successful, it is because we concentrated on identifying one-foot
hurdles that we could step over rather than because we acquired
any ability to clear seven-footers.
另外还学到一个教训，在经历25年企业管理与经营各种不同事业的岁月之后，
查理跟我还是没能学会如此去解决难题，不过我们倒学会如何去避免他们，在这
点我们倒做的相当成功，我们专挑那种一呎的低栏，而避免碰到七呎的跳高。
The finding may seem unfair, but in both business and
investments it is usually far more profitable to simply stick
with the easy and obvious than it is to resolve the difficult. On
occasion, tough problems must be tackled as was the case when we
started our Sunday paper in Buffalo. In other instances, a great
investment opportunity occurs when a marvelous business
encounters a one-time huge, but solvable, problem as was the case
many years back at both American Express and GEICO. Overall,
however, we've done better by avoiding dragons than by slaying
them.
这项发现看起来似乎是不太公平，不管是在经营企业或是投资通长坚持在容易又
明显的好公司会比死守在有问题的公司要来的好，当然有时困难的问题也有被解
决的机会，像是我们刚开始在经营水牛城报纸一样，或是有时一家好公司也会有
暂时的难关，像是以前美国运通与GEICO都曾经一度发生状况，不过总的来说，
我们尽量做到回避妖龙，而不是冒险去屠龙。
o My most surprising discovery: the overwhelming importance in
business of an unseen force that we might call "the institutional
imperative." In business school, I was given no hint of the
imperative's existence and I did not intuitively understand it
when I entered the business world. I thought then that decent,
intelligent, and experienced managers would automatically make
rational business decisions. But I learned over time that isn't
so. Instead, rationality frequently wilts when the institutional
imperative comes into play.
我最意外的发现是企业一种看不到的巨大影响力，我们称之为"系统规范"，在学
校时没有人告诉我这种规范的存在，而我也不是一开始进入商业世界就知道有这
回事，我以为任何正当、聪明有经验的经理人都会很自动的做这样的决策，但慢
慢地我发现完全就不是这么一回事，相反的理性的态度在系统规范的影响下都会
慢慢地变质。
For example: (1) As if governed by Newton's First Law of
Motion, an institution will resist any change in its current
direction; (2) Just as work expands to fill available time,
corporate projects or acquisitions will materialize to soak up
available funds; (3) Any business craving of the leader, however
foolish, will be quickly supported by detailed rate-of-return and
strategic studies prepared by his troops; and (4) The behavior of
peer companies, whether they are expanding, acquiring, setting
executive compensation or whatever, will be mindlessly imitated.
举例来说(1)就好象是受牛顿第一运动定律所规范，任何一个组织机构都会抵抗
对现有方向做任何的改变(2)就像拥有会有工作来填满所有的时间，企业的计画
或购并案永远有足够的理由将资金耗尽(3)任何一个崇拜领导者的组织，不管有
多离谱，他的追随者永远可以找到可以支持其理论的投资评估分析报告(4)同业
的举动，不管是做扩张、购并或是订定经理人待遇等都会在无意间彼此模仿。
Institutional dynamics, not venality or stupidity, set
businesses on these courses, which are too often misguided. After
making some expensive mistakes because I ignored the power of the
imperative, I have tried to organize and manage Berkshire in ways
that minimize its influence. Furthermore, Charlie and I have
attempted to concentrate our investments in companies that appear
alert to the problem.
是组织的动力而非腐败或愚蠢，误导他们走上这些路子，也因为我忽略了这种规
律的力量，使我为这些所犯的错误付出高昂的代价，之后我便试图组织管理
Berkshire尽量让这种规律降低其影响程度，同时查理跟我也试着将我们的投资
集中在对于这种问题有相当警觉的公司之上。
o After some other mistakes, I learned to go into business
only with people whom I like, trust, and admire. As I noted
before, this policy of itself will not ensure success: A secondclass
textile or department-store company won't prosper simply
because its managers are men that you would be pleased to see
your daughter marry. However, an owner - or investor - can
accomplish wonders if he manages to associate himself with such
people in businesses that possess decent economic
characteristics. Conversely, we do not wish to join with managers
who lack admirable qualities, no matter how attractive the
prospects of their business. We've never succeeded in making a
good deal with a bad person.
