advice and a flawless execution.
去年九月，Berkshire发行了9亿美元的零息可转换次顺位债券，目前并已在纽
约证券交易所挂牌交易，由所罗门公司负责本次的债券承销工作，提供了我们宝
贵的建议与完美无缺的执行结果。
Most bonds, of course, require regular payments of interest,
usually semi-annually. A zero-coupon bond, conversely, requires
no current interest payments; instead, the investor receives his
yield by purchasing the security at a significant discount from
maturity value. The effective interest rate is determined by the
original issue price, the maturity value, and the amount of time
between issuance and maturity.
大部分的债券当然需要按时支付利息，通常是每半年一次，但是零息债券却不须
要马上支付利息，而是由投资人在以相当大的折价幅度在取得债券时预先扣除，
实质的利率则取决于发行的债券价格、到期面值与发行时间的长短而定。
In our case, the bonds were issued at 44.314% of maturity
value and are due in 15 years. For investors purchasing the
bonds, that is the mathematical equivalent of a 5.5% current
payment compounded semi-annually. Because we received only
44.31 cents on the dollar, our proceeds from this offering were
$400 million (less about $9.5 million of offering expenses).
以我们这次发行的债券来说，发行价是面额的44.314%，十五年到期，对于买
下这次债券的投资人，约可获得相当于5.5%的年报酬率，因为我们只拿到44.31
每分，所以这次扣除950万美元的发行费用，我们实得的款项是4亿美元。
The bonds were issued in denominations of $10,000 and each
bond is convertible into .4515 shares of Berkshire Hathaway.
Because a $10,000 bond cost $4,431, this means that the
conversion price was $9,815 per Berkshire share, a 15% premium to
the market price then existing. Berkshire can call the bonds at
any time after September 28, 1992 at their accreted value (the
original issue price plus 5.5% compounded semi-annually) and on
two specified days, September 28 of 1994 and 1999, the
bondholders can require Berkshire to buy the securities at their
accreted value.
这次发行的债券面额是10,000美元，每张债券可以申请转换为0.4515股的
Berkshire股份，因为每张债券的发行价大约是4,431美元，所以代表转换为
Berkshire的价格大概是9,815美元，约为现在市价15%的溢价，同时Berkshire
有权在1992年9月28日以后加计利息(5.5%的年利率)赎回这些债券，至于债
券持有人也有权在1994年与1999年的9月28日要求公司加计利息买回其所
持有的债券。
For tax purposes, Berkshire is entitled to deduct the 5.5%
interest accrual each year, even though we make no payments to
the bondholders. Thus the net effect to us, resulting from the
reduced taxes, is positive cash flow. That is a very significant
benefit. Some unknowable variables prevent us from calculating
our exact effective rate of interest, but under all circumstances
it will be well below 5.5%. There is meanwhile a symmetry to the
tax law: Any taxable holder of the bonds must pay tax each year
on the 5.5% interest, even though he receives no cash.
就税负的观点而言，虽然没有马上支付利息，但Berkshire每年仍可享受5.5%
利息支出的所得税扣抵，由于减少了税负支出，所以就现金流量的角度而言，我
们每年还有现金净流入，这是一项不错的好处，当然一些不可知的变处，使我们
无法确定这次发行真正的资金成本，但不管怎样，应该都低于5.5%，而相对的
债券持有人每年还是要支付5.5%的利息所得税，虽然他们根本没有收到任何的
现金利息收入。
Neither our bonds nor those of certain other companies that
issued similar bonds last year (notably Loews and Motorola)
resemble the great bulk of zero-coupon bonds that have been
issued in recent years. Of these, Charlie and I have been, and
will continue to be, outspoken critics. As I will later explain,
such bonds have often been used in the most deceptive of ways and
with deadly consequences to investors. But before we tackle that
subject, let's travel back to Eden, to a time when the apple had
not yet been bitten.
去年我们与其它公司所发行的类似债券(尤其是Loews与摩托罗拉公司)，与这
几年盛行的零息债券有相当大的差异，对于后者，查理跟我一直有相当的意见，
后面我会再详加说明，我们认为这些债券隐藏着欺骗行为，对买下他们的投资人
有相当不利的影响，不过在谈论这个话题之前，让我们回溯时光到亚当还未引诱
夏娃啃下苹果之前的时代。
If you're my age you bought your first zero-coupon bonds
during World War II, by purchasing the famous Series E U. S.
