这场经典的赛事，甚至还用慢动作播放精彩的第四节，我们以今年封面的颜色表 .76
get the auditors to divulge what they know.
就像是我们先前讨论过的，近年来太多的经理人在公司的营运数字上动
手脚，不管
是会计帐上或是营运统计皆是如此，表面上虽然完全合法，但实际上却
严重误导投
资人，在通常的情况下，会计师都相当清楚这些欺骗手法，但偏偏他们
选择保持沉
默，所以审计委员会最主要的职责就是让会计师吐露他们所知道的事
实。
To do this job, the committee must make sure that the auditors
worry more about misleading its members than about offending
management. In recent years auditors have not felt that way.
They have instead generally viewed the CEO, rather than the
shareholders or directors, as their client. That has been a
natural result of day-to-day working relationships and also of
the auditors’ understanding that, no matter what the book says,
the CEO and CFO pay their fees and determine whether they are
retained for both auditing and other work. The rules that have
been recently instituted won’t materially change this reality.
What will break this cozy relationship is audit committees
unequivocally putting auditors on the spot, making them
understand they will become liable for major monetary penalties
if they don’t come forth with what they know or suspect.
要达成这项任务，委员会必须确定会计师勇于冒犯管理当局，免于成为
同谋误导委员会的共犯，但很遗憾近年来会计师的想法作为却刚好相
反，他们往往把公司的CEO，而不是股东或董事当作是客户，这是因为
平日合作的关系使然，同时会计师也很清楚，不论公司的报表数字如
何，CEO与CFO保证会支付签证公费，并且有权决定是否由原会计师继
续进行签证业务及其它服务，而近来修正的法令依然无法改变这个根本
的现实，想要打破这种暧昧的关系，唯有靠审计委员会明白地告诉会计
师，让他们清楚地了解如果不将所发现或怀疑的事实说出来，他们将必
须负担大笔的金钱赔偿。
In my opinion, audit committees can accomplish this goal by
asking four questions of auditors, the answers to which should
be recorded and reported to shareholders. These questions are:
我个人认为，审计委员会可以经由询问会计师以下四个问题来达到这个
目的，同时必须将他们的回复记录下来，并向股东报告，这四个问题分
别是：
1. If the auditor were solely responsible for preparation of the
company’s financial statements, would they have in any way
been prepared differently from the manner selected by
management? This question should cover both material and
nonmaterial differences. If the auditor would have done
something differently, both management’s argument and the
auditor’s response should be disclosed. The audit committee
should then evaluate the facts.
1.如果今年是由 贵会计师单独负责本公司的财务报表编制，那么你的做
法会不会与现在管理当局准备的报表有所不同? 不论是重大或不重大的
差异，都必须答复，如果 贵会计师的做法有任何不同，包含管理当局的
论述以及会计师的回复都必须揭露，然后由审计委员会来评估现实的状
况。
2. If the auditor were an investor, would he have received – in plain
English – the information essential to his understanding the
company’s financial performance during the reporting period?
2.如果 贵会计师身为投资人，那么你是否认为已经收到了-讲的白一点-
你认为了解这家公司在签证期间财务经营状况，所需的所有必要信息?
3. Is the company following the same internal audit procedure that
would be followed if the auditor himself were CEO? If not, what
are the differences and why?
3.如果 贵会计师是本公司的CEO，那么你认为本公司是否已经遵循了所
有必要的内部稽核程序? 如果没有，是哪边有差异，以及其原因为何?
4. Is the auditor aware of any actions – either accounting or
operational – that have had the purpose and effect of moving
revenues or expenses from one reporting period to another?
4. 贵会计师是否知悉管理当局有任何可能挪移公司的收入或费用的举
动，不管是会计帐面或者是营运统计上的数字?
If the audit committee asks these questions, its composition –
the focus of most reforms – is of minor importance. In addition,
the procedure will save time and expense. When auditors are
put on the spot, they will do their duty. If they are not put on
the spot . . . well, we have seen the results of that.
我相信如果审计委员会能确实询问会计师以上四个问题，那么其组织架
构(这是大部分改革计画的重点)就一点也不重要了，此外，这样的做法可
以大大节省时间跟成本，当会计师被推上火线，保证他们会乖乖负起职
责，但如果让他们静静地躲在角落，嗯! 届时你就知道结果如何。
The questions we have enumerated should be asked at least a
week before an earnings report is released to the public. That
timing will allow differences between the auditors and
management to be aired with the committee and resolved. If the
timing is tighter – if an earnings release is imminent when the
auditors and committee interact – the committee will feel
pressure to rubberstamp the prepared figures. Haste is the
enemy of accuracy. My thinking, in fact, is that the SEC’s recent
shortening of reporting deadlines will hurt the quality of
information that shareholders receive. Charlie and I believe that
rule is a mistake and should be rescinded.