再犯下其它几个错误之后，我试着尽量只与我们所欣赏喜爱与信任的人往来，就
像是我之前曾提到的，这种原则本身不会保证你一定成功，二流的纺织工厂或是
百货公司不会只因为管理人员是那种你会想把女儿嫁给他的人就会成功的，然而
公司的老板或是投资人却可以因为与那些真正具有商业头脑的人打交道而获益
良多，相反地我们不会希望跟那些不具令人尊敬的特质为伍，不管他的公司有多
吸引人都一样，我们永远不会靠着与坏人打交道而成功。
o Some of my worst mistakes were not publicly visible. These
were stock and business purchases whose virtues I understood and
yet didn't make. It's no sin to miss a great opportunity outside
one's area of competence. But I have passed on a couple of really
big purchases that were served up to me on a platter and that I
was fully capable of understanding. For Berkshire's shareholders,
myself included, the cost of this thumb-sucking has been huge.
其实有些更严重的错误大家根本就看不到，那是一些明明我很熟悉了解的股票或
公司，但却因故没有能完成投资，错失一些能力之外的大好机会当然没有罪，但
是我却白白错过一些自动送上门，应该把握却没有好好把握的好买卖，对于
Berkshire的股东，当然包括我自己本身在内，这种损失是难以估计的。
o Our consistently-conservative financial policies may appear
to have been a mistake, but in my view were not. In retrospect,
it is clear that significantly higher, though still conventional,
leverage ratios at Berkshire would have produced considerably
better returns on equity than the 23.8% we have actually
averaged. Even in 1965, perhaps we could have judged there to be
a 99% probability that higher leverage would lead to nothing but
good. Correspondingly, we might have seen only a 1% chance that
some shock factor, external or internal, would cause a
conventional debt ratio to produce a result falling somewhere
between temporary anguish and default.
另外我们一贯保守财务政策可能也是一种错误，不过就我个人的看法却不认为如
此，回想起来，很明显的我们只要能够再多用一点财务杠杆操作(虽然较之他人
还是很保守)，就可以得到远比现在每年平均23.8%还要高的投资报酬率，即使
是在1965年我们也可以百分之九十九地确定高一点的财务杠杆绝对只有好处
没有坏处，但同时我们可能也会有百分之一的机会，不管是从内部或是外部所引
发令人异想不到的因素，使得我们负债比率提高到介于一时冲高到负债倒闭之
间。
We wouldn't have liked those 99:1 odds - and never will. A
small chance of distress or disgrace cannot, in our view, be
offset by a large chance of extra returns. If your actions are
sensible, you are certain to get good results; in most such
cases, leverage just moves things along faster. Charlie and I
have never been in a big hurry: We enjoy the process far more
than the proceeds - though we have learned to live with those
also.
我们一点都不会想要有那种99比1的可能性，以后也不会，一点挫败或是侮辱
小小的可能性永远没有办法可以用很有可能大捞一笔的大好机会来弥补，只要你
的行为合理，你就一定能够得到好的结果，在大部分的状况下，融资杠杆顶多只
会让你移动的更快，查理跟我从来都不会着急，我们享受过程更甚于结果，虽然
我们也必须学会去承担后者。
* * * * * * * * * * * *
We hope in another 25 years to report on the mistakes of the
first 50. If we are around in 2015 to do that, you can count on
this section occupying many more pages than it does here.
我们希望25年后还能向各位报告Berkshire头50年所犯的错误，我想公元
2015年的年报，大家应该可以确定这一部份将占据更多的版面。
Miscellaneous
其它事项
We hope to buy more businesses that are similar to the ones
we have, and we can use some help. If you have a business that
fits the following criteria, call me or, preferably, write.
我们希望能够买进更多像我们现在拥有一样的企业，当然我们可以透过大家的协
助，如果你拥有符合以下条件的企业，记得打电话或者是写信告诉我。
Here's what we're looking for:
(1) Large purchases (at least $10 million of after-tax
earnings),
(2) demonstrated consistent earning power (future
projections are of little interest to us, nor are
"turnaround" situations),
(3) businesses earning good returns on equity while
employing little or no debt,
(4) management in place (we can't supply it),
(5) simple businesses (if there's lots of technology, we
won't understand it),
(6) an offering price (we don't want to waste our time or
that of the seller by talking, even preliminarily,
about a transaction when price is unknown).
