这场经典的赛事，甚至还用慢动作播放精彩的第四节，我们以今年封面的颜色表 .70
forward (not 50 or we’d never write any business). If we calculated the
resulting price to be $1 million, then we’d price it at $1.2 million to build
in a margin of safety.
以地震险保单来说，看看过去百年来大地震发生的数量-实际上发生了26次，所以
我们便假设之后会有30或32个地震发生(当然不能用50次，这样我们肯定接不到生
意)，如果初步算出的价位是100万美元，那么最后的价格可能就订在120万美元以
保留一些安全边际。
Munger: Using the book Deep Simplicity [see link on page 33, below], you
can predict how size is likely to be allocated. A standard power law will
tell you how many earthquakes there will be of various sizes – many small
ones, but big ones are less likely. So just do the math, apply the power
law and calculate estimated damages.
曼格：参考「深入浅出」一书，我们大概可以预估地震规模是如何分布的，标准的
能量法则告诉我们地震的规模可分为不同的程度，大部分的规模都很小，但大地震
也不是不可能发生，只有运用数学公式、能量法则来计算出可能的损失。
Buffett: It’s difficult if someone wants to protect against a 9.0 quake,
which happens only once every 1,000 years. But in investing, if it’s too
hard, skip it.
巴菲特：没有人可以抵挡平均1,000年发生一次的9级大地震，就投资而言，这太难
预估了，所以可以直接省略不计。
MidAmerican Energy Holdings and Investment Opportunities in the Energy
Sector
美中能源控股公司以及能源产业的投资机会
PUHCA [Public Utilities Holding Company Act] passed in 1935 as a
justified reaction to some really wild antics in the 1920s in the public
utility field, most dramatically in Sam Insull; there was pyramiding, capital
structure... [For more on Insull, see this web page, which has the following
sentence: “Another example comes from the breakup of Samuel Insull's
empire, whose failure was a major source of the attack on holding
companies…”] The act addressed a lot of wrong things, but it’s long been
outmoded. The SEC agrees and various energy bills included the repeal of
it, but no energy bill passed last year.
1935年通过的PUHCA(公用事业控股公司法)主要是立法单位对于1920年能源产业
界不断发生的种种不当行径所作的因应之道，其中尤以Sam Insull公司为最，金字
塔的组织与资本结构，(其溃败是众人诟病控股公司的主要原因)，这项法案抑制了
很多不当事件的发生，但有些规定却早已过时，证券主管机关也已同意，提出多项
法案来废除它，但去年并没有任何一项法案获得通过。
PUHCA restricts what we do. But it’s not clear that if it were repealed that
it would create lots of opportunities for us, because other companies
might be competing against us. So, it’s not clear that Berkshire Hathaway
would necessarily be worth a lot more money [if PUHCA were repealed].
But it would be logical to repeal it. There are plenty of regulations already.
PUHCA限制了我们的行动，但它被废除后，也不能保证就能为我们创造更多的机
会，因为如此许多公司也会加入竞争的行列，所以PUHCA被废除，Berkshire的价
值不一定就能大幅提升，当然废除它是很合理的一件事，相关的法规已经够多了。
It would be beneficial to have companies like Berkshire pouring money
into this field. It will be repealed someday I think.
这产业有Berkshire挹注资金绝对是一件正面的事，我想总有一天它会被废除。
Munger: If there were a great opportunity in the energy field, we’d find a
way to do it.
曼格：如果能源产业真有一些大机会，我们一定会努力好好地把握。
Buffett: That’s right. There’s been nothing we’ve wanted to do and
couldn’t. It isn’t like we got one yard from the finish line [on a deal] and
couldn’t finish it. But the repeal of PUHCA may make life simpler on a
large transaction.
巴菲特：没有错，到目前为止，还没有一件事是我们想做而做不到的，既然已经快
抵达终点线了，就没有理由不跑完全程，若PUHCA真的被废除，将有助于某些大笔
交易更容易完成。
PetroChina
中国石油公司
PetroChina is not opaque. It’s very similar to big oil companies elsewhere
in the world. It’s the 4th most profitable oil company in the world – it
produces as much crude as Exxon. It’s not complicated – it’s a big
integrated oil company, so it’s fairly easy to get your mind around the
economics of the business.