Savings Bond, the most widely-sold bond issue in history. (After
the war, these bonds were held by one out of two U. S.
households.) Nobody, of course, called the Series E a zero-coupon
bond, a term in fact that I doubt had been invented. But that's
precisely what the Series E was.
如果你像我这样的年纪曾在二次世界大战期间第一次买进最有名的E系列美国
储蓄零息债券，(这种广为流传的债券几乎每两个家庭最会有人持有)，当然在当
时没有人会把它当作是零息债券的一种，因为这名词根本就还未出现，但基本上
它就是一种零息债券。
These bonds came in denominations as small as $18.75. That
amount purchased a $25 obligation of the United States government
due in 10 years, terms that gave the buyer a compounded annual
return of 2.9%. At the time, this was an attractive offer: the
2.9% rate was higher than that generally available on Government
bonds and the holder faced no market-fluctuation risk, since he
could at any time cash in his bonds with only a minor reduction
in interest.
这种债券的面额最小的只有18.75美元，买下10年后美国政府必须偿还25美
元，投资人大概可以获得2.9%的年投资报酬率，在当时这是相当不错的一项投
资，2.9%的年利率远高于普通的政府债券利率，且持有人不必担心利率波动的
风险，而且他可以随时予以变现，利息不会被打折太多。
A second form of zero-coupon U. S. Treasury issue, also
benign and useful, surfaced in the last decade. One problem with
a normal bond is that even though it pays a given interest rate -
say 10% - the holder cannot be assured that a compounded 10%
return will be realized. For that rate to materialize, each semiannual
coupon must be reinvested at 10% as it is received. If
current interest rates are, say, only 6% or 7% when these coupons
come due, the holder will be unable to compound his money over
the life of the bond at the advertised rate. For pension funds or
other investors with long-term liabilities, "reinvestment risk"
of this type can be a serious problem. Savings Bonds might have
solved it, except that they are issued only to individuals and
are unavailable in large denominations. What big buyers needed
was huge quantities of "Savings Bond Equivalents."
第二种形式的美国国库零息债券出现在十几年前，也相当的不错，一般的债券有
一个很大的问题，那就是虽然它的票面是10%，但持有人却不一定能够保证就
能得到10%的报酬率，因为要能获得10%的话就必须所收到的10%利息收入也
能再运用投资也能得到10%以上才行，若是所得的利息之后只能得到6%或7%
的报酬，则最后结算的报酬率可能没有办法达到10%的预定利率，这对于退休
基金或是其它具有长期负债的投资者来说，再投资所可能遇到的风险可能是一个
很严重的问题，储蓄债券则可以解决这样的问题，只可惜它只能发行给个人而且
面额都不大，对于大买家来说，它们需要的是类似这种储蓄债券的替代品。
Enter some ingenious and, in this case, highly useful
investment bankers (led, I'm happy to say, by Salomon Brothers).
They created the instrument desired by "stripping" the semiannual
coupons from standard Government issues. Each coupon, once
detached, takes on the essential character of a Savings Bond
since it represents a single sum due sometime in the future. For
example, if you strip the 40 semi-annual coupons from a U. S.
Government Bond due in the year 2010, you will have 40 zerocoupon
bonds, with maturities from six months to 20 years, each
of which can then be bundled with other coupons of like maturity
and marketed. If current interest rates are, say, 10% for all
maturities, the six-month issue will sell for 95.24% of maturity
value and the 20-year issue will sell for 14.20%. The purchaser
of any given maturity is thus guaranteed a compounded rate of 10%
for his entire holding period. Stripping of government bonds has
occurred on a large scale in recent years, as long-term
investors, ranging from pension funds to individual IRA accounts,
recognized these high-grade, zero-coupon issues to be well suited
to their needs.