我们列举的这些问题必须要财务报表正式对外公布的前一个礼拜提出，
这段时间应该足够让委员会了解会计师与管理当局间的差异在哪里，并
把问题解决，因为如果时间太紧，将会面临财报发布在即，但会计师与
委员会却还在沟通的窘境，这将使委员会迫于压力沦为橡皮图章的老
路，时间越赶，准确度就越差，就像是我个人认为，证管会最近缩短财
报公布的时程的做法，将严重影响到股东们接收财务信息的品质，查理
跟我认为这样的规定根本就是个错误，应该要立即加以改正。
The primary advantage of our four questions is that they will act
as a prophylactic. Once the auditors know that the audit
committee will require them to affirmatively endorse, rather
than merely acquiesce to, management’s actions, they will resist
misdoings early in the process, well before specious figures
become embedded in the company’s books. Fear of the
plaintiff’s bar will see to that.
我们这四个问题最主要的优点在于，它们将能够发挥防范于未然的效
果，一旦会计师了解到审计委员会将会要求他们肯定地为管理当局的行
为背书，而不是默默地姑息他们时，会计师就能够在事情刚发生的初期
就出面制止，让有问题的数字不在会计帐上出现，可能的牢狱威胁保证
会发生效用。
Behavior of Accountants in Tax-Avoidance Schemes
会计师在租税规避方面的作为
Some of the tax shelter proposals that were sponsored by the most
prominent auditing firms were absolutely disgusting. [Such schemes are
one of the] reasons why the middle class pays more taxes than it should.
某些由大型会计师事务所提案的租税规避方案实在是令人感到不齿，就是这些方案
导致中产阶层因此负担更多不合理的税负。
Berkshire is a heavy contributor to the Treasury. As I pointed out in the
annual report, if only 540 contributors paid what we did last year, no-one
else would have pay anything – corporate, personal, social security, etc.
taxes.
Berkshire是国库相当重要的纳税人，我在年报中曾经提到，去年只要有540位像我
们这样的纳税义务人，其余的美国企业及人民就完全不必再支付包含像企业所得
税、个人综合所得税以及社会安全捐在内的任何税赋。
Sure, we buy tax-exempt bonds sometimes but we pay full 34% taxes on
our capital gains.
确实我们也会买一些免税的公债，但大部分的时候，我们必须为我们获得的资本利
得缴交34%全额所得税。
Munger: You’ll better understand the evil when top audit firms started
selling fraudulent tax shelters when I tell you that one told me that they’re
better [than the others] because they only sold [the schemes] to their top
20 clients, so no-one would notice.
曼格：我告诉大家，这些声誉卓著的大型会计师事务所，目前正流行贩售不老实的
租税规避方案给其客户，其中有一家事务所甚至告诉我，他们的方案比较好，因为
他们只介绍这类业务给排名前20名的大客户，所以没有人会发现。
Buffett: And the lawyers wrote the opinions [blessing these schemes] -- –
don’t leave them out.
巴菲特：而且还有律师为这些方案背书，老天保佑千万不要让他们得逞。
We had people come to our office, from top auditing firms – but not our
auditors [Deloitte & Touche] – and they wanted us to sign confidentiality
agreements for schemes to set up 20 offshore trusts, etc. It was designed
to be so complex and spread out that no [IRS] agent could figure out the
totality.
曾经有不是我们签证会计师(目前为Deloitte & Touche)的大型会计师事务所派人来
到我们办公室，他们希望我们为设立20家海外信托基金方案而签下保密协议，由于
这架构设计复杂的程度，将使得国税局官员无法弄清楚真貌。
It makes everyone else pay more. I was a little hard on Pamela Olsen
[Assistant Secretary for Tax Policy at the U.S. Treasury, who Buffett
criticized in his annual letter (pages 6-7) for accusing him of “playing the
tax code like a fiddle”], but I applaud Pamela on her work exposing this.
