这场经典的赛事，甚至还用慢动作播放精彩的第四节，我们以今年封面的颜色表 .74
happens to vast, sophisticated corporations.
曼格：人们往往知其然不知其所以然，一开始有人试着想要去规避利率变动的风
险，这本来就是相当困难且复杂的事，然而避险的结果反而让帐面的获利起伏不
定，所以接下来他们又利用另一种新的衍生性商品来让获利看起来平顺一点，值此
你为了圆第一个谎，就必须编更多的谎言，到最后就演变成疯狂的派对，这种情形
在庞杂的集团公司尤为常见。
Somebody has to have to step in and say, “We’re not going to do it -- it’s
just too hard.”
我认为应该有人介入，说到：我们不应该这样子做，这太麻烦了。
It was bonkers and the accountants sold out.
只有笨蛋及会计师会被出卖。
Buffett: If you want to have a little fun, go to the annual meeting of a big
financial company and ask for about the details of a complex transaction.
They won’t know – but you can be sure the trader who did it will be well
paid for it.
巴菲特：如果你想找点乐子，到一些大型金融机构的股东年会，然后问一些复杂的
交易细节，相信他们一定也搞不懂，但我敢保证该付给这些人的高额报酬一毛也少
不了。
Any time you have situation where smart people can make money by
taking risk, you’ll get it.
只要让这些聪明的家伙逮到机会，他们绝对会狠狠地捞一笔。
Derivatives were supposed to spread risk, and some make that argument
today. This may be true much of the time, but what about when risk
becomes highly concentrated in a few institutions.s? Coke is better able to
take currency risk than most trading desks. Overall, there’s much more
risk in the system because of derivatives.
理论上衍生性金融商品应该是能够分散风险，这是学者们一直强调的论点，或许通
常的情况下确实如此，但要是这些风险全部集中在少数的几家金融机构时又如何?
可口可乐比起这些交易商还能够承担汇率风险，不论如何，整个金融系统因为衍生
性金融商品的存在而使得风险大大增加。
Derivative Risk vs. Super Cat Reinsurance Risk
衍生性金融商品风险vs.超级灾难再保风险
[In response to a shareholder who compared super cat reinsurance risk to
derivative risk, Buffett responded:]
[当股东问到，超级灾难再保风险与衍生性金融商品风险时，巴菲特回答到：]
The derivative contracts that Gen Re wrote are not similar to the super cat
insurance we’re writing. We’re reinsuring personal or business risks others
don’t want to or are unable to bear. In our view, it made no sense to be in
the derivatives business.
Gen Re签订的衍生性金融商品合约与超级灾难保险保单并不相同，我们承接的再保
业务是个人或企业不想或无法承担的风险，在我们看来，衍生性金融商品业务并没
有存在的意义。
Munger: They’re radically different. Derivatives are full of clauses that say
if one party’s credit gets downgraded, then they have to put up collateral.
It’s like margin – you can go broke. In attempting to protect themselves,
they’ve introduced instability. Nobody seems to have recognition of what
a disaster of a system they’ve created. It’s a demented system.
曼格：这两者有极大的不同，衍生性金融商品有许多条款言明如果交易的一方信评
等被降级，他们就必须补提担保品，这就好象是保证金交易，你有可能因此倾家荡
产，为了要保护自己，他们反而使得整个系统很不稳定，似乎没有人了解他们创造
的交易系统潜藏着多大的危机，这是一个疯狂的系统。
Buffett: Gen Re, which had been rated AAA, hHad Berkshire not bought
itGen Re, which was rated AAA, it could have run into terrible financial
difficulty post-9/11, especially if they’d recognized their actual liabilities.
They would have been downgraded, which could have triggered things in
derivative activities which would have triggered coming up with loads of
cash.
巴菲特：要不是因为Berkshire的买进使得Gen Re的信用评等因而被提升为三A等
级，光是911事件被迫承担许多责任，就有可能导致金融危机的发生，Gen Re有可
能因而被降等，进而导致衍生性金融商品合约要求提拨大量的现金。
The system wasn’t built to last. Many CEOs at other major financial
institutions don’t really comprehend that. When you get margin calls for
huge amounts of money, it only has to be one day when you can’t meet it
[and you can be forced to file for bankruptcy]. In 1987, there was a large
wire transfer that didn’t make it towas late arriving at the a Chicago
brokerage house, and it came close to unraveling the system (the money
finally showed up).
