这场经典的赛事，甚至还用慢动作播放精彩的第四节，我们以今年封面的颜色表 .75
doing business with another shady character they didn’t name – perhaps .]
[巴菲特跟曼格在回想到所罗门跟另外一位有争议的人物做生意的情景时，自我解嘲
地轻笑]
Munger [dripping with sarcasm]: That was a wonderful experience.
Warren, Lou Simpson and I are were all on the board [of Salomon], we’re
we were the largest shareholders, and we said, “Don’t do business with
this guy.” But they ignored us and said that the underwriting committee
had approved it.
曼格以自我讽刺的语调说：那实在是很难得的经验，华伦、辛普森跟我当时都担任
所罗门的董事，我们是持股比例最高的股东，当时我们一再强调，不要跟这个家伙
做生意，但他们就是不听，坚称审议委员会已经核准这个案子。
Buffett: He had a neon sign on him saying “CROOK.” He did go to jail.
Incidentally, he claimed to have owned a lot of Berkshire stock and to have
made a lot of money on it, but I checked the shareholder records and
couldn’t see it. It could have been in street name, but for a block that big,
I think I would have found it [so he has probably lying about his Berkshire
holdings].
巴菲特：他身上明明挂了一个招牌「骗子」，结果他果真踉铛入狱，更好笑的是，
他声称拥有Berkshire大量的股份，并因此赚了一大笔钱，但我特定查了一下股东名
册却找不到他的名字，虽然他有可能用别人的名字，但以那样庞大的持股，我应该
会发现[所以我猜他可能连这个也是在骗人]。
Dividends and Share Buybacks
买回库藏股
The equation is simple, but practice doesn’t always follow logic. Assuming
you’ve been honest with shareholders [in communicating enough
information so they can accurately estimate intrinsic value], then if your
stock is far below intrinsic value, then buying stock it back adds a lot of
value. The Washington Post did this and Teledyne bought back 90% of its
stock over time.
这道理很简单，但实务上却不一定就合逻辑，假设你对股东们够坦白，让他们有足
够的信息可以自行判断公司实质的价值，又假设你公司的股价明显低于实质的价
值，那么买回库藏股将可以大大增加公司的每股价值，华盛顿邮报过去便曾这样做
过，而Teledyne公司甚至买回90%流通在外的股份。
Today, stock buybacks are popular. The underlying rationale – not the
professed rationale – is that people hope the stock price won’t go down.
But often this doesn’t make sense for shareholders.
今天，股份买回相当普遍，其基本而不是宣称的原理是投资人希望股价不要下跌，
但这实际上对股东不见得有意义。
If the stock is underpriced, buy it back with excess cash; if it’s overvalued,
don’t buy a single share.
如果股票价格被低估，那就利用多余的资金买回，但是如果股票价格被高估，那么
就算有再多的钱也不要轻举妄动。
If we wanted to return cash to shareholders, we’d go to them and say,
“Our stock is cheap and we’re going to return cash to you by buying it
back.”
如果我们想要把钱退还给股东，我们也向大家宣布，由于我们的股票太便宜了，我
们将以买回股份的方式将现金退给你们。
Dividends and Frictional Costs
股利与摩擦成本
In terms of dividends, you get into an expectational problem. Most public
companies don’t bounce around their dividend from year to year
(although this is very common in private companies and Berkshire
subsidiaries) because investors come to rely on it. So once you establish a
dividend policy at a public company, think a long time before changing it.
就股利而言，你可能会陷入一个预期的迷思，大部份的上市公司的股利发放不太会
跳来跳去(虽然这在私人公司以及Berkshire的子公司来说非常普遍)，因为投资人有
依赖的倾向，所以一旦上市公司有意建立一股利政策的话，要改变请三思而为。
Munger: The total amount paid out in dividends is roughly equal to the
amount lost in trading and investment advice, so net dividends to
shareholders are zero. This is a very peculiar way to run a republic.
曼格：全体公司支付的股利金额约当支付在手续费以及顾问费的总额，所以实际上
股东们收到的结余等于零，这个世界实在是有够奇怪。
Buffett: In a Fortune article I published in 1999 [Mr. Buffett on the Stock
Market, 11/99], the frictional costs are equal to the total amount paid out
in dividends.
