目前Berkshire真实的价值已大幅超越其帐面价值，过去24年以来，企业价值
成长的速度一直要比帐面价值成长的幅度要高一点，但在1988年情况有点不
同，后者增加的幅度略高于前者。
Berkshire past rates of gain in both book value and
business value were achieved under circumstances far different
from those that now exist. Anyone ignoring these differences
makes the same mistake that a baseball manager would were he to
judge the future prospects of a 42-year-old center fielder on the
basis of his lifetime batting average.
过去Berkshire真实与帐面价值成长的背景，与现在有很大的不同，若搞不清楚
其间的差异，就好象是一位棒球教练在判断高龄42岁的中外野手未来潜力时，
以他一生的平均打击率作为判断依据。
Important negatives affecting our prospects today are: (1) a
less attractive stock market than generally existed over the past
24 years; (2) higher corporate tax rates on most forms of
investment income; (3) a far more richly-priced market for the
acquisition of businesses; and (4) industry conditions for
Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., GEICO Corporation, and The Washington
Post Company - Berkshire three permanent investments,
constituting about one-half of our net worth - that range from
slightly to materially less favorable than those existing five to
ten years ago. All of these companies have superb management and
strong properties. But, at current prices, their upside
potential looks considerably less exciting to us today than it
did some years ago.
今日我们所面临不利的因素主要有︰(1)目前的股票市场过热，股价相对偏高(2)
企业投资利益的税负过高(3)企业被购并的价格偏高(4) Berkshire主要三大投资
事业(约占本公司净值的一半) 资本城/ABC、GEICO汽车保险与华盛顿邮报，
个别的产业状况多多少少不若以往，虽然这些公司有杰出的管理与强势的资产，
但以目前的股价来看，他们向上成长的潜力相对有限。
The major problem we face, however, is a growing capital
base. Youe heard that from us before, but this problem, like
age, grows in significance each year. (And also, just as with
age, it better to have this problem continue to grow rather
than to have it olved.?
然而我们面对的主要问题还是不断增加的资金规模，先前各位也听过类似的说
明，不过这个问题就好象是一个人的身体健康与年纪的关系一样，随着时间的流
逝，问题也越严重，(当然在这种情况下，我们是希望这个问题越严重越好)
Four years ago I told you that we needed profits of $3.9
billion to achieve a 15% annual return over the decade then
ahead. Today, for the next decade, a 15% return demands profits
of $10.3 billion. That seems like a very big number to me and to
Charlie Munger, Berkshire Vice Chairman and my partner. (Should
that number indeed prove too big, Charlie will find himself, in
future reports, retrospectively identified as the senior
partner.)
四年前我曾告诉各位若在未来十年，Berkshire想要每年维持15%的报酬，我们
总共约要有39亿美元的获利，时至今日，这个数字暴增到103亿美元，对查
理与我来说，这实在是无法承担之重，(当然若这个数字事后发现真的过大，大
家或许会在以后的报告中，查理可能会另外个别署名资深合伙人)
As a partial offset to the drag that our growing capital
base exerts upon returns, we have a very important advantage now
that we lacked 24 years ago. Then, all our capital was tied up
in a textile business with inescapably poor economic
characteristics. Today part of our capital is invested in some
really exceptional businesses.
虽然资金规模会影响到最后的投资报酬率，但同时我们也拥有另外一项以前没有
的优势，过去我们大部分的资金都被绑在没有多大经济效益的纺织事业之上，如
今部份的资金已转移到一些相当不错的事业。
去年我将他们取名叫做七个圣徒�水牛城日报、费区海默、寇比吸尘器、内布拉
斯加家具量贩店、史考特费兹制造集团、喜斯糖果及世界百科全书等，今年七圣
徒持续向前迈进，大家可以发现以历史投资成本的角度来看，他们的投资报酬实
在是惊人，没有依靠财务杠杆，平均股东权益报酬率高达67%。
Last year we dubbed these operations the Sainted Seven:
Buffalo News, Fechheimer, Kirby, Nebraska Furniture Mart, Scott
Fetzer Manufacturing Group, See, and World Book. In 1988 the
Saints came marching in. You can see just how extraordinary
their returns on capital were by examining the historical-cost
financial statements on page 45, which combine the figures of the
Sainted Seven with those of several smaller units. With no
benefit from financial leverage, this group earned about 67% on
average equity capital.
