was greatly increased by the 1986 Tax Bill and, to a lesser
extent, by the 1987 Bill, particularly in instances where the
intermediary is an insurance company. We have no way of
offsetting this increased level of taxation. It simply means
that a given set of pre-tax investment returns will now translate
into much poorer after-tax results for our shareholders.
投资人透过中间企业法人(除了专业投资公司外)持有的股份或债券，
先天上本来就比直接持有这些有价证券要来的不利的多，尤其是在1986年
租税改革法案通过后，这种租税惩罚更为明显，(虽然1987年的情况稍微好转一点，
尤其是对保险公司来说)，我们没有任何方法可以规避这项增加的税负成本，
简而言之，现在同样的税前获利，在扣除税负成本后最后所得到的税后净利，
要比过去要来得少的多。
All in all, we expect to do well in the insurance business,
though our record is sure to be uneven. The immediate outlook is
for substantially lower volume but reasonable earnings
improvement. The decline in premium volume will accelerate after
our quota-share agreement with Fireman's Fund expires in 1989.
At some point, likely to be at least a few years away, we may see
some major opportunities, for which we are now much better
prepared than we were in 1985.
不论如何，我们的保险事业应该可以做的不错，只是最后的成绩可能无法
像过去那么好，目前的展望是保费收入将减少，尤其是消防人员基金
在1989年到期后，但盈余可略微改善，之后我们可能可以再遇到好机会，
不过那可能要好几年以后，届时我们应该可以作好更万全的准备。
Marketable Securities - Permanent Holdings
有价证券-永恒的持股
每当查理跟我为Berkshire旗下的保险公司买进股票(扣除套利交易，
后面会再详述)，我们采取的态度就好象是我们买下的是一家私人企业一样，
我们着重于这家公司的经济前景、经营阶层以及我们支付的价格，
我们从来就没有考虑再把这些股份卖出，相反地只要能够预期这家公司的价值
能够稳定地增加，我们愿意无限期地持有这些股份，在投资时我们从不把
自己当作是市场的分析师、总体经济分析师或是证券分析师，而是企业的分析师。
Whenever Charlie and I buy common stocks for Berkshire's
insurance companies (leaving aside arbitrage purchases, discussed
later) we approach the transaction as if we were buying into a
private business. We look at the economic prospects of the
business, the people in charge of running it, and the price we
must pay. We do not have in mind any time or price for sale.
Indeed, we are willing to hold a stock indefinitely so long as we
expect the business to increase in intrinsic value at a
satisfactory rate. When investing, we view ourselves as business
analysts - not as market analysts, not as macroeconomic analysts,
and not even as security analysts.
我门的方式在交易热络的股票市场相当管用，因为市场三不五时就会
突然浮现令人垂涎三尺的投资机会，但这价格其实并不太重要，
因为就算是我们持有的股票停止交易很长一段时间我们也不在意，
就像是世界百科全书或是费区海默同样没有每天的报价，最后一点，
我们的经济利益取决于我们所拥有的公司本身的经济利益，
不管我们持有的是全部或者是部份股权都一样。
Our approach makes an active trading market useful, since it
periodically presents us with mouth-watering opportunities. But
by no means is it essential: a prolonged suspension of trading in
the securities we hold would not bother us any more than does the
lack of daily quotations on World Book or Fechheimer.
Eventually, our economic fate will be determined by the economic
fate of the business we own, whether our ownership is partial or
total.
班哲明．葛拉汉是我的老师，也是我的朋友，很久以前讲过一段有关
对于市场波动心态的谈话，是我认为对于投资获利最有帮助的一席话，
他说投资人可以试着将股票市场的波动当作是一位市场先生每天给你的报价，
他就像是一家私人企业的合伙人，不管怎样，市场先生每天都会报个价格
要买下你的股份或是将手中股份卖给你。
Ben Graham, my friend and teacher, long ago described the
mental attitude toward market fluctuations that I believe to be
most conducive to investment success. He said that you should
imagine market quotations as coming from a remarkably
accommodating fellow named Mr. Market who is your partner in a
private business. Without fail, Mr. Market appears daily and
names a price at which he will either buy your interest or sell
you his.