这样的系统禁不起任何的考验，许多大型金融机构的总裁根本就不了解其严重性，
但你被要求补提大量的保证金时，往往就是你调不到头寸的紧急时刻，结果有可能
就因此导致公司破产倒闭，回顾1987年，有一次因为系统故障使得一大笔汇款迟迟
无法入帐，就差点让整个交割系统因而瓦解，所幸在最后一刻，资金及时到位才化
解危机。
Corporate Governance
企业治理
[A shareholder asked what Buffett thought of the Calpers/ISS proposal
that he should not be on Coke’s audit committee. (From a Forbes article:
“The California Public Employees Retirement System, or Calpers, and
investor advisory group Institutional Shareholder Services argued that
votes for Buffett for the Coke board should be withheld because Berkshire
subsidiaries, such as ice cream chain Dairy Queen and food distributor
McLane Co., do business with the world's largest soft drink maker… In
defending the decision last month, an ISS spokesman said the group
didn't want Buffett off the board entirely, just off of the audit committee,
which should operate with zero tolerance for any conflicts. The
spokesman said they don't make exceptions for anyone, even Buffett.”)
Buffett replied:]
[有股东问到，巴菲特对于美国最大的退休基金- Calpers/以及投资人协会ISS建议
股东投票反对巴菲特续任可口可乐审计委员会的看法，巴菲特回答到：]
(根据富比士报导，加州公务人员退休组织Calpers以及投资人顾问协会声称基于利
益回避原则，必须制止股东投票支持巴菲特续任董事会，由于Berkshire旗下许多子
公司诸如冰淇淋连锁国际乳品皇后以及物流公司McLane与全世界最大的饮料公司有
生意上的往来，为了替自己的言论辩护，ISS的一位发言人强调，他们并不是要求巴
菲特要完全退出可口可乐的董事会，而只是不希望他续任审计委员会，因为后者不
能存在丝毫的利益冲突，该发言人表示，任何人都不能例外，就算是巴菲特也一样)
I would say that whoever suggested that should do 500 sit-ups [this was a
reference to a funny skit in the movie shown before the meeting, in which
Arnold Schwarzenegger punishes Buffett for taking about raising taxes in
California by making him to do 500 sit-ups].
我必须说，讲这话的人应该要先罚500个仰卧起坐[这是影射在正式会议前，会场播
放的一段影片，当中提到阿诺在竞选加州州长时，因为巴菲特提及加税议题而开玩
笑说要罚他做500个仰卧起坐]。
Actually, Charlie and I have encouraged the idea that shareholders should
behave like owners, not sheep – where, in too many cases, they’ve been
shorn. Big institutional shareholders have too long sat on the sidelines
when they should have been active. [Now that they’re finally waking up,]
the question is: Can they behave like intelligent owners? In last year or
two, as they’ve woken up, they’ve searched for checklists, but frankly, a
checklist is no substitute for thinking. Bertrand Russell once said: “Most
men would rather die than think. Many do.”
实际上，大家都知道我们鼓励股东因为要有自己当老板的想法，而不是一昧顺从公
司的看法，通常他们都会变得像绵羊一样被修理，大型投资机构法人在很多应该挺
身而起的时刻反而在一旁坐视不管，[现在他们终于慢慢醒过来]，问题是：他们真
能表现的像一个有智能的老板吗? 过去一两年，当他们终于觉醒后，开始寻找一个
检查清单，但坦白说，光是一份清单无法真正解决问题，Bertrand Russell曾说
过：大部分的人，打死都不肯用心思考，确实如此。
A board’s real job is to find the right CEO and prevent him or her from
overreaching. Not much else matters. Bertrand Russell once said: “Most
men would rather die than think. Many do.”
我认为董事会真正的职责在于寻找合适的总裁，同时要能防止他逾越权限，至于其
他事情根本无管紧要。
I think it’s absolutely silly, if Berkshire Hathaway owns 200 million shares
of Coke worth $10 billion, to think that because Berkshire Hathaway sells
a few hours of flight training to Coke, that I’m conflicted. It's almost
absurd that people don't understand proportionality at all.
我认为如果你觉得Berkshire持有2亿股价值100亿美元的可口可乐股票，会因为为
了出售一些飞行训练时数给可口可乐而触犯利益冲突，这样的想法未免太幼稚了，
我认为不考量中间的比例原则实在是很荒谬的一件事。
I receive $100,000 per year [to sit on Coke’s board]. This is obviously a
tiny amount of money to me. If we picked someone from the welfare line
and gave them the same money, this would represent all of their income,
yet they’d be considered independent, but they wouldn’t really be. This
thinking is kind of silly.
