得到很好的利益。
Good business or investment decisions will eventually
produce quite satisfactory economic results, with no aid from
leverage. Therefore, it seems to us to be both foolish and
improper to risk what is important (including, necessarily, the
welfare of innocent bystanders such as policyholders and
employees) for some extra returns that are relatively
unimportant. This view is not the product of either our
advancing age or prosperity: Our opinions about debt have
remained constant.
只要是好公司或是好的投资决策，不靠投资杠杆，最后还是能够得到令人满意的结果，
因此我们认为为了一点额外的报酬，将重要的东西(也包含政策制定者与员工福祉)
暴露在不必要的风险之下是相当愚蠢且不适当的。
However, we are not phobic about borrowing. (We're far from
believing that there is no fate worse than debt.) We are willing
to borrow an amount that we believe - on a worst-case basis -
will pose no threat to Berkshire's well-being. Analyzing what
that amount might be, we can look to some important strengths
that would serve us well if major problems should engulf our
economy: Berkshire's earnings come from many diverse and wellentrenched
businesses; these businesses seldom require much
capital investment; what debt we have is structured well; and we
maintain major holdings of liquid assets. Clearly, we could be
comfortable with a higher debt-to-business-value ratio than we
now have.
当然我们不会畏惧借贷(我们还不至于认为借钱是万恶不赦的)，
我们还是愿意在估计不会损及Berkshire利益的最坏情况下，进行举债，
至于这个限度在哪里，我们就必须评估自己本身的实力，
Berkshire的获利来自于许多不同且扎实的产业，这些产业通常不需要额外大量的投资，
负债的部份也相当健全，同时我们还保有大量的流动资产，很明显的，
我们大可以承担比现在更高的负债比例。
One further aspect of our debt policy deserves comment:
Unlike many in the business world, we prefer to finance in
anticipation of need rather than in reaction to it. A business
obtains the best financial results possible by managing both
sides of its balance sheet well. This means obtaining the
highest-possible return on assets and the lowest-possible cost on
liabilities. It would be convenient if opportunities for
intelligent action on both fronts coincided. However, reason
tells us that just the opposite is likely to be the case: Tight
money conditions, which translate into high costs for
liabilities, will create the best opportunities for acquisitions,
and cheap money will cause assets to be bid to the sky. Our
conclusion: Action on the liability side should sometimes be
taken independent of any action on the asset side.
我们举债政策还有一向特点值得说明，不像其它公司，
我们比较希望能够预先准备而不是事后补救，一家公司若能够
同时管好资产负债表的两侧，就会有不错的成绩，
这代表一方面要能够将资产的报酬率提高，一方面要能够将负债的资金成本降低，
若是两边都能碰巧的兼顾那就太好了，不过事实告诉我们，
通常情况正好相反，当资金吃紧时，代表负债的成本上升，
这正是对外购并的最好时机，因为便宜的资金有时会将竞标的资产飙到天价，
我们的结论是，在举债方面的动作，有时应该要跟购置资产方面的动作分开做。
Alas, what is "tight" and "cheap" money is far from clear at
any particular time. We have no ability to forecast interest
rates and - maintaining our usual open-minded spirit - believe
that no one else can. Therefore, we simply borrow when
conditions seem non-oppressive and hope that we will later find
intelligent expansion or acquisition opportunities, which - as we
have said - are most likely to pop up when conditions in the debt
market are clearly oppressive. Our basic principle is that if
you want to shoot rare, fast-moving elephants, you should always
carry a loaded gun.
当然何谓吃紧﹖何谓便宜的资金﹖很难有一个清楚的分野，
我们无法去预测利率的走向，所以我们随时保持开放的心态，
随机地在市场还没有那么悲观时借钱，期望之后可以找到合适的购并或投资标的，
而通常如同我们先前所提到的，大概是会在债市情况悲观时出现，
我们一个基本的原则就是，如果你想要猎捕那种罕见且移动迅速的大象，
那么你的枪枝就要随时上膛准备。
Our fund-first, buy-or-expand-later policy almost always
penalizes near-term earnings. For example, we are now earning
about 6 1/2% on the $250 million we recently raised at 10%, a
disparity that is currently costing us about $160,000 per week.
