这场经典的赛事，甚至还用慢动作播放精彩的第四节，我们以今年封面的颜色表 .71
Progressive是GEICO可敬的对手，他们一直关注我们的一举一动，而且迎头赶上。
Dell is very efficient. I’d hate to compete with them. If they turn out a
decent competitive product at a good price, that system will win.
Dell非常有效率，我痛恨与他们为敌，如果你的产品相当有竞争力且价格也很理
想，这个系统就会成功。
Charlie is on the board of Costco. Costco and Wal-Mart have figured out
how to do this [be ultra-low-cost] and they’re winning.
查理是Costco的董事，Costco跟威名百货就很懂得这一套[超低成本]，他们都是大
赢家。
It’s always a good idea to go with the low-cost producer over time. Being
the low-cost producer of something that people need is a good business.
能与低成本业者常在是个很好的idea，至于成为人们所需的低成本产品生产者则铁
定是一家好企业。
Wells Fargo and Its Derivatives Risk
Wells Fargo银行以及其衍生性金融商品风险
[A shareholder asked why Buffett felt comfortable owning Wells Fargo
stock, and even buying more, given its exposure to derivatives. Buffett
replied:]
[股东问到为何巴菲特会放心持有Wells Fargo的股票，甚至还持续加码，该公司不
是有衍生性金融商品的部位不是很高吗? 巴菲特回答到：]。
I don’t have Wells Fargo’s annual report here, but I’d bet that J.P. Morgan
Chase is far larger [in terms of exposure to derivatives]. I don’t think of
them [Wells Fargo] as being a big player in the derivatives game.
我手上没有Wells Fargo的年报，但我打赌J.P. Morgan Chase的衍生性金融商品部
位一定比Wells Fargo大得多，我不认为他们是这场游戏的主要玩家。
There is no perfect measure of the size of a derivative position. The
numbers sound large that are thrown around, but you can talk about a $1
billion notional exposure in one derivative and have less risk than a $50
million derivative of another type. I don’t think Wells Fargo is a really big
derivatives player.
很难有一个标准还衡量衍生性金融商品部位到底合不合适，这些数字看起来都是天
文数字，但有些金额的风险可能高达10亿美元，但金额在5,000万美元的部位也
有，我不认为Wells Fargo是的主要玩家。
Wells Fargo is an exceptional bank. We disagree with management
violently on expensing stock options, so I voted our stock to expense
options. But even though I disagree on this accounting point,
management has a terrific record. Dick [Kovacevich, Well Fargo’s
Chairman and CEO] is a great guy and I’d rank him way up there in terms
of bank managers.
Wells Fargo是一家相当杰出的银行，虽然我们对于该公司经营阶层强烈反对将选择
权费用化的看法不敢苟同，(所以我个人就投票赞成将选择权费用化)，但即便在这
项会计议题上看法相异，但无可否认他们的经营绩效相当不错，Dick(Wells Fargo
的总裁兼董事长)是一个优秀的人才，在同业中属一属二。
Criticism of MidAmerican’s Environmental Record
关于对美中能源环保记录的批评
[A shareholder asked about an article he read – perhaps this one – that
was critical of David Sokol’s support for President Bush because, the
article claimed, MidAmerican was seeking concessions from the
government on environmental matters. Buffett asked Sokol to take the
microphone and Sokol said (my notes are weak here):]
[股东问到他读到一篇文章(编注：我想应该是这一篇)，批评美中能源的总裁David
Sokol支持布什总统，该文章宣称美中能源企图游说政府对其环保问题做出让步，巴
菲特请Sokol接下麦克风回答这个问题，Sokol表示：(编注：我这部份的记录不是很
清楚)
The article criticized me for being a Ranger [a category of large donors
who produce $200,000 or more] for President Bush. The article implied
that I was trying to influence the Bush Administration so that MidAmerican
could benefit from weaker environmental standards. In fact, MidAmerican
has a great environmental record. Also, my being a Ranger was certainly
not an attempt to influence regulation/legislation – and incidentally, I’m
no longer a Ranger.
这篇文章批评我是Ranger布什总统的金主[指捐赠金额超过20万美元]，并暗指我试
图影响布什政府降低对美中能源的环保标准，事实上，美中能源的环保记录一项优
异，而我身为金主的目的绝非是企图影响法令规定，而碰巧的是我现在已经不再担
任金主了。
Silver Position
白银部位
I have no comment on whether we’ve added to, held, reduced or
completely sold our silver position. But I would disagree with you very
much that the gold or silver market is rigged. Many writers have
conspiracy theories. The answer is that there is plenty of silver above
ground and I’m not sure of supply and demand recently, but there’s
nothing flawed about the market of any commodity I can think of.