中国石油没有什么不透明，它就像是全世界其它主要的石油公司一样，目前排名位
居第四，出产的原油比艾克森还要多，它是一家垂直整合的石油集团，所以大家可
以很容易就了解这家公司的体质。
The annual report will tell you more about the business than [the annual
reports of] other oil giants. They tell you they’ll pay out 45% of their
earnings, barring the unexpected. I like knowing that that cash will come
to Berkshire.
该公司年报所透露的信息甚至比其它主要石油公司还要详尽，他们明确表示会将盈
余的45%分配给股东，避免不确定性，我很喜欢期待配发现金股利的感觉。
It was bought because it was very, very cheap by any metric – far cheaper
than Exxon, BP, Shell... You could say it should be cheaper, given that it’s
90% owned by the government of China, which is a factor, yes, but not so
big for me. If you read the annual report of PetroChina, you’ll have as
good an understanding of the company as reading the annual report any
other oil company. Then, you can think about risks such as a disruption of
US-China relations.
我们买进的原因是它们实在是很便宜，不管从任何角度看，比起艾克森、英国石油
或壳牌等都便宜许多，当然你可以说它之所以便宜是因为90%的股份为中国政府所
有，这是原因之一，但我并不在乎，如果你读过中国石油的年报，你一定能像读其
他石油公司的年报一样了解这家公司，当然你也可能会想到诸如美中关系恶化等不
确定的风险。
Munger: I think if it’s cheap enough, you can afford more country risk or
regulatory risk. It’s not complicated.
曼格：我认为它们实在很便宜，所以可以多忍受一些国家风险或管制风险，这项投
资案并不复杂。
Buffett: There’s Yukos, the big oil company in Russia. In evaluating
country risk, you can reach your own judgments. In our view, PetroChina
had less risk.
巴菲特：比如像俄罗斯最大的石油公司Yukos，评量国家风险本来就是见仁见智，
相较之下，我们认为中国石油的风险比较低。
[Later in the meeting, Buffett and Munger returned to the discussion of
this company:]
[会议的后段，巴菲特与曼格再度谈到中国石油:]。
Buffett: You don’t need any blinding insights to invest in PetroChina.
They’re producing 2.5% of the world’s oil, it’s priced in US dollars, they
control a significant part of the refining in China, and they pay out 45% of
their earnings in dividends. If you’re buying something like that at 1/3 the
valuation of comparable companies, it’s not hard. You just have to do the
work.
巴菲特：投资中国石油不需要特别锐利的眼光，其石油产出占全世界2.5%，以美元
计价，同时控制中国主要的炼油设备，将盈余的45%支付股利给股东，这就好象你
以三分之一的价格买进类似的公司一样，只要作好功课就足够了。
Munger: But when you were buying, no-one else was. It required
uncommon sense.
曼格：但是当市场上只有你独自买进时，这就需要一点特殊的智能了。
National Indemnity and Incentives in the Insurance Business
国家产险以及保险业的激励方式
We are very big in insurance and having the wrong incentives in place
could be very harmful.
我们在保险业有相当大的投资，所以若激励方式使用不当将会有相当严重的后果。
[Buffett had prepared slides and had them put up on the screens in the
convention center. Slide 1 showed Berkshire Hathaway’s balance sheet
shortly before it bought National Indemnity.]
[巴菲特特别准备了投影片，在会议中心的现场放映给全体股东看，投影片一显示
Berkshire在刚买下国家产险时的资产负债表]
For 15 minutes each year, Jack Greenwald [the owner of National
Indemnity] would get frustrated with something and want to sell his
company. I told Charlie that the next time he was in heat, bring him to
me. So, we bought it in ’67 for $7 million.
每年约有15分钟，Jack Greenwald(国家产险公司的老板)会对某些事情感到不快而
想要卖掉公司，为此我告诉查理如果下一次发现有这个念头时，赶快带我去见他，
就这样我们在1967年以700万美元买下这家公司。
[Slide 2 showed premium volume for National Indemnity from 1980
through 2003. It was $80 million in 1980, rose to $366 million in 1986,
then declined nearly every year down to $54 million in 1999, and then
spiked up to $595 million in 2003. Buffett highlighted the decline from
1986 to 1999 and asked:]
[投影片二显示国家产险1980年到2003年的保费收入，从最初的8,000万美元一路
成长到1986年的3.66亿美元，然后又一路下滑至1999年的5,400万美元，之后又
暴增至2003年的5.95亿美元，巴菲特特别指出1986年到1999年的下滑，并问
到：]
How many public companies in America would see premiums go down
every year for such an extended period?
