这场经典的赛事，甚至还用慢动作播放精彩的第四节，我们以今年封面的颜色表 .72
advertisements.
曼格：但你就不会想要买下香烟制造公司或相关的广告公司。
Buffett: Yes. I can’t tell you why I draw the line there, but I do. One time, I
owned the bonds of RJR, and I’d still do it, but I would not buy the
company. We walked [away from] one [situation like this] – we were
thinking about it…
巴菲特：没错，我无法向各位说明是如何画出这样的界限，有一度我曾经投资RJR的
债券，我想若有可能，以后我也会做出类似的投资，但我绝不会买下整家的公司，
我们曾经放弃过一家类似的公司，虽然我们曾经考虑过买下它的可能性。
Munger: We didn’t think very long. We don’t claim to have perfect morals,
but at least we have a huge area of things that, while legal, are beneath
us. We won’t do them. Currently, there’s a culture in America that says
that anything that won’t send you to prison is OK.
曼格：但我们没有考虑很久，我们坦承没有最高的道德标准，但至少我们的底线远
超过法令的相关规定，我们不会那样做，但以目前美国企业界普遍地认为，任何事
情只要不违法万事都OK。
Buffett: Eating hamburgers or drinking Coke – that’s a choice. If one lives
to 75 eating what they want or 85 eating carrots and broccoli – who’s
lived a better life? I know where I come out on that. [Laughter.]
巴菲特：要吃汉堡或是喝可乐，都是个人的选择，如果一个人可以选择，每天都吃
山珍海味但只能活到75岁，跟另外一个每天粗茶淡饭，却能活到85岁，到底是哪种
生活好呢? 我想我自己很清楚自己的选择(现场一片大笑)。
I’ve never been near a Whole Foods Market.
我几乎就很少吃所谓的天然食品。
Munger: My idea of a good place to shop is Costco – it has these heavily
marbled fillet steaks. The idea of eating some wheat thing and washing it
down with carrot juice has never appealed to me.
曼格：我个人最喜欢逛的店就是Costco，它那里有很棒的菲力牛排，要我只吃谷类
食品配红萝卜汁，我实在是不敢领教。
Buffett: Charlie and I never disagree on where to eat. [Laughter.]
巴菲特：查理跟我从来就不会为要到哪里用餐而争吵(现场一片大笑)。
Buffett’s Salary
巴菲特的薪水
[A shareholder pointed out that Buffett’s salary is only about 10 cents/
year/A share and suggested shareholders would happily pay him 25 cents/
share/year. Buffett replied:]
[有股东指出巴菲特的薪水每年约当每股A股区区10美分，因此建议股东会将他的薪
水调为25美分，巴菲特回答到： ]
I would pay to have this job. It doesn’t get any better than this. I’m getting
SS now. My family would go crazy if I were getting any more money.
如果必要，就算是付费我也要做这份工作，再也没有比这个好的了，我已经够忙
了，我的家人如果知道我变得更有钱时，可能会疯掉。
Google’s Owner’s Manual Modeled After Berkshire’s
网络搜寻引擎Google效法Berkshire的股东使用手册
I’m pleased that the fellows at Google were, they say, inspired by the
Berkshire Owner’s Manual, and that they think it’s good for companies to
communicate with shareholders. If you read it [the Google Owner’s
Manual], you know what they’re like.
我很高兴听到Google公司的人受到Berkshire的启发引用我们的股东手册，这将有
助于公司与股东们沟通，如果你读过他们的股东手册，应该会觉得很熟悉。
It’s like writing a letter to your partner in a business, in which you’d say,
“I’d like you to join me as a partner, I’d like you to invest your money, so
here’s the information I want you to have and how I will treat you...”
这就像是企业主写一封信给所有的合伙人，里面说到：欢迎你成为合伙人，由于我
将运用你的资金去投资，所以以下是我希望你能知道的事以及我们将如何对待你。
I like their prose, though that doesn’t mean I agree with every idea. I hope
more companies sign on for this.
他们的文章相当不错，虽然这不代表我同意所有的内容，我希望有更多的公司也能
加入同样的行列。
Munger: Most of the world doesn’t in any way imitate Berkshire Hathaway.
19,500 Berkshire shareholders came [the announced attendance at this
year’s annual meeting], but we’re the quirky few.
曼格：世界上会想要模仿Berkshire的人并不多，现场的19,500位股东(出席开会的
股东人数)，可以说是最特别的少数。
The Google guys are among the smartest in the country – it’s always nice
to be imitated by smart people.
