(2)由于市场对于这些公司的股价，相较于一般企业所做合理的修正所带来的额
外红利。
在未来我们有信心仍然可以享受公司所创造出来的价值，但是对于先前补涨的利
益则因为大都已实现，这意味着我们将来只能靠前者来受惠。
We face another obstacle: In a finite world, high growth
rates must self-destruct. If the base from which the growth is
taking place is tiny, this law may not operate for a time. But
when the base balloons, the party ends: A high growth rate
eventually forges its own anchor.
此外我们还面临到另一项挑战，在有限的世界里，任何高成长的事物终将自我毁
灭，若是成长的基础相对较小，则这项定律偶尔会被暂时打破，但是当基础膨胀
到一定程度时，好戏就会结束，高成长终有一天会被自己所束缚。
Carl Sagan has entertainingly described this phenomenon,
musing about the destiny of bacteria that reproduce by dividing
into two every 15 minutes. Says Sagan: "That means four doublings
an hour, and 96 doublings a day. Although a bacterium weighs only
about a trillionth of a gram, its descendants, after a day of
wild asexual abandon, will collectively weigh as much as a
mountain...in two days, more than the sun - and before very long,
everything in the universe will be made of bacteria." Not to
worry, says Sagan: Some obstacle always impedes this kind of
exponential growth. "The bugs run out of food, or they poison
each other, or they are shy about reproducing in public."
Carl Sagan曾经开玩笑地解释这种现象，假设有一种细菌每15分钟可以分裂
一次，亦即代表每一小时复制四次，一天可复制96次，虽然单一个细菌其重量
只有一兆分之一公克重，但是只要经过一天无止尽的无性生殖，其重量可能会比
一座山还重，经过两天后，甚至会比太阳还重，要不了多久所有的宇宙都将由这
种细菌所组成，不过Sagan又说，大家不必担心，上天一定会安排障碍来阻止
其倍数成长，有可能他会耗尽食物，或是毒死自己，或是有可能羞于在大庭广众
之下复制。
Even on bad days, Charlie Munger (Berkshire's Vice Chairman
and my partner) and I do not think of Berkshire as a bacterium.
Nor, to our unending sorrow, have we found a way to double its
net worth every 15 minutes. Furthermore, we are not the least bit
shy about reproducing - financially - in public. Nevertheless,
Sagan's observations apply. From Berkshire's present base of $4.9
billion in net worth, we will find it much more difficult to
average 15% annual growth in book value than we did to average
23.8% from the $22 million we began with.
即使是在最坏的情况下，查理孟格(Berkshire的副主席兼主要合伙人)，与我都
不认为Berkshire会像细菌一样无止尽地成长，当然更不可能像细菌那样找到每
15分钟就能够复制一次的方法，虽然我们不会像细菌那般羞于在公开场合进行
复制，不过Sagan的观察还是对的，相较于刚开始的2,200万，以Berkshire
目前的49亿美元的净值基础，我们实在很难像过去那样每年以15%以上的成长
率增加。
Taxes
租税
Our 1989 gain of $1.5 billion was achieved after we took a
charge of about $712 million for income taxes. In addition,
Berkshire's share of the income taxes paid by its five major
investees totaled about $175 million.
事实上，1989年Berkshire 15亿美元的增加净值还是已扣除7.12亿美元估计
应付所得税后的净额，此外这还不包含其五个主要被投资公司合计已缴1.75亿
美元的所得税。
Of this year's tax charge, about $172 million will be paid
currently; the remainder, $540 million, is deferred. Almost all
of the deferred portion relates to the 1989 increase in
unrealized profits in our common stock holdings. Against this
increase, we have reserved a 34% tax.
在今年的所得税费用中，大约有1.72亿美元是马上要支付的，剩下的5.4亿则
可以记帐递延处理，大部分是由于1989年我们持有的股票未实现利益，以34%
的预估税率计算出来的数字。
We also carry reserves at that rate against all unrealized
profits generated in 1987 and 1988. But, as we explained last
year, the unrealized gains we amassed before 1987 - about $1.2
billion - carry reserves booked at the 28% tax rate that then
prevailed.