This negative spread is unimportant to us and will not cause us
to stretch for either acquisitions or higher-yielding short-term
instruments. If we find the right sort of business elephant
within the next five years or so, the wait will have been
worthwhile.
我们这种先准备资金，之后再买进扩张的政策，虽然会对我们短期间的盈余造成影响，
例如我们之前取得10%成本的2.5亿美元，现在大概只能赚得6.5%的收益，
中间的利差损失每个礼拜大概是16万美元，这对我们来说，只是个小数目，
也不会迫使我们去从事一些短期高风险的投资，只要我们能在未来五年内
找到理想的目标猎物，这一切等待都是值得的。
Miscellaneous
其它事项
We hope to buy more businesses that are similar to the ones
we have, and we can use some help. If you have a business that
fits the following criteria, call me or, preferably, write.
我们希望能够找到更多像我们现在拥有的企业，当然这需要一些帮助，
如同你知道有公司符合以下的条件，打电话或者最好是写信给我。
(1)钜额交易(每年税后盈余至少有一千万美元)
(2)持续稳定获利(我们对有远景或具转机的公司没兴趣)
(3)高股东报酬率(并且甚少举债)
(4)具备管理阶层(我们无法提供)
(5)简单的企业(若牵涉到太多高科技，我们弄不懂)
(6)合理的价格(在价格不确定前，我们不希望浪费自己与对方太多时间)
我们不会进行敌意的购并，并承诺完全保密并尽快答复是否感兴趣
(通常不超过五分钟) ，我们倾向采现金交易，除非我们所换得的
内含价值跟我们付出的一样多，否则不考虑发行股份。
我们欢迎可能的卖方与那些过去与我们合作过的对象打听，
对于那些好的公司与好的经营阶层，我们可以提供一个好的归属。
另一方面我们也持续接到一些不符合我们条件的询问，
包括新事业、转机股、拍卖案以及最常见的中介案
(那些说你们要是能过碰一下面，一定会感兴趣之类的) 。
在此重申我们对这些一点兴趣都没有。
Here's what we're looking for:
(1) large purchases (at least $10 million of after-tax
earnings),
(2) demonstrated consistent earning power (future
projections are of little interest to us, nor are
"turnaround" situations),
(3) businesses earning good returns on equity while
employing little or no debt,
(4) management in place (we can't supply it),
(5) simple businesses (if there's lots of technology,
we won't understand it),
(6) an offering price (we don't want to waste our time
or that of the seller by talking, even preliminarily,
about a transaction when price is unknown).
We will not engage in unfriendly takeovers. We can promise
complete confidentiality and a very fast answer - customarily
within five minutes - as to whether we're interested. We prefer
to buy for cash, but will consider issuing stock when we receive
as much in intrinsic business value as we give. We invite
potential sellers to check us out by contacting people with whom
we have done business in the past. For the right business - and
the right people - we can provide a good home.
On the other hand, we frequently get approached about
acquisitions that don't come close to meeting our tests: new
ventures, turnarounds, auction-like sales, and the ever-popular
(among brokers) "I'm-sure-something-will-work-out-if-you-peopleget-
to-know-each-other." None of these attracts us in the least.
Besides being interested in the purchases of entire
businesses as described above, we are also interested in the
negotiated purchase of large, but not controlling, blocks of
stock comparable to those we hold in Cap Cities and Salomon. We
have a special interest in purchasing convertible preferreds as a
long-term investment, as we did at Salomon.
除了以上买下整家公司的购并案外，我们也会考虑买进一大部份不具控制权的股份，
就像我们在资本城与所罗门这两个Case一样，尤其是我们对于像这次购买
所罗门一样的可转换特别股当作长期投资特别有兴趣。
* * *
接下来是一点记忆回顾，大部分Berkshire的大股东是在1969年
清算巴菲特合伙事业时取得本公司股份的，这些合伙的伙伴可能
还记得当初在1962年，我曾经在巴菲特合伙事业所投资控制的
Dempster-一家帮浦与农用机具制造公司，面临经营上重大的难题。
And now a bit of deja vu. Most of Berkshire's major
stockholders received their shares at yearend 1969 in a
liquidating distribution from Buffett Partnership, Ltd. Some of
these former partners will remember that in 1962 I encountered
severe managerial problems at Dempster Mill Manufacturing Co., a
pump and farm implement manufacturing company that BPL
controlled.
