这场经典的赛事，甚至还用慢动作播放精彩的第四节，我们以今年封面的颜色表 .66
我个人所管理的一些三A评等的固定收益证券，过去几年的获利都还不错，这些机
会来来去去，但就现阶段而言，我们找不到什么机会，反倒是去年我们主动弃他们
而去，这部份的利益约占表上已实现收益的24%。
Though far from foolproof, these transactions involve no credit risk and are
conducted in exceptionally liquid securities. We therefore finance the positions
almost entirely with borrowed money. As the assets are reduced, so also are
the borrowings. The smaller portfolio we now have means that in the near
future our earnings in this category will decline significantly. It was fun while it
lasted, and at some point we’ll get another turn at bat.
虽然不是那么简单易懂，但由于这些交易未牵涉到信用风险，且多为流动性极高的
有价证券，因此我们几乎都是以融资的方式买进这些部位，所以当这部份的资产减
少，相对应的负债也跟着消失，目前仅存的少数部位意味着在未来这部份的收益将
大幅减少，过去持有他们的经验相当愉快，我相信不久之后，又会轮到我们上场打
击。
. A far less pleasant unwinding operation is taking place at Gen Re Securities,
the trading and derivatives operation we inherited when we purchased General
Reinsurance.
至于清理通用再保证券部门的经验就没有那么令人感到愉快了，衍生性金融商品交
易部门在我们买进该公司时就已经存在了。
When we began to liquidate Gen Re Securities in early 2002, it had 23,218
outstanding tickets with 884 counterparties (some having names I couldn’t
pronounce, much less creditworthiness I could evaluate). Since then, the unit’s
managers have been skillful and diligent in unwinding positions. Yet, at yearend
– nearly two years later – we still had 7,580 tickets outstanding with 453
counterparties. (As the country song laments, “How can I miss you if you won’t
go away?”)
当我们在2002年初开始着手清算通用再保证券时，它还有23,218份合约流通在外，
总计有884位交易对象(我甚至不会念某些交易对方的名字，更不用说要去评估这些
公司的信用)，打从那时起，部门经理人就开始努力小心地清理这些部位，然而经过
两年之后，直到去年底，我们还有7,580份合约流通在外，牵涉453个交易对象，(就
像有首乡村歌曲形容的，如果你不离去，我又如何能想念你呢?)。
The shrinking of this business has been costly. We’ve had pre-tax losses of $173
million in 2002 and $99 million in 2003. These losses, it should be noted, came
from a portfolio of contracts that – in full compliance with GAAP – had been
regularly marked-to-market with standard allowances for future credit-loss and
administrative costs. Moreover, our liquidation has taken place both in a benign
market – we’ve had no credit losses of significance – and in an orderly manner.
This is just the opposite of what might be expected if a financial crisis forced a
number of derivatives dealers to cease operations simultaneously.
清除这个部门的代价相当高，光是2002年及2003年的税前损失就达到1.73亿美元及
0.99亿美元，必须强调的是，这些损失全部来自于那些已依照一般公认会计原则按
时依公平市价，参酌适当的未来信用损失估列以及行政成本的合约，更甚者，在我
们清算的过程期间，市场的变动还算相当温和，处理过程也有条不紊，同时也未发
现有任何重大的信用损失，这样的结局比起万一发生金融危机，许多衍生性金融商
品交易双方同时无法履约的惨况，已算是不幸的大幸。
If our derivatives experience – and the Freddie Mac shenanigans of mindblowing
size and audacity that were revealed last year – makes you suspicious
of accounting in this arena, consider yourself wised up. No matter how
financially sophisticated you are, you can’t possibly learn from reading the
disclosure documents of a derivatives-intensive company what risks lurk in its
positions. Indeed, the more you know about derivatives, the less you will feel
you can learn from the disclosures normally proffered you. In Darwin’s words,
“Ignorance more frequently begets confidence than does knowledge.”