We will not engage in unfriendly takeovers. We can promise
complete confidentiality and a very fast answer - customarily
within five minutes - as to whether we're interested. We prefer
to buy for cash, but will consider issuing stock when we receive
as much in intrinsic business value as we give.
Our favorite form of purchase is one fitting the Blumkin-
Friedman-Heldman mold. In cases like these, the company's ownermanagers
wish to generate significant amounts of cash, sometimes
for themselves, but often for their families or inactive
shareholders. At the same time, these managers wish to remain
significant owners who continue to run their companies just as
they have in the past. We think we offer a particularly good fit
for owners with such objectives. We invite potential sellers to
check us out by contacting people with whom we have done business
in the past.
我们想要找的企业条件
(1)钜额交易(每年税后盈余至少有一千万美元)
(2)持续稳定获利(我们对有远景或具转机的公司没兴趣)
(3)高股东报酬率(并且甚少举债)
(4)具备管理阶层(我们无法提供)
(5)简单的企业(若牵涉到太多高科技，我们弄不懂)
(6)合理的价格(在价格不确定前，我们不希望浪费自己与对方太多时间)
我们不会进行敌意的购并，并承诺完全保密并尽快答复是否感兴趣(通常不超过
五分钟) ，我们倾向采现金交易，除非我们所换得的内含价值跟我们付出的一样
多，否则不考虑发行股份。
我们最喜欢的交易对象之一是像B太太- Heldman家族那样，公司经营者希望
能马上有一大笔现金，不管是给自己、家人或是其它股东，最好这些经营者如往
常一样能够继续留在公司，我想我们可以提供具有以上想法的经营者，一个满意
的方式，我们也欢迎可能的卖方与那些过去与我们合作过的对象打听。
Charlie and I frequently get approached about acquisitions
that don't come close to meeting our tests: We've found that if
you advertise an interest in buying collies, a lot of people will
call hoping to sell you their cocker spaniels. Our interest in
new ventures, turnarounds, or auction-like sales can best be
expressed by a Goldwynism: "Please include me out."
另一方面查理跟我也常常接到一些不符合我们条件的询问，包括新事业、转机
股、拍卖案以及最常见的中介案。我们发现如果你登广告要买牧羊犬，结果却有
一大堆人打电话来要卖你长耳猎犬，在此重申我们对这些交易，只有高德温的另
一句话可以形容，请把我排除在外。
Besides being interested in the purchase of businesses as
described above, we are also interested in the negotiated
purchase of large, but not controlling, blocks of stock
comparable to those we hold in Capital Cities, Salomon, Gillette,
USAir and Champion. Last year we said we had a special interest
in large purchases of convertible preferreds. We still have an
appetite of that kind, but it is limited since we now are close
to the maximum position we feel appropriate for this category of
investment.
除了以上买下整家公司的购并案外，我们也会考虑买进一大部份不具控制权的股
份，就像我们在资本城、所罗门、吉列、美国航空与冠军企业这几个Case一样
的公司，去年我曾告诉各位我们对于买进大笔金额的可转换特别股相当有兴趣，
到现在这种态度还是没改变，只不过由于目前这部份的部位已经接近我们认为适
当的水位。
* * * * * * * * * * * *
Two years ago, I told you about Harry Bottle, who in 1962
quickly cured a major business mess at the first industrial
company I controlled, Dempster Mill Manufacturing (one of my
"bargain" purchases) and who 24 years later had reappeared to
again rescue me, this time from problems at K&W Products, a small
Berkshire subsidiary that produces automotive compounds. As I
reported, in short order Harry reduced capital employed at K&W,
rationalized production, cut costs, and quadrupled profits. You
might think he would then have paused for breath. But last year
Harry, now 70, attended a bankruptcy auction and, for a pittance,
acquired a product line that is a natural for K&W. That company's
profitability may well be increased 50% by this coup. Watch this
space for future bulletins on Harry's triumphs.
