这场经典的赛事，甚至还用慢动作播放精彩的第四节，我们以今年封面的颜色表 .73
不必太费心，这部份的判断必须仰赖查理跟我本人，将之纳入到评估企业价值的因
素之中。
Munger: In our early days, we tended to overestimate the difficulties of
regulation. We refrained by buying the stocks of television stations
because we thought it was peculiar that someone could ask to have the
government pull your license any year – and the government could do it.
曼格：在Berkshire早期，我们时常过度高估法规的困难性，我们之所以没有投资电
视台的股票便是觉得电视台的执照随时都可能被地方政府所撤销。
Buffett: Tom Murphy [the former head of Capital Cities and Cap Cities/
ABC; click here to read a 2000 interview with him] was way ahead of us on
this one.
巴菲特：Tom Murphy(资本城/ABC的前领导人)在这方面比我们懂得太多。
Index Funds
指数型基金
[When asked whether one should buy Berkshire, invest in an index fund,
or hire a broker, Buffett replied:]
[当被问到投资人应该买Berkshire，还是买指数型基金，或是直接找投资顾问，巴
菲特回答到：]
We never recommend buying or selling Berkshire. Among the various
propositions offered to you, if you invested in a very low cost index fund –
where you don’t put the money in at one time, but average in over 10
years –you’ll do better than 90% of people who start investing at the same
time.
我们从来不建议大家买进或卖出Berkshire，在各种投资机会当中，如果你投资手续
费很低的指数型基金，且不是一次而是分十年慢慢投入，那么你的绩效可能超过其
他90%的投资人。
Munger: It’s hard to sit here at this annual meeting, surrounded by smart,
honorable stock brokers who do well for their clients, and criticize them.
But stock brokers, in toto, will do so poorly that the index fund will do
better.
曼格：要我在年度股东会中批评，周遭坐满了非常聪明且受人尊敬的股票经纪人，
实在是难以启口，但我还是必须说股票经纪人，总的来说还是比不上指数型基金。
BUSINESS AND INVESTING TOPICS
企业与投资
Outlook for the Market
股票市场的前景
[In response to a shareholder laying outexpressing all of his the many
reasons why he is concerned s about the future outlook for the economy
and the market, Buffett replied:]
[当股东问到他在判断未来经济与股票市场的前景时，会考量哪些因素，巴菲特回答
到：]
I would say that at any given point in history, including when stocks were
the cheapest, you could find have found an equally impressive list of
negatives. In ‘74, you could have written down all kinds of things that
would show the future would be terrible.
我认为不论是什么时候，即便是股票价格便宜到不行，你都可以找到一大串负面的
因素，就像1974年，在那个时候，你可以列举出一堆未来前景极其悲观的理由。
We don’t pay any attention to this kind of thing. Our underlying premise is
that this country will do very well and that businesses will do very well. We
used nuclear bombs, endured the cold war, etc., but over time the
opportunities have won out over the problems.
我们不理会这类事物，我们背后的前提是这个国家不会有问题，企业也不会有问
题，我们动用核子弹、渡过冷战时期，事后证明机会一再凌驾问题之上。
I expect this will continue, barring use [against us of] weapons of mass
destruction – it would be hard for businesses to win out over this.
而我预期这样的情势将继续维持下去，除非有人运用大规模的毁灭武器来伤害我
们，我想这是一般企业所无法独立对抗的。
Going back to ‘59, I can’t think of any discussions Charlie and I have had
in which we’ve passed on something because of a view on macro
conditions. It won’t be the economy that will do in investors; it will be
investors themselves. If you’d just owned stocks over time, you’d do fine.
We’re unaffected by the variables that you mentioned. Show us a good
business tomorrow and we’ll jump.
时光回到1959年，我记不起来任何一次查理跟我因为总经情势的关系而错过什么投
资机会的，经济情势对投资人不会有什么影响，会影响的是投资人本身，如果你打
定主意长期投资股票，那么你就不会有问题，我们并不会受到你所提的那些因为所
影响，只要有好的企业出现，我们就会大举买进。
Munger: We wouldn’t be surprised if professionally managed money in the
US will have unimpressive returns relative to the high returns we had until
three years ago.