巴菲特：我在1999年曾在财富杂志刊登过一篇名为[巴菲特对股票市场的看法]的文
章中提到，整体股市的摩擦成本约当于实际支付的股利。
Companies should be paying out dividends. Take See’s Candies: we’ve
tried to grow it without successwe haven’t figured out a way to grow it, so
we can’t reinvest, so something approaching a 100% payout [of profits]
would make sense [were it a public company]. Most managements want to
ensure regularity [of dividends], so they go with a conservative level
[below 100%].
公司本来就应该配发股利，以喜斯糖果为例，由于我们实在找不到好的方法让它继
续成长，所以我们无法将盈余转投资，结果当然应该将盈余100%支付给股东[我想
就算是上市公司也应该如此]，大部分的上市公司经营阶层都希望确保股利正确的稳
定性，所以倾向比较保守的比例[低于100%]。
We think about this at Berkshire. If we don’t didn’t think we could put it
[all of our excess cash] to work, then we’d pay it out. But we expect – and
this is reasonable, I think – that we will have the chance to put it to work.
在Berkshire我们的想法就是如此，一旦我们认为无法利用这些多余的资金，我们就
将它分出去，但目前我们仍合理地预期，这些资金将有机会得以好好运用。
[If we decided to return cash to shareholders and] iIf our stock wasn’t
underpriced, then we’d probably pay out a dividend – but don’t plan count
on it anytime soon.
如果我们决定将现金还给股东，而我们的股票价格又未被低估，那么我们很有可能
就会分配股利，但目前并无这样的计画。
Stock options
股票选择权
Congress has no business legislating accounting. It was a disgrace when
Congress 10 years ago effectively bludgeoned Arthur Leavitt into backing
down on expensing stock options, at the behest of big corporate
contributors. In a very significant way, this accelerated the [accounting]
abuses of the late 1990s.
国会无权立法规范会计原则，十年前在企业金主的要求下，国会强势介入胁迫
Arthur Leavitt推翻将选择权列为费用的法案，这实在是很可耻，此举大大助长了
1990年代滥用会计原则的恶果。
The Senate voted 88-9 to say that it’s more important to have stock prices
go up than to have accurate expenses. All of the big auditing firms
endorsed their big clients’ views, so they could report higher earnings.
and put option expenses in the footnotes. They [the auditing firms] have
now shifted completely [and support expensing options].
参议院以88比9的票数说明其认为股价上涨远比正确地将费用入帐重要多了，所有
的大型会计师事务所纷纷为其大客户的观点做辩护，好让它们的盈余报表好看一
点，然而时至今日，这些事务所又幡然悔改，转而支持将选择权费用化。
The compromise was the firms were given the choice of expensing
options or showing their cost in the footnotes – and 498 of the S&P 500
companies chose the latter.
当时的折衷方式是事务所可以选择将选择权费用化或是在财务报表中的附注揭露相
关的成本，结果在S&P 500家公司中，有498家选择采用后者。
I suggest that you write to your Congressman Congressmen and tell them
that FASB knows more about acting than he they does.
我建议大家写信给自己选区的国会议员，告诉他们FASB的专家比他们更懂得如何去
执行。
In Google, type in “Indiana” and “pi” and you’ll find a site [here’s one] that
relates how, in 1897, the Indiana state legislature voted to round pi to
3.20 because it’s an easier number to work with. It passed the Indiana
House, but by the time it got to the Senate, a few people managed to get
it shot down.
在Google你只要输入“Indiana” 及 “pi”，你就可以发现一个网站，提到1897年时，
印地安那州的国会立法将pi订为3.2，只因这样比较方便好记，最后这项法案在印地
安那州通过后，在参议院被一些人给挡了下来。
In 1993, the U.S. Senate cleansed the record of the Indiana House by
changing the rules on something they knew nothing about [stock options].
88 senators declared the world was flat because big donors said it was
thus.
到了1993年，美国参议院把印地安那州地方议会的惨痛教训忘的一乾二净，88位
参议院议员公然宣称地球是平的，只因他们背后的大金主要他们这样子说。
Munger: The people who voted this way were way worse than in Indiana.
Those people were stupid. These people [the 88 Senators] are stupid and
dishonorable. They knew it was wrong and did it anyway.
曼格：这些人干得好事比起印地安那所作的要恶劣的多，因为后者都是笨蛋，但前
者却是可耻的笨蛋，他们明明知道不对但却还是执意那样做。
[For more on stock options, I’ve written the following columns on stock
options: The Stock Option Travesty, Stock Options’ Perverse Incentives,
Rebutting Stock Option Defenders and Coalition of the Greedy.]
