning: When analyzing Berkshire, be sure to remember that the
company should be viewed as an unfolding movie, not as a still photograph.
Those who focused in the past on only the snapshot of the day sometimes
reached erroneous conclusions.
因此，在接下来的篇幅，我们将按旗下四大事业分别列示资产负债表与盈余数字并
加以说明，特别要告诉大家的是，只有在罕见的情况下，我们才会举债经营，基本
上我们一向对负债采取回避的态度，同时我们也不会塞给各位一些对于衡量
Berkshire实质价值毫无意义的信息，因为那样做只会模糊了真正的焦点，另外要提
醒大家，在分析Berkshire时，记得把它当作是一部正在上演的影片，而不是一张静
止的照片，否则仅靠单一片段的信息有时很可能会得到错误的结论。
Insurance
保险事业
Let’s start with insurance – since that’s where the money is.
首先登场的是保险事业，因为这也是真正的重心所在。
The fountain of funds we enjoy in our insurance operations comes from “float,”
which is money that doesn’t belong to us but that we temporarily hold. Most of
our float arises because (1) premiums are paid upfront though the service we
provide – insurance protection – is delivered over a period that usually covers a
year and; (2) loss events that occur today do not always result in our
immediately paying claims, since it sometimes takes years for losses to be
reported (think asbestos), negotiated and settled.
我们经营保险事业所取得主要资金的来源就是浮存金，这笔钱并不属于我们而只是
交给我们暂时保管，浮存金的来源包含(1)藉由我们所提供的服务-亦即保险防护
时，所收到的保费，期间通常长达一年，(2)损失已经发生但却不必马上支付的理赔
金，因为有些损失可能要经过一段很长的时间之后才会被通报、协商乃至于和解(就
像是石绵案一样)。
Float is wonderful – if it doesn’t come at a high price. The cost of float is
determined by underwriting results, meaning how losses and expenses paid
compare with premiums received. The property-casualty industry as a whole
regularly operates at a substantial underwriting loss, and therefore often has a
cost of float that is unattractive.
保险浮存金固然多多益善，但前提是其取得成本不能太高，浮存金的成本取决于核
保绩效，也就是相对于收到的保费收入，支应损失及费用的比例，产物意外险通常
都会产生核保损失，其结果往往导致浮存金的成本不太理想。
Overall, our results have been good. True, we’ve had five terrible years in
which float cost us more than 10%. But in 18 of the 37 years Berkshire has been
in the insurance business, we have operated at an underwriting profit, meaning
we were actually paid for holding money. And the quantity of this cheap money
has grown far beyond what I dreamed it could when we entered the business in
1967.
总的来说，我们的成绩相当出色，确实我们过去曾有五个年头浮存金的成本超过
10%，但是在Berkshire跨入保险领域的37个年头中，有18个年头享有核保利益，这
代表我们以收取费用的方式保管这些资金，而这些便宜资金累积的速度远远超过当
初1967年我介入这个行业时的预期。
Yearend Float (in $ millions)
Other Other
Year GEICO General Re Reinsurance Primary Total
1967 20 20
1977 40 131 171
1987 701 807 1,508
1997 2,917 4,014 455 7,386
1998 3,125 14,909 4,305 415 22,754
1999 3,444 15,166 6,285 403 25,298
2000 3,943 15,525 7,805 598 27,871
2001 4,251 19,310 11,262 685 35,508
2002 4,678 22,207 13,396 943 41,224
2003 5,287 23,654 13,948 1,331 44,220
Last year was a standout. Float reached record levels and it came without cost
as all major segments contributed to Berkshire’s $1.7 billion pre-tax
underwriting profit.
去年的表现尤其杰出，累积的浮存金再度创下历史新高，这些资金不但没有成本，
而且额外还贡献了17亿美元的税前核保利益。
Our results have been exceptional for one reason: We have truly exceptional
managers. Insurers sell a non-proprietary piece of paper containing a nonproprietary
promise. Anyone can copy anyone else’s product. No installed base,
key patents, critical real estate or natural resource position protects an
insurer’s competitive position. Typically, brands do not mean much either.
我们的成绩之所以能够这么出色，只有一个原因，那就是我们拥有真正杰出的经理
人，保险公司贩售的是不具任何独特性的保单，任何人都可以仿制类似的产品，没
有固定的基础、重要的专利、不动产或任何自然资源来保护现有竞争优势，而通常
品牌的重要性也不那么明显。
The critical variables, therefore, are managerial brains, discipline and
integrity. Our managers have all of these attributes – in spades. Let’s take a
look at these all-stars and their operations.
因此真正关键的因素还在于管理者的智能、纪律以及品格，我们旗下的经理人统统
具备这样的特性，接下来就让我们一起来欣赏这些明星经理人以及他们的营运成
果。
. General Re had been Berkshire’s problem child in the years following our
acquisition of it in 1998. Unfortunately, it was a 400-pound child, and its
negative impact on our overall performance was large.
通用再保在我们于1998年购并之后，一直就是Berkshire的问题小孩，更惨的是，他
还是一个重达四百磅的巨无霸小孩，所以他的负面效应对我们整体表现的影响极为
重大。
That’s behind us: Gen Re is fixed. Thank Joe Brandon, its CEO, and his partner,
Tad Montross, for that. When I wrote you last year, I thought that discipline had
been restored to both underwriting and reserving, and events during 2003
solidified my view.
不过这已经是过去式，通用再保已经完全恢复，这要感谢Joe Brandon总裁以及他
的伙伴Tad Montross为我们所作的一切，当我去年在写年报的时候，我以为所有核
保的纪律以及损失准备的提列都已完全改进，2003年所发生的事件更加加深我这样
的看法。
That does not mean we will never have setbacks. Reinsurance is a business that
is certain to deliver blows from time to time. But, under Joe and Tad, this
operation will be a powerful engine driving Berkshire’s future profitability.
当然这不代表以后就完全不会再有问题，再保险这行业本来就注定不时会有爆炸性
事件发生，但在Joe及Tad的领导下，这家公司将会是Berkshire未来获利成长的重要
推动力。
Gen Re’s financial strength, unmatched among reinsurers even as we started
2003, further improved during the year. Many of the company’s competitors
suffered credit downgrades last year, leaving Gen Re, and its sister operation at
National Indemnity, as the only AAArated companies among the world’s major
reinsurers.
通用再保的财务实力，是其它再保同业所无法比拟的，遑论2003年该公司的实力又
更上一层楼，相形之下，许多同业在去年的信用评等纷纷被降级，使得通用再保以
及其姊妹公司国家产险成为全世界主要再保险公司中，唯一具备三A最高信用评等
等级的再保业者。
When insurers purchase reinsurance, they buy only a promise – one whose
validity may not be tested for decades – and there are no promises in the
reinsurance world equaling those offered by Gen Re and National Indemnity.
Furthermore, unlike most reinsurers, we retain virtually all of the risks we
assume. Therefore, our ability to pay is not dependent on the ability or
willingness of others to reimburse us. This independent financial strength could
be enormously important when the industry experiences the mega-catastrophe
it surely will.