曼格：如果过去三年美国专业管理的基金绩效表现远低于我们，我们一点都不会感
到讶异。
Buffett: Our expectations were more modest than most three years ago
[see Buffett’s Fortune article, Mr. Buffett on the Stock Market, 11/99]. We
didn’t project the end of the world, but said anyone who thought they
could sit at home and day trade to double digit returns was living in a
fool’s paradise. It’s hard to understand how people could believe such
things. To some extent, they’re sold these beliefs.
巴菲特：目前我们的预期比起三年前稍微乐观一点[参见巴菲特在1999年11月在财
富杂志发表关于股市的看法]，我们并不是预期世界末日要到了，只是要提醒哪些整
天坐在家里买卖股票就妄想每年有两位数以上投资报酬率的人不要再傻了，实在很
难想象怎么会有那么多人会相信这样的事，就某种程度而言，他们被这些想法给卖
掉了。
Impact of Inflation
通货膨胀的冲击
The best thing to combat the threat of inflation is to have a lot of earnings
power of your own. If you’re the only surgeon in town, you’ll be OK
[because you can simply raise your prices to keep up with inflation and
people will pay it]. Charlie and I think it’s best to own fine businesses that
can price in inflationary terms and don’t require big capital investments.
See’s Candies can handle an inflationary world and maintain value.
对抗通膨最好的武器就是自己拥有赚钱的能力，如果你是镇上唯一的一位医生，你
就可以安心，[因为你大可随心所欲地提高你的收费]，查理跟我都认为面临通膨最
好的方式就是拥有可以随时反应售价又不必再投入大量资本的优质企业，像喜斯糖
果都能安度高通膨以维持既有价值。
Unfortunately, most businesses will not come out well in real terms.
Earnings might be up, but the business will be compelled to invest more
and more dollars into the business to stay in place. The worst businesses
compel you to put more and more in, without any rise in profits.
不幸的是，大部分的企业处境都不那么好过，盈余或许会提高，但企业却必须被迫
投入更多的资金才能继续生存下去，更惨的企业是一再又一再投入的结果是获利不
增反减。
TIPS [Treasury Inflation Protected Securities] are not a bad investment for
people worried about inflation heating up, which we’re seeing signs of.
TIPS[预防通膨的国库券]是害怕通膨高涨人士不错的投资选择，目前我们确实看到
某些通膨绩效。
Munger: Most people will see declining returns [due to inflation]. One of
the great defenses if you’re worried about inflation is not to have a lot of
silly needs in your life – if you don’t need a lot of material goods.
曼格：大部分的人会眼看投资报酬率下滑[受通膨影响]，如果你真的担心通膨的
话，最好的防卫方式就是降低生活不必要的需求，摆脱那些不必要的物质享受。
Buffett: Charlie, we’re selling a lot of material goods in the other room, so
keep quiet. [Laughter.]
巴菲特：查理，我们在隔壁房间有许多东西在出售中，所以还是少说一点，[现场一
阵大笑]。
The Mutual Fund Scandal
共同基金丑闻
Munger: The business of selecting investment managers was recently
shown to be even harder by the revelation that a significant fraction of
mutual fund managers took bribes to betray their own shareholders.
曼格：选任基金经理人这档子事在最近传出基金经理人背弃投资人收受贿款后，显
得更加复杂。
It was as if a man came up and said, “Why don’t we kill your mother and
we’ll split the insurance money?” And many people said, “Why, yes, I’d like
some of that insurance money.”
这就好象是有人跳出来说：要不要杀了你妈，然后由我们来平分你的保险金? 结果
很多人竟回答说：好啊! 但我要分多一点。
Buffett: And they were already rich.
巴菲特：而且重点是这群人本来就很有钱。
Munger: And many of them think what happened to them was unjust.
曼格：更甚者，这群人认为他们受到不公平的对待。
Buffett: Many people had to know what was going on. Many people at the
big funds, even if they were not doing it themselves, had to know. The
Investment Company Institute was patting itself on the back and getting
cozy with legislators, but nothing was done until a whistleblower went to
Spitzer and he publicized it.
巴菲特：大家必须了解到底发生了什么事，那些在大型基金公司工作，就算不为自
己而做也必须知道的，投资公司机构以逐渐振作并与立法单位的关系日渐融洽，不
过直到一位史匹哲检察官跳出来公开真相以前，并没有什么太大作为。
Hundreds of people knew and it went on for a long time, but nobody did
anything.