关于这个问题，我不评论是否有增加、持有、减少或完全出清我们的白银部位，而
且我也不认同黄金或白银市场有被操纵的说法，许多作者惯用阴谋论，我认为地底
下还有丰富的白银矿藏量，我个人对于最近银金属的供给需求也不甚清楚，我不认
为目前的大宗商品也任何太大的问题。
Munger: You’re asking for the opinion of people who haven’t particularly
distinguished themselves in this arena.
曼格：我想你问到的人对于这个市场并没有特殊的研究。
Foreign Currencies
外币投资
[Buffett was not asked about his foreign currency holdings at the annual
meeting, but at another venue he, according to one news story I read,
“said he has increased his bet against the U.S. dollar in the past several
months on concern that the U.S. trade deficit will weaken the currency
over time. Buffett told reporters…that he has boosted his foreign currency
holdings by ‘more than a little bit.’”]
[在股东大会上，巴菲特并没有被问到有关外币投资的问题，不过在另外一个场合，
根据我个人听到的一个消息，巴菲特说：过去几个月以来，由于美国赤字问题持续
恶化，所以他告诉在场的记者，他再度加码投资外币，而且是大幅加码! ]
OTHER BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY COMMENTS
其它有关Berkshire
Thinking on Investing Berkshire’s Cash
如何运用Berkshire的资金进行投资
[When asked about the relative attractiveness of bonds, arbitrage, etc.,
Buffett replied:]
[当被问到债券、套利等投资哪一种比较好时，巴菲特回答到： ]。
Charlie and I are competent to make judgments on certain things, and not
other things. We try to focus on what we can understand, which is a
reasonable amount.
查理跟我相当擅于判断某些事物，但某些则不行，我们试着将精神集中在那些我们
弄得懂的，这部份还不算太多。
In the summer to mid-fall of 2002, when junk bonds became very
attractive, we bought a lot. But we did not make a big decision to buy junk
bonds – it’s just that a lot of them got really cheap.
2002年的秋天，当时的垃圾债券相当吸引人，所以我们一口气大量买进，但我们判
断的逻辑并不复杂，我们只是认为他们实在是太便宜了。
We have an open mind – whatever we see on a given day that overcomes
our resistance to take risk, we’ll do. Charlie and I do not have a checklist
to prioritize categories. I hope he gets a good idea, he hopes I have one
and if we find one, then we move, hopefully in a big way. It has to be big.
对于投资我们保持开放的态度，只要时机对了，我们能够克服自己下海去承担风
险，查理跟我并不会特别去列一张优先级表，我希望他有好的idea，而他也希望
我能够有好的idea，如果我们真的发现，就会立刻行动，而且希望越大越好，事实
上不大也不行。
We’re recently made big investments in currencies and viatical
settlements. We don’t do arbitrage any more because we’re too big.
就像我们最近大手笔投资外币以及保单贴现，我们不再做任何套利投资，因为我们
的规模实在是太大了。
Munger: We have a lot of cash because we don’t like any of those fields at
the moment. Trying to prioritize among things we’re unlikely to do is
pretty fruitless.
曼格：我们手头上握有大笔现金，部份原因在于我们对于目前市场上的投资大多不
感兴趣，勉强在不喜欢的东西间选择终将徒劳无功。
Investment Mistakes
投资错误
The main mistakes we’ve made – some of them big time – are: 1) Ones
when we didn’t invest at all, even when we understood it was cheap; and
2) Starting in on an investment and not maximizing it.
我们犯过的主要错误是-其中有些大者：1)那些明明知道够便宜，但最后却没有投
资；2)确实进场投资，但却没有真正买够。
Charlie is a big fan of doing things on a big scale. But when I bought
something at X and it went up to X and 1/8th, I sometimes stopped
buying, perhaps hoping it would come back down. We’ve missed billions
when I’ve gotten anchored.
查理喜欢大手笔投资，但是当我以X价位买进某个投资时，一旦它的价格上涨超过
10%，我往往就会停止买进，当然一部份原因是希望等它回档再加码，但这一迟疑
让我们少赚数十亿美元。
Munger: Do you have anything worse to confess than Wal-Mart?