即使是你们所共同拥有的合伙企业经营稳定变化不大，市场先生每天还是
会固定提出报价，同时市场先生有一个毛病，那就是他的情绪很不稳定，
当他高兴时，往往只看到合伙企业好的一面，所以为了避免手中的股份被你买走，
他会提出一个很高的价格，甚至想要从你手中买下你拥有的股份；但有时候，
当他觉得沮丧时，眼中看到的只是这家企业的一堆问题，这时他会提出
一个非常低的报价要把股份卖给你，因为他很怕你会将手中的股份塞给他。
Even though the business that the two of you own may have
economic characteristics that are stable, Mr. Market's quotations
will be anything but. For, sad to say, the poor fellow has
incurable emotional problems. At times he feels euphoric and can
see only the favorable factors affecting the business. When in
that mood, he names a very high buy-sell price because he fears
that you will snap up his interest and rob him of imminent gains.
At other times he is depressed and can see nothing but trouble
ahead for both the business and the world. On these occasions he
will name a very low price, since he is terrified that you will
unload your interest on him.
市场先生还有一个很可爱的特点，那就是他不在乎受到冷落，若今天他
提出的报价不被接受，隔天他还是会上门重新报价，要不要交易完全由你自主，
所以在这种情况下，他的行为举止越失措，你可能得到的好处也就越多。
Mr. Market has another endearing characteristic: He doesn't
mind being ignored. If his quotation is uninteresting to you
today, he will be back with a new one tomorrow. Transactions are
strictly at your option. Under these conditions, the more manic
depressive his behavior, the better for you.
但就像辛蒂瑞拉参加的化妆舞会一样，你务必注意午夜前的钟响，
否则马车将会变回番瓜，市场先生是来给你服务的，千万不要受他的诱惑
反而被他所导引，你要利用的是他饱饱的口袋，而不是草包般的脑袋，
如果他有一天突然傻傻地出现在你面前，你可以选择视而不见或好好地加以利用，
但是要是你占不到他的便宜反而被他愚蠢的想法所吸引，则你的下场可能会很凄惨；
事实上若是你没有把握能够比市场先生更清楚地衡量企业的价值，
你最好不要跟他玩这样的游戏，就像是打牌一样，若是你没有办法在30分钟内
看出谁是肉脚，那么那个肉脚很可能就是你！
But, like Cinderella at the ball, you must heed one warning
or everything will turn into pumpkins and mice: Mr. Market is
there to serve you, not to guide you. It is his pocketbook, not
his wisdom, that you will find useful. If he shows up some day
in a particularly foolish mood, you are free to either ignore him
or to take advantage of him, but it will be disastrous if you
fall under his influence. Indeed, if you aren't certain that you
understand and can value your business far better than Mr.
Market, you don't belong in the game. As they say in poker, "If
you've been in the game 30 minutes and you don't know who the
patsy is, you're the patsy."
葛拉汉的市场先生理论在现今的投资世界内或许显得有些过时，
尤其是在那些大谈市场效率理论、动态避险与beta值的专家学者眼中更是如此，
他们会对那些深奥的课题感到兴趣是可以理解的，因为这对于渴望投资建议的追求者来说，
是相当具吸引力的，就像是没有一位名医可以单靠「吃两颗阿斯匹宁」
这类简单有效的建议成名致富的。
Ben's Mr. Market allegory may seem out-of-date in today's
investment world, in which most professionals and academicians
talk of efficient markets, dynamic hedging and betas. Their
interest in such matters is understandable, since techniques
shrouded in mystery clearly have value to the purveyor of
investment advice. After all, what witch doctor has ever
achieved fame and fortune by simply advising "Take two aspirins"?
这当然是股市秘籍存在的价值，但就我个人的看法，投资成功不是靠
晦涩难解的公式、计算机运算或是股票行情板上股票上下的跳动，
相反地投资人要能成功，惟有凭借着优异的商业判断同时避免自己的想法、
行为，受到容易煽动人心的市场情绪所影响，以我个人的经验来说，
要能够免除市场诱惑，最好的方法就是将葛拉汉的市场先生理论铭记在心。
The value of market esoterica to the consumer of investment
advice is a different story. In my opinion, investment success
will not be produced by arcane formulae, computer programs or
signals flashed by the price behavior of stocks and markets.