Google的人是全美国最聪明的一群，而被聪明的人仿效的感觉很不错。
Buffett: We think they’re a lot smarter this week than last [because they
imitated us]. [Laughter.]
巴菲特：我想在这个礼拜后，比他们又比以前更聪明一点了(现场一片大笑)。
HOW TO BECOME A BETTER INVESTOR
如何成为一位优秀的投资人
General
总论
If we were to do it over again, we’d do it pretty much the same way. The
world hasn’t changed that much. We’d read everything in sight about
businesses and industries we think we’d understand. And, working with
far less capital, our investment universe would be far broader than it is
currently.
如果我们可以重头再来一次，我们可能还是会这样做，世界并没有多大的改变，我
们会大量阅读那些我们能够了解的企业与产业信息，而如果可运用的资金规模较小
的话，我们可以投资的世界将比现在宽广许多。
There’s nothing different, in my view, about analyzing securities today vs.
50 years ago.
我个人认为现在的我在分析股票的看法，与50年前没有任何改变。
Ongoing Learning
持续学习
I haven’t been continually learning the basic principles [of sound
investing], which are still Ben Graham’s. They were affected in a
significant way by Charlie and Phil Fisher in terms of looking at better
businesses. And I’ve learned more about how businesses operate over
time.
基本的投资原则数十年如一日，还是葛拉罕那一套，后来受到查理跟费雪的影响，
在看待优质企业的方面做了一些修正，当然这些年来我也学习到许多企业经营管理
之道。
You need an intellectual framework, which you can get mostly from The
Intelligent Investor. Then, think about businesses you can get your mind
around if you really work at it. Then, you will do well if you have the right
temperament.
你必须拥有一套健全的知识网络，这部份的观念你绝对可以从智能型投资人一书中
获得，然而看看周遭那些你可以接触到的任何企业，我相信如果有正确的心态，你
一定可以表现的很好。
Munger: I’ve watched Warren for decades. Warren has learned a lot. He
can pooh pooh investing in PetroChina, but he’s learned, which has
allowed him to [expand his circle of competence so he could invest in
something like PetroChina].
曼格：我观察巴菲特已经有好几十年了，他确实学到很多，过去他可能不会投资中
国石油，但他确实做了改变，使得他能够跨越原先的能力范围投资像中国石油这样
的公司。
If you don’t keep learning, other people will pass you by.
如果你不能持续的学习，别人很可能就会赶上你。
Temperament alone won’t do it – you need a lot of curiosity for a long,
long time.
光是气质还无法做到，你还必须一直保好奇心，我说的是一直。
Filter Out the Noise
过滤杂音
Munger: Part of [having uncommon sense] is being about to tune out folly,
as opposed to recognizing wisdom. If you bat away many things, you
don’t clutter yourself.
曼格：拥有不凡的见识必须避免愚昧的行为，唯有摒除繁杂事物，你才不会把自己
搞得太复杂。
Buffett: People get frustrated because they start to pitch something to us
and when they get halfway through the first sentence, we say we’re not
interested. We don’t waste a lot of time on bad ideas.
巴菲特：有些人可能会觉得很沮丧，因为当他们准备跟我们讲一些事时，话才说到
一半，我们马上表明没有兴趣，对于那些没意思的想法，我们不愿浪费任何的时
间。
When humans compete against computers in chess, how can human
compete? The human eliminates 99% of possibilities without even thinking
about it – they get right down to few possibilities that have any chance of
success. They get rid of the nonsense.
人类如何能够与计算机比赛下棋呢 人类会直接消去99%的情况，只考虑那些有可能
成功的情况，他们不会去理那些不可能的机会。
When people call you with bad idea, don’t be polite and waste 10 minutes.
当别人打电话告诉你一些有的没有的，别客气，不要跟他浪费一分一秒的时间。
Thinking About Risk
论风险
We think the best way to minimize risk is to think. Our default is [to have
our capital] in short-term instruments and only do something when it
makes sense.
我们认为降低风险最好的方式就是思考，若没有其它用途，我们资金设定的去处就
是短期票券，除非谋定，否则我们不轻举妄动。
The Importance of the Right Temperament
心态正确的重要性
Munger: We read a lot. I don’t know anyone who’s wise who doesn’t read
a lot. But that’s not enough: You have to have a temperament to grab
ideas and do sensible things. Most people don’t grab the right ideas or
don’t know what to do with them.