担任可口可乐的董事，每年我约可获取10万美元的报酬，这笔钱对我来说，根本就
是九牛一毛，又如果我们从靠领取社会救济金的人士中，随便抓一个来担任可口可
乐董事，那么这笔钱几乎等于他全部的所得，虽然表面上他们完全符合独立性的规
定，但事实上刚好完全相反，所以这种想法实在是愚昧的可以。
I encourage institutions and large owners to behave like owners and think
carefully about what causes to take on.
我鼓励投资机构以及大股东表现的像老板的样子，同时好好地想一想该采取何种作
为。
Munger: The cause of reform is hurt not helped when an activist makes an
idiotic suggestion like saying that having Warren on the board of Coke is
contrary to the interests of Coke. Nutty behavior undermines their cause.
曼格：当有人积极主张「像华伦这样的人担任可口可乐的董事会违背可口可乐利
益」的白痴建议，反而会让改革的目标受到伤害，神经病的行为将让改革的旗号大
大受损。
Buffett: It’s like having a slicing machine in an apple orchard. The machine
picks up things like rocks, so you program it to slice only red round
things, but when red balloons come down the conveyor belt, the machine
doesn’t know what to make of it.
巴菲特：这就好象是在苹果园里摆一台削皮机，这台机器可以自动设定挑出石头，
而只削红色圆形的物体，但是当输送带送来一个红色的大气球时，这台机器反而不
知道该怎么办。
Institutions are coming around to new ways of thinking. Hopefully, with
evolution, they’ll think about what’s actually good for the shareholders of
the company.
投资机构正在寻找新的思惟模式，个人衷心盼望他们能够思考出什么是真正对于公
司股东有利的做法。
Finding Good Investment Advisors
找寻好的投资顾问
The question of finding investment advisors is a hard one. When I was
winding up my partnership [in the early 1970s], I was returning a fair
amount of capital to people, and they asked me what to do with it. I
recommended two people who I felt were exceptionally good and honest:
Sandy Gottesman, who just joined Berkshire’s board, and Bill Ruane [of the
Sequoia Fund]. They were contemporaries of mine, so I knew their results
and how they’d achieved them, which is critical. I don’t know today’s
managers, so I can’t recommend anyone.
对我来说，找寻好的投资顾问实在是个难题，当我在1970年代结束合伙事业时，我
将一大笔资金还给投资人，当时他们问我该如何处理这笔钱，我向他们推荐两位人
选，我认为他们的表现与诚信都相当不错：一位是Sandy Gottesman(他刚加入
Berkshire董事会)，一位是Bill Ruane (系Sequoia基金经理人)，他们和我属于同类
型，而且我也很清楚他们的表现以及达到目标的过程，这很重要，至于现在的基金
经理人由于我不熟，所以我不便推荐任何人。
The fact that I only knew two shows the difficulties of finding someone
good. The promotional types going around to institutions today are not
likely to be good – or have high integrity.
事实上，只认识两位也凸显找到好的经理人的困难性，以目前投资机构惯用的推销
方式，实在是很难找到优秀且具诚信的经理人。
I read an article [in the Wall Street Journal last week] about the two fellows
who founded Google and all the problems they’ll have with their newfound
riches – I almost sent a sympathy card. [Laughter.] They don’t have
a big problem. They’re smarter than the people coming to them. The
people with the problem are the people trying to sell them services and
want to convince them that they have a problem.
我在上礼拜华尔街日报读到一篇文章，系有关两位Google创办人以及他们如何与那
些新贵间产生的问题，我几乎想要发函慰问他们，[现场一阵大笑]，他们的问题不
大，他们比那些所接触的人聪明的多，真正有问题的人是那些想要推销本身提供的
服务，同时企图说服你有问题的人。
It’s merchandising. You don’t need these people at all in investing – all
these professionals who say you’re going to be in big trouble if you don’t
listen to them. They’re selling.
他们只不过是想卖东西而已，想要投资并不需要这些人的协助，所有那些说你如果
不听他们的建议就会碰到大麻烦的专业经理人，他们只不过是想卖东西给你而已。
It reminds me of when I asked my former brother-in-law: “How do you get
farmers to pay you to sell their cow to Swift or Armour?” He replied,
“Warren, it’s not how you sell ‘em, it’s how you tell ‘em.”
这让我想起我曾经问我的姊夫：你是如何让这些农夫付费请你卖牛给肉品公司的?
他回答到：华伦，重点不在如何卖，而是你如何说服他们。
The Investment Advisory Business
投资顾问行业
Munger: Mutual funds charge 2% per year and then brokers switch people
between funds, costing another 3-4 percentage points. The poor guy in
the general public is getting a terrible product from the professionals. I
think it’s disgusting. It’s much better to be part of a system that delivers
value to the people who buy the product. But if it makes money, we tend
to do it in this country.