In most cases the remarkable performance of these units
arises partially from an exceptional business franchise; in all
cases an exceptional management is a vital factor. The
contribution Charlie and I make is to leave these managers alone.
虽然其中一部分的企业本身就是属于强势的企业，但优良的管理却是绝对必要的
条件，查理跟我唯一可以做的就是让他们放手去干。
In my judgment, these businesses, in aggregate, will
continue to produce superb returns. Wel need these: Without
this help Berkshire would not have a chance of achieving our 15%
goal. You can be sure that our operating managers will deliver;
the question mark in our future is whether Charlie and I can
effectively employ the funds that they generate.
根据我个人的判断，这些企业总的来说，应该还会持续有好的表现，我们想要在
往后年度继续维持15%报酬率的目标，绝对需要他们的支持，唯一的关键在于
查理跟我是否能够有效地运用他们所贡献出来源源不绝的资金。
In that respect, we took a step in the right direction early
in 1989 when we purchased an 80% interest in Borsheim, a
jewelry business in Omaha. This purchase, described later in
this letter, delivers exactly what we look for: an outstanding
business run by people we like, admire, and trust. It a great
way to start the year.
在这点我们做出了一个正确的决定，那就是买下位于奥玛哈Borsheim珠宝80%
的股权，这项购并案会在后面说明，与我们当初的预期相符，一家优秀的企业由
我们所欣赏且信任的人来经营，今年有一个好的开始。
Accounting Changes
会计原则变动
We have made a significant accounting change that was
mandated for 1988, and likely will have another to make in 1990.
When we move figures around from year to year, without any change
in economic reality, one of our always-thrilling discussions of
accounting is necessary.
1988年开始有一项重要的会计原则变动开始适用，展望1990年还会有一项变
动，当经济现况没有改变，但会计帐面却必须将数字搬来搬去，我们一定会花一
番工夫讨论一下影响层面。
首先我习惯性的提出拒绝声明，虽然一般公认会计原则确有缺点，但我却必须坦
承没有能力重新订出一套新的规则，虽然这套原则确有其先天性的限制，却不必
就此废除，CEO大可以也应该将一般公认会计原则当作是对股东与债权人尽告
知义务的开始而非结束；若他们只是提供阳春的财务报表，却没有附上经营分析
所必要的关键讯息，部门经理人会发现会被总经理修理的很惨，同样的母公司的
总经理是不是也应该向他的老板，也就是公司股东所有人，报告必要有用的信息。
First, Il offer my customary disclaimer: Despite the
shortcomings of generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP),
I would hate to have the job of devising a better set of rules.
The limitations of the existing set, however, need not be
inhibiting: CEOs are free to treat GAAP statements as a beginning
rather than an end to their obligation to inform owners and
creditors - and indeed they should. After all, any manager of a
subsidiary company would find himself in hot water if he reported
barebones GAAP numbers that omitted key information needed by his
boss, the parent corporation CEO. Why, then, should the CEO
himself withhold information vitally useful to his bosses - the
shareholder-owners of the corporation?
What needs to be reported is data - whether GAAP, non-GAAP,
or extra-GAAP - that helps financially-literate readers answer
three key questions: (1) Approximately how much is this company
worth? (2) What is the likelihood that it can meet its future
obligations? and (3) How good a job are its managers doing, given
the hand they have been dealt?
真正需要的是资料�不管是一般公认、非一般公认或是一般公认以外，可以帮助
财务报表使用者可以了解三个问题︰(1)这家公司大概价值多少?(2)它达到未来
目标的可能性有多大?(3)在现有条件下，经理人的工作表现如何?
In most cases, answers to one or more of these questions are
somewhere between difficult and impossible to glean from the
minimum GAAP presentation. The business world is simply too
complex for a single set of rules to effectively describe
economic reality for all enterprises, particularly those
operating in a wide variety of businesses, such as Berkshire.