另外我们也1987年及1988年的未实现资本利得依照前项税率补提准备，但如
同去年解释过的，我们在1987年所累积的未实现利益约12亿美元仍依照当时
28%的税率提列准备。
A new accounting rule is likely to be adopted that will
require companies to reserve against all gains at the current tax
rate, whatever it may be. With the rate at 34%, such a rule would
increase our deferred tax liability, and decrease our net worth,
by about $71 million - the result of raising the reserve on our
pre-1987 gain by six percentage points. Because the proposed rule
has sparked widespread controversy and its final form is unclear,
we have not yet made this change.
新的会计原则有可能会要求公司将所有的利得以现行的税率估算(不管实际可能
会是多少)，若以34%来计(等于将税率提高6个百分点)，这样的规则可能会大
幅增加我们帐列递延所得税的数字，并使我们的帐面净值减少约7,100万美元，
由于新提出的规定引发相当大的争议，最后的结果尚难定论，所以目前公司帐上
尚未做此反应。
As you can see from our balance sheet on page 27, we would
owe taxes of more than $1.1 billion were we to sell all of our
securities at year-end market values. Is this $1.1 billion
liability equal, or even similar, to a $1.1 billion liability
payable to a trade creditor 15 days after the end of the year?
Obviously not - despite the fact that both items have exactly the
same effect on audited net worth, reducing it by $1.1 billion.
大家可以从资产负债表上看到，若是年底我们一口气将所有的有价证券按市价全
部出清，则我们要支付的所得税将高达11亿美元，但这11亿的负债真的就跟
15天后要付给厂商的货款，一样或是相近吗? 很显然的并非如此，虽然在财务
报表上计算的净值的方式都一样，只是很简单地减掉11亿美元。
On the other hand, is this liability for deferred taxes a
meaningless accounting fiction because its payment can be
triggered only by the sale of stocks that, in very large part, we
have no intention of selling? Again, the answer is no.
从另一个角度来看，难道这项估计所得税负债，会因为我们从来没有意愿要把股
票卖掉，所以政府课不到所得税，就表示它不具重大的意义吗? 答案很显然也不
是。
In economic terms, the liability resembles an interest-free
loan from the U.S. Treasury that comes due only at our election
(unless, of course, Congress moves to tax gains before they are
realized). This "loan" is peculiar in other respects as well: It
can be used only to finance the ownership of the particular,
appreciated stocks and it fluctuates in size - daily as market
prices change and periodically if tax rates change. In effect,
this deferred tax liability is equivalent to a very large
transfer tax that is payable only if we elect to move from one
asset to another. Indeed, we sold some relatively small holdings
in 1989, incurring about $76 million of "transfer" tax on $224
million of gains.
就经济实质而言，这种所得税负债就好象是美国国库借给我们的无息贷款，且到
期日由我们自己来决定，(当然除非国会把课税时点提早到未实现时)，这种贷款
还有一项很奇怪的特点，它只能被用来购买某些特定涨价的股票，而且额度会随
时市场价格来变动，有时也会因为税率变动而改变，事实上这种递延所得税其实
有点类似于资产移转时所要缴交的交易税，事实上我们在1989年只做了一小部
份的变动，总共产生了2.24亿的资本利得，因此发生了7,600万的交易税。
Because of the way the tax law works, the Rip Van Winkle
style of investing that we favor - if successful - has an
important mathematical edge over a more frenzied approach. Let's
look at an extreme comparison.
由于税法运作的方式，如果情况许可的话，我们偏爱李伯大梦式的投资，因为较
之疯狂短线进出的方法，它有一个很重要的利基点，让我们举一个很极端的例子
来做说明。
Imagine that Berkshire had only $1, which we put in a
security that doubled by yearend and was then sold. Imagine
further that we used the after-tax proceeds to repeat this
process in each of the next 19 years, scoring a double each time.
At the end of the 20 years, the 34% capital gains tax that we
would have paid on the profits from each sale would have
delivered about $13,000 to the government and we would be left
with about $25,250. Not bad. If, however, we made a single
fantastic investment that itself doubled 20 times during the 20
years, our dollar would grow to $1,048,576. Were we then to cash
out, we would pay a 34% tax of roughly $356,500 and be left with
about $692,000.