这将使得其余的人支付更多的税负，或许我对Pamela Olsen女士或许要求太过，但
我还是对Pamela勇于揭发这个问题而给予赞许。
[Pamela Olsen系美国财政部主管税务政策的助理秘书，巴菲特曾经在年报中批评
她不实指控巴菲特玩弄税法]。
NYSE’s Specialist System
纽约证券交易所的专家系统
Munger: Generally speaking, I think the specialist system has worked
pretty well for a long time. Yes, there have been a few abuses, but I’m not
that horrified that some guy who stands there all day makes a lot of
money.
曼格：基本上，我认为目前专家系统运作的还算不错，虽然曾经发生过几次问题，
但如果说有人在哪里可以因此大赚一笔，我并不会感到非常惊讶。
Buffett: You should know that Charlie actually had a specialist firm that
was the specialist on General Motors on the west coast for 13 years.
巴菲特：大家或许不知道，事实上，查理曾经在西岸的一家顾问公司担任通用汽车
顾问长达13年。
Fraud By and On Insurance Companies
保险公司的舞弊行为
[In response to a compliant by a shareholder that his insurance company
had – he claimed – defrauded him on a Workman’s Comp claim, Buffett
said:]
[在响应，一位股东抱怨他投保的保险公司反控他在劳工退休保险理赔案中诈欺，巴
菲特回答到：]。
There is plenty of fraud in various aspects of insurance. In automobile
insurance, we have fraud units.
保险业界时常发生很多诈欺案，以汽车保险来说，我们就设有投诉部门。
We have lost more money in Workman’s Comp insurance than just about
any other line in terms of aggregate dollars. It’s been a tough period. We
have one small direct seller of Workman’s Comp insurance in California,
and then Gen Re does Workman’s Comp reinsurance, and it’s been a
bloodbath – the rates haven’t covered the losses. There’s been a fair
amount of fraud, especially in the direct lines.
就金额来说，我们在劳工退休保险险种所损失的金额居所有险种之冠，这险种相当
不好经营，我们在加州有一个小型的直接销售部门，而Gen Re也从事这类业务的再
保险，这实在是一个杀戮战场，目前的费率根本无法反应成本，其中确有相当多的
诈欺案件，尤其是直接销售的保单。
Many companies that have been in the Workman’s Comp business,
especially in California, wish they hadn’t. They haven’t made money from
it.
许多保险公司都曾经经营过劳工退休保险这一块，但大部分都后悔莫及，尤其是在
加州，根本就没有人赚过钱。
Munger: If a company gets into a lot of trouble by fraud practiced on it,
and its own affairs are disrupted, then it’s just human nature to give
customers a hard time.
曼格：如果一家公司面临许多诈欺案件，那么其公司本身的业务势必受到影响，自
然而然，其客户也不会好受到哪里去。
But the main fraud isn’t by insurance carriers against small businessmen,
but by the doctors, lawyers, etc. doing it against the carriers.
但真正的诈欺并不在于保险承保人与这些投保的中小企业主，而是在专门与保险公
司对立的医生与律师身上。
Asbestos and Tort Reform
石绵案以及侵权行为改革
Munger: What’s happened in asbestos is that a given group of people get
mesothelioma – a horrible cancer that comes only from asbestos exposure
and kills people. Then, there’s another group of claimants who smoked
two pack of cigarettes a day and have a spot on their lung. Then you get a
lawyer who gets a doctor to testify that every spot is caused by asbestos.
Once you effectively bribe a doctor, then you can get millions of people to
sue on fears of getting cancer.
曼格：石绵案的成因是因为有一特定族群罹患间皮瘤，这是一种因为长期暴露在石
绵环境中而罹患足以致命的恶性肿瘤，接着另外还有一群原告声称，因为每天抽两
包香烟因为在其肺部发现斑点，然后就找律师请医生证明这些斑点都是因为石绵所
造成的，一旦你能够利用贿赂找到愿意配合的医生，那么你就不难在找到一大票人
出面控告害怕自己得到癌症。
But there’s not enough money [to pay all of the claimants], so people who
are truly harmed don’t get enough. In a southern state with a jury pool
that hates all big companies [you get big judgments], but lawyers are
stealing money from people who are hurt and giving it to people who
aren’t entitled. It’s a bonkers system, but with federalism [state’s rights],
there’s no way to stop it. The Supreme Court refused to step in.
