再次验证Disraeli的名言：「我们唯一从历史得到的教训就是我们从来无法
从历史得到教训！」
When shortages exist, however, even commodity businesses
flourish. The insurance industry enjoyed that kind of climate
for a while but it is now gone. One of the ironies of capitalism
is that most managers in commodity industries abhor shortage
conditions - even though those are the only circumstances
permitting them good returns. Whenever shortages appear, the
typical manager simply can't wait to expand capacity and thereby
plug the hole through which money is showering upon him. This is
precisely what insurance managers did in 1985-87, confirming
again Disraeli's observation: "What we learn from history is that
we do not learn from history."
在Berkshire，我们努力避免自己的公司成为商品化的企业，首先我们凭借着
自己强大的资金实力，来凸显我们产品的不同，但这种效果实在是有限，
尤其在个人险的部份，因为即使是其所投保的保险公司倒闭(事实上这种状况还不少)，
汽车险或或房屋险的购买者仍可获得理赔，在商业险的部份也是如此，当情况好时，
许多大企业投保户与保险掮客都不太关心保险业者的财务状况，即使是比较复杂的案件，
顶多拖个三、五年，最后还是有办法可以解决，
(眼不见为净的结果，可能会让你的口袋落空)
At Berkshire, we work to escape the industry's commodity
economics in two ways. First, we differentiate our product by our
financial strength, which exceeds that of all others in the
industry. This strength, however, is limited in its usefulness.
It means nothing in the personal insurance field: The buyer of
an auto or homeowners policy is going to get his claim paid even
if his insurer fails (as many have). It often means nothing in
the commercial insurance arena: When times are good, many major
corporate purchasers of insurance and their brokers pay scant
attention to the insurer's ability to perform under the more
adverse conditions that may exist, say, five years later when a
complicated claim is finally resolved. (Out of sight, out of mind
- and, later on, maybe out-of-pocket.)
不过一段期间保户会偶尔想起富兰克林所说的空沙包很难站的直挺，
并了解寻找一个可靠稳定的保险公司的重要性，这时我们发挥优势的机会就来了，
当客户认真想到往后五到十年，若是面对景气不佳同时又碰上金融市场低迷，
再保业者倒闭频繁等景象时，而怀疑保险公司是否仍有能力轻松地支付
一千万美元理赔金时，那么他可以挑选的保险公司其实是相当有限的，
在所有的沙包之中，Berkshire无疑是站得最直挺的一个。
Periodically, however, buyers remember Ben Franklin's
observation that it is hard for an empty sack to stand upright
and recognize their need to buy promises only from insurers that
have enduring financial strength. It is then that we have a
major competitive advantage. When a buyer really focuses on
whether a $10 million claim can be easily paid by his insurer
five or ten years down the road, and when he takes into account
the possibility that poor underwriting conditions may then
coincide with depressed financial markets and defaults by
reinsurer, he will find only a few companies he can trust.
Among those, Berkshire will lead the pack.
Our second method of differentiating ourselves is the total
indifference to volume that we maintain. In 1989, we will be
perfectly willing to write five times as much business as we
write in 1988 - or only one-fifth as much. We hope, of course,
that conditions will allow us large volume. But we cannot
control market prices. If they are unsatisfactory, we will
simply do very little business. No other major insurer acts with
equal restraint.
我们第二个方法是试着让我们完全不理会签发保单的数量，在下一个年度
我们很愿意一口气签出比前一年多五倍的保单，但若是只能签发五分之一
的保单也无所谓，当然情况若许可我们希望是越多越好，但我们实在是
无法掌握市场价格，若价格不理想，我们就会暂时退出市场少做一点生意，
在同业中再没有其它任何一家保险公司有我们如此高的自制力。
Three conditions that prevail in insurance, but not in most
businesses, allow us our flexibility. First, market share is not
an important determinant of profitability: In this business, in
contrast to the newspaper or grocery businesses, the economic
rule is not survival of the fattest. Second, in many sectors of
insurance, including most of those in which we operate,
distribution channels are not proprietary and can be easily
entered: Small volume this year does not preclude huge volume
next year. Third, idle capacity - which in this industry largely
means people - does not result in intolerable costs. In a way
that industries such as printing or steel cannot, we can operate
at quarter-speed much of the time and still enjoy long-term
prosperity.