假设Berkshire只有1块美金的投资，但它每年却可以有一倍的报酬，假设我
们将卖掉后所得的资金，用同样的方式再重复19年，结果20年下来，依照34%
的税率总共贡献给国库13,000美元，而我们自己则可以拿到25,250美元，看
起来还不错，然而要是我们简单一点，只做一项不变的投资，但是它同样可以赚
每年一倍，则最后的金额却高达1,048,576美元，在扣除34% 356,500的所
得税之后，实得约692,000美元。
The sole reason for this staggering difference in results
would be the timing of tax payments. Interestingly, the
government would gain from Scenario 2 in exactly the same 27:1
ratio as we - taking in taxes of $356,500 vs. $13,000 - though,
admittedly, it would have to wait for its money.
之所以会有如此大的差异唯一的理由就是所得税支付的时点，有趣的是政府从后
面那种情况所抽的税金还比前者高，当然政府必须等到最后才能拿到这笔税金。
We have not, we should stress, adopted our strategy
favoring long-term investment commitments because of these
mathematics. Indeed, it is possible we could earn greater aftertax
returns by moving rather frequently from one investment to
another. Many years ago, that's exactly what Charlie and I did.
必须强调的是我们并不是因为这种简单的算术就倾向采用长期投资的态度，没错
经常性的变动有可能会使我们的税后报酬高一些，事实上在几年之前，查理跟我
就是这样在做的。
Now we would rather stay put, even if that means slightly
lower returns. Our reason is simple: We have found splendid
business relationships to be so rare and so enjoyable that we
want to retain all we develop. This decision is particularly
easy for us because we feel that these relationships will produce
good - though perhaps not optimal - financial results.
Considering that, we think it makes little sense for us to give
up time with people we know to be interesting and admirable for
time with others we do not know and who are likely to have human
qualities far closer to average. That would be akin to marrying
for money - a mistake under most circumstances, insanity if one
is already rich.
但现在我们觉得一动不如一静，虽然这样的投资报酬看起来可能会少一点，其中
的理由很简单，我们已经找到相当难得的商业合作关系，并珍惜我们彼此间所发
展出来的情感，做这种决定对我们来说一点都不困难，因为我们相信这样的关系
一定会让我们有一个满意的投资成果，虽然它可能不是最佳的。也因此我们觉得
实在没有意义要舍弃原来我们熟悉欣赏的人，而把时间浪费在我们不认识且人格
可能会在水准以下的人身上，那不等于一个有钱人竟然还为了金钱而结婚，这未
免有些精神错乱。
Sources of Reported Earnings
帐列盈余的来源
The table below shows the major sources of Berkshire's
reported earnings. In this presentation, amortization of Goodwill
and other major purchase-price accounting adjustments are not
charged against the specific businesses to which they apply, but
are instead aggregated and shown separately. This procedure lets
you view the earnings of our businesses as they would have been
reported had we not purchased them. I've explained in past
reports why this form of presentation seems to us to be more
useful to investors and managers than one utilizing generally
accepted accounting principles (GAAP), which require purchaseprice
adjustments to be made on a business-by-business basis. The
total net earnings we show in the table are, of course, identical
to the GAAP total in our audited financial statements.
下表显示Berkshire帐列盈余的主要来源，在这张表中商誉的摊销数与购买法会
计调整数会从个别被投资公司分离出来，单独加总列示，之所以这样做是为了让
旗下各事业的盈余状况，不因我们的投资而有所影响，过去我一再地强调我们认
为这样的表达方式，较之一般公认会计原则要求以个别企业基础做调整，不管是
对投资者或是管理者来说，更有帮助，当然最后损益加总的数字仍然会与经会计
师查核的数字一致。
Further information about these businesses is given in the
Business Segment section on pages 37-39, and in the Management's
Discussion section on pages 40-44. In these sections you also
will find our segment earnings reported on a GAAP basis. For
information on Wesco's businesses, I urge you to read Charlie
Munger's letter, which starts on page 54. In addition, we have
reprinted on page 71 Charlie's May 30, 1989 letter to the U. S.
