million accrued interest, and so on as the compounding proceeds.
Such high-rate reborrowing schemes, which a few years ago were
appropriately confined to the waterfront, soon became models of
modern finance at virtually all major investment banking houses.
在这种新的标准之下，一家公司假设税前有1亿美元的获利，同时最近一年有9
千万的利息支出，大可以运用零息债券或是PIK债券来额外负担6千万只要记
帐却不须马上支付利息与本金，而这种债券的利率通常非常高，到了第二年，公
司可能要承担9千万的付现息与6,900万的记帐息，之后随着复利记帐息持续
增加，而这种高利率的融资计画，在刚开始几年还能获得有效控制，但不久之后
就变成所有大型投资银行必备推荐给客户的标准融资工具。
When they make these offerings, investment bankers display
their humorous side: They dispense income and balance sheet
projections extending five or more years into the future for
companies they barely had heard of a few months earlier. If you
are shown such schedules, I suggest that you join in the fun:
Ask the investment banker for the one-year budgets that his own
firm prepared as the last few years began and then compare these
with what actually happened.
当他们推出这样的新案子时，投资银行展现他们幽默的一面，他们将损益表与资
产负债表的预估展延为五年或甚至更长的一段期间，虽然在几个月之前，他们可
能连这家公司的名字都没听过，我想如果你那天碰到这种预估表，我建议你可以
参与这样的游戏：跟这位投资银行家要一份他们自己公司的过去几年的年度预
算，然后跟他们实际的结果必较一下，你就知道是什么回事了。
Some time ago Ken Galbraith, in his witty and insightful
The Great Crash, coined a new economic term: "the bezzle,"
defined as the current amount of undiscovered embezzlement. This
financial creature has a magical quality: The embezzlers are richer
by the amount of the bezzle, while the embezzlees do not yet feel
poorer.
许久以前Ken Galbraith在他的名著「大恐慌」中，发明了一个新的经济名词
-Bezzle，用来代表现有未被发现的贪污舞弊，这种财经现象有一个很奇特的特
质，那就是贪污舞弊者因为贪污舞弊而发大财，但问题是受害者却一点也没有被
剥夺变穷的感觉。
Professor Galbraith astutely pointed out that this sum
should be added to the National Wealth so that we might know the
Psychic National Wealth. Logically, a society that wanted to feel
enormously prosperous would both encourage its citizens to
embezzle and try not to detect the crime. By this means, "wealth"
would balloon though not an erg of productive work had been done.
Galbraith教授真知卓见地点出大家应该把这个数字统计一下，加进国民财富当
中，从而我们可以知道心理上的国民财富为多少，理论上一个社会若想要觉得自
己经济繁荣发展就应该多多鼓励人民去贪污舞弊，并试着不要去揭发它，透过这
种方式，一个国家的财富可以大幅地增长，虽然实际上它什么有生产力的事都没
做。
The satirical nonsense of the bezzle is dwarfed by the realworld
nonsense of the zero-coupon bond. With zeros, one party to
a contract can experience "income" without his opposite
experiencing the pain of expenditure. In our illustration, a
company capable of earning only $100 million dollars annually -
and therefore capable of paying only that much in interest -
magically creates "earnings" for bondholders of $150 million. As
long as major investors willingly don their Peter Pan wings and
repeatedly say "I believe," there is no limit to how much
"income" can be created by the zero-coupon bond.
但是这种不合理的贪污舞弊，在现实社会中却被零息债券给比了下去，利用这些”
零”一家公司可以大大方方靠着这纸签约，利用借款享受所带来的收入，但另外
一方面却不知承担支付支出的痛苦，以我们先前提到的例子，一家每年可以赚1
亿美元的公司，利用这种方法，在债券投资人的面前，却可以把膨胀到1亿5,000
万美元，只要投资人愿意充当彼得潘，不断地说「我相信你」，只要你愿意零息
债券所创造的收入是没有上限的。
Wall Street welcomed this invention with the enthusiasm
less-enlightened folk might reserve for the wheel or the plow.
Here, finally, was an instrument that would let the Street make
deals at prices no longer limited by actual earning power. The
result, obviously, would be more transactions: Silly prices will
always attract sellers. And, as Jesse Unruh might have put it,
transactions are the mother's milk of finance.