如果在看到我们处理衍生性金融商品的经验，加上Freddie Mac去年被揭发大规模
的舞弊行为后，让你开始怀疑这方面的会计原则，这就表示你变聪明了，不管你具
备有多丰富的金融知识，你都无法经由阅读这些从事衍生性金融商品公司的相关揭
露文件来了解它到底背负了多少潜藏的风险，事实上，你越了解这些衍生性金融商
品，你就越知道这些制式文件能够给你的讯息多么地有限，套句达尔文的话，初生
之犊不畏虎，越无知胆子越大，越有经验就越怕死。
* * * * * * * * * * * *
And now it’s confession time: I’m sure I could have saved you $100 million or
so, pre-tax, if I had acted more promptly to shut down Gen Re Securities. Both
Charlie and I knew at the time of the General Reinsurance merger that its
derivatives business was unattractive. Reported profits struck us as illusory, and
we felt that the business carried sizable risks that could not effectively be
measured or limited. Moreover, we knew that any major problems the
operation might experience would likely correlate with troubles in the financial
or insurance world that would affect Berkshire elsewhere. In other words, if the
derivatives business were ever to need shoring up, it would commandeer the
capital and credit of Berkshire at just the time we could otherwise deploy those
resources to huge advantage. (A historical note: We had just such an
experience in 1974 when we were the victim of a major insurance fraud. We
could not determine for some time how much the fraud would ultimately cost
us and therefore kept more funds in cash-equivalents than we normally would
have. Absent this precaution, we would have made larger purchases of stocks
that were then extraordinarily cheap.)
接下来是忏悔时间，如果当初我当机立断关掉通用再保证券部门，我确信可以为大
伙省下税前1亿美元的损失，查理跟我当初在购并通用再保时，就知道其证券部门
很令人讨厌，只是当时帐面上的盈余数字误导了我们，虽然我们总是觉得这部门有
极高的风险且无法有效的衡量或限制，更有甚者，我们知道这部份所可能产生的任
何重大问题，无论是金融或是保险方面，再再皆与Berkshire其它营运隐含某些关
连，换个角度说明，如果说我们打算继续支撑衍生性金融商品部门，这代表我们必
须放弃Berkshire本身原来可以运用的资金与信用所创造出潜在的更大利益，(历史
的经验告诉我们， 1974年我们在保险舞弊案所经历的惨痛教训殷鉴不远，我们无法
判断当时的舞弊事件将会引发多少的成本，这使得我们必须被迫将众多的资金摆在
流动性最高的约当现金之上，若非如此，当时我们大可以趁股市低档大举买进更多
物廉价美的好股票)。
Charlie would have moved swiftly to close down Gen Re Securities – no question
about that. I, however, dithered. As a consequence, our shareholders are
paying a far higher price than was necessary to exit this business.
要是换查理作主，他肯定会快刀斩乱麻，立即关闭通用再保证券部门，绝对不要怀
疑，可惜的是我犹豫不决，也因此导致股东们必须花更高的代价才能摆脱这个事业
的纠缠。
. Though we include Gen Re’s sizable life and health reinsurance business in
the “insurance” sector, we show the results for Ajit Jain’s life and annuity
business in this section. That’s because this business, in large part, involves
arbitraging money. Our annuities range from a retail product sold directly on
the Internet to structured settlements that require us to make payments for 70
years or more to people severely injured in accidents.
虽然我们把通用再保庞大的人寿及健康再保险业务归类在保险事业之下，另外我们
则把Ajit Jain负责的人寿及年金业务归类在财务及金融商品业务项下，这是因为他
的业务大部分都牵涉到套利资金，我们的年金保险的种类，从网络直接零售到因重
大职业伤害而要求我们在70年后付款的协议清偿都有。
We’ve realized some extra income in this business because of accelerated
principal payments we received from certain fixed-income securities we had
purchased at discounts. This phenomenon has ended, and earnings are
therefore likely to be lower in this segment during the next few years.
去年我们在这些业务实现了一些额外的收益，其原因在于我们先前以折价买进某些
特定的固定收益证券提前清偿本金所致，这样的现象的发生已经告一段落，换句话
说，这部门的盈余在未来几年很可能会持续下滑。
. We have a $604 million investment in Value Capital, a partnership run by
Mark Byrne, a member of a family that has helped Berkshire over the years in
many ways. Berkshire is a limited partner in, and has no say in the management
of, Mark’s enterprise, which specializes in highly-hedged fixed-income
opportunities. Mark is smart and honest and, along with his family, has a
significant investment in Value.