在保险业普遍存在的第三种情况，(这在其它产业并不多见)使得我们能保持
相当的弹性，第一市场占有率并不绝对等于获利率，不像新闻业或是零售业，
最后能够存活的不一定是最肥的那个人，第二许多的保险类种，
其中也包含我们所从事的主要险种，销售通路并非只有唯一管道，
所以进入障碍低，今年业绩不多，不代表明年就一定会很少，第三闲置的产能，
在保险业来说主要是在于人力，这部份并不会造成太大的负担，
在印刷或是钢铁业的话就不是如此，我们可以在保持慢速前进的同时，
随时蓄势待发准备向前冲刺。
We follow a price-based-on-exposure, not-on-competition
policy because it makes sense for our shareholders. But we're
happy to report that it is also pro-social. This policy means
that we are always available, given prices that we believe are
adequate, to write huge volumes of almost any type of propertycasualty
insurance. Many other insurers follow an in-and-out
approach. When they are "out" - because of mounting losses,
capital inadequacy, or whatever - we are available. Of course,
when others are panting to do business we are also available -
but at such times we often find ourselves priced above the
market. In effect, we supply insurance buyers and brokers with a
large reservoir of standby capacity.
我们完全以价格为导向(而非竞争)来决定我们的风险部位，因为如此对于
股东投资者才有意义，但同时我们也很高兴，因为这对社会同样也有助益，
这个原则代表我们随时准备就绪，只要市场价格合理，我们愿意随时进场
承接任何产物意外险的保单，配合许多保险同业遵循的进出策略，
当他们因为损失扩大、资本不足等原因退出市场时，我们随时可以接替，
当然当一些同业进来杀价抢食市场时，虽然我们也愿意继续服务大众，
但由于我们的报价高于市场价格，所以只好暂时退出观望，基本上我们
扮演的是市场供需调节的角色。
One story from mid-1987 illustrates some consequences of our
pricing policy: One of the largest family-owned insurance
brokers in the country is headed by a fellow who has long been a
shareholder of Berkshire. This man handles a number of large
risks that are candidates for placement with our New York office.
Naturally, he does the best he can for his clients. And, just as
naturally, when the insurance market softened dramatically in
1987 he found prices at other insurers lower than we were willing
to offer. His reaction was, first, to place all of his business
elsewhere and, second, to buy more stock in Berkshire. Had we
been really competitive, he said, we would have gotten his
insurance business but he would not have bought our stock.
1987年中的一个事件可以充分说明我们的价格政策，在纽约有一家家族
经营的保险经纪公司是由一个Berkshire多年资深的老股东所领导，
这老兄手上有许多客户是我们所想要交往的，但基于职业道德他仍然必须
为他的客户争取到最好的权益，所以当保险市场价格大幅滑落，
他发现我们的保费比起其它同业贵了许多时，他第一个反应就是赶快
把他客户的保单从Berkshire转移到别的保险公司，接下来第二的动作
就是买进更多Berkshire的股票，他说要是那一天Berkshire也一样
以降价竞争作为因应，那么他就会把生意给Berkshire做，但他可能
就会把Berkshire的股票卖光。
Berkshire's underwriting experience was excellent in 1987,
in part because of the lag factor discussed earlier. Our
combined ratio (on a statutory basis and excluding structured
settlements and financial reinsurance) was 105. Although the
ratio was somewhat less favorable than in 1986, when it was 103,
our profitability improved materially in 1987 because we had the
use of far more float. This trend will continue to run in our
favor: Our ratio of float to premium volume will increase very
significantly during the next few years. Thus, Berkshire's
insurance profits are quite likely to improve during 1988 and
1989, even though we expect our combined ratio to rise.