关于这个问题，我曾经写给以下这些文章：股票选择权的荒谬、股票选择权-邪恶的
诱因、反驳股票选择权的支持者以及贪婪的联盟等。
IPOs
初次公开发行
Munger: It is entirely possible that you could use our mental models to
find good IPOs to buy. There are a zillioncountless IPOs every year, and
I’m sure that there are a few cinches that you could jump on. But the
average person is going to get creamed. So if you’re talented, good luck.
曼格：运用我们的心态是有可能找得到好的初次公开发行标的，每年有相当多的初
次公开发行公司，而我也确信其中必定有一些是不负大家所望，但平均而言，参与
的投资人大多会被海削一笔，所以如果你自认胆识过人，那么就祝你好运。
IPOs are too small for us, or too high tech, so we won’t understand them.
So, if Warren’s looking at them, I don’t know about it.
初次公开发行的公司对我们来说不是规模太小，就是属于高科技领域，这方面我们
不太懂，说不定华伦曾他们做过一些研究，至于我则不太了解。
Buffett: An IPO is like a negotiated transaction – the seller chooses when
to come public – and it’s unlikely to be a time that’s favorable to you. So,
by scanning 100 IPOs, you’re way less likely to find anything interesting
than scanning an average group of 100 stocks.
巴菲特：初次公开发行就好象是协议买卖，卖方可以选择何时公开上市，因此这类
时机对于买方来说不见得有利，所以与其花时间研究100件初次公开，还不如把精
力花在研究100家已经上市的公司身上。
The seller of a $100,000 house in Omaha will never sell for $50,000. But
if 100 entities each owned 1% of a basket of homes in Omaha, the price
could be anywhere.
座落奥玛哈的屋主绝不可能以5万美元出售价值10万美元的房子，但若是将这个地
区房子拆成100等份来出售，那么交易的价格很可能有很大的差异。
You’re way more likely to get incredible prices in an auction market.
所以在拍卖市场你很有可能可以得到意想不到的价钱。
The Importance of Math
数学的重要性
[When asked why math reflects reality, Munger said:]
[当被问到数学可以反映现实，曼格回答到：]
It’s just the way it is. If you want to understand science, you have to
understand math. In business, if you’re enumerate, you’re going to be a
klutz. The good thing about business is that you don’t have to know any
higher math.
如果你想要了解科学，你就必须懂点数学，但在商业界，如果太拘泥于数字，你就
会变成呆头鹅，从商的好处就是你不必懂得太高深的数学。
Buffett: It may be an advantage not to know it.
巴菲特：或许不懂反而更好。
Munger: Yes, it is. If you know it, you feel the need to use it.
曼格：没错，如果你懂，你就会觉得一定要用它。
Comments on Philip Fisher
对于费雪的看法
Phil Fisher was a great man. He died a month ago, well into his 90s. His
first book was Common Stocks and Uncommon Profits in 1958. He wrote
a second book, and they were great books.
Phil Fisher是个伟大的人物，一个月前他刚过世，享年九十好几，他的第一本着作
1958年出版的「普通股与不普通的获利」，另外他还写的第二本书，也相当不错。
You could get what you wanted from the books (I only met him once). Like
Ben Graham, it was in the books – the writing was so clear, you didn’t
need to meet them.
你可以从书中得到你想要的(我只跟他见过一次面)，就像葛拉罕，所有的精华尽在
书中，写作文笔相当清晰，你甚至可以不必与他们亲身见面。
I thoroughly enjoyed meeting him. I met Phil in 1962. I just went there. I’d
go to New York and just drop in on people. They thought that because I
was from Omaha, they’d only have to see me once and be rid of me.
[Laughter.] Phil was nice to me. I met Charlie in ’59; he was preaching a
similar doctrine, so I got it from both sides.
那次的会面相当愉快，我是在1962年遇到他的，当时我走进去，我本来到纽约是要
顺道去拜访一位朋友，他们或许认为我大老远从奥玛哈赶过来，所以不得不见见我
然而就可以把我给打发回去，[现场一阵大笑]，费雪对我相当亲切，而我是在1959
年第一次碰到查理，当时他也正在宣扬类似的理念，所以我从这两方面受益不少。
Munger: I always like it when someone attractive to me agrees with me, so
I have fond memories of Phil Fisher. The idea that it was hard to find good
investments, so concentrate in a few, seems to me to be an obviously
good idea. But 98% of the investment world doesn’t think this way. It’s
been good for us – and you – that we’ve done this.