这时创意十足的银行家就适时出现了，(我很高兴的向各位报告那就是所罗门兄
弟公司)，它们从标准的政府债券中，分拆出大家所想要的零息债券，每一张债
券都跟储蓄债券一样，在未来的某一天到期后可以拿回完整的一笔钱，举例来说
如果你可以将20年期每半年付息的债券，分拆成40张到期日分别为半年到20
年不等的零息债券，之后再将到期日相同的债券并起来对外出售，假设现行的殖
利率为10%，半年期的价格大概是95.24%，20年期的则只有14.20%，如此
一来所有购买这种债券的投资者就可以明确的确保它可以获得的报酬率，分拆债
券这几年因符合长期的退休基金与个人的IRA帐户投资者需求，广受欢迎而大
量流行。
But as happens in Wall Street all too often, what the wise
do in the beginning, fools do in the end. In the last few years
zero-coupon bonds (and their functional equivalent, pay-in-kind
bonds, which distribute additional PIK bonds semi-annually as
interest instead of paying cash) have been issued in enormous
quantities by ever-junkier credits. To these issuers, zero (or
PIK) bonds offer one overwhelming advantage: It is impossible to
default on a promise to pay nothing. Indeed, if LDC governments
had issued no debt in the 1970's other than long-term zero-coupon
obligations, they would now have a spotless record as debtors.
但就像是华尔街经常会发生的，不管什么好东西到最后都会变质，最近几年来零
息债券(以及功能类似的pay-in-kind债券，只发放PIK债券取代现金)，有一大
部份是垃圾债券等级，对这些发行公司来说，零息债券有一个很大的好处，因为
在发行后直到到期日前根本就不必付出任何资金所以根本就不有无法偿付的情
况，事实上，LDC政府在1970年后除了长期零息债券之外就没有发行过其它
债券，所以就一个债务人来说，它们到现在还拥有完美无暇的记录。
This principle at work - that you need not default for a
long time if you solemnly promise to pay nothing for a long time
- has not been lost on promoters and investment bankers seeking
to finance ever-shakier deals. But its acceptance by lenders took
a while: When the leveraged buy-out craze began some years back,
purchasers could borrow only on a reasonably sound basis, in
which conservatively-estimated free cash flow - that is,
operating earnings plus depreciation and amortization less
normalized capital expenditures - was adequate to cover both
interest and modest reductions in debt.
这原则实在是管用，你大可以正经八百的说你一定不会还不出钱，原因是因为你
有好长一段时间可以不必支付一毛钱，直到支持者与投资银行家再发明出更刺激
的融资方式之前，不过债权人也要花好长一段时间才能支持这种做法，当融资购
并热开始风行的几年之前，投资者只能借到一点钱，因为债权人会保守地估计其
未来的现金流量，亦即营业收益加计折旧与摊销再扣除资本支出，必须要能够确
保未来的利息支出与本金的支付。
Later, as the adrenalin of deal-makers surged, businesses
began to be purchased at prices so high that all free cash flow
necessarily had to be allocated to the payment of interest. That
left nothing for the paydown of debt. In effect, a Scarlett
O'Hara "I'll think about it tomorrow" position in respect to
principal payments was taken by borrowers and accepted by a new
breed of lender, the buyer of original-issue junk bonds. Debt now
became something to be refinanced rather than repaid. The change
brings to mind a New Yorker cartoon in which the grateful
borrower rises to shake the hand of the bank's lending officer
and gushes: "I don't know how I'll ever repay you."
之后随着肾上腺素升高，买价持续飙高使得所有的预估现金流量都必须被分配用
来支付利息，至于本金的部份根本就不在预计偿付范围之内，接着贷款者对于本
金偿还的态度就变得像乱世佳人中的郝思佳一样，「管他的，明天再说吧！」，
而更离谱的是偏偏就有借钱者愿意吃这一套，那就是专门买垃圾债券的投资者，
债务从此以后只要再融资即可，根本就不用考虑要偿还，这种心态的转变在纽约
客卡通中描写的罪贴切，一个贷款人痛哭零涕地握着银行员的手说到，「我实在
不知道该如何”偿还”你对我的恩情。」
Soon borrowers found even the new, lax standards intolerably
binding. To induce lenders to finance even sillier transactions,
they introduced an abomination, EBDIT - Earnings Before
Depreciation, Interest and Taxes - as the test of a company's
ability to pay interest. Using this sawed-off yardstick, the
borrower ignored depreciation as an expense on the theory that it
did not require a current cash outlay.