Rather an investor will succeed by coupling good business
judgment with an ability to insulate his thoughts and behavior
from the super-contagious emotions that swirl about the
marketplace. In my own efforts to stay insulated, I have found
it highly useful to keep Ben's Mr. Market concept firmly in mind.
追随葛拉汉的教诲，查理跟我着眼的是投资组合本身的经营成果，
以此来判断投资是否成功，而不是他们每天或是每年的股价变化，
短期间市场或许会忽略一家经营成功的企业，但最后这些公司终将
获得市场的肯定，就像葛拉汉所说的：「短期而言，股票市场是一个投票机，
但长期来说，它却是一个体重机」一家成功的公司是否很快地就被发现并不是重点，
重要的是只要这家公司的内在价值能够以稳定地速度成长才是关键，
事实上越晚被发现有时好处更多，因为我们就有更多的机会以便宜的价格买进它的股份。
Following Ben's teachings, Charlie and I let our marketable
equities tell us by their operating results - not by their daily,
or even yearly, price quotations - whether our investments are
successful. The market may ignore business success for a while,
but eventually will confirm it. As Ben said: "In the short run,
the market is a voting machine but in the long run it is a
weighing machine." The speed at which a business's success is
recognized, furthermore, is not that important as long as the
company's intrinsic value is increasing at a satisfactory rate.
In fact, delayed recognition can be an advantage: It may give us
the chance to buy more of a good thing at a bargain price.
当然有时市场也会高估一家企业的价值，在这种情况下，我们会考虑把股份出售，
另外有时虽然公司股价合理或甚至略微低估，但若是我们发现有更被低估的
投资标的或是我们觉得比较熟悉了解的公司时，我们也会考虑出售股份。
Sometimes, of course, the market may judge a business to be
more valuable than the underlying facts would indicate it is. In
such a case, we will sell our holdings. Sometimes, also, we will
sell a security that is fairly valued or even undervalued because
we require funds for a still more undervalued investment or one
we believe we understand better.
然而我们必须强调的是我们不会因为被投资公司的股价上涨或是因为
我们已经持有一段时间，就把它们给处分掉，在华尔街名言中，
最可笑的莫过于是「赚钱的人是不会破产的」，我们很愿意无限期的持有
一家公司的股份，只要这家公司所运用的资金可以产生令人满意的报酬、
管理阶层优秀能干且正直，同时市场对于其股价没有过度的高估。
We need to emphasize, however, that we do not sell holdings
just because they have appreciated or because we have held them
for a long time. (Of Wall Street maxims the most foolish may be
"You can't go broke taking a profit.") We are quite content to
hold any security indefinitely, so long as the prospective return
on equity capital of the underlying business is satisfactory,
management is competent and honest, and the market does not
overvalue the business.
但是这不包含我们保险公司所拥有的三家企业，即使它们的股价再怎么涨，
我们也不会卖，事实上我们把这些投资与前面那些具控制权的公司一样地看待，
它们不像是一般的商品可以卖来卖去，反而像是Berkshire企业的一部份，
不管市场先生提出再怎么高的天价也一样，只是在此我要加一条但书，
除非因为我们的保险公司发生钜额亏损，必须出售部份的持股来弥补亏损，
当然我们会尽所能避免这种情况发生。
However, our insurance companies own three marketable common
stocks that we would not sell even though they became far
overpriced in the market. In effect, we view these investments
exactly like our successful controlled businesses - a permanent
part of Berkshire rather than merchandise to be disposed of once
Mr. Market offers us a sufficiently high price. To that, I will
add one qualifier: These stocks are held by our insurance
companies and we would, if absolutely necessary, sell portions of
our holdings to pay extraordinary insurance losses. We intend,
however, to manage our affairs so that sales are never required.