曼格：除了威名百货外，你还有没有其它要招的
Buffett: I cost us about $10 billion. I set out to buy 100 million sharers,
pre-split, at $23. We bought a little and it moved up a bit and I stopped
buying. Perhaps I thought it might come back a bit – who knows? That
thumb-sucking, the reluctance to pay a little more, cost us a lot. There are
other examples.
巴菲特：为此我们付出了100亿美元的代价，本来我预计用23块(分割前)买进1亿
股，一开始我们确实买进一部份，但之后股价开始上涨，所以我就停止买进，本来
以为等它回档再加码，谁知道? 为了愚蠢地省下一点小钱，结果反而让我们损失不
贷，这样的例子还算不少。
On the other hand, it doesn’t bother us. If every shot you hit in golf was a
hole-in-one, you’d lose interest. You gotta hit a few in the woods.
当然换个角度想，我们一点都不觉得难过，如果每一次挥击都是一杆进洞，那么人
生还有什么乐趣，总是有几球会不小心打到树丛里。
We probably won’t make the kind of mistake that costs us a lot – though
we did with Dexter Shoes. We’re more likely to make mistakes of
omission, not commission, in the future.
我们大概不太可能会犯下什么天大的错误，虽然有Dexter鞋业这样的先例，未来我
们犯的错误可能也都是应为而不为，而不是不应为而为之。
Munger: Since mistakes of omission don’t appear in the financial
statements, most people don’t pay attention to them. We rub our noses in
mistakes of omission – as we just did.
曼格：由于这类的疏失不会在财务报表上显现出来，所以多数人都注意不到，而我
们在犯下这类错误时，大多也只能摸摸鼻子了事。
Berkshire Running a Mutual Fund?
Berkshire经营共同基金的可能性?
[Responding to a shareholder’s suggestion that they get into the money
management business, Buffett replied:]
[在响应股东提议Berkshire是否可能介入基金管理行业时，巴菲特回答到： ]
There would be too many conflicts. We’re managing too much money as it
is and we can’t wear two hats. I certainly wouldn’t want to start a fund
management company and then pro-rate purchases. I’ve been pitched
many times [to start a fund company] and we could certainly sell it, but
once we did so I don’t know what we’d do with it. Do you, Charlie?
这中间可能会有太多的利益冲突，我们现在管理的资金已经够多了，我们不大可能
身兼数职，我个人也没有这个意愿从新创立一家基金管理公司，然而按比例去认
购，我已经被传了好几次，而要我们推销这类基金也没有什么太大的困难，但一旦
我们真的下海，我实在不知道这样做是为了什么，查理你呢?
Munger: No. That’s why we don’t do it. But that doesn’t seem to bother
other people.
曼格：我也不晓得，我想这也是我们没有这样做的原因，反正我们也没有碍到什么
人。
Competition to Buy Companies
购并公司时所面临的竞争
You are absolutely correct that the private equity funds are a form of
competition for Berkshire. Stocks sometimes trade well below intrinsic
value, but businesses are sold in a negotiated transaction, so pricing
doesn’t get as extreme. But our strong preference is to buy entire
businesses at a fair price rather than stocks, even if stocks [can be
acquired] a bit cheaper.
没错，私募的基金确实成为Berkshire购并公司时的竞争对手，股票市场上的价格有
时会远低于其实质价值，但企业要出售通常都是经过协议谈判的方式进行，所以价
格通常不会差到哪里去，但如果可能，我们还是偏爱以合理的价格买下整家公司而
不是少部份的股权，即使后者的价格相对便宜。
If someone wants what we are offering, we are pretty much one-of-akind.
People can sell their company to us, yet continue to run it as they
please as long as they want. So, if someone needs liquidity for tax or
inheritance or other reasons, but doesn’t want to auction their business
off like a piece of meat, they can come to us and they know they’ll get the
response they want. We don’t get super bargains this way, but it allows us
to put money to work at a sensible price.
如果有人对于我们的报价有兴趣，我们确实是一时之选，人们可以放心的把公司卖
给我们，然后以原有的模式继续经营这家公司，所以如果有人因为租税或是继承或
其它原因想要出售公司，但又不愿意公司好象一块猪肉一样秤斤论两卖，他们大可
以来找我们，我相信他们一定可以得到满意的响应，虽然通常这样的情况很难让我
们买到便宜货，但这至少可以让我们的资金获得合理的报酬。
Acquisitions don’t come along every day.
购并案件并不是每天都会发生。
If I owned a business that my father had started and wanted to monetize
it, I would sell to Berkshire because I wouldn’t want to split it up to
auction it off, just as it would be silly to auction your daughter off to the
man who bids the most.