League of Savings Institutions, which conveyed our disgust with
its policies and our consequent decision to resign.
年报中还有企业个别部门的信息，有关Wesco公司的信息，我强烈建议大家可
以看看查理孟格所写的年报，里头包含查理在1989年5月写给美国储贷联盟
的一封公开信，信中传达对于其推行政策的不满并做出辞去在其组织中的职位。
(000s omitted)
----------------------------------------------
Berkshire's Share
of Net Earnings
(after taxes and
Pre-Tax Earnings minority interests)
---------------------- ----------------------
1989 1988 1989 1988
---------- ---------- ---------- ----------
Operating Earnings:
Insurance Group:
Underwriting ............ $(24,400) $(11,081) $(12,259) $ (1,045)
Net Investment Income ... 243,599 231,250 213,642 197,779
Buffalo News .............. 46,047 42,429 27,771 25,462
Fechheimer ................ 12,621 14,152 6,789 7,720
Kirby ..................... 26,114 26,891 16,803 17,842
Nebraska Furniture Mart ... 17,070 18,439 8,441 9,099
Scott Fetzer
Manufacturing Group .... 33,165 28,542 19,996 17,640
See's Candies ............. 34,235 32,473 20,626 19,671
Wesco - other than Insurance 13,008 16,133 9,810 10,650
World Book ................ 25,583 27,890 16,372 18,021
Amortization of Goodwill .. (3,387) (2,806) (3,372) (2,806)
Other Purchase-Price
Accounting Charges ........ (5,740) (6,342) (6,668) (7,340)
Interest Expense* ......... (42,389) (35,613) (27,098) (23,212)
Shareholder-Designated
Contributions .......... (5,867) (4,966) (3,814) (3,217)
Other ..................... 23,755 41,059 12,863 27,177
---------- ---------- ---------- ----------
Operating Earnings .......... 393,414 418,450 299,902 313,441
Sales of Securities ......... 223,810 131,671 147,575 85,829
---------- ---------- ---------- ----------
Total Earnings - All Entities $617,224 $550,121 $447,477 $399,270
*Excludes interest expense of Scott Fetzer Financial Group and
Mutual Savings & Loan.
*不包含史考特飞兹与联合储贷的利息费用
We refer you also to pages 45-51, where we have rearranged
Berkshire's financial data into four segments. These correspond
to the way Charlie and I think about the business and should help
you calculate Berkshire's intrinsic value. Shown on these pages
are balance sheets and earnings statements for: (1) our
insurance operations, with their major investment positions
itemized; (2) our manufacturing, publishing and retailing
businesses, leaving aside certain non-operating assets and
purchase-price accounting adjustments; (3) our subsidiaries
engaged in finance-type operations, which are Mutual Savings and
Scott Fetzer Financial; and (4) an all-other category that
includes the non-operating assets (primarily marketable
securities) held by the companies in segment (2), all purchase
price accounting adjustments, and various assets and debts of the
Wesco and Berkshire parent companies.
在后面我会提到重新将Berkshire的部门分类为四大项，这是查理跟我认为可以
帮助大家计算本公司实质价值的最好方式，以下的资产负债表与盈余表就是依此
分类表示(1)保险事业，并将主要投资部位归类(2)制造、出版与零售事业，扣除
非本业资产与购买法的会计调整(3)金融业的子公司-诸如联合储贷与史考特飞
兹财务公司(4)其它项目，包含前述非营业资产(主要是有价证券投资)与购买法调
整，还有Wesco与Berkshire母公司一些其它的资产与负债。
If you combine the earnings and net worths of these four
segments, you will derive totals matching those shown on our GAAP
statements. However, I want to emphasize that this four-category
presentation does not fall within the purview of our auditors,
who in no way bless it.
如果你将这四个部门的盈余与净值加总，会得到与经会计师依公认会计原则查核
的数字一致，然而我还是必须强调这种表达方式并未经过会计师的检视，我想他
宁可选择不要看的好。
In addition to our reported earnings, we also benefit from