当然查理跟我决定要拥有并持有一家公司的股份，是同时综合了个人想法
与财务方面的考量，对某些人来说，我们这样的做法可能有点不合常规，
(查理跟我长期以来一直遵从奥美广告创办人�大卫奥美的建议，
在年轻时发展出你自己的特异风格，这样子等你到老时，人们就不会觉得
你是个怪胎)，的确，近年来在交易频繁的华尔街，我们的态度看起来有些
特立独行，在那个竞技场内，所有的公司与股份，都不过是交易的筹码而已。
A determination to have and to hold, which Charlie and I
share, obviously involves a mixture of personal and financial
considerations. To some, our stand may seem highly eccentric.
(Charlie and I have long followed David Oglivy's advice: "Develop
your eccentricities while you are young. That way, when you get
old, people won't think you're going ga-ga.") Certainly, in the
transaction-fixated Wall Street of recent years, our posture must
seem odd: To many in that arena, both companies and stocks are
seen only as raw material for trades.
但是我们的态度完全符合我们本身的人格特质，这就是我们想要过的生活，
丘吉尔曾经说过，我们很清楚我们要如何去塑造我们想要的模式，
因此我们宁愿跟我们喜欢与推崇的对象往来，就算是因此，
会比跟一些我们讨厌或是不喜欢的人打交道，少得到一些投资报酬也没有关系，
我想我们是大概不可能再遇到像这三家主要的被投资公司组成份子一样，
令我们所喜爱与推崇。
以下所列就是我们永恒的持股
Our attitude, however, fits our personalities and the way we
want to live our lives. Churchill once said, "You shape your
houses and then they shape you." We know the manner in which we
wish to be shaped. For that reason, we would rather achieve a
return of X while associating with people whom we strongly like
and admire than realize 110% of X by exchanging these
relationships for uninteresting or unpleasant ones. And we will
never find people we like and admire more than some of the main
participants at the three companies - our permanent holdings -
shown below:
No. of Shares Cost Market
------------- ---------- ----------
(000s omitted)
3,000,000 Capital Cities/ABC, Inc. ........... $517,500 $1,035,000
6,850,000 GEICO Corporation .................. 45,713 756,925
1,727,765 The Washington Post Company ........9,731 323,092
在这些公司上，我们实在看不出买下并控制一家企业或是购买部份股权
有什么基本上的差异，每次我们都试着买进一些长期看好的公司，
我们的目标是以合理的价格买到绩优的企业，而不是以便宜的价格买进平庸的公司，
查理跟我发现买到货真价实的东西才是我们真正应该做的。
We really don't see many fundamental differences between the
purchase of a controlled business and the purchase of marketable
holdings such as these. In each case we try to buy into
businesses with favorable long-term economics. Our goal is to
find an outstanding business at a sensible price, not a mediocre
business at a bargain price. Charlie and I have found that
making silk purses out of silk is the best that we can do; with
sow's ears, we fail.
(It must be noted that your Chairman, always a quick study,
required only 20 years to recognize how important it was to buy
good businesses. In the interim, I searched for "bargains" - and
had the misfortune to find some. My punishment was an education
in the economics of short-line farm implement manufacturers,
third-place department stores, and New England textile
manufacturers.)
必须特别注意的是，本人虽然以反应快速著称，不过却花了二十年才明白
要买下好企业的重要性，刚开始我努力寻找便宜的货色，不幸的是真的让我找到了一些，
所得到的教训是在农具机械、三流百货公司与新英格兰纺织工厂等经济形态上上了一课。
Of course, Charlie and I may misread the fundamental
economics of a business. When that happens, we will encounter
problems whether that business is a wholly-owned subsidiary or a
marketable security, although it is usually far easier to exit
from the latter. (Indeed, businesses can be misread: Witness the
European reporter who, after being sent to this country to
profile Andrew Carnegie, cabled his editor, "My God, you'll never
believe the sort of money there is in running libraries.")
当然查理跟我确实会误判一家企业的基础竞争力，结果是我们面临了一大堆问题与挑战，
不管是买下全部或是部份的股权，当然后者要脱身相对容易一点，
(确实企业很可能会被误判，一位欧洲记者被派驻到美国采访卡内基，
发了一封电报给他的编辑主管说到，老天你一定不敢相信经营博物馆竟然可以赚那么多钱)
In making both control purchases and stock purchases, we try
to buy not only good businesses, but ones run by high-grade,
talented and likeable managers. If we make a mistake about the
managers we link up with, the controlled company offers a certain