结果是根本就不可能有足够的钱让所有的原告都获得理赔，这导致真正受害的人得
不到应有的赔偿，尤其是在南方几个特别仇视大财团的州，其陪审团几乎一面倒，
最后的结果导致不肖的律师从那些真正的被害人口袋中搬走钱，再放到哪些不应获
得理赔的人手里，这实在是一个混蛋的制度，然而根据联邦制度，这又是各州的权
限，联邦最高法院拒绝介入，所以根本就无法可管，。
The Manville [Personal Injury Settlement] Trust [created when Johns
Manville went into bankruptcy; it separated the operating company from
the asbestos liabilities; Berkshire bought the operating company and the
proceeds went into the trust to pay asbestos claims] had more new claims
last year than in any year – and the company last mined and sold asbestos
35 years ago.
Manville个人伤害赔偿信托基金，是在Johns Manville破产之后，从原来的营业单
位中提拨一定的资金而成立的，后来Berkshire买下其营业单位，至于这些基金则转
为信托以支付石绵案赔偿，结果该基金去年实际赔偿的件数创下新高，而该公司最
后一次出售石绵产品已经是35年前的事了。
Trying to buy people off is like trying to put out a fire by dousing it with
gasoline. With word processors, lawyers can easily produce countless
claimants. But only 25% of the money goes to claimants – the rest goes to
the lawyers, doctors, etc.
想要把一个人买断，就好象是试着在火上加油一样，只要有打字机，律师就有办法
变出一大堆原告，实际上只有25%的钱落到原告的手上，其余的钱都流入到律师以
及医生等人士的口袋里。
The only people who can fix it are the Supreme Court or Congress. The
Supreme Court – some people would say rightly – refused refused to get
involved – [but I say] they chickened out. And Congress, given the politics,
has yet to step in.
唯一能够化解这个问题的人就是最高法院或是国会，但最高法院的人却义正严词地
予以拒绝，但我却认为实际上是因为他们的胆量不够，至于国会以目前的政治环境
来说，也力有未逮。
There’s an important lesson here: Once wrong-doers get rich, they get
enormous political power and you can’t stop it, so the key is to nip things
like this in the bud.
这里我们学到一个很重要的教训，那就是一旦作恶多端的人变得有钱，他们就可以
获得巨大的政治影响力，你就更拿他们没有办法，唯一能做的就是防患于未然。
It would be easy to fix the problem: the right way is to say we’re not going
to pay off all these little claims.
目前可能的解决问题的方案就是我们对外宣称完全不打算支付任何赔偿。
Buffett: We own Johns Manville and their behavior was reprehensible.
巴菲特：我们拥有Johns Manville公司，他们过去的行为确实应该受到谴责。
Munger: Johns Manville’s behavior was one of the worst in the history of
Corporate America – they knew asbestos hurt people and covered it up to
make more money.
曼格：Johns Manville的行为确实堪称美国企业史上一大丑闻，他们明明知道石绵
对人体有害，但为了赚钱却装作什么都不知道。
Buffett: We have no connection to this. The Manville Personal Injury
Settlement Trust has billions of dollars and has been around for close to
20 years.
巴菲特：我们跟这件事情完全无关，Manville个人伤害赔偿信托基金拥有数十亿美
元的资金，而且已经存在有将近20年了。
It didn’t have a record number of claims last year due to new injuries.
Rather, it’s a honey pot. But they’re only paying 5% on claims, so the guy
who’s been drastically injured is only getting a small amount. It’s not the
right way to do it.
因新的伤害而获得理赔的个案数目并未创下新高，但它却被视为是一只肥羊，实际
上，最后赔偿的金额只有当初求偿数目的5%，所以这使得那些特别严重的受害人无
法获得足额的理赔，我认为这样的做法实在是不对。
Regarding the proposed legislation [in Congress]: in the end, we didn’t
support it. It wasn’t the answer we needed.
关于目前正在国会审查的法案，事实上，到最后我们并不支持，因为那不是我们想
要的答案。
The Supreme Court, when they ducked it, they left a problem that will be
around for decades and decades.
由于最高法院的回避，将使得这个问题，永远无法获得合理的解决。
Munger: If you want to be cynical, look at the perjury. There are only three
solvent companies left [facing asbestos claims], so [surprise!] plaintiffs
can only remember those three names [when recalling which products
they were exposed to decades ago]. It’s a case of perjury being suborned
by practicing lawyers.
曼格：如果你是愤世嫉俗的人，看看什么叫做伪证，由于为石绵案所困的厂商当
中，目前只剩三家公司还健在，所以当原告在被问到几十年前，使用的是哪一家公
司的产品时，往往都只能找这三家公司开刀，这根本就是执业律师唆使原告做出伪
证证词。
Immigration
移民政策