Berkshire 1987年的承保表现实在是好极了，一方面是因为先前提到的
递延效应，我们的综合比率是105(泛指一般保单，不包含私下协议与
金融再保部份)，虽然这个数字比起1986年的103来说略微逊色，
但我们在1987年的获利却由于有更多的浮存金运用而大幅增进，
这种好现象将会持续保持，在往后几年我们浮存金对保费收入的比例
还是继续增加，所以展望Berkshire1988年与1989年的获利仍将大幅成长，
即便综合比率预估亦会增加。
Our insurance business has also made some important nonfinancial
gains during the last few years. Mike Goldberg, its
manager, has assembled a group of talented professionals to write
larger risks and unusual coverages. His operation is now well
equipped to handle the lines of business that will occasionally
offer us major opportunities.
我们的保险事业去年在非财务数字面亦有重大的斩获，我们组织了一支
训练有素的专业团队，专门承保特殊钜额的风险，他们已准备好帮助
我们处理任何可能遇到庞大的商机。
Our loss reserve development, detailed on pages 41-42, looks
better this year than it has previously. But we write lots of
"long-tail" business - that is, policies generating claims that
often take many years to resolve. Examples would be product
liability, or directors and officers liability coverages. With a
business mix like this, one year of reserve development tells you
very little.
有关损失准备提列的情况，详附表，今年的状况比前几年好一点，
但由于我们签下了许多长期的生意，许多理赔申请可以要花上好几年才能解决，
就像是产品责任保险，或专业经理人责任险，在这种特殊的产业，
一年的损失准备其实无法是代表最后结果。
You should be very suspicious of any earnings figures
reported by insurers (including our own, as we have unfortunately
proved to you in the past). The record of the last decade shows
that a great many of our best-known insurers have reported
earnings to shareholders that later proved to be wildly
erroneous. In most cases, these errors were totally innocent:
The unpredictability of our legal system makes it impossible for
even the most conscientious insurer to come close to judging the
eventual cost of long-tail claims.
大家应该对保险公司的盈余数字时时抱持怀疑的态度，(当然也包含我们公司本身，
事实证明确是如此) ，过去十年来的记录显示，有许多显赫一时的保险公司
报告给股东亮丽的盈余数字最后证明只不过是一场空，在大部分的情况下，
这种错误是无心的，我们诡谲多变的司法制度，使得就算是最有良知的保险公司
都无法准确预测这类长期保险的最终成本。
Nevertheless, auditors annually certify the numbers given
them by management and in their opinions unqualifiedly state that
these figures "present fairly" the financial position of their
clients. The auditors use this reassuring language even though
they know from long and painful experience that the numbers so
certified are likely to differ dramatically from the true
earnings of the period. Despite this history of error, investors
understandably rely upon auditors' opinions. After all, a
declaration saying that "the statements present fairly" hardly
sounds equivocal to the non-accountant.
但奇怪的是，会计师每年就是有办法为就这些管理阶层给的数字背书，
并出具无保留的意见表示这些数字允当表达该公司，也就是他们的客户
的财务状况，而事实上他们自己深知过去惨痛的经验告诉他们，
这些经过验证的数字与最后可能结算出来的可能会有天壤之别，
但却还是仍然使用这种坚定的语言，而从另一方面来说，
就算是历史殷鉴在前，投资人却还是相当仰赖会计师的意见，
对于会计门外汉来说，他根本就不懂得「该财务报表允当表达」，
所代表的真正含意是什么。
The wording in the auditor's standard opinion letter is
scheduled to change next year. The new language represents
improvement, but falls far short of describing the limitations of
a casualty-insurer audit. If it is to depict the true state of
affairs, we believe the standard opinion letter to shareholders
of a property-casualty company should read something like: "We
have relied upon representations of management in respect to the
liabilities shown for losses and loss adjustment expenses, the
estimate of which, in turn, very materially affects the earnings
and financial condition herein reported. We can express no
opinion about the accuracy of these figures. Subject to that
important reservation, in our opinion, etc."