曼格：我们经营阅读，我没有听过有那位智者不经营阅读的，当然光这样还不够，
你必须能够抓住想法然而做出有意义的事，大部分的人都无法找到正确的想法或是
不知道如何去执行。
Buffett: The key is to have a “money mind,” which is not IQ, and then you
have to have the right temperament. If you can’t control yourself, you’re
going to have disasters. Charlie and I have seen it. The whole world in the
late 1990s went a little mad in terms of investments. How could that
happen? Don’t people learn? What we learn from history is that people
don’t learn from history.
巴菲特：主要的关键是赚钱的头脑而不是IQ，然后你还要拥有正确的心态，如果你
无法控制自己，麻烦就会上门，查理跟我都曾目睹，1990年代全球都曾陷入投资的
狂热，它到底是如何发生的? 难道人们不能记取教训，我们从历史学到的教训就是
人们从来不能从历史记取教训。
Diversification
多角化分散风险
You’ll occasionally see something that so obvious that you’ll load up on it,
like junk bonds in 2002 or Berkshire Hathaway many years ago. If you
think you’ll see an opportunity every week, you’re going to lose a lot of
money.
有时你会发现一些好东西，那时你就会一口气买个够，就像是2002年的垃圾债券或
是许多年以前的Berkshire，如果你发现每个礼拜都有好机会出现，那你可能马上就
会有大麻烦出现。
Munger: The idea of excessive diversification is madness.
曼格：过度地强调多角化实在是很荒谬。
Asset Allocation
资产配置
We don’t hold any committee meetings. The business of saying you
should have 50% in stocks, 30% in bonds…it’s nonsense.
我们没有什么投资委员会，有些企业要求资产配置必须有50%的股票、30%的债券
等等，实在是有够无聊。
The idea of recommending that assets should be split 60/40 [between
stocks and bonds], and then have a big announcement that you’re moving
to 65/35 is pure nonsense. It just doesn’t make any sense.
至于建议资产应该分成60/40(股票及债券)，然后又大举宣称比例要调整为65/35
的做法更是无聊透顶，这实在是没有什么意义。
Valuation Matters
评价
If you pay way too much for a business, you’ll get a poor return on what
you paid, even if the return on tangible equity is very good.
如果你买贵了，那么你的投资报酬率将会因此大受影响，即使这家企业本身的资产
报酬率极高也没有用。
Avoid Leverage
避免举债
The most dramatic way we protect ourselves is we don’t use leverage. We
believe almost anything can happen in financial markets. The only way
smart people can get clobbered is [if they use] leverage. If you can hold
them [the positions you own during a crisis], then you’re OK. But even
smart people can get clobbered with leverage – it’s the one thing that can
prevent you from playing out your hand.
保护我们自己最好的方式就是不使用财务杠杆，我们认为金融市场什么事都可能发
生，而聪明人被逮到的唯一可能就是使用杠杆，如果你在危机发生时可以控制住，
那么你就过关，但即使是最聪明的家伙也有可能因为使用杠杆而突锤，避免举债是
让事情失控的最好方式。
Weathering Financial Cataclysms
渡过金融危机
Absent leverage or just going crazy on valuation, the financial cataclysms
won’t do you in. And if you have any more money, you buy.
没有使用杠杆或是评价发生重大失误，金融危机都拿你没有办法，而如果你手上有
多余的闲钱，就可多买一些。
Berkshire is in an extraordinary position to weather any financial
cataclysm. While we don’t go around like an undertaker, hoping for a
plague, we would benefit [in such a situation] and have done so in the
past. We’ve never gotten hurt in the past 30-40 years by what’s going on
in the world around us.
Berkshire早已做好准备以渡过任何金融危机，虽然我们不是殡葬业者，整天期盼瘟
疫发生，但不可否认过去我们确实因此受惠，过去的3、40年间，我们从来没有因
为周遭的巨变而受到伤害。
Spotting Crooked Managements
辨别不正派的经营阶层
Munger: Bernie Ebbers and Ken Lay were caricatures – they were easy to
spot. They were almost psychopaths. But it’s much harder to spot
problems at companies like Royal Dutch [Shell].
曼格：Bernie Ebbers及Ken Lay都是跳梁小丑，他们很容易被发现，他们近乎是变
态，相较之下，人们就很难发觉像荷兰皇家(壳牌)这类公司的问题。
Buffett: [Throwing up his hands] Charlie and I would not have spotted the
problems at Royal Dutch.
