depended upon the membership turnover in such organizations, you
could be sure that there would be at least one proponent of
activity, as in: .here hasn. been much going on in Christianity
for a while; maybe we should switch to Buddhism next week.?
我们希望能够吸引具有远见的投资人，在买进股份时，抱着打算与我们永远同在
而不是订有卖出价格的时间表，我们实在不能理解为何有公司的CEO希望自己
公司的股份交易量越多越好，这代表公司的股东组合会变来变去，在其它如学
校、俱乐部、教堂等社会机构当中，没有主持人希望自己的组织成员离开的，(然
而偏偏就有营业员就是要靠着说服成员离开组织来维生，你有没有听过有人劝你
反正最近基督教也没有什么搞头，不如下礼拜大家改信佛教试一试)。
Of course, some Berkshire owners will need or want to sell
from time to time, and we wish for good replacements who will pay
them a fair price. Therefore we try, through our policies,
performance, and communications, to attract new shareholders who
understand our operations, share our time horizons, and measure
us as we measure ourselves. If we can continue to attract this
sort of shareholder - and, just as important, can continue to be
uninteresting to those with short-term or unrealistic
expectations - Berkshire shares should consistently sell at
prices reasonably related to business value.
当然还是有些Berkshire股东需要或是想要偶尔把他持有的股份卖掉，而我们希
望能够找到合适的人以适当的价格来接手，因此我们试着透过我们的政策、表现
与沟通，吸引真正了解我们营运、认同我们理念并用同样的方式来对待我们的新
股东，如果我们能够持续地吸引这种类型的股东，同时很重要的，让那些短视近
利的投资人远离我们，相信Berkshire一定能够持续地以合理的价格交易买卖。
David L. Dodd
大卫．陶德
Dave Dodd, my friend and teacher for 38 years, died last
year at age 93. Most of you don. know of him. Yet any longtime
shareholder of Berkshire is appreciably wealthier because of
the indirect influence he had upon our company.
与我相交38年亦师亦友的大卫．陶德，于去年以高龄93岁过世，大多数的人
可能都不知道他是谁，但是许多Berkshire的老股东却因为他对本公司的间接影
响而受益良多。
Dave spent a lifetime teaching at Columbia University, and
he co-authored Security Analysis with Ben Graham. From the
moment I arrived at Columbia, Dave personally encouraged and
educated me; one influence was as important as the other.
Everything he taught me, directly or through his book, made
sense. Later, through dozens of letters, he continued my
education right up until his death.
大卫终其一生在哥伦比亚大学教书，同时他也与葛拉罕合作著述「证券分析」一
书，自从我到哥伦比亚之后，大卫不时地鼓励与教导我，给我的影响一个接着一
个，他所教导我的很一件事，不论是直接或透过他的著作都非常有道理，后来毕
业后，透过不断往来的信件，他给我的教育持续到他逝世之前。
I have known many professors of finance and investments but
I have never seen any, except for Ben Graham, who was the match
of Dave. The proof of his talent is the record of his students:
No other teacher of investments has sent forth so many who have
achieved unusual success.
我认识许多财经与投资学的教授，除了葛拉罕以外，没有人可以比得上大卫，最
好的证明就是他学生的成绩，没有其它投资学的教授可以造就出那么多杰出的英
才。
When students left Dave classroom, they were equipped to
invest intelligently for a lifetime because the principles he
taught were simple, sound, useful, and enduring. Though these
may appear to be unremarkable virtues, the teaching of principles
embodying them has been rare.
当学生离开大卫的教室，就代表着他们一生将具备有投资智能，因为他所教导的
原则是如此的简单、完整有用且持久，虽然这些特点看起来并不显著，但要将这
些原则教导给学生却不是一件容易的事。
It particularly impressive that Dave could practice as
well as preach. just as Keynes became wealthy by applying his
academic ideas to a very small purse, so, too, did Dave. Indeed,
his financial performance far outshone that of Keynes, who began
as a market-timer (leaning on business and credit-cycle theory)
and converted, after much thought, to value investing. Dave was
right from the start.