试问全美有哪一家上市公司可以容忍保费收入如此长期持续地下滑?
[Slide 3 showed the number of employees at National Indemnity from
1980-2003. The number rose from 1980-86 and then declined from
1986-99, but much more slowly than premiums declined. Buffett noted:]
[投影片三显示国家产险从1980年到2003年间的员工人数，1980年到1986年人数
一路增加，然后从1986年到1999年又下滑，但巴菲特强调下滑的速度明显低于保
费收入减少的幅度]
We never fired anyone – the decline in headcount was solely due to
retirements. The key is you can’t fire people if they don’t write business,
or they’ll write business. You must be able to tell them that if they write
no business, their job is not in jeopardy.
我们从来不开除员工，这段期间人数的下滑完全是员工届龄退休所致，重点在于你
不能只看员工是否有签下保单来决定其去留，你必须明确地告诉他们，即使他们没
有签下任何保单，也不必担心会被炒鱿鱼。
[Slide 4 showed National Indemnity’s expense ratio from 1980-2003,
which was as low as 25.9% in a peak year, and as high as 41% in the worst
year, 1999. Buffett noted that:]
[投影片四显示国家产险1980年到2003年的费用率，从最低的25.9%到最高的41%
不等]
Some companies would feel that this is unacceptable. [We don’t.] We can
take an expense ratio that’s out of line, but can’t take writing bad
business.
巴菲特表示某些公司可能会觉得根本不可能接受这样高的比率，但我们却不这样认
为，我们可以接受离谱的费用率，但却无法忍受签下品质不良的保单。
[Slide 5 showed the combined ratio at National Indemnity from 1980-
2003. The combined ratio exceed 100 during a few bad years for the
industry in the early 1980s, which is what led to the hard market that
peaked in 1986, but National Indemnity’s combined ratio has been below
100 – e.g., the business has been profitable – in every year for the past
20. Buffett pointed out:]
[投影片五显示国家产险1980年到2003年的综合比率，1980年初期产业表现普遍
不佳时，同业平均综合比率曾经一度超越100，但即便是最惨的1986年，国家产险
的综合比率还是低于100，巴菲特指出，这表示该公司过去20年来，每年都能持续
获利]
In 1986, our combined ratio was only 69.3 because we did the most
volume ever that year, up to that point [the company has done more
volume in the past few years]. We coined money when we wrote a lot of
business, and made a little when we didn’t. We’re the only company like
this. We’ll have a high expense ratio when business is slow.
1986年我们的综合比率只有69.3，原因是当年度我们的保费收入创下历史新高，
当我们大举签单时就表示要赚大钱，若是不接业务则不赚钱，没有公司像我们这
样，当业务量低时，我们的费用率就会变得偏高。
National Indemnity was a no-name company when we bought it, and has
no copyrights, patents, etc. to distinguish it, but they have a record like
no-one else because they had discipline.
国家产险在我们买下它时还默默无名，没有任何著作权或专利来凸显自己，但独有
的核保纪律使得它与众不同。
You can’t run an auto or steel company this way, but it’s the best way to
run an insurance company.
你不可能以这样的方式来经营汽车或钢铁公司，但这却是经营保险公司最好的方
式。
Munger: Nobody else does it, but to me it’s obviously the only way to go.
A lot about Berkshire is like this. Being controlling owners is key – it would
be hard for a committee to make these kinds of decisions.
曼格：没有人这样做，但我却认为这是唯一的可行之道，Berkshire旗下的事业经营
很多都是如此，成为具控制权的股东是一个关键，合议制很难做下这样的决定。
HomeServices of America
美国居家服务
HomeServices will grow. It owns 15-16 local real estate firms, which retain
all of their local identities – akin to the whole Berkshire model. Managers
operate them as if they owned them themselves. We have no national
identity, unlike Cendant, which operates under a few big names.
居家服务还会继续，它在全美拥有15-16家地区型的房屋中介公司，依照Berkshire
的经营惯例，全都以原有的品牌经营，经理人就像是在经营自己的事业一样管理公
司，我们没有认同问题，不像Cendant只以少数的大品牌经营。
There’s no question that we’ll buy a few – or a lot – of [real estate
brokerage] companies over the next 10 years. It’s a great company with
great management. Last year, we participated in $50 billion of
transactions – but this was only a small percentage of the national total.
We’re big in California, Minnesota and Nebraska.