很快的其它借款人又找到更新、更宽松的约束方式，为了拐骗金主借钱来从事更
离谱的交易，这群人又引进了一个新名词叫做扣除折旧、利息与税负前的盈余
EBDIT，来衡量一家公司偿债的能力，利用这种较低的标准，借款人故意忽略了
折旧也是一种费用，虽然它不会马上有现金的支出。
Such an attitude is clearly delusional. At 95% of American
businesses, capital expenditures that over time roughly
approximate depreciation are a necessity and are every bit as
real an expense as labor or utility costs. Even a high school
dropout knows that to finance a car he must have income that
covers not only interest and operating expenses, but also
realistically-calculated depreciation. He would be laughed out of
the bank if he started talking about EBDIT.
这样的态度摆明了就是掩耳盗铃，95%的美国企业，长期而言其资本支出大概与
平时提列的累积折旧费用相当，所花的每一分钱都与日常的劳工薪资或水电成本
一样实在，即使是中学的中辍生也知道养一台车子不只是要负担利息与日常油钱
保养费用而已，还必须精确地考量到每月实际摊销的折旧，若是他跑到银行摆出
EBDIT这一套说法，保证一下子就会被轰出来。
Capital outlays at a business can be skipped, of course, in
any given month, just as a human can skip a day or even a week of
eating. But if the skipping becomes routine and is not made up,
the body weakens and eventually dies. Furthermore, a start-andstop
feeding policy will over time produce a less healthy
organism, human or corporate, than that produced by a steady
diet. As businessmen, Charlie and I relish having competitors who
are unable to fund capital expenditures.
在企业资本支出当然可以暂时不去考虑，就像是一个人可以一天或甚至一个礼拜
不吃东西，但若是这种情况便做是一种坏习惯的话，身体很快就会发生不适的状
况，甚至有死亡的危险，更甚者，有一餐没一餐的做法比起稳定的进食习惯，更
可能使得一个健康的人身体机能变差，不管是人体或是企业都是如此，身为一个
生意人，查理跟我对于竞争对手可能没有资金进行资本支出来感到欣喜。
You might think that waving away a major expense such as
depreciation in an attempt to make a terrible deal look like a
good one hits the limits of Wall Street's ingenuity. If so, you
haven't been paying attention during the past few years.
Promoters needed to find a way to justify even pricier
acquisitions. Otherwise, they risked - heaven forbid! - losing
deals to other promoters with more "imagination."
或许你会认为排除一项主要的费用诸如折旧等使得原本一桩很烂的交易变成不
错的交易，是华尔街聪明才智极致的表现，，那你可能是完全没有注意到华尔街
过去几年的发展，支持者必须再找到一个更有看头的做法，来合理解释价格更离
谱的购并案，不然的话，他们就必须冒犯最严重的天条-被其它更有”创意”的支
持者把生意抢走。
So, stepping through the Looking Glass, promoters and their
investment bankers proclaimed that EBDIT should now be measured
against cash interest only, which meant that interest accruing on
zero-coupon or PIK bonds could be ignored when the financial
feasibility of a transaction was being assessed. This approach
not only relegated depreciation expense to the let's-ignore-it
corner, but gave similar treatment to what was usually a
significant portion of interest expense. To their shame, many
professional investment managers went along with this nonsense,
though they usually were careful to do so only with clients'
money, not their own. (Calling these managers "professionals" is
actually too kind; they should be designated "promotees.")
所以穿过外面的那道玻璃，支持者与其投资银行宣称EBDIT应该可以只跟要付
的利息做比较就好，意思是说在评估一项投资案的时候，那些记帐不须马上支付
的利息根本就可以不必纳入考量，这样的方式不但是把折旧丢到没人注意的角落
边，还将大部分的利息费用用同样的方式对待，可耻的是，许多专业投资银行家
竟然昧着良心附和，反正只要确定这是客户而不是他们自己的钱就好，(称呼这
群人为专业人士实在是太恭维他们了，他们应该被归类为抬轿者)。
Under this new standard, a business earning, say, $100
million pre-tax and having debt on which $90 million of interest
must be paid currently, might use a zero-coupon or PIK issue to
incur another $60 million of annual interest that would accrue
and compound but not come due for some years. The rate on these
issues would typically be very high, which means that the
situation in year 2 might be $90 million cash interest plus $69