目前我们投资了6.04亿美元在Value Capital之上，这是由Mark Byrne所领导的合伙
企业，他的家族一直以来都是Berkshire重要的支柱，Berkshire仅为Value Capital的
有限责任合伙人，并未参与实际的营运管理，这家企业主要专精于高度避险的固定
收益投资，Mark相当聪明且诚实，他和他的家人在Value Capital同样有大笔的投
资。
Because of accounting abuses at Enron and elsewhere, rules will soon be
instituted that are likely to require that Value’s assets and liabilities be
consolidated on Berkshire’s balance sheet. We regard this requirement as
inappropriate, given that Value’s liabilities – which usually are above $20 billion
– are in no way ours. Over time, other investors will join us as partners in
Value. When enough do, the need for us to consolidate Value will disappear.
由于安隆等公司滥用会计原则的关系，相关规定在近日将会修改，要求我们将
Value Capital所有的资产与负债并入Berkshire合并报表之中，我们认为这样的要求
并不合理，由于Value Capital的负债经常维持在200亿美元的高档，而这显然不是
属于我们的负债，不过不用过多久，等到其它投资人加入Value Capital后，我们在
该公司的权益比例将逐渐下降，合并的条件也就跟着消失。
. We have told you in the past about Berkadia, the partnership we formed
three years ago with Leucadia to finance and manage the wind-down of Finova,
a bankrupt lending operation. The plan was that we would supply most of the
capital and Leucadia would supply most of the brains. And that’s the way it has
worked. Indeed, Joe Steinberg and Ian Cumming, who together run Leucadia,
have done such a fine job in liquidating Finova’s portfolio that the $5.6 billion
guarantee we took on in connection with the transaction has been
extinguished. The unfortunate byproduct of this fast payoff is that our future
income will be much reduced. Overall, Berkadia has made excellent money for
us, and Joe and Ian have been terrific partners.
过去我已跟各位提过Berkadia，这是我们在三年前与Leucadia合资成立的公司，主
要目的是用来经营管理并金援一家面临倒闭的融资公司-Finova，根据当初的计画，
我们将提供大部分的资金而Leucadia则负责出大脑管理，事后证明彼此合作愉快，
确实在Leucadia的Joe Steinberg及Ian Cumming的领导之下，Finova顺利成功地将
原有的资产组合予以清算，这也使得当初我们提供的56亿美元的连带保证随着取
消，如此快速清偿唯一的副作用是往后我们可以因此获得的利益将大幅减少，不过
总的来说，Berkadia为我们赚进大把的钞票，而Joe及Ian实在是不可多得的合伙
人。
. Our leasing businesses are XTRA (transportation equipment) and CORT
(office furniture). Both operations have had poor earnings during the past two
years as the recession caused demand to drop considerably more than was
anticipated. They remain leaders in their fields, and I expect at least a modest
improvement in their earnings this year.
目前我们的租赁事业包含XTRA(运输设备)以及CORT(办公室家具)等，两者过去两年
的营运都乏善可陈，景气衰退使得需求下降的幅度超乎预期，不过他们在各自的产
业依旧处于领导的地位，而我也预期他们今年的盈余将会有所改善。
. Through our Clayton purchase, we acquired a significant manufacturedhousing
finance operation. Clayton, like others in this business, had
traditionally securitized the loans it originated. The practice relieved stress on
Clayton’s balance sheet, but a by-product was the “front-ending” of income (a
result dictated by GAAP).
透过Clayton的购并案，我们同时也取得庞大的组合房屋融资业务，Clayton如同这
行的其它同业，习惯将这部份的贷款予以证券化，这样的做法虽然可以稍解Clayton
财务报表的压力，但同样也使得其盈余迫于一般公认会计原则的规定提前漏馅。
We are in no hurry to record income, have enormous balance-sheet strength,
and believe that over the long-term the economics of holding our consumer
paper are superior to what we can now realize through securitization. So
Clayton has begun to retain its loans.
我们资产负债表的实力一向雄厚，从来就不急着将利益提前认列入帐，同时也相信
目前手上所持有的客户债权，其长期的经济利益肯定优于透过证券化所能得到的收
益，基于这样的理由，Clayton目前已开始保留其客户贷款。
We believe it’s appropriate to finance a soundly-selected book of interestbearing
receivables almost entirely with debt (just as a bank would).