大部分的情况下，简单的财务数字并不能回答以上的问题，商业世界实在很难用
一套简单的规则有效地来解释企业的经济实质状况，尤其是像Berkshire这种由
许多各种不同产业组成集团。
Further complicating the problem is the fact that many
managements view GAAP not as a standard to be met, but as an
obstacle to overcome. Too often their accountants willingly
assist them. (.ow much,?says the client, s two plus two
Replies the cooperative accountant, .hat number did you have in
mind Even honest and well-intentioned managements sometimes
stretch GAAP a bit in order to present figures they think will
more appropriately describe their performance. Both the
smoothing of earnings and the .ig bath?quarter are hite lie?
techniques employed by otherwise upright managements.
更复杂的是许多管理阶层不把一般公认会计原则当作是应该达到的标准，而是应
该要克服的阻碍，且大多数的会计师也心甘情愿给予协助，当客户问到二加二等
于几?配合的会计师可能会回答︰「那要看你想要多少?」即使是诚实且正直
的管理阶层有时也会超越一般公认会计原则，以使得报表数字更符合他们认为应
该有的表现，不管是让损益平滑一点或是某季特别突出，都是还算正直的经营阶
层经常运用的做帐技巧。
Then there are managers who actively use GAAP to deceive and
defraud. They know that many investors and creditors accept GAAP
results as gospel. So these charlatans interpret the rules
maginatively?and record business transactions in ways that
technically comply with GAAP but actually display an economic
illusion to the world.
另外还有一些不肖经理人专门利用一般公认会计原则来进行欺骗与贪污，他们很
清楚许多投资人与债权人把一般公认会计原则当作圣经朝拜，所以这些骗徒运用
丰富的想象力技巧性让交易记录符合一般公认会计原则，但却与实际的经济实质
背道而驰。
As long as investors - including supposedly sophisticated
institutions - place fancy valuations on reported .arnings?that
march steadily upward, you can be sure that some managers and
promoters will exploit GAAP to produce such numbers, no matter
what the truth may be. Over the years, Charlie and I have
observed many accounting-based frauds of staggering size. Few of
the perpetrators have been punished; many have not even been
censured. It has been far safer to steal large sums with a pen
than small sums with a gun.
只要投资人，包含看起来复杂的专业投资机构，迷信稳定向上攀升的盈余数字，
我们可以百分之百确定还会有经理人与拥护者不顾现实，继续滥用一般公认会计
原则来满足投资人的需求，多年以来查理跟我看到许多会计诈骗案，鲜少有人因
此被惩罚，有的甚至都没有被发现，用笔偷钱要比用枪抢劫要来的容易的多。
Under one major change mandated by GAAP for 1988, we have
been required to fully consolidate all our subsidiaries in our
balance sheet and earnings statement. In the past, Mutual
Savings and Loan, and Scott Fetzer Financial (a credit company
that primarily finances installment sales of World Book and Kirby
products) were consolidated on a .ne-line?basis. That meant we
(1) showed our equity in their combined net worths as a singleentry
asset on Berkshire consolidated balance sheet and (2)
included our equity in their combined annual earnings as a
single-line income entry in our consolidated statement of
earnings. Now the rules require that we consolidate each asset
and liability of these companies in our balance sheet and each
item of their income and expense in our earnings statement.
1988年一般公认会计原则有一个很重大的转变，依新规定Berkshire必须将子
公司与关系企业的资产与损益完全并到母公司的财务报表之上，在过去互助储贷
与史考特费兹金融(主要从事世界百科全书与寇比吸尘器分期付款的信用公
司)，只须一次认列投资损益即可，意思是说(1)仅将被投资公司净值按投资比例
以投资权益显示在Berkshire的合并资产负债表之上(2)仅将被投资公司年度损
益按投资比例以投资利益显示在Berkshire的合并损益表之上，但是现在我们必
须将被投资公司的资产与负债、营收与费用，放进合并的财务报表之上。
This change underscores the need for companies also to
report segmented data: The greater the number of economically
diverse business operations lumped together in conventional
financial statements, the less useful those presentations are and
the less able investors are to answer the three questions posed
earlier. Indeed, the only reason we ever prepare consolidated
figures at Berkshire is to meet outside requirements. On the
other hand, Charlie and I constantly study our segment data.