华尔街以热情拥抱这项新的发明，后知后觉的人可能就准备等着卷铺盖走路，终
于在这里大家找到一个可以不必理会公司实际获利能力的融资方法，结果很明
显，当然就会有更多的生意上门，离谱的价格一定有卖家愿意出，就像Jesse
Unruh可能会说的一句话，交易就像是金融世界的母奶。
The zero-coupon or PIK bond possesses one additional
attraction for the promoter and investment banker, which is that
the time elapsing between folly and failure can be stretched out.
This is no small benefit. If the period before all costs must be
faced is long, promoters can create a string of foolish deals -
and take in lots of fees - before any chickens come home to roost
from their earlier ventures.
此外零息与PIK债券还有一项特点使得支持者与银行家更愿意推行，就是东窗事
发的时间可以再延长，这点可是相当的重要，如果交易所衍生的后果要很长一段
时间才会浮现，那么支持者就可以在这段期间做更多的交易，从中赚取更多的手
续费，直到事件东窗事发之前。
But in the end, alchemy, whether it is metallurgical or
financial, fails. A base business can not be transformed into a
golden business by tricks of accounting or capital structure. The
man claiming to be a financial alchemist may become rich. But
gullible investors rather than business achievements will usually
be the source of his wealth.
不过到最后，炼金术，不管是冶金的或是财务上的，终究是会落空，一个烂公司
不可能只靠着会计或财务技巧而摇身一变成为好公司，那个宣称会炼金术的财务
专业人士或许会发大财，但他靠的却是容易上当的投资人而不是企业经营。
Whatever their weaknesses, we should add, many zero-coupon
and PIK bonds will not default. We have in fact owned some and
may buy more if their market becomes sufficiently distressed.
(We've not, however, even considered buying a new issue from a
weak credit.) No financial instrument is evil per se; it's just
that some variations have far more potential for mischief than
others.
不过这些债券有多少缺点，但我们却必须承认许多零息与PIK债券应该不会还不
出钱来，事实上我们自己也投资了一些，而且若是债券市场情况再变差一点，我
们可能还会买的更多，(当然我们从来就不会考虑去买那些新发行债信又差的垃
圾债券)，就本质而言，没有一项财务工具是不对的，只是有一些含有相当高程
度的可能伤害在里面。
The blue ribbon for mischief-making should go to the zerocoupon
issuer unable to make its interest payments on a current
basis. Our advice: Whenever an investment banker starts talking
about EBDIT - or whenever someone creates a capital structure
that does not allow all interest, both payable and accrued, to be
comfortably met out of current cash flow net of ample capital
expenditures - zip up your wallet. Turn the tables by suggesting
that the promoter and his high-priced entourage accept zerocoupon
fees, deferring their take until the zero-coupon bonds
have been paid in full. See then how much enthusiasm for the deal
endures.
所有的罪过应该归咎于债券发行者没有办法在现在就立即支付利息，我们的建议
是当任何投资银行家在开始提到EBDIT之前，或是任何人在对你提议一项可以
不必支付任何利息的金融工具时，为了你自己的现金流量着想，赶快把你的荷包
看紧，换个角度建议这些推销者是否也能接受等这些零息债券真正偿还本金之
后，再缴交手续费，看看这些人的热情还能支撑多久。
Our comments about investment bankers may seem harsh. But
Charlie and I - in our hopelessly old-fashioned way - believe
that they should perform a gatekeeping role, guarding investors
against the promoter's propensity to indulge in excess.
Promoters, after all, have throughout time exercised the same
judgment and restraint in accepting money that alcoholics have
exercised in accepting liquor. At a minimum, therefore, the
banker's conduct should rise to that of a responsible bartender
who, when necessary, refuses the profit from the next drink to
avoid sending a drunk out on the highway. In recent years,
unfortunately, many leading investment firms have found bartender
morality to be an intolerably restrictive standard. Lately, those
who have traveled the high road in Wall Street have not
encountered heavy traffic.