两年前，我曾跟各位提到Harry Bottle这个人，他在1962年曾帮我解决我个
人所控制的第一家公司Dempster纺织制造公司(又是一个便宜货)，一个大难
题，接着在24年后又重出江湖来拯救我，那次换做K&W一家Berkshire所属
专门生产自动组件的小公司，就像我曾提到的，Harry很快地就有效地降低K&W
的资金负担、大砍成本使获利倍增，你或许认为任务完成后，他铁定要休息一下
喘口气，但是去年高龄70岁的他，又参与一家破产公司的拍卖，以极少数的资
金取得符合K&W使用的产品线，经过这次斩获，公司的获利又因此将增加50%
以上，请大家好好拭目以待，这个专门替Harry准备的专栏。
* * * * * * * * * * * *
With more than a year behind him of trading Berkshire's
stock on the New York Stock Exchange, our specialist, Jim Maguire
of Henderson Brothers, Inc. ("HBI"), continues his outstanding
performance. Before we listed, dealer spreads often were 3% or
more of market price. Jim has maintained the spread at 50 points
or less, which at current prices is well under 1%. Shareholders
who buy or sell benefit significantly from this reduction in
transaction costs.
Henderson 兄弟公司的Jim Maguire是纽约证交所专门帮我们买卖Berkshire
股票的交易员，一年下来他的表现相当称职，在Berkshire上市挂牌之前，公司
股份买卖的价差多在3%甚至以上，但Jim却能将价差维持在50点以下，这使
得股东在买卖本公司股份的交易成本降到1%以下。
Because we are delighted by our experience with Jim, HBI and
the NYSE, I said as much in ads that have been run in a series
placed by the NYSE. Normally I shun testimonials, but I was
pleased in this instance to publicly compliment the Exchange.
因为我们与Jim、NYSE与纽约证交所这次合作愉快的经验，使我尽可能在纽约
证交所安排的活动中免费帮他们打广告，通常我种场合我是能免则免，但这次我
很高兴能够公开地赞扬交易所的表现。
* * * * * * * * * * * *
Last summer we sold the corporate jet that we purchased for
$850,000 three years ago and bought another used jet for $6.7
million. Those of you who recall the mathematics of the
multiplying bacteria on page 5 will understandably panic: If our
net worth continues to increase at current rates, and the cost of
replacing planes also continues to rise at the now-established
rate of 100% compounded annually, it will not be long before
Berkshire's entire net worth is consumed by its jet.
去年夏天我们把三年前以85万美元买的公司专机给卖掉，另外又以670万美
元买了一架二手飞机，大家只要想到先前我提过的细胞复制的数字游戏就会觉得
很惊讶，如果我们公司的净值持续以相同速度增长，而更换飞机的成本同样也以
每年100%的速度上升，大家会发现，Berkshire庞大的净值很快就会被这架飞
机给吃光光。
Charlie doesn't like it when I equate the jet with bacteria;
he feels it's degrading to the bacteria. His idea of traveling in
style is an air-conditioned bus, a luxury he steps up to only
when bargain fares are in effect. My own attitude toward the jet
can be summarized by the prayer attributed, apocryphally I'm
sure, to St. Augustine as he contemplated leaving a life of
secular pleasures to become a priest. Battling the conflict
between intellect and glands, he pled: "Help me, Oh Lord, to
become chaste - but not yet."
查理对于我将飞机比喻成细菌的做法不太高兴，他认为这样岂不污辱了细菌，他
个人最理想的旅行方式是坐有空调冷气的巴士，这还是当车票有打折时才有的奢
侈做法。对于这架专机我个人一贯的态度是圣奥古斯丁当初想要脱离世俗的富裕
生活出家去到教士一样，在理智与荣耀的中间天人交战，他乞求上天，救救我吧，
让我成为一个圣洁的人，不过不是现在！
Naming the plane has not been easy. I initially suggested
"The Charles T. Munger." Charlie countered with "The Aberration."
We finally settled on "The Indefensible."
替这架飞机命名可不是一件简单的事，一开始我建议取名叫做查理孟格号，查理
反击说应该叫神经有问题号，最后双方妥协决定称它为「无可辩解号」。
* * * * * * * * * * * *