毫无疑问我们未来10年内会继续买下一些或甚至许多房地产中介公司，这是一家拥
有好的经营阶层的好公司，去年我们的成交金额累积达到500亿美元，这只占全美
成交总额的几个百分点而言，我们在加州、明尼苏达州及内布拉斯加州的业务量都
相当大。
It’s a good business, but very cyclical. It’s very good now. We’ll go
through a bad period, but we’ll keep buying. I don’t know how big it will
become, but it’s conceivable that as we grow, we’ll add things like buying
furniture. When people buy a new house, they need a lot of things.
这个产业相当不错，不过产业波动性相当大，现在处于景气高峰，当然以后也会遇
到低潮，但我们仍将继续买进，我不确定将来它会变得多大，但可以确定的是只要
这类的业务成长，人们一定会多添购家具，当人们买下一个新家，他们总是需要很
多的东西。
[In response to another question about whether the internet will threaten
the commission structure of real estate brokers like HomeServices, Buffett
replied:]
[另外有人问到，网络的兴起是否会威胁到像居家服务这类房仲业者原有的佣金收费
模式，巴菲特回答说：]
I think commissions in HomeServices are sustainable. Barry Diller is
interested in the space via Lending Tree, and the internet is a threat to any
business, including real estate brokerage. But when I think about the
process of owning a home, the for-sale-by-owner (FSBO) was with us 50
years ago and it is now [but it hasn’t affected commissions]. My guess is
that 30 years from now, a very significant percentage of home sales will
be done through the brokerage system like today’s, though there are
people trying to change it.
我认为居家服务的佣金收费模式应该可以继续维持下去，Barry Diller(译注：USA
Network董事长)有意透过网络建立另一套模式，网络对任何行业都是一项威胁，当
然也包含房仲业在内，但我个人认为买卖房屋的过程，FSBO屋主自售的形式已有
50年的历史，一直维持到现在，[但却从来没有威胁到佣金制度] ，虽然不断有人想
要试图颠覆现有制度，但我个人预估在未来的30年内，房地产的交易有绝大部份还
是会透过中介商完成。
Munger [speaking to Buffett]: You tried to change it dramatically in
Omaha, and you fell on your ass. [Chuckling.] You tried to take home
listing business from the Omaha World Herald with your little paper and
failed.
曼格[对着巴菲特说：]你自己就曾在奥玛哈地区尝试做改变，结果自讨没趣，[一阵
大笑]，为了自己的小报纸，他试着从奥玛哈世界先锋报手中抢下房地产广告业务，
结果失败了。
GEICO, the History of the Direct Model, and the Importance of Being the
Low-Cost Producer
GEICO、直接模式历史以及身为低成本业者的重要性
The idea of direct marketing in auto insurance at GEICO came from Leo
Goodwin and his wife. They came from USAA, which was established
because US military personnel moved around a lot and had trouble getting
insurance. Leo took this idea and broadened it beyond military officers.
It’s a better system.
GEICO直接销售汽车保单的想法来自创办人Leo Goodwin跟他的太太，他们来自苏
联，其成立的原因在于美军人员经常移防，所以投保很麻烦，Leo承接这个概念，
并将它推行到军中以外，这套制度比原先来得好。
Going back 100 years, auto insurance was sold by casualty companies via
a system of agents that charged large commissions. It was a cartel. State
Farm was formed in the 1920s and had the idea of a captive agency force,
which brought down costs. It became the largest auto insurer, and Allstate
because #2 following the same model. This was a better system.
100年前，当时的产险公司都是经由收取大额佣金的中介系统销售车险保单，它本
身就是一个卡特尔，直到1920年州农公司引进内部业务人员的制度，降低营业成
本，进而成为最大的汽车保险公司，至于Allstate也沿用相同的模式而排名第二，这
套制度比原先来得好。
Leo bypassed the agents and brought down costs even further.
至于Leo则跳过中介，更进一步降低成本。
Every American family has to buy auto insurance. It’s not a luxury item, so
cost is key and the low cost is going to win. The direct sellers, GEICO and
Progressive, will slug it out and will win. GEICO has a tough competitor in
Progressive – they’ve seen how we’ve done it [the direct model] and are
moving to it.
几乎每个美国家庭都会购买车险保单，它并非奢侈品，所以成本是关键，因此低成
本业者终将胜出，直接销售业者，诸如GEICO及Progressive强棒出击，