我们对于这些投资银行家的批判或许是激烈了一点，但查理跟我以我们这种无可
救药的保守作风，相信他们确实应该要做好把关的工作，保护投资人免于这些推
销者过度的引诱，因为推销者对于佣金的饥渴就像是酗酒者对于酒精的沉溺一
样，最低限度，投资银行家也要肩负起吧台调酒师的角色，必要的时候，就算少
赚一杯酒钱，也要劝客户少喝一点，不幸的是最近几年来，许多大型的投资银行
都认为这样的基本道德规范是一项很严重的限制，因为其它很多大胆的业者，可
以更自由的大行其道。
One distressing footnote: The cost of the zero-coupon folly
will not be borne solely by the direct participants. Certain
savings and loan associations were heavy buyers of such bonds,
using cash that came from FSLIC-insured deposits. Straining to
show splendid earnings, these buyers recorded - but did not
receive - ultra-high interest income on these issues. Many of
these associations are now in major trouble. Had their loans to
shaky credits worked, the owners of the associations would have
pocketed the profits. In the many cases in which the loans will
fail, the taxpayer will pick up the bill. To paraphrase Jackie
Mason, at these associations it was the managers who should have
been wearing the ski masks.
最后还有一个令人不平的附带说明，零息债券的代价并不只由直接参与者自己承
担而已，一些储贷机构由于是这些垃圾债券的大买家，利用由联邦政府所保险的
人民储蓄存款来投资，为了尽量美化帐面盈余数字，这些单位将这些即使还没有
收到的超高利息收入全部认列，许多储贷机构现在却因此面临严重的问题，若是
他们那些债信不佳的债务人付出本金，当然状况就可以顺利解决，但问题是通常
他们都付不出本金，到最后还是必须由整体纳税义务人来买单，套句Jackie
Mason的话，应该是由这些储贷机构的经理人来戴区棍球面罩。
Mistakes of the First Twenty-five Years (A Condensed Version)
头25年所犯的错误(浓缩版)
To quote Robert Benchley, "Having a dog teaches a boy
fidelity, perseverance, and to turn around three times before
lying down." Such are the shortcomings of experience.
Nevertheless, it's a good idea to review past mistakes before
committing new ones. So let's take a quick look at the last 25
years.
套用Robert Benchley的名言：「要一只狗教小孩子忠诚、忍耐，并此能够滚
三圈再在地上躺好」，这就是经验传承的难处，不过不论如何，再犯下一错误之
前，最好能够先反省一下以前的那些错误，所以让我们花点时间回顾一下过去
25年的经验。
o My first mistake, of course, was in buying control of
Berkshire. Though I knew its business - textile manufacturing -
to be unpromising, I was enticed to buy because the price looked
cheap. Stock purchases of that kind had proved reasonably
rewarding in my early years, though by the time Berkshire came
along in 1965 I was becoming aware that the strategy was not
ideal.
首先我所犯的第一个错误，当然就是买下Berkshire纺织的控制权，虽然我很清
楚纺织这个产业没什么前景，却因为它的价格实在很便宜而受其所引诱，虽然在
早期投资这样的股票确实让我获利颇丰，但在1965年投资Berkshire后，我就
开始发现这终究不是个理想的投资模式。
If you buy a stock at a sufficiently low price, there will
usually be some hiccup in the fortunes of the business that gives
you a chance to unload at a decent profit, even though the longterm
performance of the business may be terrible. I call this the
"cigar butt" approach to investing. A cigar butt found on the
street that has only one puff left in it may not offer much of a
smoke, but the "bargain purchase" will make that puff all profit.
如果你以很低的价格买进一家公司的股票，应该很容易有机会以不错的获利出脱
了结，虽然长期而言这家公司的经营结果可能很糟糕，我将这种投资方法称之为
「烟屁股」投资法，在路边随地可见的香烟头捡起来可能让你吸一口，解一解烟
瘾，但对于隐君子来说，也不过是举手之劳而已。
Unless you are a liquidator, that kind of approach to buying
businesses is foolish. First, the original "bargain" price
probably will not turn out to be such a steal after all. In a
difficult business, no sooner is one problem solved than another
surfaces - never is there just one cockroach in the kitchen.
Second, any initial advantage you secure will be quickly eroded
by the low return that the business earns. For example, if you
buy a business for $8 million that can be sold or liquidated for
$10 million and promptly take either course, you can realize a
high return. But the investment will disappoint if the business
is sold for $10 million in ten years and in the interim has
annually earned and distributed only a few percent on cost. Time
is the friend of the wonderful business, the enemy of the
mediocre.