曼格：共同基金每年收取2%的手续费，而中介将投资人的资金在基金间转来转去，
又要收取3到4%的手续费，可怜的一般投资大众只能被动地从专业经理人那些得到
悲惨的服务，我认为这实在是很可耻，我认为能够让投资人增加价值的产品才算是
好系统，当然除非真的有利可图，我们才会考虑从事这类业务。
Hedge Funds
避险基金
I think people who invest in hedge funds, in aggregate, are unlikely to do
well. Hedge funds are in the midst of a fad. It’s distinguished by an
extraordinary amount of fees. If the world is paying hedge funds 2% and a
percentage of the profits, and the losers fade away, then it won’t be good
for all investors. Obviously, some will do well, but not in aggregate.
我认为投资避险基金的投资人，总的来说，不可能有好的结果，避险基金正陷入一
片狂热，它以收费高而著称，如果大家支付给避险基金业者2%的手续费，以及实际
获利的一定百分比，但亏钱则不用赔，那么我想这并不适合大部分的投资人，很显
然的或许有些基金的表现可能不错，但总的来说则有问题。
Munger: Why would you want to invest with a guy whose thought process
says, “Iif a second layer of fees is good, then let’s add a third layer.”
曼格：我为什么要将钱交给这样的家伙投资，他说如果你可以接受二层的收费机
制，那何不试试三层。
Buffett: Maybe [high fees] are what the traffic can bear, but that reflects an
attitude. It’s a basically unfair arrangement. In effect, [hedge fund
managers] are getting four times standard fees. And I’d bet they don’t
have all of their own money in their own funds.
巴菲特：或许高收费才能负担如此复杂的通路，但这也反应出某些态度，这基本上
是一种不公平的制度，事实上，避险基金经理人已经收取四倍以上的管理费，而我
敢打赌他们一定不会把自己的钱摆在这些基金内。
Charlie and I both ran partnerships that would generally be classified as
hedge funds. There are some similarities, but I don’t think we had quite
the same attitude that the present managers have.
查理跟我过去都曾经营过类似避险基金的合伙组织，当然其中有一些类似之处，但
我不认为两者的态度有任何雷同之处。
The fund of funds stuff – it’s really unbelievable, piling on the layers of
costs. People don’t become geniuses because on the door it says “hedge
fund.” But they may be good at marketing – in -- in fact, if they’re good at
this, they don’t need to be good at anything else.
怎么会有基金中的基金这种东西，这实在是很难想象，多层的收费组织，人们不会
因为自己的门口挂上避险基金而变成天才，但不可否认，他们的行销手法确实优
异，事实上，他们只要靠这部份的专长就可以吃喝不尽了。
Willingness of Bank to Do Deal s Wwith Shady Characters
银行为何喜欢跟有争议的人打交道
Munger: It’s amazing what goes on. Salomon was at least as disciplined
and rational as other investment banks, but by the end, Salomon was
begging for investment business from Robert Maxwell, whose nickname
was “The Bouncing Check.” You’d think if this was his nickname,
investment banks wouldn’t be chasing his business.
曼格：这实在是让人感到很讶异，所罗门至少像其它投资银行一样具有纪律以及理
性，但结果所罗门还挤破头要跟Robert Maxwell这样的人做生意，他有个外号叫做
「跳票人」，我想你一定在想，如果这果真是他的绰号，投资银行为什么还要拼命
抢接他的生意。
Buffett: The day they found him bobbing [in the water; he committed
suicide as the scandal about his misdeeds broke], we [Salomon] sent
money to him in exchange for money they he wasere sending to us, but
they he didn’t pay. So, we went to England to collect from his sons and it
was a mess. We got what we deserved.
巴菲特：记得我们发现被骗的那一天[Maxwell在东窗事后宣布破产之后，畏罪自
杀]，我们(指所罗门)必须先借他钱好让他把先前的债务还给我们，但结果他又跳
票，所以我们感到英国去向他的儿子要钱，当时真是一片混乱，我们实在是活该倒
楣。
To an investment banker, his earnings would be affected to a significant
way if he wrote a few more tickets to Maxwell. You have to control this if
guys can make money by bringing dubious things in the door.
对投资银行经理人来说，他的奖金会随着开给Maxwell的帐单多寡而有很大的不
同，所以你必须小心防止这些家伙为了捞钱而将不可靠的客户带进门。
[Buffett and Munger chuckled to themselves as they recalled Salomon