会计师标准无保留意见查核报告的遣词用语在明年将有重大改变，
新的用语有相当的改进，但还是很难充分说明产物意外险公司
在查核时所受到的限制，如果一个人想要描述一件事情的真相，
我们认为给产物意外险公司股东的标准无保留意见报告中应这样写︰
「我们仰赖管理当局提供损失准备与损失费用调整产生财务报表，
而这些估计数字事实上影响公司盈余与财务状况甚巨，受限于损失准备
的提列先天信息的不足与我们必须提出的意见，我们完全无法
对这些数字的正确性表达看法，等等」
If lawsuits develop in respect to wildly inaccurate
financial statements (which they do), auditors will definitely
say something of that sort in court anyway. Why should they not
be forthright about their role and its limitations from the
outset?
假若有人对这种完全不正确的财务报表提出诉讼官司(事实上就有)，
会计师一定会在法庭上做类似的辩解，那么他们为什么不一开始
就坦白地说明他们真实的角色与所受的限制呢
We want to emphasize that we are not faulting auditors for
their inability to accurately assess loss reserves (and therefore
earnings). We fault them only for failing to publicly
acknowledge that they can't do this job.
我们想要强调的是我们并不是怪罪会计师没有办法准确地评估损失准备
(当然这会影响到最后的盈余数字)，我们无法原谅的是他们没有公开地
承认做不到这一点。
From all appearances, the innocent mistakes that are
constantly made in reserving are accompanied by others that are
deliberate. Various charlatans have enriched themselves at the
expense of the investing public by exploiting, first, the
inability of auditors to evaluate reserve figures and, second,
the auditors' willingness to confidently certify those figures as
if they had the expertise to do so. We will continue to see such
chicanery in the future. Where "earnings" can be created by the
stroke of a pen, the dishonest will gather. For them, long-tail
insurance is heaven. The audit wording we suggest would at least
serve to put investors on guard against these predators.
从各种不同的角度来看，这种不断在提列损失准备时所犯无心的错误，
往往也伴随着许多故意的过失，许多骗徒就是看准会计师没有能力
评估这些数字，同时又愿意配合为这些数字背书，假装好象他们真的
有这个能力，靠着这种方式来欺骗投资大众赚大钱，在往后的日子
我们仍将看到这样的骗局持续上演，只要大笔一挥，盈余便可凭空生出，
前述我们建议的查核报告措词，至少可以让无知的投资人提高警觉避免
遭到这些掠食者的坑杀。
The taxes that insurance companies pay - which increased
materially, though on a delayed basis, upon enactment of the Tax
Reform Act of 1986 - took a further turn for the worse at the end
of 1987. We detailed the 1986 changes in last year's report. We
also commented on the irony of a statute that substantially
increased 1987 reported earnings for insurers even as it
materially reduced both their long-term earnings potential and
their business value. At Berkshire, the temporarily-helpful
"fresh start" adjustment inflated 1987 earnings by $8.2 million.
去年在年报中详述刚通过的税负改革法案，使得保险公司支付的税负
以递延渐进的形式大幅增加，这种情况在1987年更加恶化，讽刺的是
虽然这个法案大大地影响到保险公司长期的获利与价值，却让保险公司
短期的盈余数字格外亮丽，光是在Berkshire1987年的盈余就增加了八百多万美金。
In our opinion, the 1986 Act was the most important economic
event affecting the insurance industry over the past decade. The
1987 Bill further reduced the intercorporate dividends-received
credit from 80% to 70%, effective January 1, 1988, except for
cases in which the taxpayer owns at least 20% of an investee.
就我们个人的看法，1986年的法案是近十多年来保险业界最重要的经济事件，
1987年的新法案进一步将企业间股利可扣抵的比率由80%减为70%，
除非被投资公司有超过20%的股权是由一般投资人所拥有。
Investors who have owned stocks or bonds through corporate
intermediaries other than qualified investment companies have
always been disadvantaged in comparison to those owning the same
securities directly. The penalty applying to indirect ownership