不过除非你是清算专家，否则买下这类公司实在是属于傻瓜行径，第一长期而
言，原来看起来划算的价格到最后可能一点都不值得，在经营艰困的企业中，通
常一个问题才刚解决不久，另外一个问题就又接踵而来，厨房里的蟑螂绝对不会
只有你看到的那一只而已，第二先前的价差优势很快地就会被企业不佳的绩效所
侵蚀，例如你用800万美元买下一家清算价值达1,000万美元的公司，若你能
马上把这家公司给处理掉，不管是出售或是清算都好，换算下来你的报酬可能会
很可观，但是若这家公司要花上你十年的时间才有办法把它给处理掉，而在这之
前你只能拿回一点点可怜的股利的话，相信我时间虽然是好公司的朋友，但却是
烂公司最大的敌人。
You might think this principle is obvious, but I had to
learn it the hard way - in fact, I had to learn it several times
over. Shortly after purchasing Berkshire, I acquired a Baltimore
department store, Hochschild Kohn, buying through a company
called Diversified Retailing that later merged with Berkshire. I
bought at a substantial discount from book value, the people were
first-class, and the deal included some extras - unrecorded real
estate values and a significant LIFO inventory cushion. How could
I miss? So-o-o - three years later I was lucky to sell the
business for about what I had paid. After ending our corporate
marriage to Hochschild Kohn, I had memories like those of the
husband in the country song, "My Wife Ran Away With My Best
Friend and I Still Miss Him a Lot."
或许你会认为这道理再简单不过了，不过我却必须经历惨痛的教训才真正的搞
懂，在买下Berkshire不久之后，我又买了巴尔的摩百货公司、Hochschild Kohn
与一家叫多元零售公司(后来与Berkshire合并)，我以相当的折价幅度买下这些
公司，经营的人也属一流，整个交易甚至还有额外的利益，包含未实现的房地产
增值利益与后进先出法的存货会计原则，我到底还漏掉了什么? 还好三年之后，
算我走狗运，能够以成本价左右的价格脱身，在跟Hochschild Kohn公司结束
关系之后，我只有一个感想，就像一首乡村歌曲的歌词所述的，「我的老婆跟我
最要好的朋友跑了，我是多么地怀念他!」
I could give you other personal examples of "bargainpurchase"
folly but I'm sure you get the picture: It's far
better to buy a wonderful company at a fair price than a fair
company at a wonderful price. Charlie understood this early; I
was a slow learner. But now, when buying companies or common
stocks, we look for first-class businesses accompanied by firstclass
managements.
我可以给各位另外一个个人经验，以合理的价格买下一家好公司要比用便宜的价
格买下一家普通的公司来的好的多，像查理老早就明白这个道理，我的反应则比
较慢，不过现在当我们投资公司或股票时，我们不但选择最好的公司，同时这些
公司还要有好的经理人。
o That leads right into a related lesson: Good jockeys will
do well on good horses, but not on broken-down nags. Both
Berkshire's textile business and Hochschild, Kohn had able and
honest people running them. The same managers employed in a
business with good economic characteristics would have achieved
fine records. But they were never going to make any progress
while running in quicksand.
从这里我们又学到了一课，好的马还要搭配好骑师才能有好成绩，像Berkshire
纺织与Hochschild, Kohn也都有才能兼具的人在管理，很不幸的他们所面临的
是流沙般的困境，若能将这些人摆在体质更好的公司相信他们应该会有更好的成
绩。
I've said many times that when a management with a
reputation for brilliance tackles a business with a reputation
for bad economics, it is the reputation of the business that
remains intact. I just wish I hadn't been so energetic in
creating examples. My behavior has matched that admitted by Mae
West: "I was Snow White, but I drifted."
我曾说过好几次，当一个绩效卓著的经理人遇到一家恶名昭彰的企业，通常会是
后者占上风，但愿我再也没有那么多精力来创造新的例子，我以前的行为就像是
Mae West曾说的︰「曾经我是个白雪公主，不过如今我已不再清白。」
o A further related lesson: Easy does it. After 25 years of
buying and supervising a great variety of businesses, Charlie and
I have not learned how to solve difficult business problems. What
we have learned is to avoid them. To the extent we have been