曼格：当我欣赏的人认同我的理念时，总是让人感到相当高兴，所以我对费雪也感
到特别的怀念，「由于好的投资标的难寻，所以一旦发现就务必集中火力投资」，
对我来说这样的理念再明显不过，但投资界中98%的人却不这样想，当然对你我来
说，这样的情形反而对我们有利。
Risk of Holding Assets at Banks or Brokerage Houses
将资产摆在银行或证券商的风险
As a depositor in major banks and brokerages firms, I wouldn’t worry. We
have a too-big-to-fail view toward large institutions to protect depositors
– though this is not true of equity holders or margin accounts.
身为大型金融机构与证券商的存款大户，我并不担心这一点，我们这个社会存在有
银行已经大到绝对不能倒闭以保护存款人的既有共识，虽然这并适用于银行股东或
保证金帐户。
Thinking About the Odds of a Nuclear Attack
核子攻击的可能性
You are quite correct that people tend to underestimate low probability
events when they haven’t happened recently, and overestimate them when
they have.
你说的没错，对于发生可能性极低的风险，人们总是健忘的，但对刚发生的事件却
又一朝被蛇咬，十年怕草绳。
On the nuclear question, you can do the math easily – the question is
whether your assumptions are right. If there’s a 10% chance each year [of
an attack], then there’s only a 0.5% chance it doesn’t happen sometime in
the next 50 years. But if the odds are only 1% each year, then there’s a
60% chance you get through the next 50 years.
关于核子攻击这个问题，对我来说，就好象是一个简单的数学公式，问题的关键在
于你的假设是否正确，如果每年有10%的机会会爆发攻击事件，那么在往后的50年
后都不会发生这类事件的机率就低于0.5%，但是如果每年发生的机率推估只有1%，
那么往后的50年后都不会发生这类事件的机率就高达60%。
Corporate Profits as a Percentage of GDP
企业获利占国民生产毛额的比例
I don’t see how corporate profits will move up as percentage of GDP.
我不认为企业获利占国民生产毛额的比例会往上增加。
Recommendations for Audit Committees
对审计委员会的建议
[During the opening business-of-the-annual-meeting segment of the
meeting, Buffett put four slides up, each with a question that the audit
committee of Berkshire Hathaway asked the auditors, and the response.
This was taken nearly word-for-word from his 2002 annual letter, so I’ve
just reprinted this section from that letter below.]
[在年会会议一开始关于企业经营的部份，巴菲特曾经播放四张投影片，每张分别有
一个Berkshire审计委员会询问签证会计师的问题以及其回复，那几乎是一字不差的
从2002年的年报上抄过来的，所以我直接把年报这部份的内容列示如下]
Buffett: If such questions were asked every year – or better yet, every
quarter – there would be a lot fewer accounting problems…They should
be asked and the answers should be put into the record. It would have a
very helpful effect. It puts the auditors on the line. I’ve been on many
boards and in retrospect many things went by that I wish the auditors had
brought to my attention…I noticed that in Google’s Owner’s
ManualOwner’s Manual [ADD LINK], it said that if the numbers are lumpy
when they come to us, they’ll be lumpy when we report them to you.
巴菲特：如果每一个问题在每年都重复被问到或甚至每一季会更好，那么因为会计
制度所引发的问题就会降到最低，他们必须一再被问到，同时将其回复列入正式记
录，这将会有大大的效果，因为此举等于直接将会计师推上火线，我曾经担任过许
多公司的董事，但事后很多情况是我想听听会计师关于这些事情的看法，我特别注
意到Google的股东手册中提到，如果结出的财报数字很惨，那么各位最后看到的数
字也会是那样。
Excerpt from 2002 Berkshire Hathaway annual letter:
这是Berkshire2002年年报的摘要
The Audit Committee
审计委员会
Audit committees can’t audit. Only a company’s outside auditor
can determine whether the earnings that a management
purports to have made are suspect. Reforms that ignore this
reality and that instead focus on the structure and charter of the
audit committee will accomplish little.
审计委员会没有能力进行稽核，唯有公司外部独立的会计师才有能力判
断公司管理
当局提出的盈余报告是否可疑，没有正视这项现实而只是将焦点放在审
计委员会组
织架构上的任何改革终将徒劳无功。
As we’ve discussed, far too many managers have fudged their
company’s numbers in recent years, using both accounting and
operational techniques that are typically legal but that
nevertheless materially mislead investors. Frequently, auditors
knew about these deceptions. Too often, however, they
remained silent. The key job of the audit committee is simply to