让我印象最深刻的是大卫总是言行一致，就像凯恩斯运用自己研究出的学术观点
来致富，大卫也是如此。事实上他在财务操作上的表现远比凯恩斯来得出色，凭
借着企业与信用循环理论，之后再演变成价值投资，大卫一开始就选择了正确的
方向。
In Berkshire investments, Charlie and I have employed the
principles taught by Dave and Ben Graham. Our prosperity is the
fruit of their intellectual tree.
查理跟我运用大卫与葛拉罕所教的原则，在Berkshire的投资之上，我们的成功
正代表着他们心血的结晶。
Miscellaneous
其它事项
We hope to buy more businesses that are similar to the ones
we have, and we can use some help. If you have a business that
fits the following criteria, call me or, preferably, write.
我们希望能够买进更多像我们现在拥有一样的企业，当然我们可以透过大家的协
助，如果你拥有符合以下条件的企业，记得打电话或者是写信告诉我，
Here what wee looking for:
(1) large purchases (at least $10 million of after-tax
earnings),
(2) demonstrated consistent earning power (future projections
are of little interest to us, nor are .urnaround?
situations),
(3) businesses earning good returns on equity while employing
little or no debt,
(4) management in place (we can. supply it),
(5) simple businesses (if there lots of technology, we won.
understand it),
(6) an offering price (we don. want to waste our time or that
of the seller by talking, even preliminarily, about a
transaction when price is unknown).
我们想要找
(1)钜额交易(每年税后盈余至少有一千万美元)
(2)持续稳定获利(我们对有远景或具转机的公司没兴趣)
(3)高股东报酬率(并且甚少举债)
(4)具备管理阶层(我们无法提供)
(5)简单的企业(若牵涉到太多高科技，我们弄不懂)
(6)合理的价格(在价格不确定前，我们不希望浪费自己与对方太多时间)
我们不会进行敌意的购并，并承诺完全保密并尽快答复是否感兴趣(通常不超过
五分钟) ，我们倾向采现金交易，除非我们所换得的内含价值跟我们付出的一样
多，否则不考虑发行股份。
我们最喜欢的交易对象之一是像B太太- Heldman家族那样，公司经营者希望
能马上有一大笔现金，不管是给自己、家人或是其它股东，最好这些经营者如往
常一样能够继续留在公司，我想我们可以提供具有以上想法的经营者，一个满意
的方式，我们也欢迎可能的卖方与那些过去与我们合作过的对象打听。
We will not engage in unfriendly takeovers. We can promise
complete confidentiality and a very fast answer - customarily
within five minutes - as to whether wee interested. We prefer
to buy for cash, but will consider issuing stock when we receive
as much in intrinsic business value as we give.
Our favorite form of purchase is one fitting the Blumkin-
Friedman-Heldman mold. In cases like these, the company ownermanagers
wish to generate significant amounts of cash, sometimes
for themselves, but often for their families or inactive
shareholders. However, these managers also wish to remain
significant owners who continue to run their companies just as
they have in the past. We think we offer a particularly good fit
for owners with these objectives and invite potential sellers to
check us out by contacting people with whom we have done business
in the past.
Charlie and I frequently get approached about acquisitions
that don. come close to meeting our tests: Wee found that if
you advertise an interest in buying collies, a lot of people will
call hoping to sell you their cocker spaniels. Our interest in
new ventures, turnarounds, or auction-like sales can best be
expressed by another Goldwynism: lease include me out.?
另一方面我们也持续接到一些不符合我们条件的询问，包括新事业、转机股、拍
卖案以及最常见的中介案。我们发现如果你登广告要买牧羊犬，结果却有一大堆
人打电话来要卖你长耳猎犬，在此重申我们对这些交易，只有高德温的另一句话
可以形容，请把我排除在外。
Besides being interested in the purchase of businesses as
described above, we are also interested in the negotiated
purchase of large, but not controlling, blocks of stock
comparable to those we hold in Cap Cities and Salomon. We have a
special interest in purchasing convertible preferreds as a longterm
investment, as we did at Salomon.