在当时我带着我无法解决的问题去找查理，就像是现在一样，
查理建议我在加州他有一位朋友叫Harry Bottle非常脚踏实地，
或许可以帮得上忙，我在当年四月去洛杉矶拜访他，一个礼拜后，
他就被请到内布拉斯加州来管理Dempster，此后问题立刻获得解决，
记得在1962年的年报中，我还特地将Harry封为年度风云人物。
At that time, like now, I went to Charlie with problems that
were too tough for me to solve. Charlie suggested the solution
might lie in a California friend of his, Harry Bottle, whose
special knack was never forgetting the fundamental. I met Harry
in Los Angeles on April 17, 1962, and on April 23 he was in
Beatrice, Nebraska, running Dempster. Our problems disappeared
almost immediately. In my 1962 annual letter to partners, I
named Harry "Man of the Year."
24年后，场景搬到Berkshire 另外一家子公司K & W公司，
一家专门生产自动机具的小公司，过去这家公司做得还不错，
不过到了1985-1986年却突然发生状况，盲目追求达不到的东西，
却放弃现有可以做的产品，负责管理监督K & W的查理，
知道可以不必知会我，直接找到现年68岁的Harry，任命他为CEO，
然后就静待结果出来，事实上他没有等多久，到了1987年隔年，
K & W的获利就创下新高，比1986年成长三倍，由于获利提升，
该公司所需的资金也就跟着减少，该公司的应收及存货水准减少了20%。
Fade to 24 years later: The scene is K & W Products, a small
Berkshire subsidiary that produces automotive compounds. For
years K & W did well, but in 1985-86 it stumbled badly, as it
pursued the unattainable to the neglect of the achievable.
Charlie, who oversees K & W, knew there was no need to consult
me. Instead, he called Harry, now 68 years old, made him CEO,
and sat back to await the inevitable. He didn't wait long. In
1987 K & W's profits set a record, up more than 300% from 1986.
And, as profits went up, capital employed went down: K & W's
investment in accounts receivable and inventories has decreased
20%.
所以要是在往后的十年、二十年，我们的被投资事业又发生问题时，
你就知道谁的电话又会响了。
If we run into another managerial problem ten or twenty
years down the road, you know whose phone will ring.
* * *
About 97.2% of all eligible shares participated in
Berkshire's 1987 shareholder-designated contributions program.
Contributions made through the program were $4.9 million, and
2,050 charities were recipients.
大约有97.2%的有效股权参与1987年的股东指定捐赠计划，
总计约490万美元捐出的款项分配给2,050家慈善机构
最近一项研究显示约有50%的美国大公司的捐赠计画是由董事会所决定，
这等于是由代表公司所有股东的一小群人来决定公司资金捐给他们所偏爱
的慈善机构，却从来不会去管股东们的意见，(我很怀疑若情况刚好相反，
由股东们来决定这些董事口袋里的钱要捐给谁时，他们会有什么样的反应)，
当甲从乙的身上拿钱给丙时，若甲是立法者，则这个过程叫做课税，
若甲是企业的主管或是经理人时，这就叫做是慈善，我们仍然坚信除非
是捐给那些很明显对于公司有助益的单位时，应该要先征询股东们而非
仅仅是经理人或是董事的意见。
A recent survey reported that about 50% of major American
companies match charitable contributions made by directors
(sometimes by a factor of three to one). In effect, these
representatives of the owners direct funds to their favorite
charities, and never consult the owners as to their charitable
preferences. (I wonder how they would feel if the process were
reversed and shareholders could invade the directors' pockets for
charities favored by the shareholders.) When A takes money from B
to give to C and A is a legislator, the process is called
taxation. But when A is an officer or director of a corporation,
it is called philanthropy. We continue to believe that
contributions, aside from those with quite clear direct benefits
to the company, should reflect the charitable preferences of
owners rather than those of officers and directors.