巴菲特：(举起他的手)查理跟我还没有发现荷兰皇家的问题。
Munger: But we don’t learn because I’d still expect that Exxon’s figures
are fair.
曼格：但我们之所以没学到是因为我还是认为艾克森的数字尚称公允。
Buffett: In the late 1990s, one business leader after another was cutting
corners. They sink faster to a lower prevailing morality than rise to a
higher prevailing morality, but they still generally follow the crowd.
巴菲特：在1990年代后期，企业领袖相继走快捷方式，他们向下沉沦的速度相当惊人，
但他们还不致于脱轨太多。
Munger: I want to make an apology. Last night, referring to some of our
modern business tycoons – specifically, Armand Hammer – I said that
when they’re talking, they’re lying, and when they’re quiet, they’re
stealing. This wasn’t my witticism; it was used [long ago] to describe the
robber barons.
曼格：我想先向各位倒个歉，昨天晚上 (他指的是某些有名的企业大亨，特别是
Armand Hammer) ，我说他们不但睁眼说瞎话，又五鬼搬运，我并不是在开玩
笑，古时候人们称这种行为叫做贵族强盗。
Forecasts
预测
Munger: People have always had this craving to have someone tell them
the future. Long ago, kings would hire people to read sheep guts. There’s
always been a market for people who pretend to know the future.
Listening to today’s forecasters is just as crazy as when the king hired the
guy to look at the sheep guts. It happens over and over and over.
曼格：人们总是渴望有人可以告诉他们未来，古时候，国王会请专人来判读动物内
脏，总是会有人跳出来自称知道未来，听信今天的股票分析师分析未来，就好象古
代的君王聘请专人判读动物内脏一样荒谬，历史总是一再地重演。
Thinking About Growth Rates When Estimating Valuation
在估算价值时，想到成长率
When the [long-term] growth rate is higher than the discount rate, then
[mathematically] the value is infinity. This is the St. Petersburg Paradox,
written about by Durant 30 years ago.
当长期成长率高过折现率，则理论上价值将无限大，这是著名的圣彼得堡诡论，由
Durant在30年前所提出。
Some managements think this [that the value of their company is infinite].
It gets very dangerous to assume high growth rates to infinity – that’s
where people get into a lot of trouble. The idea of projecting extremely
high growth rates for a long period of time has cost investors an awful lot
of money. Go look at top companies 50 years ago: how many have grown
at 10% for a long time? And [those that have grown] 15% is very rarified.
某些经营阶层真的认为自己所经营的公司其价值无限大，事实上这样的举动相当危
险，人们往往因此惹上不小的麻烦，预期公司将可以一直以很高的成长率的这种想
法，一再让股东与投资人损失大笔的金钱，看看50年前全美最顶尖的那些公司，有
哪一家到现在还可以稳定地维持10%的成长，更不要说15%了。
Charlie and I are rarely willing to project high growth rates. Maybe we’re
wrong sometimes and that costs us, but we like to be conservative.
查理跟我很少会用高成长率来预估一家公司，或许有时我们真的看走眼而失去一些
机会，但我们宁愿选择保守一点。
Munger: If your growth rate is so high that you conclude the business has
an infinite valuation, you have to use more realistic numbers. What else
could anyone do?
曼格：如果你因为设定过高的成长率而使得企业评估的价值变成无限大时，我想你
必须换一个更实际的数字，否则别人也无能为力?
Avoid Bad Businesses
规避不良的企业
In the textile industry, we always had new machinery that held the
promise of increasing our profit, but it never did because everyone else
bought the same machinery. It was sort of like being in a crowd, and
everyone stands on tip-toes – your view doesn’t improve, but your legs
hurt.
在纺织业界，我们总是能找到一些号称能够增加我们获利的新机器，但结果往往令
人大失所望，原因在于别人也同样买了这些新机器，这就好象是在拥挤的人群中，
每个人颠脚的结果，不但大家看不到更远，反而是全部脚酸。
Thinking About Regulatory Risk
谈到法规管制风险
In some businesses, regulatory changes have a big impact, others none.
We just try to think intelligently about any business that we’re in. What
regulatory changes might there be? What might the impact be? If we’re in
furniture retailing, we’re not going to think about it. It’s up to Charlie and
me to think about this and weigh it in our evaluation of a company.
对某些产业来说，法规的改变影响很大，但有些产业则没有太大的差别，我们只是
试着了解所处的这些产业，会受到哪些法规的影响，如果是家具零售业，那我们就