除了以上买下整家公司的购并案外，我们也会考虑买进一大部份不具控制权的股
份，就像我们在资本城与所罗门这两个Case一样，尤其是我们对于像这次购买
所罗门一样的可转换特别股当作长期投资特别有兴趣。
* * *
We received some good news a few weeks ago: Standard &
Poor raised our credit rating to AAA, which is the highest
rating it bestows. Only 15 other U.S. industrial or propertycasualty
companies are rated AAA, down from 28 in 1980.
几个礼拜以前，我们接到了一个好消息，史坦普评等机构将我们的债信等级调高
的三A的最高标准，相较于1980年的28家，目前全美只有15家公司可以拥
有此殊荣。
Corporate bondholders have taken their lumps in the past few
years from .vent risk.?This term refers to the overnight
degradation of credit that accompanies a heavily-leveraged
purchase or recapitalization of a business whose financial
policies, up to then, had been conservative. In a world of
takeovers inhabited by few owner-managers, most corporations
present such a risk. Berkshire does not. Charlie and I promise
bondholders the same respect we afford shareholders.
过去几年企业公司债的持有人在事件风险上跌了一大跤，意思是说一家原本财务
操作保守的公司，因为进行高杠杆购并或是重整再造，使得公司在一夜之间被大
幅调降信用评等，购并的世界之中，除了少数经营权与所有权一致的公司之外，
大部分的公司都会面临这样的风险，但Berkshire绝对不会，查理跟我保证给债
券持有人与股东一样的承诺。
* * *
About 97.4% of all eligible shares participated in
Berkshire 1988 shareholder-designated contributions program.
Contributions made through the program were $5 million, and 2,319
charities were recipients. If we achieve reasonable business
results, we plan to increase the per-share contributions in 1989.
大约有97.4%的有效股权参与1988年的股东指定捐赠计划，总计约500万美
元捐出的款项分配给2,319家慈善机构，若经营情况许可，我们计画在1989年
扩大这项捐赠计画。
We urge new shareholders to read the description of our
shareholder-designated contributions program that appears on
pages 48-49. If you wish to participate in future programs, we
strongly urge that you immediately make sure your shares are
registered in the name of the actual owner, not in the nominee
name of a broker, bank or depository. Shares not so registered
on September 30, 1989 will be ineligible for the 1989 program.
我们敦促新加入的股东，仔细阅读年报上有关股东捐赠计画的详细内容，如果在
未来年度内，你想要参加这类的计画，我们强烈建议你将股份登记在自己而不是
受托人的名下，必须在1989年9月30日之前完成登记，才有权利参与1989
年的计画。
* * *
Berkshire annual meeting will be held in Omaha on Monday,
April 24, 1989, and I hope you will come. The meeting provides
the forum for you to ask any owner-related questions you may
have, and we will keep answering until all (except those dealing
with portfolio activities or other proprietary information) have
been dealt with.
今年的股东会将在1989年4月24日星期一在奥玛哈举行，我们希望大家都能
来参加，这个会议提供一个场所让你能够提出任何与股东有关的问题，我们会一
直回答到所有股东都满意为止(除了那些想要知道投资组合明牌或是内线消息的
人)
After the meeting we will have several buses available to
take you to visit Mrs. B at The Nebraska Furniture Mart and Ike
Friedman at Borsheim. Be prepared for bargains.
会后我们将安排几台巴士载着有兴趣的股东到B太太的家具广场与波仙珠宝
店，准备大捡便宜货吧！
Out-of-towners may prefer to arrive early and visit Mrs. B
during the Sunday store hours of noon to five. (These Sunday
hours seem ridiculously short to Mrs. B, who feels they scarcely
allow her time to warm up; she much prefers the days on which the
store remains open from 10 a.m. to 9 p.m.) Borsheims, however, is
not open on Sunday.
外地来的股东可以会选择提早一点来，B太太的店星期天会从中午开到下午五
点，只有五个小时可能不够B太太暖身，她可能希望还是能够像平日一样从早上
10点到晚上9点，另外波仙珠宝星期天并不开门营业。
Ask Mrs. B the secret of her astonishingly low carpet
prices. She will confide to you - as she does to everyone - how
she does it: can sell so cheap .ause I work for this dummy
who doesn. know anything about carpet.?