如果我拥有一家父亲留下来的祖传事业，想要把它变卖掉，那么我一定会把它卖给
Berkshire，因为我不希望这家公司被拍卖分割掉，这感觉就好象没有人会想要把自
己的女儿以拍卖的方式，嫁给出价最高的人。
There is no-one else who can make the promises we can make [not to
ever sell the acquired company]. Most big companies can’t do that
because what if the board decides it wants a pure play? I tell sellers that
I’m the only one who can double cross you – nobody else can. We don’t
have consultants or Wall Street advisors.
再也没有人可以像我们这样做出类似的承诺(意指保证不再将这家公司转卖掉)，大
部分的公司都做不到，因为它们无法保证董事会不会决议这只是玩票性质的投资，
我可以向卖方做出双重保证，我们没有购并顾问或是华尔街分析师。
But, yes, we do have a lot of competition.
不过，是的，我们确实面临相当多的竞争。
Munger: We’ve had private equity competitors for a long time, but one
way or another we’ve managed to buy quite a few things.
曼格：来自私募购并基金的竞争也不是一天两天的事，不过不论如何，我们确实买
下了不少的企业。
Splitting the Stock
股票分割
We have the best investors and the lowest turnover of any major company.
Why? It’s a self-selection process. People who say they’re not interested in
a stock that trades for thousands of dollars per share, simply for this
reason, are probably not as intelligent or as in-sync as this group
[referring to Berkshire’s current shareholders]. It’s a sign, a symptom.
我们拥有最佳的股东阵容，以及最低的股权周转率，为什么? 这是一个自我筛选的
过程，有人说他们对股价动辄好几万美元的股票没有兴趣，有这样愚昧想法的人，
基本就不是属于我们同类，这是一个征兆，也是一个指针。
By not splitting, we’ve helped attract the best shareholders – people who
don’t care if the stock is at $90,000 or $9.
刻意不将股票分割，我们得以吸引到最优质的股东，他们不会在乎公司的价位是9万
美元或是9块钱。
Munger: I think the notion that liquidity of tradable common stock is a
great contributor to capitalism is mostly twaddle. The liquidity gives us
these crazy booms, so it has as many problems as virtues.
曼格：我认为那些宣称股票的流动性有助于资本主义的发展的说法根本就是胡说八
道，就是这种流动性导致股市的疯狂泡沫，他们跟病毒一样麻烦多多。
After the South Sea bubble, England banned tradable stocks and England
did fine during this period. If you think liquidity is a great contributor to
civilization, then you probably think all real estate in America, which is
mostly illiquid, is a problem.
继南海泡沫之后，英格兰禁止股票交易，结果经济运作一切正常，所以若你以为流
动性对人类文明有重大的贡献，那么你是不是也认为目前美国大部分不具流动性的
不动产也是很大的问题呢。
Buffett: Berkshire trades $50 million per day, so very few people will have
problem selling.
巴菲特：Berkshire股份每天的成交金额约在5,000万美元左右，所以如果真的有人
想卖，也不致求售无门。
Munger: But were trying to create more people who have the problem of
owning stock worth so much that liquidity is an issue.
曼格：当然如果越来越多的股东拥有价值如此高的股票，流动性确实是一个问题。
Buying the Stocks of Businesses That Make Unhealthy Products
买进那些专门制造有害健康产品的公司股份
I’ve been drinking five cokes a day for years and I feel terrific.
多年来我每天平均喝五罐可乐，但我觉得再愉快也不过。
We passed one time on the chance to buy a terrific business [I think he’s
likely referring to UST], [even] after we [spent the time and] met
management. They were fine people, but we didn’t want to be in the
business. But we’d buy stock in the business. I don’t have any problem
with buying stock or bonds of companies that engage in activities that I
wouldn’t endorse myself, but I’d have a problem with owning outright and
directing the activities myself.
曾经有一度我们有机会买下一家相当不错的公司(编注：我想他指的是UST)，我们曾
与经营阶层见过面，他们人相当的不错，但我们却不想介入这项产业，但即便如
此，我们还是买进部份的股份，对于那些我个人无法对其所处的产业形态给予背书
的公司，我不介意买进部份股票或是债券，但不能拥有直接经营权，主导整个企业
的经营。
Every retailer sells cigarettes, but it doesn’t bother me to own the retailer.
每家零售商店都会贩卖香烟，但这并不妨碍我们投资这些零售通路。
Munger: But you wouldn’t own the company that made the tobacco or the