长期以来，成千上万的人都知情，但就是没有人跳出来说一句话。
Compensation Systems
报酬制度
[Our approach to compensation] is wildly different from the approach of
most companies, which go through elaborate procedures. The typical
corporation has a compensation committee, and believe me, they don’t
ask Dobermans to be on it; rather, they want Chihuahuas who’ve been
sedated.
我们的报酬制度与其它公司有极大的不同，后者通常有相当精细的程序，一般来
说，这些公司都设有薪资报酬委员会，但我敢打包票他们绝对不敢找杜宾犬而看
门，通常会找乖巧的吉娃娃。
I’ve been on 19 boards and only been asked to be on one compensation
committee they put me on one committee – and they regretted it. [In that
case, because I opposed the compensation plan,] I was outvoted – by two
smart, honorable people, by the way.
我个人担任19家公司的董事，但只有一家邀请我出任薪资委员会，而且事后证明他
们后悔不已，因为我曾经反对过他们的薪资提案，当然最后反对无效，被另外两位
受尊敬且识时务的社会贤达所推翻。
I’ve never seen a compensation consultant say: “This bozo you’ve got [the
CEO] is only worth half what you’re paying him.”
我从来没有听过薪资顾问会说：你们请的这家伙只值现在付给他的一半。
It’s an unequal negotiation [between the board and the CEO]. The CEO
really cares, but to the board, it’s play money. It’s hard for board
members – they just get handed a piece of paper showing what the top
quartile of comparable CEOs get paid, so there’s a ratcheting effect. In
this kind of system, things will quickly get out of whack. There’s some
change now, but it’s not being led by CEOs.
这是不公平的谈判[指董事会与经理人]，经理人非常在乎，但对董事会来说，这只
是数字游戏，对董事会成员来说，他们往往会拿到一张顶尖经理人薪资报酬的列
表，期望引起比照效应，在这样的制度下，事情通常很容易就失控，所以若要改
革，绝对不是由经理人做起。
Munger: I’d rather throw a viper down my shirt front than hire a
compensation consultant.
曼格：我宁愿被丢到毒蛇面前也不要看到薪资顾问。
Irrational Markets
不理性的市场
In insurance, we think a lot more about low-probability events than most
people. We think more about big events in the financial arena than the
natural arena. Financial markets have vulnerabilities that we try to think of
and build in ways to protect us against them – and even some capabilities
where we might profit in a huge way.
在保险业，我们非常关心发生机率非常小的事件，但在投资领域我们关心的则是一
些重大的事件，金融市场有其脆弱的一面，而我们首要之务就是尽量避免受到其波
动的影响，甚至有可能因而得以大有斩获。
Munger: The temporary collapse in junk bonds, where they got to 35-40%
yields, was just a strange thing. There was absolute chaos at the bottom
tick. Apply this behavior to stocks – it’s not hard to imagine a big crunch
coming along.
曼格：垃圾债券市场暂时性的崩盘，使得值利率飙高到35-40%的报酬率就是一个
怪现象，节拍器有时也会乱了步调，在股票市场中，暂时性的崩跌也是时有所闻。
Buffett: It’s a fascinating thing to me: in 2002, there were tens of
thousands of smart people, money was available, everyone had the desire
to make money, yet look at what happened [to the prices of junk bonds].
Extraordinary things happened. Can these be the same people [buying
such bonds yielding 6% today] who let them sink to such levels?
巴菲特：当时真是令人回味再三，回顾2002年，成千上万的聪明人士、资金充沛，
所有人都妄想大发利市，但大家看看垃圾债券的价格，奇怪的事情发生，一直等到
垃圾债券殖利率回到6%时，同样这群人才又回过头来买这些债券。
Wall Street is awash in money and talent, but you get these absolutely
extraordinary swings. It doesn’t happen with apartments and other types
of assets.
华尔街的资金与人才汇集，但市场的波动也相当剧烈，不像不动产那样价格稳定。
At the minimum, you want to protect yourself from this type of insanity
from wiping you out – and better yet, make a profit from it.
最低底限，你必须保护自己不被这类不理性的疯狂行为所扫出场，更有甚者，还有
可能从中获利。
Risk of Derivatives
衍生性金融商品
We don’t think that in any year the chance is very high that derivatives will
lead to or greatly accentuate a financial trauma, but we think it’s there.