Therefore, Berkshire will borrow money to finance Clayton’s portfolio and relend
these funds to Clayton at our cost plus one percentage point. This markup
fairly compensates Berkshire for putting its exceptional creditworthiness to
work, but it still delivers money to Clayton at an attractive price.
我们认为，应该可以让一些经过精挑细选的应收帐款，以融资举债的方式支应(就像
是一般银行的做法一样)，因此Berkshire将先对外借钱，再将资金转融通予
Clayton，利息则按Berkshire的借贷成本加计一个百分点，这样的加码既可以让
Berkshire超优的债信评等发挥用处取得合理的报酬，同时另一方面，Clayton也可
以划算的成本取得资金。
In 2003, Berkshire did $2 billion of such borrowing and re-lending, with Clayton
using much of this money to fund several large purchases of portfolios from
lenders exiting the business. A portion of our loans to Clayton also provided
“catch-up” funding for paper it had generated earlier in the year from its own
operation and had found difficult to securitize.
2003年，Berkshire以这样的方式借了20亿美元，并将这笔钱转借给Clayton，
Clayton则将大部分的资金从有意退出此业务的金主手中买回应收帐款，其余的资金
则用来弥补年前已发行的受益凭证，但由于后续无法继续发行所产生的资金缺口。
You may wonder why we borrow money while sitting on a mountain of cash. It’s
because of our “every tub on its own bottom” philosophy. We believe that any
subsidiary lending money should pay an appropriate rate for the funds needed
to carry its receivables and should not be subsidized by its parent. Otherwise,
having a rich daddy can lead to sloppy decisions. Meanwhile, the cash we
accumulate at Berkshire is destined for business acquisitions or for the purchase
of securities that offer opportunities for significant profit. Clayton’s loan
portfolio will likely grow to at least $5 billion in not too many years and, with
sensible credit standards in place, should deliver significant earnings.
大家或许会觉得奇怪，为何满手现金的我们还要对外举债，主要的原因在于，我们
奉行一个萝卜一个坑的策略，我们认为任何子公司要借钱，都必须支付一个合理的
费率来支应其应收款项，而不是由母公司给予补贴，否则有钱的老爸只会害了儿
子，同时我们在Berkshire累积的现金，原本就是用来做购并或是买进有机会获利的
股票之用，而Clayton的贷款组合预估在未来几年内将会成长到50亿美元，相信只
要有合理的信用评估程序，应该可以贡献不错的盈余数字。
For simplicity’s sake, we include all of Clayton’s earnings in this sector, though
a sizable portion is derived from areas other than consumer finance.
为了让事情简单化，我们将Clayton全部的盈余归到本项下，虽然有某些部份的获利
并非来自消费金融业务。
(in $ millions)
Pre-Tax Earnings Interest-bearing Liabilities
2003 2002 2003 2002
Trading – Ordinary Income ........................... $ 379 $ 553 $7,826 $13,762
Gen Re Securities ........................................... (99) (173) 8,041* 10,631*
Life and annuity operation.............................. 99 83 2,331 1,568
Value Capital.................................................. 31 61 18,238* 20,359*
Berkadia ......................................................... 101 115 525 2,175
Leasing operations.......................................... 34 34 482 503
Manufactured housing finance (Clayton) ....... 37** — 2,032 —
Other............................................................... 84 102 618 630
Income before capital gains............................ 666 775
Trading – Capital Gains.................................. 1,215 578 N.A. N.A.
Total ............................................................$1,881 $1,353
* Includes all liabilities
** From date of acquisition, August 7, 2003
Manufacturing, Service and Retailing Operations
制造、服务及零售业务
Our activities in this category cover the waterfront. But let’s look at a
simplified balance sheet and earnings statement consolidating the entire group.
这个项目的业务种类相当繁多，但请先看一看简化的资产负债表以及盈余报表等合
并报表。
Balance Sheet 12/31/03 (in $ millions)
Assets Liabilities and Equity
Cash and equivalents ...................... $ 1,250 Notes payable ....................... $ 1,593
Accounts and notes receivable ........... 2,796 Other current liabilities............. 4,300
Inventory ........................................... 3,656 Total current liabilities ............. 5,893
Other current assets ............................. 262
Total current assets............................ 7,964
Goodwill and other intangibles........... 8,351 Deferred taxes............................. 105