这项转变低估了公司也要报告部门别信息，企业形态越复杂的公司，其按传统财
务报表所加总出来的数字越没有意义，越没有办法让投资人回答前面所提的三个
问题，事实上在Berkshire我们会准备合并数字的唯一原因就是要符合外部规
定，查理跟我看的则是另一套部门别的信息。
Now that we are required to bundle more numbers in our GAAP
statements, we have decided to publish additional supplementary
information that we think will help you measure both business
value and managerial performance. (Berkshire ability to
discharge its obligations to creditors - the third question we
listed - should be obvious, whatever statements you examine.) In
these supplementary presentations, we will not necessarily follow
GAAP procedures, or even corporate structure. Rather, we will
attempt to lump major business activities in ways that aid
analysis but do not swamp you with detail. Our goal is to give
you important information in a form that we would wish to get it
if our roles were reversed.
现在我们被要求在财务报表上将更多的数字混在一起，我们现在决定公布更多的
补充信息，有助于帮助各位来衡量企业价值与管理当局的表现，Berkshire将责
任转移给债权人的能力�我们提到的第三个问题，应该很明确，不管是在看什么
样的报表，在这些补充信息中，我们不一定会依照一般公认会计原则，甚至不会
以公司别来区分，相反地我们会试着将同性质的企业汇总有助于大家分析而不是
被一大堆信息所掩没，我们的目标是设身处地的为各位设想，给各位我们认为重
要的讯息。
On pages 41-47 we show separate combined balance sheets and
earnings statements for: (1) our subsidiaries engaged in financetype
operations, which are Mutual Savings and Scott Fetzer
Financial; (2) our insurance operations, with their major
investment positions itemized; (3) our manufacturing, publishing
and retailing businesses, leaving aside certain non-operating
assets and purchase-price accounting adjustments; and (4) an allother
category that includes the non-operating assets (primarily
marketable securities) held by the companies in (3) as well as
various assets and debts of the Wesco and Berkshire parent
companies.
下表我们依(1)金融事业，包含互助储贷与史考特财务公司(2)保险事业，依投资
部位分门别类(3)制造、出版、零售事业，去除某些非营业资产与购买法会计调
整数(4)其它项目，包含前述非营业资产(主要是有价证券投资)及Wesco与
Berkshire母公司所持有的资产与负债
If you combine the earnings and the net worths of these four
segments, you will derive totals matching those shown on our GAAP
statements. However, we want to emphasize that our new
presentation does not fall within the purview of our auditors,
who in no way bless it. (In fact, they may be horrified; I don.
want to ask.)
如果将以上四类的盈余与净值加总，你将得到与一般公认会计原则一致的总数，
但是我们必须强调的是这种新的表示方法并未经过会计师看过，最好是不要，因
为他们要是看到这种报表，一定会被吓个半死。
I referred earlier to a major change in GAAP that is
expected in 1990. This change relates to the calculation of
deferred taxes, and is both complicated and controversial - so
much so that its imposition, originally scheduled for 1989, was
postponed for a year.
先前我曾提到在1990年会有另一项会计原则的重大变动，主要与递延所得税有
关，这原则相当的复杂且极具争议性，以致于原定计画于1989年实施延后一年。
When implemented, the new rule will affect us in various
ways. Most important, we will be required to change the way we
calculate our liability for deferred taxes on the unrealized
appreciation of stocks held by our insurance companies.
当这项原则开始实施后，对我们有几个方面，最重要的一点就是我们必须重新修
正旗下保险公司所持有的未实现股票资本利得，其计算递延所得税负债的方式，
Right now, our liability is layered. For the unrealized
appreciation that dates back to 1986 and earlier years, $1.2
billion, we have booked a 28% tax liability. For the unrealized