记得问B太太地毯价格为什么会如此便宜的秘密，她一定会向跟所有人一样地偷
偷跟你讲她是如何办到的，(我之所以能够卖的这么便宜是因为我的老板对于地
毯根本就一无所知！)
Warren E. Buffett
February 28, 1989 Chairman of the Board
华伦．巴菲特
董事会主席
1989年2月28日
BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC.
波克夏海瑟崴股份有限公司
To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:
致所有股东:
Our gain in net worth during 1989 was $1.515 billion, or
44.4%. Over the last 25 years (that is, since present management
took over) our per-share book value has grown from $19.46 to
$4,296.01, or at a rate of 23.8% compounded annually.
本公司1989年的净值增加了15亿1千5百万美元，较去年增加了44.4%，
过去25年以来(也就是自从现有经营阶层接手后)，每股净值从19元成长到现
在的4,296美元，年复合成长率约为23.8%。
What counts, however, is intrinsic value - the figure
indicating what all of our constituent businesses are rationally
worth. With perfect foresight, this number can be calculated by
taking all future cash flows of a business - in and out - and
discounting them at prevailing interest rates. So valued, all
businesses, from manufacturers of buggy whips to operators of
cellular phones, become economic equals.
然而真正重要的还是实质价值-这个数字代表组合我们企业所有份子合理的价
值，根据精准的远见，这个数字可由企业未来预计的现金流量(包含流进与流
出)，并以现行的利率予以折现，不管是马鞭的制造公司或是行动电话的业者都
可以在同等的地位上，据以评估其经济价值。
Back when Berkshire's book value was $19.46, intrinsic
value was somewhat less because the book value was entirely tied
up in a textile business not worth the figure at which it was
carried. Now most of our businesses are worth far more than their
carrying values. This agreeable evolution from a discount to a
premium means that Berkshire's intrinsic business value has
compounded at a rate that somewhat exceeds our 23.8% annual
growth in book value.
当Berkshire的帐面价值是19.46美元之时，由于主要的资产多属于纺织事业，
所以实质的价值大概比帐面价值要少一点，但时至今日我们企业的价值却早已较
帐面价值多的多，这代表着Berkshire实质价值成长的速度要比帐面价值每年平
均23.8%的复合成长率还要再高一些。
The rear-view mirror is one thing; the windshield is
another. A large portion of our book value is represented by
equity securities that, with minor exceptions, are carried on our
balance sheet at current market values. At yearend these
securities were valued at higher prices, relative to their own
intrinsic business values, than has been the case in the past.
One reason is the buoyant 1989 stock market. More important, the
virtues of these businesses have been widely recognized. Whereas
once their stock prices were inappropriately low, they are not
now.
后照镜是一回事，雨刷又是另外一回事，我们帐面价值大部分是反应我们所持有
的有价证券，而这些有价证券除了少数的例外，又大多以市价在资产负债表上列
示，在去年年底这些有价证券较之过去，又以比实质价值呈现更高的价格，一方
面当然是因为1989年股市的飙涨，另一方面则是这些有价证券的价值得到大家
的认同，也就是说过去他们的股价曾经相当的低，但这种情况如今已不复存在。
We will keep most of our major holdings, regardless of how
they are priced relative to intrinsic business value. This 'tildeath-
do-us-part attitude, combined with the full prices these
holdings command, means that they cannot be expected to push up
Berkshire's value in the future as sharply as in the past. In
other words, our performance to date has benefited from a doubledip:
(1) the exceptional gains in intrinsic value that our
portfolio companies have achieved; (2) the additional bonus we
realized as the market appropriately "corrected" the prices of
these companies, raising their valuations in relation to those of
the average business. We will continue to benefit from good gains
in business value that we feel confident our portfolio companies
will make. But our "catch-up" rewards have been realized, which
means we'll have to settle for a single-dip in the future.
我们仍然会保有我们主要的持股，不管相较于实质价值，他们现在的市场价格是
多少，我们对于他们至死不分离的态度加上这些股份现在的价位，意味者他们在
未来可能无法再像先前那样将Berkshire的净值大幅向上推升，换句话说，我们
能有现在的表现主要受惠于两方面(1)我们旗下的公司所创造出的实质价值增长