我们敦促新加入的股东，仔细阅读年报上有关股东捐赠计画的详细内容，
如果在未来年度内，你想要参加这类的计画，我们强烈建议你将股份登记
在自己而不是受托人的名下，必须在1988年9月30日之前完成登记，
才有权利参与1988年的计画。
We urge new shareholders to read the description of our
shareholder-designated contributions program that appears on
pages 54 and 55. If you wish to participate in future programs,
we strongly urge that you immediately make sure your shares are
registered in the name of the actual owner, not in "street" name
or nominee name. Shares not so registered on September 30, l988
will be ineligible for the 1988 program.
* * *
去年总共有450位股东参加年度股东会，总计提出了60个左右精彩的问题，
在许多公司股东会只是浪费时间，因为大多流于形式，不过我们的股东会
却不一样，股东们非常具有建设性且带来了许多欢乐。
Last year we again had about 450 shareholders at our annual
meeting. The 60 or so questions they asked were, as always,
excellent. At many companies, the annual meeting is a waste of
time because exhibitionists turn it into a sideshow. Ours,
however, is different. It is informative for shareholders and
fun for us. (At Berkshire's meetings, the exhibitionists are on
the dais.)
This year our meeting will be on May 23, 1988 in Omaha, and
we hope that you come. The meeting provides the forum for you to
ask any owner-related questions you may have, and we will keep
answering until all (except those dealing with portfolio
activities or other proprietary information) have been dealt
with.
今年的股东会将在1988年5月23日在奥玛哈举行，我们希望你们都能来参加，
这个会议提供一个场所让你能够提出任何与股东有关的问题，我们会一直
回答到所有股东都满意为止(除了那些想要知道投资组合明牌或是内线消息的人)
Last year we rented two buses - for $100 - to take
shareholders interested in the trip to the Furniture Mart. Your
actions demonstrated your good judgment: You snapped up about
$40,000 of bargains. Mrs. B regards this expense/sales ratio as
on the high side and attributes it to my chronic inattention to
costs and generally sloppy managerial practices. But, gracious
as always, she has offered me another chance and we will again
have buses available following the meeting. Mrs. B says you must
beat last year's sales figures, and I have told her she won't be
disappointed.
去年我们花了100元租两台巴士载着有兴趣的股东到家具广场，
大家的行动展现了明智的抉择，总共买下了约4万美元的东西，
B太太认为这样的营业费用比例太高，认为这都是我个人长久以来
对于成本没有概念、管理松散的缘故，不过还是一样大方，
今年她再次给我机会，在会后还是会有巴士等着各位，B太太希望我
一定要打破去年的记录，而我也已经答应她不会让她失望。
华伦．巴菲特
董事会主席
1988年2月29日
Warren E. Buffett
Chairman of the Board
February 29, 1988
BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC.
波克夏海瑟崴股份有限公司
To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:
致所有股东:
Our gain in net worth during 1988 was $569 million, or
20.0%. Over the last 24 years (that is, since present management
took over), our per-share book value has grown from $19.46 to
$2,974.52, or at a rate of 23.0% compounded annually.
本公司1988年的净值增加了五亿六千九百万美元，较去年增加了20.0%，而
过去24年以来(自从现有经营阶层接手后)，每股净值从19元成长到现在的
2,974美元，年复合成长率约为23.0%。
Wee emphasized in past reports that what counts, however,
is intrinsic business value - the figure, necessarily an
estimate, indicating what all of our constituent businesses are
worth. By our calculations, Berkshire intrinsic business value
significantly exceeds its book value. Over the 24 years,
business value has grown somewhat faster than book value; in
1988, however, book value grew the faster, by a bit.
在过去的年报中我们一再强调真正重要的是企业的真实价值，它代表着我们旗下
企业组成份子到底值多少钱？这个数字绝对是个估计数，根据我们内部的估算，