我们不确定哪一个特定年度衍生性金融商品会导致或加剧金融风暴的产生，但我们
认为这样的危机确实存在。
It’s fascinating to look at a company like Freddie Mac: an institution that
dozens of financial analysts were looking at; that had an oversight office;
that was created by Congress with committees to oversee it; that had two
smart, exceptional board members, Marty Leiiebowitz and Henry
Kauffman; and that had auditors present – yet Freddie misstated earnings
by $6 billion in a short time. That’s big money. And a large part of it was
facilitated by derivatives. You can go back and read the footnotes, listen
to the conference calls, etc. and you wouldn’t have known. In the end, it
was $6 billion, but it could have been $12 billion if they’d wanted.
Freddie Mac这家公司相当有趣，这是一家财经分析师相当关注的一家公司，它上
有一个主管机关，并由国会立法成立并受其委员会监督，它有两位优秀又聪明的董
事Marty Leibowitz及Henry Kaufman，同时还有会计师负责查帐，但最后
Freddie Mac还是出了问题，突然间盈余被灌水60亿美元，这可不是一笔小数目，
其中大部分的亏损系衍生性金融商品所造成，你或许可以再把过去的年报附注拿出
来读一读、或者去参加公司记者说明会等等，但我打包票你一定找不出问题在哪
里，就这样60亿美元飞了，若是他们敢，谁说不可能是120亿美元。
Derivatives can lead to a lot of mischief. When you have a complicated
derivative transaction, and a trader with investment house A on one side
and investment house B on the other side, and on the day the deal is
done, both record a profit, this can lead to mischief – and the scale is
getting bigger every day.
衍生性金融商品有可能招致相当多舞弊，当你进行一项相当复杂的衍生性金融商品
交易，一位营业员代表投资银行A，另一位则代表投资银行B，在合约敲定的当天，
两家同时都有可能记录获利，这很容易导致舞弊事件发生，而且规模与日俱增。
I know the managements of many large financial institutions and they
don’t have their minds around this. We tried at Gen Re [where we had a
small derivative book] and couldn’t.
我认识很大大型投资机构的管理阶层，但他们却一点也没有警觉，我们在Gen Re便
试过(该公司目前有小额的衍生性金融商品部位)，结果没有用。
Whatever problems there were at Salomon [during its crisis years ago],
they’re far, far worse now [systemwide].
所罗门当年发生很严重的问题，但我认为现在的情况比起那时又严重许多。
In 1991, if the government hadn’t reversed himself [in its plans to put
take actions that would have put Salomon out of business], we were
preparing documents [to file for bankruptcy. Had this happened,] We had
$1.2 trillion [notional value] of derivative contracts that others were
counting on, that would have gone bad. All sorts of securities transactions
wouldn’t have settled, accounts in Japan and the UK would have been
affected, etc. For instance, Salomon had a relationship with a bank in
Germany which took large deposits in Germany and lent the money to
Salomon. All kinds of things would have come out. You don’t need to put
these strains on a system that’s already highly leveraged.
1991年，如果政府没有撤回吊销所罗门业务资格的决定，我们将会递件申请破产，
一旦如此，所罗门将有总值1.2兆美元的衍生性金融商品合约待解决，所有的证券交
易将无法顺利交割，还包含日本与英国的帐户也会跟着受到影响，举个例来说，所
罗门跟德国一家银行有大量的金额借贷关系，什么事都有可能发生，事实上，在高
度杠杆的系统下，任何一点压力都有可能变成压垮骆驼的最后一根稻草。
When you get huge amounts of transactions, which not many people
understand, you create a huge problem that may be triggered by an
exogenous event.
当你从事大量的交易不是很多能搞得懂的，这些交易就很有可能因为某些外部事件
而惹出大麻烦。
We use derivatives – we get them collateralized – and we’ve made money
on them. But I predict that sometime in the next 10 years, we will have a
big problem caused by or exaggerated by derivatives.
我们利用衍生性金融商品，并提供相关担保，从中获利，但我预期未来10年以内，
我们将因此爆发严重的金融问题。
Munger: People don’t think about the consequences of the consequences.
People start by trying to hedge against interest rate changes, which is very
difficult and complicated. Then, the hedges made the results [reported
profits] lumpy. So then they use new derivatives to smooth this. Well, now
you’ve morphed into lying. This turns into a Mad Hatter’s Party. This
